Rescue Groups

Catholic Church
The Protestant Church
The Voluntary Ambulance Service
The Committee for the Aid of Jewish Refugees from Northern Transylvania
The Hashomer Hatzair
The He Halutz Youth (Zionist Pioneers)
Institute of Geology, Budapest
Zionist Youth
Clothes-Collecting Company (Ruhagyujto Munkasszazad), known as Section T of the International Red Cross
The International Red Cross
Good Shapard Committee
The Jewish Agency for Palestine
The Jewish Council (Zsido Tanacs) Budapest
The Refugee Aid Committee (Comisia Autonoma de Ajutorare)
Relief and Rescue Committee of Budapest (Va’adat ha-Ezra ve-ha-Hatsala be-Budapest; Va’ada)
Ujvary Group
War Refugee Board, US Department of the Treasury, 1943-45
The Working Group, Slovakia

Catholic Church

Lévai 1948 pp. 394-:

“On December 23rd Gabor Vajna, the Minister of the Interior, issued a decree ordering all Jews hiding in the town to move into the ghetto voluntarily. Some ten thousand were affected by this decree. Some of them were hiding in Catholic and Calvinist ecclesiastic institutes and others were being sheltered by Christians. The Catholic institutions particularly were foremost in offering shelter to the baptized Jews as well as to the Jews who still clung to their faith. Here are some illustrating examples:   

“The Lazarist Fathers sheltered some 30 men in their prayer house, all of whom escaped. In the house of the Sisters of Mercy 150 children and 50 adults found refuge. The children were all off-springs of deported parents and no notice was taken of their confession. The gates of the religious houses were opened only to poor and forlorn creatures; those offering money could not count on help. The Nyilas repeatedly expressed a desire to search these houses, but miraculously they were always satisfied with looking through some papers in the porter's lodge, therefore all refugees were saved. The Sophianum hid 80 women, 40 children and-later on-10 men. All refugees were saved thanks to the energetic conduct of the Mothers. The Oblatas of the Benedictines saved 10 political refugees and 82 Jews. 110 were hiding in the Sion Convent on the Svabhegy. They were discovered by the Gestapo, but the nuns succeeded in smuggling them out and offering them shelter elsewhere, so that all of them were saved. The Franciscan Missionary Sisters offered refuge to 120 children and 30 adults. Here the Nyilas carried out a raid and dragged away most of the refugees. The nuns were robbed of all their possessions. Under the pretext of illness 100 Jews were sheltered so cleverly in the hospital of the nuns of St. Elisabeth that they were not discovered in spite of the frequent searches conducted by the Nyilas. The Society of the girls of Sacre Coeur hid refugees on the premises of their bookshop. They assisted about 2,000 Jews in obtaining false papers and accomodation.’’   

“One hundred girls of Jewish origin found board and lodging in the Regnum Marianum; all of them were rescued. The College of St. Anne was hiding about 150 persecuted people, most of them provincial refugees. Benevolent policemen successfully guarded the college against the Nyilas. 30 refugees found shelter in the Collegium Theresianum. The Nyilas searched the house three times, but met with no success, as their intended victims were able to reach the neighbouring houses through a corridor hidden (395) in a bomb-damaged corner of the building. All of them survived. The "Champagnat" Institute of the Order of Mary had 100 pupils as boarders, together with 50 adults, the parents of the children. An agent provocateur, (an SS. man from Alsace), who pretended to be a French soldier in hiding, denounced the monks. As a result they suddenly found themselves, one night, surrounded by 40 members of the Gestapo, who dragged six monks, two thirds of the children and most of the adults away. The monks, after having undergone terrible tortures, were taken to the fortress and released, but the Jews were all killed. The few adults and children left in the institute were miraculously saved. In the house of the Sisters of the Divine Saviour 150 children found refuge, but the Nyilas and the Gestapo, who were accomodated in the neighbourhood, found them and dragged them away. The Nyilas took them to their headquarters in Ujpest, from where they drove 62 into the Danube at Meder Street. These were killed, the rest deported. The "English Sisters," in two of their houses, gave refuge to 100 children and 40 adults, all of whom were saved in spite of the molestations of the Nyilas. Temporary shelter for 15-20 children was available at the Central Seminary. The "Hospitalors" of Óbuda sheltered 25 adults and 15 children, but were discovered by the Nyilas; it was, however, possible to transfer them to Pest, where they were placed in protected houses. The Convent of the Good Shepherd hid 112 girls, which twice escaped the clutches of the Nyilas by hiding in neighbouring houses whilst the convent was being searched. 150 refugees were hidden in the Jesuit College. The Prior, Father Jacob Raile, was one of the chief executives of the rescue actions. His name became legendary in Budapest. All day long he used to pull strings in the town, procuring false certificates of baptism for his proteges, the number of which increased at the rate of at least one or two a day. The rescue action of the Jesuits became so far-famed that hardly a day passed on which their house was not searched by the Nyilas. Father Raile put an end to these molestations by dressing some of the 100 Christian deserters in hiding in police uniforms and making a "police station" out of the porter's lodge. From that day onwards no Nyilas man passed their threshold. Father Reisz and particularly Father Joszef Janossy took a prominent part in the rescue action. The latter was the leader of the Holy Cross Society, which had taken charge of the rescue action of the baptized Jews. The Ranolder Institute established a "faked war industry plant" employing 100 Jewish girls. The Order of Divine Love hid 110 refugees. Unfortunately they were discovered by the Nyilas, who were billeted on the other side of the road; they attacked the Convent and dragged away and killed all refugees with the exception of five who managed to escape through the roof. 25 refugees hid in the home of the Social Sisters. They were denounced by an employee, a Nyilas (396) sympathizer. Surprisingly the Nyilas recognised all documents with the exception of those of six of the refugees, who, together with Sister Sarah Schalkahazy and Vilma Berkovits, were dragged away and murdered that same day. Safe-conducts and forged legitimations were distributed on a large scale by the Institute of St. Teresa and the refugees provided with these were placed in private houses by the Sisters. 30 found refuge in the institute itself. 26 were hiding in the home of the Catholic Youth, who also issued several hundred safe-conducts and false legitimations. Although a German Motorised Division was billeted in the home, the Jews, living on a separate floor, were able to escape. In the Home of the Sisters of Mercy of Szatmar 20 Jews were hidden, and although the inhabitants of the house-the home being part of a large tenement building-knew that the Sisters were hiding Jews, all were saved. In the Convent of Sacre Coeur 200 women and children survived the siege. 11 refugees were hidden in the small premises of the Charite. One night the manager was arrested, cross-examined and threatened. Nevertheless he did not betray his proteges, who were all saved. The Josephinum (Society of the Virgin Mary) in the very neighbourhood of the Nyilas headquarters successfully hid 60 children and two adults. 20 persons found refuge in the small hospital of the Sisters of the Eucharistic Union. They were discovered and taken away by the Nyilas, who tortured the Prioress, but finally let her off with the warning that they would kill her, if they ever caught her hiding Jews again. After her escape the Prioress immediately rented a flat-Prelate Dr. Arnold Pataky placed his own flat consisting of four rooms at her disposal-and again gathered around her large numbers of persecuted Jews. The Fathers of St. Salese gave shelter to 12 adults and 40 children. Three times the house was broken into, always in the middle of the night. On the first occasion all hidden men were taken away, whose legitimations were found to be dubious. All of them were shot. The same fate awaited the five men, who were dragged away on the second occasion. On Christmas Eve, the third occasion, 13 small boys were carried away. 12 of them were shot on the shores of the Danube, the thirteenth managed to escape by jumping into the icy river and dodging the bullets sent after him. The Prior and his deputy were taken to the Nyilas headquarters and severely beaten. Only the intervention of the Nuntio saved their lives. The Nyilas looted the seat of the Order and carried off the contents of the cash box.’’

In the air-raid shelter of the Order of St. Benedict, 80 persecuted Jews survived the siege. 15 others were successfully concealed in the monastery of the Cistercian Order, whilst the Carmelite Sisters accorded hospitality to 300 children.’’

The Protestant Church

Levai 1948 p. 398:

“Special mention must be made of the rescue activities of the Scottish Mission. Following the "Anschluss" of Austria, the refugees found a helping hand here. Their ministers: George (397) Knight, Gyula Forgacs and Dr. Lajos Nagybaczoni Nagy, fearlessly branded racial ideology in their sermons and lectures as being contrary to all Christian ideals. Jewish artists and writers, who, as a result of the Jewish laws, were forbidden to appear in public, were given an opportunity to express themselves in the "cultural gatherings" arranged by the Mission.’’

“After the German forces had entered Hungary the Gestapo  carried away Miss J. [Jane] M. Raining, the heroic head of the Girl's School. She was arrested on April 25th, 1944. The Scottish lady first showed her personal documents and then produced the safe-conduct of the Swiss Legation, which the Germans brushed aside with a wave of the hand. She was not allowed to take her Bible with her, although she repeatedly asked to be permitted to do so. The Swiss Legation and the Calvinist Church did their utmost to obtain her release. Bishop Ravasz intervened with Sztojay and Horthy, but was unsuccessful, although the Hungarian Government intervened on other occasions. Then on August 22nd a Gestapo man appeared at the Scottish Mission with a bundle of papers, the legacy of Miss Raining, and reported that she had died in Auschwitz, where she had been deported to. Miss Lee, who was imprisoned together with Miss Raining, later reported that she had twice been taken to be cross-examined. She was accused of: 1) working among Jews, 2) crying on first seeing the Jewish Star on her Jewish pupils, 3) dismissing her Aryan housekeeper and engaging a Jewish one instead, 4) listening to the news broadcasts of the British Broadcasting Corporation, 5) receiving many English visitors, 6) talking politics, 7) visiting British prisoners-of-war, 8) sending them parcels.’’

“Miss Raining courageously admitted these "crimes," with the exception of No. 6. With that her fate was sealed.’’

The Scottish minister, George Knight, was called home in 1940, Gyula Forgacs died in 1942 and therefore the remaining minister, Lajos Nagybaczoni-Nagy was left in sole charge of the rescue action during the difficult times of the Szálasi Regime. The Mission inaugurated a Children's Home under the protection of the Swiss Red Cross, where 70 children, 30 mothers and 10 fathers, all of them Jews, found shelter. Zoltan Tildy with his family, Ferenc Nagy and Victor Csornoky were also hiding here. On December 12th, 1944, police came to the house in order to escort the Jews hiding there to the ghetto. Nagy succeeded in rescuing some of the persecuted, whereas the rest were taken into the ghetto. There, on behalf of the Mission, the visiting minister and his assistants provided them with food, until, with the help of faked documents, it was possible to smuggle them out of the ghetto and to bring them back to the Mission again, where for the future they remained unmolested.’’

“The rescue of the Jews in hiding was greatly facilitated by the false legitimations produced by some clever groups; in most cases they were brought into circulation unselfishly and without (398) payment being demanded for them. Two groups, who carried on this work on a large scale deserve mention. Generally these actions were started in connection with the resistance movement against the Germans, although others had already existed before the German invasion, whose aim it had been - as an anti-Fascist movement - to hide English, Dutch, French, Belgian and Polish officers and men who had escaped from German prisons and to provide them with material help and personal documents. After the German invasion, partly for political and partly for racial reasons, the rescue of the persecuted became predominant and these groups with their organisation were of the greatest help to the Jewish rescue actions. Without exception the members of these groups were Christians with Left-wing sympathies. One of these groups for instance was led by: Dr. Tibor Szalay, director of the Institute of Geology and his wife, Laszlo Csuros, Rafael Ruppert, Ferenc Korom, Karoly Dobos, a Calvinist minister, Baron Jeno Josika and others. They were greatly assisted in the production of forged documents by "underground" foreigners: Capt. Roy Natush from New Zealand, the British Lieutenant Thomas Clement, Flight-Lieutenant of the R. A. F. Reginald Barratt, Sergeant Tibor Weinstein of the Palestine Regiment, the British Privates Gordon Tasker and R. W. Jones, Gordon Park, and Heburn and the Dutch Lieutenants G. van der Waals and W. Puckel.’’

The Voluntary Ambulance Service 

Levai 1948 p. 378-379:

THE AMBULANCE SERVICE AS RESCUERS OF THE JEWS.

“By request of the Jewish Council, the Ambulance Service placed two of their largest trucks with trailers at the disposal of the ghetto Jews and from November 15th onwards answered about 70 to 80 calls per day. In faithful execution of their duty the Ambulance Service never discriminated between races and religions; on the contrary, it can be stated that cases occurred in which they gave first aid to people in the street although they wore the Star of David - this was contrary to a decree then in force - and carried them away after having bandaged them, in order to accord them further protection.  

“The Nyilas strictly forbade the Ambulance Service to attend to Jews. It was only possible to put the two abovementioned ambulances at the disposal of the Jewish Council by selling them, together with 13 other cars, to the Swedish Legation for the sum of 1 Swedish Crown on November 18th. (It is interesting to note that the Nyilas Lord-Mayor and Mayor of Budapest consented to this transaction taking place.)

“With the consent of Dr. László Bisits, Chief Medical Officer, the ambulances, accompanied by Wallenberg, went as far afield as Hegyeshalom and brought back some Swedish-protected deportees, who were in a very sorry condition indeed. Dr. Bisits went to Balf-Spa to bring back 15 Jews in possession of Portuguese passports. The ambulances - despite the orders to the contrary - were also available for taking sick Jews to hospital or for bringing them back after recovery. The Voluntary Ambulance Society of Budapest had, taking everything into consideration, no small share in the rescue actions.

“On December 3rd Nyilas men attacked the Jewish settlement of the International Red Cross in Columbus Street. At first some 5 to 600 Jewish emigrants occupied the camp consisting of an old cottage and an improvised barracks at the back of the Deaf and- Dumb Institute. Later on the number rose to 1,600 as refugees from Kolozsvar, Nagyvarad, Szeged and so on flowed in, who found it impossible to find some other shelter in Budapest. The camp was originally guarded by the Germans, but the "Sonderkommando" left at the end of August.’’

“After the events of October 15th, the number of the occupants of the camp rose enormously. 3,600 men crowded into a space sufficient for perhaps 180, sleeping practically on top of each other and in shifts. There was no question of sanitary measures and as a result epidemics raved.’’ (379)

“At 2.30 p.m. on the afore-mentioned 3rd of December the ambulance was called to Columbus Street. They were refused admittance to the camp; Acting Police Constable No. 2565, who had sent for them, reported that shots had been fired in the camp and that there were a number of fatal casualties. The door was just opening and somebody ran out, leaving a bloody trail behind him. Close on his heals were a couple of Nyilas men, who again fired at the escaping Jew. The victim collapsed just in front of the doctor accompanying the ambulance: one of the shots had proved fatal. The victim turned out to be the deaf and dumb Moses Roth, aged 16.’’

“In the ghetto the transports were being formed. In the meantime the young doctor succeeded in rescuing two young men, both profusely bleeding from shot wounds: Endre Gross, aged 21, joiner, and Mano Wertheimer, aged 17, shop-assistant. Much determination was needed to protect them, as the Nyilas men wanted to shoot them whilst they were still being bandaged. This was the 26th case in the log-book entries of the Ambulance Service for that day, and it closed with the remark: The ambulance had to leave without the accompanying doctor having been able to effect an entry into the camp. The Camp Eldest, together with his family and some other men - in all 9 persons - were assassinated by the Nyilas. Amidst bloody scenes those within the age-limit were driven into the ghetto, the others to Teleki Square and from there to Bergen-Belsen.’’

“At 2 a. m. on December 4th the was ambulance again called out. They discovered that, starting from the corner of Alfoldi and Fiumei Streets, along the whole of Nepsinhaz Street up to the corner of Jozsef Boulevard, the corpses of members of the Jewish Labour Companies had been thrown out of the back of a truck. They were beyond help, all of them had been killed by shots through the back of the neck. (Log-Book of the Ambulance Service, item 3-9.)’’ (380)

The Committee for the Aid of Jewish Refugees from Northern Transylvania

‘’The Committee for the Aid of Jewish Refugees from Northern Transylvania was created in Bucharest, Romania, under the Zionist Aliyah office.  It was headed by Ernö (Ernest) Marton, a former newspaper editor and a former member of the Romanian parliament.  This organization helped hundreds of refugees flee to safety.  Prominent members of the committee were Martin Hirsch, J. Schmetterer, Leon Goldenberg, Paul Benedek and D. Lampel.’’

The committee also worked with leaders of Romanian Jewry Abraham Zissu and Wilhelm Filderman.

[Braham, Randolph L. The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 907-909, Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry Central European Times Publishing, 1948, Vago, Bela. “Political and Diplomatic Activities for the Rescue of the Jews of Northern Transylvania.” Yad Vashem Studies, 6 (1967), pp. 155-174.]

The Hashomer Hatzair

“The Hashomer Hatzair was a prominent rescue organization that operated in Budapest after the Nazi occupation.  Like the other youth groups, members impersonated Nazi and Arrow Cross soldiers and carried Aryan papers.  Moshe Rosenberg was a prominent leader.  The Hashomer established a Haganah committee with Moshe Pil, Menachem (Meno) Klein, Leon Blatt and Dov Avramcsik.  The Hashomer Hatzair distributed protective papers and documents in Budapest.’’

[Braham, Randolph L. The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 999-1000, Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry Central European Times Publishing, 1948]

The He Halutz Youth (Zionist Pioneers)

The He Halutz Youth (Zionist Pioneers) was a militant rescue organization of young Jews in Budapest.  There were approximately 500 active members of the Halutz.  Their rescue operations in Budapest in 1944-1945 were an important part of the overall rescue of Jews in the Hungarian capital.  Before the Nazi occupation, the Halutz provided Polish, Slovakian and other refugees in Hungary with false identification papers.  They worked with both the Va’ada and the Tiyyul (Excursion) departments.  After the German occupation, they continued to distribute counterfeit identification papers.  Members of this operation included Dan Zimmerman, Saraga Weil, Sandor Groszmann and Efra Teichmann.  Many of the Halutz members operated underground, sometimes even passing themselves off as members of the SS or the Arrow Cross.  The activities of the Halutz were headquartered in the building of the Jewish Council.  Halutz members Jenö Kolb and Yehuda Weisz were also part of the Jewish Council’s Information Section.  Kolb and Weisz distributed Jewish Council certificates to a number of Jews who were smuggled to Budapest from ghettoes in the provinces.  In July 1944, the Halutz made their headquarters at the Glass House on Vadász Street.  Halutz leaders became workers at the Glass House.  In the Glass House, they continued illegal rescue programs with Tiyyul.  Halutz members distributed a number of Swiss protective papers.  After the Arrow Cross takeover, Halutz obtained guns and built fortified bunkers throughout Budapest.  Jews were hidden and housed in some of these bunkers.  In the fall of 1944, Halutz continued to mass produce counterfeit protective passes that were being issued by neutral diplomats.  Wearing the uniforms of the Arrow Cross, the SS and other military units, the Halutz rescued Jews from captivity.  They rescued their fellow Jews from yellow star houses, internment camps and the Obuda (North Buda) brickyard.  They liberated Jews from prisons and from Arrow Cross execution gangs on the Danube.  Halutzim also worked with Department A of the International Red Cross, led by Otto Komoly.  With Department A, they helped supply food to children’s homes and the protected houses.  Other prominent members of He Halutz were Zvi Goldfarb, Rafi (Friedl) Ben-Shalom, Peretz Revesz, David (Gur) Grosz, Sándor (Alexander; Ben Eretz) Groszmann, Yitzhak (Mimish) Horváth, József Mayer, Moshe (Alpan) Pil, Moshe Rosenberg and Efra (Agmon) Teichmann.

Braham 1981 pp. 1319-1332:

“The Rescue Activities of the Hehalutz Youth. In contrast to the positions taken by the Central Jewish Council (see Chapter 14) and the Vaada, the members of the young Zionist pioneers (and there were only a few hundred of them) took militant action for the rescuing of Jews. By doing so they were responsible for what were by far the brightest hours in the tragic wartime history of Hungarian Jewry. They never engaged in open combat and they failed to sabotage any of the many rail lines leading to Auschwitz (they did not have this kind of power), but their heroic rescue operations can clearly be classified as acts of resistance.’’ (1319)

“The movement was under the leadership of young Zionists belonging primarily to the Hashomer Hatzair and Dror groups. The dominant role in the movement was played by young Polish and Slovak refugees who came to Hungary in 1942-1944. Among these were Neshka and Zvi Goldfarb of Poland, and Rafi (Friedl) Ben-Shalom and Peretz Revesz of Slovakia. 247 These were soon joined by a number of equally brave young Hungarian Halutzim, who distinguished themselves during the underground struggle. Special mention must be made of the heroic activities of David (Gur) Grosz, Sandor (Alexander; Ben Eretz) Grosszmann, Yitzhak (Mimish) Horvath, Jozsef Mayer, Moshe (Alpan) Pil, Moshe Rosenberg, and Efra (Agmon) Teichmann.’’ 248

“With approximately 500 members in Budapest, the leaders of the Hehalutz concentrated their attention on rescuing individuals, mostly their comrades and Zionist sympathizers; they had become convinced that there was no hope for the Jewish masses. 249 The nature and scope of their activities varied with the changing situation. Before the occupation, the Hehalutz was primarily engaged in the rescue and "legalization" of refugees. They provided these refugees with the necessary-mostly Aryan-identification papers, and rescued a number of Jews from Polish, Slovak, and other camps. In this rescue campaign they worked closely with the Vaada, especially its Tiyul section.’’ 250

“Cooperation between the Hehalutz leaders and the Hungarian Jewish establishment and Zionist leaders was not always smooth or easy. The Slovak and Polish Hehalutz and refugee leaders were particularly scornful about the official leadership of Hungarian Jewry. Their assessment was largely shared by Gisi Fleischmann and other leaders of the Bratislava Vaada. Ben-Shalom identified Hungarian Jewry "as a particularly ugly lot" that did not want to know anything about events in the neighboring countries, although he and his fellow refugees were doing everything possible to enlighten them.’’ 251

“The Hehalutz youth as a whole did not get along with the Hungarian Zionist establishment either. Ideological differences were compounded by generational conflicts. The older, traditional leaders of the weak Hungarian Zionist movement (the so-called Vatikim) resented what they perceived as the intrusion, impatience, and militancy of the younger pioneers. The latter, in turn, became increasingly and ever more vocally scornful of the establishment leaders’ complacency and (1320) bureaucratic tendencies. While they questioned some aspects of the Vaada leadership, their ire was directed especially against Krausz, the Mizrachi leader, for his allegedly improper and incompetent administration of the Palestine Office. 252 The dispute erupted into open conflict during the Nyilas era (see below).’’

“Just before the occupation, the Hashomer Hatzair group decided to have all its members " aryanized" in order to assure their freedom of movement. While extremely risky, this enabled them to carry out their rescue operations more effectively. Under the leadership of Moshe Rosenberg they also established a Hagana Committee (composed of Pil, Menachem (Meno) Klein, Leon Blatt, and Dov Avramcsik) which, however, was short-lived.’’

“The German occupation of Hungary caught most of the Halutzim off guard. Their immediate concern was to assure, first and foremost, their own and their families’ safety. Because of the speed with which the anti-Jewish measures had been enacted in the countryside and the weaknesses of the Zionist movement there, the young Halutzim decided to focus on their rescue activities in Budapest. During the first phase of the occupation, the Hehalutz concentrated its attention on the production and distribution of forged Aryan identification papers-including even Gestapo, SS, and Nyilas membership cards. 253 For reasons of security, the leaders in charge of this aspect of the underground operations, including Dan Zimmermann, Sraga Weil, Grosz, and Teichmann, had to shift their headquarters at great risk to themselves. They naturally never wore the Yellow Star badge, which to their great consternation caused some establishment Jewish leaders to accuse them of trying to extricate themselves from the common lot. Presumably unaware of the ominous implications of the badge, some among the latter were in fact urging their fellow Jews to wear the Yellow Star in proud defiance.’’ 254

“Another important aspect of the Hehalutz work during this period was the organization of small groups of young men and women, mostly followers of one or another Zionist organization, for the smuggling of Jews into Romania and Slovakia, where the anti-Jewish drive at the time was at a standstill. Among those most active in the smuggling of Jews into Romania were As her Aranyi and Hannah Ganz (Grunfeld), members of Dror-Habonim movement. According to their postwar accounts, they were unable to persuade the establishment leaders of the Jewish (1321) communities they bad contacted in Northern Transylvania about the seriousness of the situation. Nevertheless, they managed to distribute a number of forged documents and smuggle a number of Jews across the Romanian border, including Rabbi Mozes Weinberger, the Chief Rabbi of the small Neolog community of Kolozsvar. 255 A few groups of Jews were also smuggled into Tito's Yugoslavia. After the capture of one of their comrades (Avri Lisszauer), this route was de-emphasized, especially since the Vaada leaders had protested that its use was a threat to their negotiations with the Germans.’’ 256

“Interestingly, while the Hehalutz leaders questioned some of the activities of the Vaada, they too failed to engage in the large-scale distribution of the Auschwitz Reports, which might have had a greater impact on the provincial Jewish leaders and masses than the warnings by the young Zionist emissaries. 257 Moreover, in spite of their conflicts with the Vaada, the Hehalutz leaders tried to make sure that as many of their own followers as possible were included in the Kasztner group. And in fact on the night of June 30, when the transport left Budapest, a large number of the Halutzim managed to "illegally" climb onto the train.’’

“Much of the illegal work of the Hehalutz was directed from the headquarters of the Central Jewish Council, where the masses of people seeking help or inclusion in the Kasztner group gave them cover and allowed them to operate unobtrusively. Some of their comrades, including Jeno Kolb and Yehuda Weisz, who were associated with the Council's Information Section, had given them forged Council certificates through which a number of Jews were brought to Budapest from the provincial ghettos. Also active toward this end was the so-called Provincial Department (Videki Osztaly) of the Council, which was headed by senior Zionists, including Lajos Gottesman of the Betar and Moshe Rosenberg of the Hashomer Hatzair movements. In the relative calm that returned to Council headquarters following the departure of the Kasztner group and the subsequent halting of the deportations, a conflict erupted between the official leaders and the Hehalutz. The latter's operations had become more and more conspicuous, causing considerable consternation among the establishment leaders. Particularly vitriolic was the reaction of the leaders of the Jewish Combatants' League (Zsido Frontharcos Szovetseg), many of whose members had enjoyed exemption from the anti-Jewish laws. The Hehalutz leaders, following (1322) a heated altercation that even led to violence, moved out of the Council headquarters and continued to conduct their affairs from various public parks.’’ 258

“After the Swiss-sponsored Glass House was established late in July, the Hehalutz gradually shifted their headquarters there. The Hehalutz leaders became staff members of the Glass House with considerable privileges, including virtual immunity. They exploited this haven to continue their " illegal" rescue operations-the organization of Tiyul groups as well as the production of forged documents, especially Swiss protective passes. This led to a conflict with the official Zionist leaders of the Glass House, above all Krausz and Arthur Weisz, the owner and chief administrator of the building. 259 The latter were eager not only to safeguard the emigration scheme for which the Glass House operation was launched in the first place, but also to scrupulously uphold all the conditions under which the Swiss bad agreed to cooperate. They were also concerned about their own welfare after Magyar Szo (Hungarian Word) published an expose on the Glass House. The dispute became so intense that on September 5, Krausz and Weisz allegedly threatened to call the police to forcibly evict Pil and Teichmann. A similar incident involved Rafi Ben-Shalom on October 15.’’ 260

“Although the relationship between Krausz and the Hehalutz leaders remained tense, the latter continued to use the Glass House as the center of their operations. The relationship worsened after the Nyilas coup, when the Glass House became the refuge of close to 2,000 Jews. 261 To some extent, this was because the crowds that milled around daily included informers and occasionally even detectives, whose activities contributed to the misunderstanding and tension between the Jewish groups.’’

“During the Nyilas era, the Hehalutz stepped up their daring efforts. Some of the young pioneers managed to acquire guns by taking advantage of the chaotic conditions on the day of the coup. Others, especially those associated with the Dror, led by Goldfarb and other Polish refugees, 262 built bunkers in various parts of the capital. Seven or eight bunkers were built; there is no information as to the number of Jews who were actually saved in them. The one built on Hungaria Boulevard was discovered by the Nyilas and in an exchange of fire there were casualties on both sides.’’ (1323)

“The production and distribution of forged papers took on a new dimension. In addition to continuing the forging of Aryan papers, the Hehalutz intensified the mass production of protective passes (Vedolevelek; Schutzpässe) and related documents that were issued by the representatives of the Vatican and the neutral states; especially valuable were copies of papers issued by the Swiss and Swedish authorities (Figures 29.4-29.11). They also reproduced all the stamps and seals used by these authorities as well as those used by the Hungarians and the Germans. (One of the stamps inadvertently led to the arrest of a number of people because it misspelled the word " Suisse" as " Susse.")’’

“Perhaps the most heroic actions undertaken by the Hehalutz involved the rescue of Jews from the hands of the Nyilas. Dressed in the uniforms of the Nyilas, Honved, Levente, KISKA (Kisegito Katonai Alakulat; Auxiliary Military Unit), and even of the SS, and in possession of guns and automatic weapons as well as all the appropriate orders and documents, they rescued Jews from the locked Yellow-Star houses, internment camps, and the Óbuda brickyard. They also snatched condemned Jews from prisons and even from columns being driven by the Nyilas gangs for execution along the banks of the Danube. It was in this manner that Goldfarb and Grosz were themselves rescued after their capture in December.’’

“In cooperation with the International Red Cross (especially Komoly's Department A, with which some of the members were directly associated), the Halutzim also undertook to help supply food to the many children' s homes, to the so-called "protected houses," and to the ghetto, and to protect the warehouses with food stockpiles. One of the largest of these warehouses was in the Swiss building at 17 Wekerle Sandor Street, which was under the command of Sandor Groszman. 263 The Halutzim had used the buildings assigned to Department A as additional centers of operation. Many of their activities were helped by the mutually rewarding contacts they bad established with several Hungarian officials eager to acquire alibis just before the end of the war. Among these were Andras Szentandrassy, the commander of the camp at the Óbuda brickyard, and Captain Laszlo (Leo) Lulay, Ferenczy's deputy. Contact with the latter was occasionally maintained through Vera Gorog, the daughter of Frigyes Gorog, who was then associated with the International Red Cross.’’ 264 (1332)

“During the Soviet siege of the capital, Nyilas gangs tried a number of times to invade the Glass House in search of food and in pursuit of their murderous aims. Sometimes they were talked into leaving peacefully; at other times, however, they shot into the crowds within the courtyard. In one of these forays they killed four Jews, including the mother of Sandor Scheiber, the postwar head of the National Rabbinical Institute. Among the Vadasz Street victims were also Arthur Weisz, who was taken away through a ruse by First Lieutenant Pal Fabry and never returned, and Simcha Hunwald (alias Janos Klihne) who was shot on January 6, 1945.265 In pursuit of their objectives, the Hehalutz members also maintained contact with the small and loosely organized non-Jewish resistance organizations. The Hehalutz provided these organizations with whatever identification papers they requested; they in tum provided the Hehalutz members with arms and occasional shelter. Among the units with which the Hehalutz cooperated was a POW group headed by a Dutch officer named Van der Walles (or Van-der-Vas) which consisted primarily of Dutch and British officers who bad escaped from German camps. (It was through this group that the Hehalutz rescued Joel Nussbecher.) It also maintained contact with a communist underground group headed by Pal Demeny, and with some anti-German military and bourgeois groups represented by First Lieutenant Ivan Kadar and an officer named Fabry, respectively. 266 Unfortunately the non-Jewish resistance organizations were not very effective; this was a major factor that limited the scope and character of the Hehalutz operations as well. Another negative factor was the passivity of the general population, which in tum was largely influenced by the attitude of the Christian churches.’’ 267

“The Swiss Legation in Budapest under consul, Carl Lutz, pioneered the innovative use of creating protective letters for Hungarian Jews and other refugees in Budapest.  These protective papers guaranteed that the bearer of the pass was under the protection of the Swiss government.  Lutz employed more than 400 Jewish volunteers as part of a network of distribution.  Many of these volunteers were prominent Jews, including Arthur Weisz, who was the owner of the famous Glass House on Vadasz Street. Other Jewish Halutz volunteers who worked with the Carl Lutz were Arthur Weisz, Mihály Salomon, Alexander (Sanyi) Grossman, Eliyahu Gellert (Gal-Or), Dr. Alexander (Sándor) Nathan and Simcha Hunwald.’’

Notes

248. Vago, " The British Government and the Fate of Hungarian Jewry," p. 217.

249. For a view of the photograph, see Th e New York Tim es, February 24, 1979.

250. One of the Jewish leaders (Leon A. Kubowitzki) had opposed the bombing of Auschwitz, fearing that the first victims would be the Jewish inmates. He suggested instead that "the Soviet government be approached with the request that it should dispatch groups of paratroopers to seize the buildings, to annihilate the squads of murderers, and to free the unfortunate inmates." See his letter addressed to Pehle on July 1, 1944, and Yad Vashem Archives M-2/H-I 8. See also Dina Porat, The Blue and the Yellow Stars of David. The Zionist leadership in Pales tine and the Holocaust, 1939- 1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 212-220. There is no evidence that either the Hungarians or the Germans ever went along with Krausz's interpretation that the 7,000 certificates-were for entire families.

252. Both letters can be found in the Pazner files in the archives of Yad Vashem.

253. Summary Report of the Activities of the War Refugee Board, p. 17.

254. Alfred E. Zollinger, the IRC representative in Washington, transmitted the offer on July 25. For text of the IRC note and of the U.S. reply of August 11, see ibid., pp. 20-22. See also Conway, " Between Apprehension and Indifference," p. 44.

255. PRO, Fo. 371 /42810, pp. 174-175. Linton also had a discussion with Henderson on this issue on August I. Weizmann approached Eden on September 6. For the minutes of the Linton-Henderson meeting and for a copy of Weizmann’s letter, see Weizmann Archives.

256. PRO, Fo. 371 /42810, pp. 200-202. A copy of the minutes of the meeting with the JGC leaders was sent to Washington on July 24. See telegram no. 17024 from John W. Allison of the American Embassy in London to the State Department.

257. Ibid., Fo. 371 /42812, p. 34.

258. Ibid., 371 /42810, p. 57.

259. Ibid., 371 /42 814, pp. 27-28. See also the minutes of the August 4 meeting of the War Cabinet Committee on the Reception and Accommodation of Refugees, ibid., CAB.95 / 15.

260. Ibid., 371 /42814, pp. 69-70.

261. Ibid., pp. 29-30. For a summary of the British position on the Horthy offer, prepared on August 8 for the War Cabinet, see ibid., pp. 74-76.

Questions relating to the Horthy offer were raised a number of times in the House of Commons. On August I, Edmund Harvey and others questioned Dingle Foot, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare; on August 2, Hewlett questioned Eden; and on November 8, Hammersley and Sir T. Moore questioned Eden. Great Britain. House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates (Han sard), 1944: 402, August I, 1944: 1140-41; August 2, 1944: 1410; 404, November 8, 1944: 1380.

262. PRO, Fo. 371 / 42814, p. 31. For a summary of the American position, see Winant’ s August 15, I 944, note and memorandum addressed to Eden. Ibid., 371 /428 I 5, pp. 55-58. See also Summary Report of the Activities of the War Refugee Board, pp. 17-22.

263. Summary Report of the Activities of the War Refugee Board, p. 19.

264. For some details, see Conway, "Between Apprehension and Indifference," pp. 44-46, and Vago, " The British Government a nd the Fate of Hungarian Jewry," pp. 219-222.

265. The Department of State Bulletin, 11 (August 20, 1944)269: 175. For further details on the so-called "Horthy offer," see Bela Vago, "The Horthy Offer. A Missed Opportunity for Rescuing Jews in 1944." In: Contemporary Views of the Holocaust, Randolph L. Braham, ed. (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1983), pp. 23-45. 266. PRO, Fo. 371 / 42815, pp. 78-79.

267. Ibid., pp. 167-168, and Fo.371 /42816, pp. 148-150.

[Braham, Randolph L. The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 998-1002.  Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry. (Central European Times Publishing, 1948).]

Institute of Geology, Budapest

Levai 1948 p. 398:

“The rescue of the Jews in hiding was greatly facilitated by the false legitimations produced by some clever groups; in most cases they were brought into circulation unselfishly and without (398) payment being demanded for them. Two groups, who carried on this work on a large scale deserve mention. Generally these actions were started in connection with the resistance movement against the Germans, although others had already existed before the German invasion, whose aim it had been - as an anti-Fascist movement - to hide English, Dutch, French, Belgian and Polish officers and men who had escaped from German prisons and to provide them with material help and personal documents. After the German invasion, partly for political and partly for racial reasons, the rescue of the persecuted became predominant and these groups with their organisation were of the greatest help to the Jewish rescue actions. Without exception the members of these groups were Christians with Left-wing sympathies. One of these groups for instance was led by: Dr. Tibor Szalay, director of the Institute of Geology and his wife, Laszlo Csuros, Rafael Ruppert, Ferenc Korom, Karoly Dobos, a Calvinist minister, Baron Jeno Josika and others. They were greatly assisted in the production of forged documents by "underground" foreigners: Capt. Roy Natush from New Zealand, the British Lieutenant Thomas Clement, Flight-Lieutenant of the R. A. F. Reginald Barratt, Sergeant Tibor Weinstein of the Palestine Regiment, the British Privates Gordon Tasker and R. W. Jones, Gordon Park, and Heburn and the Dutch Lieutenants G. van der Waals and W. Puckel.’’

“A printing shop was organised, where they could print blank registry extracts, passes for factories, exemption certificates etc. etc. The necessary stamps were made by Lieutenants van der Waals and W. Puckel, who literally became masters of their art. They even succeeded in producing such perfect German passes, that persons speaking neither German nor Hungarian got by everywhere without the slightest trouble.’’

So great was the activity of that group, - and so successful - that the British Military Mission in Budapest - after a thorough examination of the facts -, submitted the names of the leaders of the group to His Brittanic Majesty together with a proposal of distinction. Until the promised decorations could arrive, Field marshal Viscount Alexander saw to it that they were issued with following document:

"This certificate is awarded to . . . . , Budapest, as a token of gratitude and appreciation for the help given to the Sailors, Soldiers and Airmen of the British Commonwealth of Nations, which enabled them to escape from, or evade capture by the enemy.

                                                             H. R. Alexander.
                                                     Field marshal. 1939-1945.
                                                    Supreme Allied Commander
                                                       Mediterranean Theatre"

Many other secret printing offices and societies were engaged in similar work and quite a large number of Christians handed their own personal documents and those of their families over to Jews in order to effect their escape.’’ (399)

Dr. Tibor Szalay, director of the Institute of Geology and his wife,

Laszlo Csuros

Rafael Ruppert

Ferenc Korom

Karoly Dobos, a Calvinist minister

Baron Jeno Josika

Capt. Roy Natush from New Zealand

British Lieutenant Thomas Clement

Flight-Lieutenant of the R. A. F. Reginald Barratt

Sergeant Tibor Weinstein of the Palestine Regiment

British Privates Gordon Tasker

R. W. Jone

Gordon Park

Heburn

Dutch Lieutenant G. van der Waals

Dutch Lieutenant W. Puckel

[Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry. (Central European Times Publishing, 1948 p. 398).]

Zionist Youth

Braham, 1981, pp. 1319-1320:

“The Rescue Activities of the Hehalutz Youth. In contrast to the positions taken by the Central Jewish Council (see Chapter 14) and the Vaada, the members of the young Zionist pioneers (and there were only a few hundred of them) took militant action for the rescuing of Jews. By doing so they were responsible for what were by far the brightest hours in the tragic wartime history of Hungarian Jewry. They never engaged in open combat and they failed to sabotage any of the many rail lines leading to Auschwitz (they did not have this kind of power), but their heroic rescue operations can clearly be classified as acts of resistance.’’ (1319)

“The movement was under the leadership of young Zionists belonging primarily to the Hashomer Hatzair and Dror groups. The dominant role in the movement was played by young Polish and Slovak refugees who came to Hungary in 1942-1944. Among these were Neshka and Zvi Goldfarb of Poland, and Rafi (Friedl) Ben-Shalom and Peretz Revesz of Slovakia. 247 These were soon joined by a number of equally brave young Dr. Gyorgy Wilhelm who distinguished themselves during the underground struggle. Special mention must be made of the heroic activities of David (Gur) Grosz, Sandor (Alexander; Ben Eretz) Grosszmann, Yitzhak (Mimish) Horvath, Jozsef Mayer, Moshe (Alpan) Pil, Moshe Rosenberg, and Efra (Agmon) Teichmann.’’ 248  

“With approximately 500 members in Budapest, the leaders of the Hehalutz concentrated their attention on rescuing individuals, mostly their comrades and Zionist sympathizers; they had become convinced that there was no hope for the Jewish masses. 249 The nature and scope of their activities varied with the changing situation. Before the occupation, the Hehalutz was primarily engaged in the rescue and "legalization" of refugees. They provided these refugees with the necessary-mostly Aryan-identification papers, and rescued a number of Jews from Polish, Slovak, and other camps. In this rescue campaign they worked closely with the Vaada, especially its Tiyul section.’’ 250

“The German occupation of Hungary caught most of the Halutzim off guard. Their immediate concern was to assure, first and foremost, their own and their families’ safety. Because of the speed with which the anti-Jewish measures had been enacted in the countryside and the weaknesses of the Zionist movement there, the young Halutzim decided to focus on their rescue activities in Budapest. During the first phase of the occupation, the Dr. Gyorgy Wilhelm concentrated its attention on the production and distribution of forged Aryan identification papers-including even Gestapo, SS, and Nyilas membership cards. 253 For reasons of security, the leaders in charge of this aspect of the underground operations, including Dan Zimmermann, Sraga Weil, Grosz, and Teichmann, had to shift their headquarters at great risk to themselves. They naturally never wore the Yellow Star badge, which to their great consternation caused some establishment Jewish leaders to accuse them of trying to extricate themselves from the common lot. Presumably unaware of the ominous implications of the badge, some among the latter were in fact urging their fellow Jews to wear the Yellow Star in proud defiance.’’ 254

“Another important aspect of the Hehalutz work during this period was the organization of small groups of young men and women, mostly followers of one or another Zionist organization, for the smuggling of Jews into Romania and Slovakia, where the anti-Jewish drive at the time was at a standstill. Among those most active in the smuggling of Jews into Romania were As her Aranyi and Hannah Ganz (Grtinfeld), members of Dror-Habonim movement. According to their postwar accounts, they were unable to persuade the establishment leaders of the Jewish (1321) communities they bad contacted in Northern Transylvania about the seriousness of the situation. Nevertheless, they managed to distribute a number of forged documents and smuggle a number of Jews across the Romanian border, including Rabbi Mozes Weinberger, the Chief Rabbi of the small Neolog community of Kolozsvar. 255 A few groups of Jews were also smuggled into Tito's Yugoslavia. After the capture of one of their comrades (Avri Lisszauer), this route was de-emphasized, especially since the Vaada leaders had protested that its use was a threat to their negotiations with the Germans.’’ 256

Notes

247. Zvi Goldfarb, "On ' Hehalutz' Resistance in Hungary." In: Extermination and Resistance (Israel: Kibbutz Lohamei Hagetaot, 1958), I: 162-173. See also his statement of April 1, 1962, in Moreshet, Archives File A. 94. Goldfarb was a leader of the Dror movement. One of his closest associates in the movement was his wife, Neshka, a woman from Munkacs. He died in Kibbutz Parod in January 1978. Ben Shalom, Weil wir Leben wollten (Because We Wanted to Live), 152 pp. Moreshet, Archives File D.2.88. Hebrew edition: Neevaknu le'maan. he'haim (We Struggled for Our Lives) (Givet Haviva: Moreshet, 1977), 223 pp. A leader of the Hehalutz, Ben Shalom came to Budapest in January 1944. A representative of the Hashomer Hatzair movement, he went to Israel in 1947. He later served as Israel’s Ambassador in Mali, Cambodia, and Romania. Revesz, Hashoa be'Hungaria (The Holocaust in Hungary), statement available at the Center for Historical Studies at the University of Haifa, 14 pp.

248. An 18-year-old in 1944, Grosz was particularly active in the printing, storing, and distribution of false papers; he often went about disguised as a Nyilas, in uniform and armed. His account is reproduced in Ben-Shalom’ s Neevaknu le'maan he'haim, pp. 176-205. Mayer, whose underground name was Joska Megyeri, also dressed in Nyilas uniform; he maintained close contact with several non-Jewish resistance groups. For his account see ibid., pp. 149-160. For Pil’s account see YIVO, Archives file 187/3619; for Teichmann's account see Ben-Shalom, Nee vaknu le'maan he'haim, pp. 161-175. See also David Gur, Brothers for Resistance and Rescue. The Underground Zionist Youth Movement in Hungary during World War II. (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House, 2007), 270 pp.

249. Ben-Shalom, Weil wir leben wollen, pp. 32 and 46.

250. For details on the activities of the Halutz youth in 1942 and 1943, see Asher Cohen, The Halutz Resistance in Hungary, op. cit., pp. 16-52, and A halal arnyekaban. A nagy megprobaltatasok kora (In the Shadow of Death. The Age of Great Challenges). Hava Eichler and Yehuda Talmi, eds. (Tel Aviv: A Hanoar Hacioni Vilagmozgalom kozpontja, 1991), 66 pp., and Haim Genizi and Naomi Blank, "The Rescue Efforts of Bnei Akiva in Hungary During the Holocaust." In: YVS, 23 ( 1993): 73-212.

251. See his Weil wir Leben wollten, pp. 6 and 8. See also Chapter 23. 2

52. Ibid., pp. 24-28.

 253. The originals of these documents were usually purchased from Polish refugees who had access to Hungarian officials.

254. According to Ben-Shalom this was also the reaction of some Zionists, including Zvi Szilagyi of the Vaada. See his Weil wir Leben wollten, p. 35.

255. Asher Cohen, The Halutz Resistance in Hungary, op. cit., pp. 76 and 91-93. Ganz’s closest collaborator in Kolozsvar was Yehuda (Pici) Levi. Ganz was apprehended in Kolozsvar and deported to Auschwitz, but survived to tell her tale. For further details on the Romanian rescue operations of the Halutz youth, see the testimonies of Hannah Ganz, Eszter Goro-Frankel, Asher Aranyi, and Arieh Hirsch (Eldar) at the Center for Historical Documentation at Haifa University.

256. Ben-Shalom, Weil wir leben wollten, p. 45.

Levai, 1948 p. 388-391

“Here it must be mentioned how the Zionist Youth Movement  played a most active part in the rescue actions. Clad in various illegally worn uniforms and equipped with false legitimations, groups of young Zionists nightly patrolled the streets, wearing Nyilas armlets or disguised as members of the National Guard. Often enough they accosted real Nyilas members, asked to see their documents and declared. them to be false, whereupon they confiscated them. These authentic passes and legitimations they then used for further rescue actions’’.

“Another group of youths, consisting of both Zionists and non-Zionists, settled down in the rescue department of the International Red Cross and tried-by legal and mostly by illegal means-to rescue as many people as possible from the brick-works. This group even succeeded in establishing contact with Laszlo Ferenczy, whom they induced to grant favours by making Red Cross parcels available to him. With the authorisation of the Rescue Department of the International Red Cross, Mrs. Breuer and Vera Gorog put in a daily telephone call to Capt. Lulay, Ferenczy's deputy. In order to avoid attracting attention the code-word "Cousin Veronica called her Uncle Laci" was agreed upon, and most valuable information together with the documents required for the rescue work were obtained.’’

“Wearing an armlet describing him as "Delegate of the International Red Cross" Dr. Pal Szappanos, accompanied by Dr. Laszlo Benedek in the guise of a "Christian doctor," took turns with various other Jewish doctors (Dr. Laszlo Tauber, Dr. Glancz, Dr. Nemet and others) in paying daily calls to Teleki Square in order to liberate Jews from deportation under the pretext of "illness."

“The inventiveness of the Jewish Youth was inexhaustible and many Jews owe their lives to that animated body of men.’’

“At this time atrocities were again occurring and Locsey issued new blue legitimations; from that time on all Christians entering the ghetto had to be in possession of these blue legitimations. At the same time-on instructions of Solymossy-he gave orders to form mixed guards (police and Nyilas) in and around the ghetto. This led to a reduction in the number of atrocities committed, although looting under the pretext of "looking for arms" took place at 10, Rumbach Sebestyen Street, 5, Klauzal Square, 30, Klauzal Square etc.’’ (390)

“The Jews were provided with green legitimations, which enabled them to leave the ghetto. In case an operation proved to be urgently necessary, they could go to the hospital in 44, Wesselenyi Street by producing a white legitimation provided by the Council; on the other hand groups could go to the hospital escorted by police.’’

Mrs. Breuer, Rescue Department of the International Red Cross

Neshka Goldfarb, Poland

Zvi Goldfarb, Poland

Vera Gorog, Rescue Department of the International Red Cross

Sandor (Alexander; Ben Eretz) Grosszmann, Swiss building at 17 Wekerle Sandor Street

David (Gur) Grosz

Lajos Gottesman, Betar, Provincial Department (Videki Osztaly) of Jewish the Council

Yitzhak (Mimish) Horvath

Jeno Kolb, Jewish Council's Information Section

Jozsef Mayer

Moshe (Alpan) Pil

Peretz Revesz, Slovakia

Moshe Rosenberg, Hashomer Hatzair

Rafi (Friedl) Ben-Shalom, Slovakia

Efra (Agmon) Teichmann.

Sraga Weil

Dr. Pal Szappanos, Rescue Department of the International Red Cross

Yehuda Weisz, Jewish Council's Information Section

Dr. Gyorgy Wilhelm

Dan Zimmermann

[Braham, 1981 pp. 1319-1320; Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry Central European Times Publishing, 1948, pp. 388-391]

Clothes-Collecting Company (Ruhagyujto Munkasszazad), known as Section T of the International Red Cross

Braham 1981:

“Labor servicemen were involved in other forms of resistance as well. A unit of 25 men from Company No. 101/359, the so-called Clothes-Collecting Company (Ruhagyujto Munkasszazad), for example, provided special services to the persecuted Jews. Known as Section T of the International Red Cross, this unit, led by Dr. Gyorgy Wilhelm, the son of Karoly Wilhelm, engaged in many heroic rescue operations. The men of this unit, including Istvan Bekeffi, Istvan Komlos, Istvan Radi, and Adorjan Stella, rescued Jews from the death marches to Hegyeshalom and supplied the food made available by the International Red Cross to the children’ s homes and the ghetto. Ironically, they too had to be rescued on November 29, when they were scheduled for entrainment and deportation. This was achieved through the efforts of a rescue group headed by Sandor Gyorgy Ujvary, a journalist of Jewish background, who was associated with the International Red Cross and the Papal Nuncio. 246 The rescue activities of Section T, like those of the Ujvary group, paralleled those undertaken by the Halutzim.

Notes

246. Levai, Szurke konyv, pp. 200, 203-206. For further details on Section T, see Chapters 10 and 31; on Ujvary's activities, see section "The Vatican and the Budapest Nunciature " in Chapter 31.

Dr Gyorgy Wilhelm, Head

Istvan Bekeffi

Istvan Komlos

Istvan Radi

Adorjan Stella

[Braham 1981; Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry Central European Times Publishing, 1948.]

The International Red Cross

Braham, 1981, pp. 1401-1409:

“Until the middle of July 1944 the International Red Cross (IRC) 1 was not directly involved in the protection of the rights and interests of Jews per se. In Hungary, as elsewhere, the IRC scrupulously adhered to the letter and spirit of the 1929 Geneva Convention, which restricted its activities primarily to matters relating to prisoners of war. It preferred not to get involved with matters involving civil populations at large-the primary concern of the national Red Cross organizations-let alone with the defense and protection of minority groups against abuses by their own governments.’’

“The IRC was not inclined to accept the suggestion of Jewish organizations, spearheaded by the World Jewish Congress, that it confer upon the Jews held in the ghettos and the labor and concentration camps the status of civilian interne es-a procedure that would have enabled the IRC to carry out local inspection visits, send food parcels, provide medical care, and in the process perhaps save hundreds of thousands of lives. Aryeh Tartakower and Aryeh L. Kubowitzki (later Kubovy) of the World Jewish Congress suggested this to Dr. Mark Peter, the IRC's representative in the United States, in a sharply worded letter of December 10, 1943. This was followed by a personal discussion on January 5, 1944. Unfortunately, the IRC failed to approach the German Foreign Office with the demand that it confer the status of civilian POWs on all foreigners detained in Germany and the occupied countries until October 2, 1944, when the collapse of the Third Reich was already evident to almost everybody.’’ 2

“There were several reasons for the IRC’s reluctance to get involved in the rescue of Jews. For one thing, the Germans had declared that the Jews were not internees but detainees-a penal rather than a civil category. Consequently the supervision the IRC was empowered to exercise over the treatment of prisoners and internees did not apply to them. The IRC also claimed that continued protests in support of the Jews would be resented by the authorities and prove detrimental to the Jews as well as to other fields of IRC activities. 3 The IRC summarized its position as follows:

‘If help for the Jews had been the only cause which the international Committee was called upon to serve during the war, such a course, (1403) which could have put honor before the saving of life, might have been contemplated. But such was not the case. Relief for Jews, like relief for deportees, rested on no juridical basis. No convention provided for it, nor gave the International Committee even the shadow of a pretext for intervention. On the contrary, conditions were all against such an undertaking. Chances of success depended entirely on the consent of the Powers concerned. And there were all the other tasks, which the Conventions or time-honored tradition permitted the International Committee to undertake, or which, with so great difficulty, it had succeeded in adding thereto. To engage in controversy about the Jewish question would have imperiled all this work, without saving a single Jew.’’ 4

“Following this line of reasoning, the attitude of the IRC delegation in Hungary was at first identical with that manifested elsewhere in the world. The delegation restricted its activities to its traditional functions: responding to inquiries by foreigners and monitoring the treatment of prisoners of war, to whom it also forwarded parcels. These included thousands of Polish and Yugoslav prisoners and a smaller number of other Allied prisoners of war.’’ 5

“The IRC had been aware of the mass expulsion and subsequent massacre of the "alien" Jews of Hungary in the summer of 1941, and even discussed the " incident" in December without taking any action. By the summer of 1942, it had fully known that the Nazis were systematically massacring the Jews of Europe. Nevertheless, it continued to remain silent for fear of confronting the Germans. 6 Until October 1943, it even refused to send a delegate to Hungary despite repeated requests by the international Jewish organizations. The many reports and suggestions of Jean de Bavier, IRC’s first delegate in Hungary, calling for the alleviation of the plight of the suffering Jews and for the forestalling of a looming greater disaster, were not given any serious consideration at headquarters.’’

“On February 18, 1944, de Bavier, seeing the portents of the German occupation of Hungary, asked Geneva for instructions on how to save Hungarian Jewry from the fate that bad befallen the Jews of Poland and other Nazi-occupied countries. On March 27, i.e., a few days after the occupation, de Bavier suggested that Max Huber, the president of the IRC, go and see Hitler with a view to improving the (1404) plight of the Jews of Hungary. 7 The failure of the IRC to follow up on de Bavier' s suggestion was characterized by Aryeh Ben-Tov, an authority on the activities of the IRC during the Second World War, as one of its greatest failures.’’ He concluded:

‘Since the institution did not act in Hungary during the crucial months of the deportations and did not make the facts known either to enough interested organizations or to a sufficiently wide audience in general, the SS and the Hungarian Fascists were able to go much further than would otherwise have been possible in their attempts to implement the Final Solution.’ 8

“De Bavier was recalled to Geneva, reportedly because he did not speak German, and replaced by Friedrich (Fritz) Born, the director of the Swiss-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce of Budapest (A Budapesti Svaj ci-Magyar Keres kedelmi Kamara).9 Although Born assumed his duties on May 10, after the ghettoization in the provinces was coming to an end, the IRC continued to maintain the same posture of neutrality that had characterized its earlier position. A change in its attitude came about only after the Swiss press published some gruesome accounts on the Final Solution in Hungary based on materials forwarded to Switzerland on June 19 by Miklos (Moshe) Krausz, the bead of the Budapest Palestine Office (Chapter 23). About two weeks after the late June interventions by President Roosevelt, the King of Sweden, and the Pope, the IRC also decided to play a more active role in Hungary. The organization’s visibility became higher in both Budapest and Geneva. Born began a more active campaign, visiting the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies on behalf of the deportees. He also contacted Theodor Horst Grell, the specialist in Jewish affairs in the German legation, who had assured him that the Hungarian Jews were being taken to Germany only to work and that since the Germans needed able-bodied and healthy Jews they, the Germans, bad themselves berated the Hungarians for occasional mistreatments. Moreover, Grell had also assured Born that once the Jews arrived in Germany they were well taken care of and physically strengthened before assignment for labor. He rejected the suggestion that the IRC visit some of the camps. These camps, he argued, were spread throughout Germany and Poland (1405) and since the Jews were engaged in the production of war materiel, their location had to be kept secret.’’ 10

“On July 7, the day after Horthy had halted the deportations, Max Huber approached the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He wanted all available information that would ease the worldwide restlessness over the alleged events in Hungary, as well as permission for an IRC delegate to visit some of the ghettos and entrainment centers in which Jews were interned and distribute food and clothing. 11 A more specific request was submitted by Imre Tahy, the Hungarian charge d’affaires in Bern, on July 19. Reporting on a meeting he bad a day earlier with Carl J. Burckhardt of the IRC, Tahy urged that Hungary request the Germans to allow Dr. Robert Schirmer, the IRC delegate in Berlin, to visit Budapest. He emphasized that Schirmer bad been asked to deliver a message to Horthy in connection with the Jewish question.’’ 12

“Schirmer arrived in Budapest shortly thereafter, and on July 21 be met with Sztojay. Schirmer repeated the request that was earlier submitted by Huber. He suggested that he be allowed to visit some Yellow-Star houses; that the "shipment of Jews for labor abroad" cease and Jews be concentrated instead in ghettos similar to the one that was established in Theresienstadt, which an IRC delegation had visited and approved of on July 23; 13 and that the IRC be given an opportunity to investigate the fate of the British and American pilots who were shot down over Hungary.’’ 14

“The response of Sztojay and Andor Jaross was transmitted to Schirmer on July 23 by Denes Csopey, the head of the Political Department of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The two leaders concurred with Schirmer's requests and suggested that the IRC delegation visit the Kistarcsa and Sarvar internment camps, which also contained non-Jewish political prisoners, and that the planned visits to Yellow-Star houses were to be undertaken in consultation with Jozsef Szentrniklossy, the bead of the social-political division in the mayor’s office. 15 On July 27 and 28, a Schirmer-led IRC delegation visited the Kistarcsa and Sarvar camps, which were under the respective command of two decent men, Istvan Vasdenyei and Gyorgy Gribowszki. The situation in the camps was found to be quite acceptable. It is safe to assume that by then the delegates had been aware that the Germans bad managed to deport approximately 1,300 Jews from Kistarcsa and (1406) around 1,500 Jews from Sarvar a short while before the visit in spite of Horthy's halting of the deportations and the assurances given to the IRC. 16 The delegation also visited a few carefully selected Yellow-Star houses and Jewish institutions, finding the conditions generally satisfactory, although overcrowded. 17 The visits, presumably, gave a false picture of the dire situation Hungarian Jewry had lived under. Just as the IRC’s visit to Theresienstadt on June 23 had not revealed the realities of Auschwitz and Treblinka, the visit to the Kistarcsa and the Sarvar internment camps could, clearly, not disclose the horrible conditions that prevailed in the many brickyards and entrainment centers, let alone in the ultimate destination following their deportation.’’

“While in Budapest, Schirmer also approached Edmund Veesenmayer, the Reich’ s Plenipotentiary in Hungary, requesting permission to send packages to the deportees, to visit the camps, and to accompany the inmates on a deportation train to Kassa. Veesenmayer, after consulting with Eichmann, sent a telegram to the German Foreign Office (August 2), in which he said be would be ready to approve the first two requests " if adequate preparations were made." However, be urged that the last one be rejected, asserting that "this would violate the secrecy related to the travel route and destination." Adolf Hezinger, the Foreign Office’s expert on the treatment of Jews of foreign citizenship, was given responsibility for the reply. In a note to Horst Wagner, the head of Inland 11, he suggested the same answer that Hitler had given on July 10 to the Hungarians in connection with their earlier request to permit the emigration of some Jews. (This was in response to the appeals of Sweden, Switzerland, and the American War Refugee Board-see Chapter 25.) Hezinger suggested that the distribution of packages was to be allowed " only after the resumption of the transfer of Jews into the Reich. " He rejected the idea of anyone accompanying a deportation train, but hedged on the possibility of a camp visit "after thorough preparatory work in cooperation with Eichmann." 18

“The IRC confidentially informed the local and international Jewish organizations in Switzerland about its activities. On July 21, Burckhardt met with the leaders of a few Swiss Jewish organizations; this was followed by a larger meeting on August 10 that was attended by Huber and representatives of the 17 largest domestic and international organizations and agencies in Switzerland, including the World Jewish (1407) Congress, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the Palestine Office, and the AJDC. Burckhardt reviewed the situation of the Jews in Hungary, emphasizing the activities the IRC had undertaken on their behalf. One of the objectives of the meeting was to impress upon the leaders of the local and international Jewish organizations the need to coordinate their activities. 19 Although the conferences, like the notes and memoranda handed to Jewish organizations, were identified as confidential, the Germans became privy to their contents. (The Germans frequently intercepted the mail and the memoranda that the Jewish leaders in Switzerland forwarded to their counterparts in Istanbul or Palestine. 20)’’

“While the IRC never achieved the goals it had outlined for Veesenmayer in July, in August it did become more involved in two plans of great interest to the Jewish community: support of the Spanish, Swiss, and Swedish-initiated emigration schemes and the protection of children. On July 12, the Central Jewish Council had been informed that Spain was ready to accept 500 children. On the advice of Angel Sanz-Briz, the Spanish charge d'affaires in Budapest, the Council persuaded the IRC to take the foreign-protected children under its aegis. The IRC, which consented to the suggestion early in August, thus acquired a legal framework by which to expand its activities to include the protection of "foreign "civilians.’’

“The Spanish offer induced Burckhardt on August 9 to approach Baron Karoly Bothmer, the bead of the Hungarian Legation in Bern. He suggested that Hans Bachmann, the IRC secretary-general, meet Tahy, who had earlier assured the IRC that Hungarian Jews holding Palestine immigration certificates or visas from neutral states would have the right to leave the country. The Hungarian response, formulated by Csopey on August 26, asserted that the Hungarian government would recognize the competence of the IRC in all aid and immigration matters which it represented or initiated with the Hungarian government. The IRC took full advantage of this position statement and intervened a number of times, urging the Hungarian government to speed up the emigration of 2,000 Jews, which was being processed by the Swiss Legation in Budapest. 21 It also transmitted the notes of the Allied governments to the same effect. On August 16, for example, the British and American governments informed the Hungarians that they had accepted Hungary’s earlier offer (see Chapter 25) and would " make arrangements for the care of such (1408) Jews leaving Hungary who reach neutral or United Nations territory. " 22 Though such efforts continued until the Soviet forces liberated Budapest, no groups were ever permitted to leave Hungary as a consequence.’’

“By far the most important contributions of the IRC to the Jewish community in Budapest were the sheltering of children and the safeguarding and supplying of Jewish institutions, including the ghetto, during the Nyilas era. Plans for the protection of children were laid in August in light of the lingering threat of deportation, the continual dwindling of communal supplies, and the dangers associated with the rapidly approaching front.’’ 23

“Under Born's leadership two sections dealing with children were established within the framework of the IRC: Section A, which was placed under the leadership of Otto Komoly, the Zionist leader, 24 and Section B, which was entrusted to Reverend Gabor Sztehlo of the Good Shepherd Committee. 25 In addition, Born had been responsible for the establishment of Section T (Transportgruppe; Transportation Unit), which was composed of 25 to 35 recruits of Labor Service Company No. 101/359, the so-called Clothes-Collecting Labor Company (Ruhagyujto Munkasszazad), which was under the command of Captain Laszlo Ocskay. Section T, which was headed by. Dr. Gyorgy Wilhelm, the son of Karoly Wilhelm of the Central Jewish Council, and Istvan Komlos, was engaged in relief, rescue, and resistance operations. It was particularly active in the rescuing thousands of Jews from the death-marches to Hegyeshalom and in supplying the children’ s homes and the ghetto with food and fuel.’’ 26

“During the Nyilas era, the IRC took under its protection a large number of Jewish and non-Jewish institutions-hospitals, public kitchens, homes for the handicapped and the aged, research and scientific institutes, and various shops. 27 Each of these institutions was identified by a plate posted at the main entrance that read: "Under the Protection of the International Committee of the Red Cross" in Hungarian, German, French, and Russian. Born and his associates kept track of the anti-Jewish measures of the Nyilas, including those officially initiated by the government and those that were illegally perpetrated, and appeared frequently before the leaders, especially Baron Gabor Kemeny, the Foreign Minister, to help alleviate the plight of the Jews. It was thanks to these interventions that on October 30 the government (1409) announced the recognition of the protective passes issued by the Vatican and the foreign legations as well as the granting of ex territorial status to all institutions and buildings protected by the IRC.’’ 28

“Shortly after the Budapest ghetto was established, Hans Weyermann arrived from Geneva to assist Born. Though the relationship between the two IRC representatives was not the most harmonious one, they managed to divide their responsibilities during the critical weeks before the capital's liberation. Before the Soviet siege of Budapest began on Christmas Day, 1944. Born withdrew to his home in Buda from where he directed the activities of the IRC in that part of the capital. Weyermann’ s responsibilities were concentrated in the Pest part, where the ghetto was located. The effectiveness of the IRC during this time was greatly enhanced by its cooperation with the Papal Nuncio and of the representatives of the neutral states. In fact, some of the measures that were adopted in support of the beleaguered Jewish community, including the protection of the children's homes and the rescuing of Jews from the death marches, were conceived and carried out jointly (see below).’’ 29

Notes

1. The International Red Cross is frequently referred to as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 

2. Aryeh L. Kubovy, "The Silence of Pope Pius XII and the Beginnings of the ' Jewish Document '." In: YVS, 6: 7-11. See also Unity in Dispersion (New York: World Jewish Congress, 1948), pp. 167-169. 

3. Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on Its Activities during the Second World War (Geneva, 1948), I: 641. For a well-documented account of the efforts of Gerhart M. Riegner and other leaders of the World Jewish Congress, often acting in cooperation with Jaromir Kopecky, the delegate of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in Switzerland, to induce the IRC to act on behalf of the oppressed Jews, see Monty Noam Penkower, The World Jewish Congress Confronts the international Red Cross during the Holocaust. Jewish Social Studies, New York, 41 (Summer-Fall 1979)3-4: 229-256.  4. Inter Arma Caritas (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 194 7), p. 76. 

5. Since the outbreak of World War 11, Hungary had interned approximately 3,000 Polish military prisoners and 5,000 Polish civilians. Among these were a number of Polish Jewish officers and soldiers who were interned separately in Vamosmikolaina camp commanded by First Lieutenant Bela Turcsanyi. They were treated quite well until November 19, 1944, when they were ordered to march toward the Austrian border along the Komarom-Hegyeshalom route. Questions relating to the treatment of Polish internees were handled by Section P of the IRC. For further details, see Chapter 3. See also Friedrich Born, Bericht an die Internationale Komitee vom Roten Kreuz in Gen/(Report to the International Committee of The Red Cross in Geneva) (Geneva, June 1945), pp. 2 and 39-41. The number of Yugoslav internees and prisoners of war ranged from 6,000 to 8,000. These were handled by Section Y of the IRC. There were also a relatively few British, Dutch, Belgian, French, and American officers and soldiers who had either escaped from German POW camps or been shot down (or were caught after parachuting) in Hungary. While Soviet POWs were normally handed over to the Germans, there was a camp in Veszkeny with eight officers and 246 soldiers. There were also 109 pro-Badoglio Italian prisoners who were interned shortly after the German-occupation. Ibid., pp. 3-4 and 41-45. 

6. This conclusion was reached by Jean-Claude Favez, the former Dean of the Faculty of Letters and Rector of the University of Geneva, after a six-year review of some 350,000 Red Cross archival documents. See his Mission Impossible? le CIRC et Les camps de con centration Na z is (Lausanne: Payot, 1988). See also his Das Internationale Rote Kreuz und das Dritte Reich (Munich: C. Bettelsmann, 1988), 592 pp., and Aryeh Ben-Tov, Facing the Holocaust in Budapest. The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Jews in Hungary, 1933-45 (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 492 pp. 

7. Ben-Tov, op. cit., p. 112.  8. Ibid., p. 387. ln an article published in I 988, Jacques Moreillon, the Director General of the IRC, admitted that the IRC " could probably have saved more Jewish people than it did... " and that had it "given greater encouragement to its delegates in the field, it might well have been more effective. This is true in particular for Romania and Hungary... " See his The Red Cross Reassesses Its War Record. Jerusalem Post, August 31, 1988. See also Werner Rings, Advokaten des Feindes (Advocates of the Enemy) (Vienna: Econ Verlag, 1966), 207 pp.

 9. Born's closest associates in the Budapest office included Col Wehner, Arthur Karasz, Edit Tolgyessy, Daisy Daranyi, Elek and Klara Mathe, and Aliz Herceg. The IRC's economic bureau was headed by Jozsef Gal, the hospital bureau by Emo Teleki, and the doctors’ commission by Dr. Boldizsar Horvath. For details on the IRC structure, see Friedrich Born, op. cit., pp. 54-55. 

10. Ibid., pp. 25-26. 

11. Vadirat, 3: 100-102.

12. Ibid., pp. 226-227. 

13. Prior to the Theresienstadt visit, the German authorities engaged in a nine-month beautification of the camp. For details on this deceitful project and on the composition and findings of the IRC delegation, see Meir Dworzecki, "The international Red Cross and its Policy vis-a-vis the Jews in Ghettos and Concentration Camps in Nazi-Occupied Europe." In: RAH, pp. 96-99. 

14. Vadirat, 3: 246-247. 

15. Ibid., pp. 249-250. 

16. The leaders of the IRC complained about these deportations, arguing that they were a violation of Horthy's pledge. Baron Karoly Bothmer, the Hungarian Minister in Bern, relayed the protest to Budapest, only to be assured by Lajos Remenyi Schneller, the then Acting Prime Minister, that the deportations were being carried out without the knowledge or consent of the Hungarian government. Jeno Levai, Szurke konyv magyar zsidok megmenteseriJL (Gray Book on the Rescuing of Hungarian Jews) (Budapest: Officina, n.d.), pp. 187-190. See also Vadirat, 3: 422-423. 

17. Born, Bericht, pp. 27-28. See also No tiz uber die Situation d er Juden in Ungarn (Note on the Situation of the Jews in Hungary), November 14, 1944, Yad Vashem, Archives M-20/47. 

18. RLB, Docs. 336-338. 

19. The IRC was obviously aware of the often-conflicting operations and clearly discernible rivalries among some of the major Jewish organizations in Switzerland. For further details on the subject, see the last section in this chapter. For the minutes of the IRC conferences, see Yad Vashem, Archives M-20 /47. 

20. For example, the Foreign Correspondent Censorship Office in Vienna (Aus landsbriefprufs telle Wien) intercepted an August 6 letter by Chaim Pozner addressed to S. Mandelblatt in Istanbul, which included copies of the reports by Born and Schirmer as well as details about the plans for the possible emigration of 7,8 00 families from Hungary. Copies of the intercepted materials were sent to the main censorship office in Berlin as well as to the Wehrmacht headquarters. RLB, Doc. 339. 

21. These were the first of the 7,800 Jews whose emigration to Palestine the Swiss supported. The 2,000 Jews were provided with a collective passport through the efforts of the Palestine Office. For further details see the section on Switzerland below. 

22. Vadirat, 3: 362-366, 467-472 and 481. This proposal was also supported by Alfred Zollinger, the IRC’s representative in Washington. See also Meir Dworzecki, op. cit., pp. 102-104. 

23. According to one account, a plan for the protection of children was submitted to Born by Krausz shortly after his arrival in Budapest, but was not acted upon for a long time. Krausz reportedly complained about Born’ s alleged incompetence to Schirmer. For details on this and other accusations directed against Born, see Jeno Levai, Feher konyv. Kulfoldi akciok zsidok m egme ntesere (White Book. Foreign Activities for the Rescuing of Jews) (Budapest: Officina, n.d.), pp. 148-149, 15 2, and 155-157.

24. Born, Bericht, pp. 27 and 34-36. For details see "The Rescue Activities of Otto Komoly" in Chapter 29. 

25. Born, Bericht, pp. 37-39. For details see "The Good Shepherd Committee" in Chapter 30. 

26. Born, Bericht, pp. 33 and 36-37. See also Levai, Sziirke kony v, pp. 203-206, and the sections on the Nyilas era and Jewish resistance in Chapters 10 and 29, respectively.

27. For a list of the institutions that enjoyed the protection of the IRC, see Born, Bericht, pp. 54-68. One of the institutions that were taken under the protection of the IRC was the Columbus Street Camp, which had previously housed the Jews in the so called Kasztner group.

28. In recognition of his services on behalf of Hungarian Jewry, Friedrich Born was honored as a Righteous Among the Nations by Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, on June 5, 1987. 

29. For further details on the activities of the IRC, consult David P. Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, I 977), 298 pp. and Aryeh Ben-Tov, op. cit. See also the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 517-520. 

[Born, Bericht;  Braham, 1981 pp. 927, 1143, 1180, 1182, 1202, 1302, 1350, 1355, 1400, 1404, 1408, 1409, 1422, 1444, 1445, 1482, 1483, 1484, 1491; Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry Central European Times Publishing, 1948.]

Jean de Bavier, IRC’s first delegate in Hungary

“The IRC had been aware of the mass expulsion and subsequent massacre of the "alien" Jews of Hungary in the summer of 1941, and even discussed the " incident" in December without taking any action. By the summer of 1942, it had fully known that the Nazis were systematically massacring the Jews of Europe. Nevertheless, it continued to remain silent for fear of confronting the Germans. 6 Until October 1943, it even refused to send a delegate to “Hungary despite repeated requests by the international Jewish organizations. The many reports and suggestions of Jean de Bavier, IRC’s first delegate in Hungary, calling for the alleviation of the plight of the suffering Jews and for the forestalling of a looming greater disaster, were not given any serious consideration at headquarters.’’

“On February 18, 1944, de Bavier, seeing the portents of the German occupation of Hungary, asked Geneva for instructions on how to save Hungarian Jewry from the fate that bad befallen the Jews of Poland and other Nazi-occupied countries. On March 27, i.e., a few days after the occupation, de Bavier suggested that Max Huber, the president of the IRC, go and see Hitler with a view to improving the (1404) plight of the Jews of Hungary. 7 The failure of the IRC to follow up on de Bavier' s suggestion was characterized by Aryeh Ben-Tov, an authority on the activities of the IRC during the Second World War, as one of its greatest failures. He concluded:

‘Since the institution did not act in Hungary during the crucial months of the deportations and did not make the facts known either to enough interested organizations or to a sufficiently wide audience in general, the SS and the Hungarian Fascists were able to go much further than would otherwise have been possible in their attempts to implement the Final Solution.’ 8

Notes

“De Bavier was recalled to Geneva, reportedly because he did not speak German, and replaced by Friedrich (Fritz) Born, the director of the Swiss-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce of Budapest (A Budapesti Svaj ci-Magyar Keres kedelmi Kamara).9

3. Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on Its Activities during the Second World War (Geneva, 1948), I: 641. For a well-documented account of the efforts of Gerhart M. Riegner and other leaders of the World Jewish Congress, often acting in cooperation with Jaromir Kopecky, the delegate of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in Switzerland, to induce the IRC to act on behalf of the oppressed Jews, see Monty Noam Penkower, The World Jewish Congress Confronts the international Red Cross during the Holocaust. Jewish Social Studies, New York, 41 (Summer-Fall 1979)3-4: 229-256.  4. Inter Arma Caritas (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 194 7), p. 76. 

5. Since the outbreak of World War 11, Hungary had interned approximately 3,000 Polish military prisoners and 5,000 Polish civilians. Among these were a number of Polish Jewish officers and soldiers who were interned separately in Vamosmikolaina camp commanded by First Lieutenant Bela Turcsanyi. They were treated quite well until November 19, 1944, when they were ordered to march toward the Austrian border along the Komarom-Hegyeshalom route. Questions relating to the treatment of Polish internees were handled by Section P of the IRC. For further details, see Chapter 3. See also Friedrich Born, Bericht an die Internationale Komitee vom Roten Kreuz in Gen/(Report to the International Committee of The Red Cross in Geneva) (Geneva, June 1945), pp. 2 and 39-41. The number of Yugoslav internees and prisoners of war ranged from 6,000 to 8,000. These were handled by Section Y of the IRC. There were also a relatively few British, Dutch, Belgian, French, and American officers and soldiers who had either escaped from German POW camps or been shot down (or were caught after parachuting) in Hungary. While Soviet POWs were normally handed over to the Germans, there was a camp in Veszkeny with eight officers and 246 soldiers. There were also 109 pro-Badoglio Italian prisoners who were interned shortly after the German-occupation. Ibid., pp. 3-4 and 41-45. 

6. This conclusion was reached by Jean-Claude Favez, the former Dean of the Faculty of Letters and Rector of the University of Geneva, after a six-year review of some 350,000 Red Cross archival documents. See his Mission Impossible? le CIRC et Les camps de con centration Na z is (Lausanne: Payot, 1988). See also his Da s Internationale Rote Kreuz und das Dritte Reich (Munich: C. Bettelsmann, 1988), 592 pp., and Aryeh Ben-Tov, Facing the Holocaust in Budapest. The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Jews in Hungary, 1933-45 (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 492 pp. 

7. Ben-Tov, op. cit., p. 112.  8. Ibid., p. 387. ln an article published in I 988, Jacques Moreillon, the Director General of the IRC, admitted that the IRC " could probably have saved more Jewish people than it did... " and that had it "given greater encouragement to its delegates in the field, it might well have been more effective. This is true in particular for Romania and Hungary... " See his The Red Cross Reassesses Its War Record. Jerusalem Post, August 31, 1988. See also Werner Rings, Advokaten des Feindes (Advocates of the Enemy) (Vienna: Econ Verlag, 1966), 207 pp.

 9. Born's closest associates in the Budapest office included Col Wehner, Arthur Karasz, Edit Tolgyessy, Daisy Daranyi, Elek and Klara Mathe, and Aliz Herceg. The IRC's economic bureau was headed by Jozsef Gal, the hospital bureau by Emo Teleki, and the doctors’ commission by Dr. Boldizsar Horvath. For details on the IRC structure, see Friedrich Born, op. cit., pp. 54-55. 

Friedrich Born Chief Delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Budapest, Hungary

Friedrich Born a Swiss Citizen was the Chief Delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of Switzerland in Budapest, Hungary.  He was sent to Budapest in May 1944.  During the period from May 1944 to January 1945, Born issued thousands of Red Cross letters of protection to Jews of Budapest.  He and his staff, along with numerous Jewish volunteers, are credited with retrieving thousands of Jews from deportation camps and death marches in and around Budapest.  Born provided an additional 4,000 Jews with employment papers, preventing their deportation.  He put over 60 Jewish institutions under Red Cross protection and housed over 7,000 Jewish children and orphans. Hospitals, public kitchens, homes for the aged and handicapped, as well as many other public institutions were identified by big signs on which was written: “under the protection of the International Committee of the Red Cross.” Under Born’s leadership, two sections dealing with children were established: Section A, placed under the leadership of the Zionist leader, Otto Komoly; Section B, under Reverend Gabor Sztehlo of the Good Shepherd Committee. Born also established Section T – Transportation unit, engaged in relief, rescue and resistance operations.  He worked closely with the other neutral diplomatic legations, and set up dozens of Red Cross protected houses.  Born’s Red Cross operation is credited with rescuing between 11,000 and 15,000 Jews in Budapest.  After the war, he was criticized for overstepping his authority in his rescue activities.  A postwar report completely vindicated Born’s actions and forced the Red Cross to reassess its wartime policies.  Born died in Switzerland in 1963.  Friedrich Born worked closely with Hans Weyermann.  Friedrich Born was declared Righteous Among the Nations by Israel in January 1987.

Braham 1981 p. 1404:

“[Jean] De Bavier was recalled to Geneva, reportedly because he did not speak German, and replaced by Friedrich (Fritz) Born, the director of the Swiss-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce of Budapest (A Budapesti Svaj ci-Magyar Keres kedelmi Kamara).9 Although Born assumed his duties on May 10, after the ghettoization in the provinces was coming to an end, the IRC continued to maintain the same posture of neutrality that had characterized its earlier position. A change in its attitude came about only after the Swiss press published some gruesome accounts on the Final Solution in Hungary based on materials forwarded to Switzerland on June 19 by Miklos (Moshe) Krausz, the head of the Budapest Palestine Office (Chapter 23). About two weeks after the late June interventions by President Roosevelt, the King of Sweden, and the Pope, the IRC also decided to play a more active role in Hungary. The organization’s visibility became higher in both Budapest and Geneva. Born began a more active campaign, visiting the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies on behalf of the deportees. He also contacted Theodor Horst Grell, the specialist in Jewish affairs in the German legation, who had assured him that the Hungarian Jews were being taken to Germany only to work and that since the Germans needed able-bodied and healthy Jews they, the Germans, bad themselves berated the Hungarians for occasional mistreatments. Moreover, Grell had also assured Born that once the Jews arrived in Germany they were well taken care of and physically strengthened before assignment for labor. He rejected the suggestion that the IRC visit some of the camps. These camps, he argued, were spread throughout Germany and Poland (1405) and since the Jews were engaged in the production of war materiel, their location had to be kept secret.’’ 10

Notes

9. Born's closest associates in the Budapest office included Col Wehner, Arthur Karasz, Edit Tolgyessy, Daisy Daranyi, Elek and Klara Mathe, and Aliz Herceg. The IRC's economic bureau was headed by Jozsef Gal, the hospital bureau by Emo Teleki, and the doctors’ commission by Dr. Boldizsar Horvath. For details on the IRC structure, see Friedrich Born, op. cit., pp. 54-55. 

10. Ibid., pp. 25-26.

Braham 1981 p. 1408-1409:

“By far the most important contributions of the IRC to the Jewish community in Budapest were the sheltering of children and the safeguarding and supplying of Jewish institutions, including the ghetto, during the Nyilas era. Plans for the protection of children were laid in August in light of the lingering threat of deportation, the continual dwindling of communal supplies, and the dangers associated with the rapidly approaching front.’’ 23

“Under Born's leadership two sections dealing with children were established within the framework of the IRC: Section A, which was placed under the leadership of Otto Komoly, the Zionist leader, 24 and Section B, which was entrusted to Reverend Gabor Sztehlo of the Good Shepherd Committee. 25 In addition, Born had been responsible for the establishment of Section T (Transportgruppe; Transportation Unit), which was composed of 25 to 35 recruits of Labor Service Company No. 101/359, the so-called Clothes-Collecting Labor Company (Ruhagyujto Munkasszazad), which was under the command of Captain Laszlo Ocskay. Section T, which was headed by. Dr. Gyorgy Wilhelm, the son of Karoly Wilhelm of the Central Jewish Council, and Istvan Komlos, was engaged in relief, rescue, and resistance operations. It was particularly active in the rescuing thousands of Jews from the death-marches to Hegyeshalom and in supplying the children’ s homes and the ghetto with food and fuel.’’ 26

“During the Nyilas era, the IRC took under its protection a large number of Jewish and non-Jewish institutions-hospitals, public kitchens, homes for the handicapped and the aged, research and scientific institutes, and various shops. 27 Each of these institutions was identified by a plate posted at the main entrance that read: "Under the Protection of the International Committee of the Red Cross" in Hungarian, German, French, and Russian. Born and his associates kept track of the anti-Jewish measures of the Nyilas, including those officially initiated by the government and those that were illegally perpetrated, and appeared frequently before the leaders, especially Baron Gabor Kemeny, the Foreign Minister, to help alleviate the plight of the Jews. It was thanks to these interventions that on October 30 the government (1409) announced the recognition of the protective passes issued by the Vatican and the foreign legations as well as the granting of ex territorial status to all institutions and buildings protected by the IRC.’’ 28

“Shortly after the Budapest ghetto was established, Hans Weyermann arrived from Geneva to assist Born. Though the relationship between the two IRC representatives was not the most harmonious one, they managed to divide their responsibilities during the critical weeks before the capital's liberation. Before the Soviet siege of Budapest began on Christmas Day, 1944. Born withdrew to his home in Buda from where he directed the activities of the IRC in that part of the capital. Weyermann’ s responsibilities were concentrated in the Pest part, where the ghetto was located. The effectiveness of the IRC during this time was greatly enhanced by its cooperation with the Papal Nuncio and of the representatives of the neutral states. In fact, some of the measures that were adopted in support of the beleaguered Jewish community, including the protection of the children's homes and the rescuing of Jews from the death marches, were conceived and carried out jointly (see below).’’ 29

Notes

23. According to one account, a plan for the protection of children was submitted to Born by Krausz shortly after his arrival in Budapest, but was not acted upon for a long time. Krausz reportedly complained about Born’ s alleged incompetence to Schirmer. For details on this and other accusations directed against Born, see Jeno Levai, Feher konyv. Kulfoldi akciok zsidok m egme ntesere (White Book. Foreign Activities for the Rescuing of Jews) (Budapest: Officina, n.d.), pp. 148-149, 152, and 155-157.

24. Born, Bericht, pp. 27 and 34-36. For details see "The Rescue Activities of Otto Komoly" in Chapter 29. 

25. Born, Bericht, pp. 37-39. For details see "The Good Shepherd Committee" in Chapter 30. 

26. Born, Bericht, pp. 33 and 36-37. See also Levai, Sziirke kony v, pp. 203-206, and the sections on the Nyilas era and Jewish resistance in Chapters 10 and 29, respectively.

27. For a list of the institutions that enjoyed the protection of the IRC, see Born, Bericht, pp. 54-68. One of the institutions that were taken under the protection of the IRC was the Columbus Street Camp, which had previously housed the Jews in the so called Kasztner group.

28. In recognition of his services on behalf of Hungarian Jewry, Friedrich Born was honored as a Righteous Among the Nations by Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, on June 5, 1987. 

29. For further details on the activities of the IRC, consult David P. Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, I 977), 298 pp. and Aryeh Ben-Tov, op. cit. See also the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 517-520. 

Dr. Robert Schirmer, the IRC delegate Berlin

Braham 1981 pp. 1405-1407:

“On July 7, the day after Horthy had halted the deportations, Max Huber approached the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He wanted all available information that would ease the worldwide restlessness over the alleged events in Hungary, as well as permission for an IRC delegate to visit some of the ghettos and entrainment centers in which Jews were interned and distribute food and clothing. 11 A more specific request was submitted by Imre Tahy, the Hungarian charge d’affaires in Bern, on July 19. Reporting on a meeting he bad a day earlier with Carl J. Burckhardt of the IRC, Tahy urged that Hungary request the Germans to allow Dr. Robert Schirmer, the IRC delegate in Berlin, to visit Budapest. He emphasized that Schirmer bad been asked to deliver a message to Horthy in connection with the Jewish question.’’ 12

“Schirmer arrived in Budapest shortly thereafter, and on July 21 he met with Sztojay. Schirmer repeated the request that was earlier submitted by Huber. “He suggested that he be allowed to visit some Yellow-Star houses; that the "shipment of Jews for labor abroad" cease and Jews be concentrated instead in ghettos similar to the one that was established in Theresienstadt, which an IRC delegation had visited and approved of on July 23; 13 and that the IRC be given an opportunity to investigate the fate of the British and American pilots who were shot down over Hungary.’’ 14

“The response of Sztojay and Andor Jaross was transmitted to Schirmer on July 23 by Denes Csopey, the head of the Political Department of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The two leaders concurred with Schirmer's requests and suggested that the IRC delegation visit the Kistarcsa and Sarvar internment camps, which also contained non-Jewish political prisoners, and that the planned visits to Yellow-Star houses were to be undertaken in consultation with Jozsef Szentrniklossy, the head of the social-political division in the mayor’s office. 15 On July 27 and 28, a Schirmer-led IRC delegation visited the Kistarcsa and Sarvar camps, which were under the respective command of two decent men, Istvan Vasdenyei and Gyorgy Gribowszki. The situation in the camps was found to be quite acceptable. It is safe to assume that by then the delegates had been aware that the Germans bad managed to deport approximately 1,300 Jews from Kistarcsa and (1406) around 1,500 Jews from Sarvar a short while before the visit in spite of Horthy's halting of the deportations and the assurances given to the IRC. 16 The delegation also visited a few carefully selected Yellow-Star houses and Jewish institutions, finding the conditions generally satisfactory, although overcrowded. 17 The visits, presumably, gave a false picture of the dire situation Hungarian Jewry had lived under. Just as the IRC’ s visit to Theresienstadt on June 23 had not revealed the realities of Auschwitz and Treblinka, the visit to the Kistarcsa and the Sarvar internment camps could, clearly, not disclose the horrible conditions that prevailed in the many brickyards and entrainment centers, let alone in the ultimate destination following their deportation.’’

“While in Budapest, Schirmer also approached Edmund Veesenmayer, the Reich’ s Plenipotentiary in Hungary, requesting permission to send packages to the deportees, to visit the camps, and to accompany the inmates on a deportation train to Kassa. Veesenmayer, after consulting with Eichmann, sent a telegram to the German Foreign Office (August 2), in which he said he would be ready to approve the first two requests " if adequate preparations were made." However, be urged that the last one be rejected, asserting that "this would violate the secrecy related to the travel route and destination." Adolf Hezinger, the Foreign Office’s expert on the treatment of Jews of foreign citizenship, was given responsibility for the reply. In a note to Horst Wagner, the head of Inland 11, he suggested the same answer that Hitler had given on July 10 to the Hungarians in connection with their earlier request to permit the emigration of some Jews. (This was in response to the appeals of Sweden, Switzerland, and the American War Refugee Board-see Chapter 25.) Hezinger suggested that the distribution of packages was to be allowed " only after the resumption of the transfer of Jews into the Reich. " He rejected the idea of anyone accompanying a deportation train, but hedged on the possibility of a camp visit "after thorough preparatory work in cooperation with Eichmann." 18

Notes

9. Born's closest associates in the Budapest office included Col Wehner, Arthur Karasz, Edit Tolgyessy, Daisy Daranyi, Elek and Klara Mathe, and Aliz Herceg. The IRC's economic bureau was headed by Jozsef Gal, the hospital bureau by Emo Teleki, and the doctors’ commission by Dr. Boldizsar Horvath. For details on the IRC structure, see Friedrich Born, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

10. Ibid., pp. 25-26. 

11. Vadirat, 3: 100-102.

12. Ibid., pp. 226-227. 

13. Prior to the Theresienstadt visit, the German authorities engaged in a nine-month beautification of the camp. For details on this deceitful project and on the composition and findings of the IRC delegation, see Meir Dworzecki, "The international Red Cross and its Policy vis-a-vis the Jews in Ghettos and Concentration Camps in Nazi-Occupied Europe." In: RAH, pp. 96-99. 

14. Vadirat, 3: 246-247. 

15. Ibid., pp. 249-250. 

16. The leaders of the IRC complained about these deportations, arguing that they were a violation of Horthy's pledge. Baron Karoly Bothmer, the Hungarian Minister in Bern, relayed the protest to Budapest, only to be assured by Lajos Remenyi Schneller, the then Acting Prime Minister, that the deportations were being carried out without the knowledge or consent of the Hungarian government. Jeno Levai, Szurke konyv magyar zsidok megmenteseriJL (Gray Book on the Rescuing of Hungarian Jews) (Budapest: Officina, n.d.), pp. 187-190. See also Vadirat, 3: 422-423. 

17. Born, Bericht, pp. 27-28. See also No tiz uber die Situation d er Juden in Ungarn (Note on the Situation of the Jews in Hungary), November 14, 1944, Yad Vashem, Archives M-20/47. 

18. RLB, Docs. 336-338. 

Born, Bericht, Braham 1981 pp. 927, 1143, 1180, 1182, 1202, 1302, 1350, 1355, 1400, 1404, 1408, 1409, 1422, 1444, 1445, 1482, 1483, 1484, 1491, Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry Central European Times Publishing, 1948.

Hans Weyermann, Swiss Chargé of the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), Budapest

In December 1944, Hans Weyermann, Swiss Chargé of the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), arrived in Budapest and was active in the rescue work along with other neutral diplomats.  He was successful in keeping Jewish children from being placed in the Pest ghetto.  He was the assistant to Friedrich Born.  Weyermann worked closely with Jewish community leaders and set up a number of special Red Cross sections.  Born and Weyermann worked to protect and organize 150 clinics, hospitals, homes and other institutions in the winter of 1944-45.  The ICRC helped distribute thousands of Red Cross protective papers to Jews in Budapest.  Weyermann stayed in Hungary after Born’s departure from Budapest and continued to provide aid to Jewish refugees.

Braham 1981 p. 1409:

“Shortly after the Budapest ghetto was established, Hans Weyermann arrived from Geneva to assist Born. Though the relationship between the two IRC representatives was not the most harmonious one, they managed to divide their responsibilities during the critical weeks before the capital's liberation. Before the Soviet siege of Budapest began on Christmas Day, 1944. Born withdrew to his home in Buda from where he directed the activities of the IRC in that part of the capital. Weyermann’ s responsibilities were concentrated in the Pest part, where the ghetto was located. The effectiveness of the IRC during this time was greatly enhanced by its cooperation with the Papal Nuncio and of the representatives of the neutral states. In fact, some of the measures that were adopted in support of the beleaguered Jewish community, including the protection of the children's homes and the rescuing of Jews from the death marches, were conceived and carried out jointly (see below).’’ 29

Notes

29. For further details on the activities of the IRC, consult David P. Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, I 977), 298 pp. and Aryeh Ben-Tov, op. cit. See also the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 517-520.

[Born, Bericht, Braham 1981 pp. 927, 1143, 1180, 1182, 1202, 1302, 1350, 1355, 1400, 1404, 1408, 1409, 1422, 1444, 1445, 1482, 1483, 1484, 1491, Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry Central European Times Publishing, 1948.]

Lévai, 1948:

“On more than one occasion Weyermann, Wallenberg and Raile visited the ghetto in the middle of the night, bringing with them medical stores and inspecting the general situation.”

“Great anxiety was caused by the air-raids, which were, responsible for a great number of casualties in the ghetto. On December 10th the Presidential Room of the Jewish Council in 12, Sip Street, suffered a direct hit. Four of those present were killed outright and eight others, of whom three died later on, were severely injured. On December 20th the ghetto was the scene of a very serious raid, which claimed 36 victims and resulted in whole rows of houses in Kis Diofa, Doh and Kazinczy Streets becoming uninhabitable. The ghetto was also hit on many other occasions. Hundreds of survivors continuously had to look for new abodes, thereby increasing the already existing shortage of accomodation.”

“The police again pressed for the children to be housed in the ghetto. Weyermann tried to avert this by reporting to Locsey that a scarlet fever epidemic was raging among them and made their transport impossible. Accompanied by Dr. Gyurky, Chief Medical Inspector, Locsey appeared in the ghetto and insisted that the children be taken into the ghetto, although the buildings handed over by the Municipality on December 20th, that is to say on the day of his visit, were neither cleaned nor furnished. He referred to Solymossy's remark: "One can't be touchy when Hungarian children are tramping the high roads!" Following the report of the Chief Managing Doctor of the Jewish Hospital, Dr. Dezso Acel, according to which there were "already no less than 2,000 cases of dysentery in the ghetto," the Chief Medical Inspector stated that in his opinion the danger of an epidemic was increasing. Dr. Acel drew his attention to the fact that an epidemic would not halt at the gates of the ghetto, and that therefore its repression was in the common interest.”

Georges Dunand, International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC)

In October 1944 Georges Dunand, delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross, arrived in Slovakia with money from the Joint Distribution Committee (JCD) to save Jews.  Dunand distributed these much-needed funds to refugees and helped a number of Jews escape deportation. There, he is helped by two Swiss consular officials, Max Grässli, the Consul General, and Hans Keller, Vice Consul.  Consul General Grässli and his wife hid Jews in their home.  When the Grässli’s left, Dunand moved into their apartment and continued to hide Jews there.  Dunand also worked with Zionist youth leader Jurag Revesz.  In addition, Dunand distributed money to Jewish refugee organizations. Dunand was one of the few Red Cross representatives to publish his memoirs.  It was called Ne perdez pas leur trace!

By far the most important contributions of the IRC to the Jewish community in Budapest were the sheltering of children and the safeguarding and supplying of Jewish institutions, including the ghetto, during the Nyilas era. Plans for the protection of children were laid in August in light of the lingering threat of deportation, the continual dwindling of communal supplies, and the dangers associated with the rapidly approaching front. 23

Otto Komoly, Zionist leader, and Section B International Red Cross

“Under Born's leadership two sections dealing with children were established within the framework of the IRC: Section A, which was placed under the leadership of Otto Komoly, the Zionist leader, 24 and Section B, which was entrusted to Reverend Gabor Sztehlo of the Good Shepherd Committee. 25 In addition, Born had been responsible for the establishment of Section T (Transportgruppe; Transportation Unit), which was composed of 25 to 35 recruits of Labor Service Company No. 101/359, the so-called Clothes-Collecting Labor Company (Ruhagyujto Munkasszazad), which was under the command of Captain Laszlo Ocskay. Section T, which was headed by. Dr. Gyorgy Wilhelm, the son of Karoly Wilhelm of the Central Jewish Council, and Istvan Komlos, was engaged in relief, rescue, and resistance operations. It was particularly active in the rescuing thousands of Jews from the death-marches to Hegyeshalom and in supplying the children’ s homes and the ghetto with food and fuel.’’ 26

Notes

26. Born, Bericht, pp. 33 and 36-37. See also Levai, Sziirke kony v, pp. 203-206, and the sections on the Nyilas era and Jewish resistance in Chapters 10 and 29, respectively.

Born, Bericht, Braham 1981 pp. 122, 402, 446, 450, 490, 515, 547, 558, 560, 568, 573, 574, 912, 950, 954, 963, 984, 1052, 1055, 1060, 1073, 1094, 1098, 1144,1151, 1167, 1176, 1244, 1254, 1255, 1268, 1270, 1272, 1293, 1294, 1299, 1300-1303, 1355, 1337, 1341, 1349, 1350, 1399, 1408, 1445, Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry Central European Times Publishing, 1948, Levai, Sziirke kony v.

Reverend Gábor Sztehló Volunteer, International Red Cross, Section B, Budapest

Reverend Gábor Sztehló, Evangelical Minister, Volunteer, International Red Cross, Section B, and Member of the Good Shepard Committee, Budapest, 1944-45.

“From March 1944, commissioned by Bishop Sándor Raffay, Reverend Sztehló volunteered for and supervised Section B of the International Red Cross, which established a special department for the feeding, housing and protection of Jewish children in Budapest.  Section B provided emergency safe houses for Jews and worked closely with Valdemar Langlet of the Swedish Red Cross and Friedrich Born of the International Red Cross.  Sztehló also smuggled Jewish children out of the Pest ghetto.  The first home was opened on October 5, 1944, by Gábor Sztehlo's uncle, Ottó Haggenmacher in the villa offered by District I, Bérc Utca 16. In December 1944, he organized the accommodation and care of children in 32 homes with the support of the Swiss Red Cross in the family villa of railway director Ákos Neÿ. He was responsible for saving more than one thousand Jewish children during the last months of the German occupation.  One of the hundreds children rescued was György Oláh, later a Nobel Prize-winning scientist Sztehló was honored by Yad Vashem as Righteous Among the Nations in 1972.”

Good ShEpard Committee

Good Shepard Committee (Protestant; A Jó Pásztor Bizottsag), Budapest, Hungary, established October 1942, sponsored by the Universal Convent of the Reformed Church of Hungary; worked with Hungarian Evangelical Church; set up Protestant Orphans’ Home in Noszvaj and Budapest; hid and sheltered Jews in Budapest during Arrow Cross rule, after October 1944; operated as Section B, International Red Cross in Budapest in Fall 1944 until the liberation of Budapest in January 1945; operated 32 protected residences for Jews; 1,500 children and 500 adult Jews were saved

[Braham, 1991, pp. 492-494, 897, 1187, 1197-1198; Gutman, 1990; Gutman, 2007, p. 201, 249, 232-233, 261, 327, Born, Bericht, Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry Central European Times Publishing, 1948.]

The Jewish Agency for Palestine

The Jewish Agency for Palestine was established in 1919 in response to Article IV of the British Mandate in Palestine, which required an appropriate Jewish agency to work with the British administration in establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine.  In 1929, the World Zionist Organization (WZO) was officially recognized by the British as the Jewish Agency.  It conducted numerous attempts to rescue Jews throughout the war.  It had limited success in this endeavor.

[Friling, Tuvia, translated by Ora Cummings. Arrows in the Dark: David Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv Leadership, and Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust (Vol. 1). (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005, Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry Central European Times Publishing, 1948. Ofer, Dalia. Escaping the Holocaust: Illegal Immigration to the Land of Israel, 1939-1944. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). Ofer, Dalia. Escaping the Holocaust: Illegal Immigration to the Land of Israel, 1939-1944. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).]

The Jewish Council (Zsido Tanacs) Budapest

The Jewish Council (Zsido Tanacs) was established in Budapest in 1943.  The Council was a major organization in the relief and rescue of the Jews of Budapest after the spring of 1944.  Its prominent members were Otto Komoly, president (General Zionists); Rezsö Kasztner, executive officer; Dov Weiss, secretary; Jeno Frankel (Mizrahi); Fülöp Freudiger; Domonkos; Stöckler; and Berend.

Members of the Council tried to ameliorate the conditions of Jews in the provinces or to halt the deportations in the spring of 1944.  These efforts were unsuccessful.

After the takeover by the Nazi Arrow Cross, several members of the Council, particularly Domonkos, Stöckler and Berend, proved to be outstanding rescue operatives.

The Council organized numerous committees, which were responsible for the feeding, housing and medical aid for thousands of Jews.  The Council also helped to free Jewish internees in various camps.  The Council also helped to provide forged documents to protect Jews.

[Braham, Randolph L. The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 930-932.  Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry. (Central European Times Publishing, 1948).]

The Refugee Aid Committee (Comisia Autonoma de Ajutorare)

The Refugee Aid Committee (Comisia Autonoma de Ajutorare) was founded in Bucharest, Romania, in June 1941.  It was originally established to provide relief to Jews under the Ion Antonescu dictatorship.  It was founded and run by the following Jewish community leaders:  Wilhelm Filderman, Fred Saraga, Emil Costiner, Misu Benvenisti, Dr. Cornel Iancu and Arnold Schwefelberg.  It eventually supplied relief for more than 40,000 Jews who had been expelled from their homes and were detained in camps throughout Romania.  The Committee later supplied relief to Jews who were drafted into forced labor battalions.  Wilhelm Filderman tried unsuccessfully to provide supplies to Jews of Bessarabia and Bucovina.  Filderman was successful, however, in providing aid to the deported Jews of Transnistria.  From 1942 to 1943, the Committee provided aid to Jewish deportees in Transnistria and was able to save numerous lives.  In addition, the community organized the return of 6,000 Jews from the Dorohoi District, which included 4,000 Jewish orphans.

[Ancel, J. (Ed.) Documents Concerning the Fate of Romanian Jewry during the Holocaust, Vols. 5, 8. (New York, 1987), Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry Central European Times Publishing, 1948.]

Relief and Rescue Committee of Budapest (Va’adat ha-Ezra ve-ha-Hatsala be-Budapest; Va’ada)

‘’The Committee began operating at the end of 1941 in order to provide relief to Jewish refugees in Hungary.  In January 1943, the Committee was reorganized as part of the Jewish Agency of Palestine.  The Committee was made up of representatives from various Zionist groups, including Otto Komoly, president (General Zionists, Section A Red Cross); Dov Weiss, secretary; Jeno Frankel (Mizrahi); Ernö (Zvi) Szilágyi (Ha-Shomer ha-Tsa’ir); Joel Brand, Samuel Springmann (Ichud).  After the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944, the Committee expanded to include youth leaders and refugees, including Josko Baumer, Uziel Lichtenberg, Moshe Rosenberg, Siegfried (Stephen) Roth, Moshe Schweiger, and Eugene Frankel (Mizrahi).’’

‘’The original mission of Va’ada was to rescue Jews by bringing them into Hungary and to provide for their housing and welfare.  This part of the rescue activity was organized by Joel Brand and was called Tiyyul (excursion).  The Va’ada was able to smuggle approximately 1,100 Polish Jews out of Poland before September 1939.  The Va’ada supported 13,000 Jewish refugees in Hungary.  Most of them came from Slovakia and Germany.  The Va’ada worked with Gisi Fleischman, Dov Weissmandel and the Working Group.  The Va’ada was also involved in providing intelligence to the West regarding the murder of Jews in Eastern Europe.’’

‘’Oskar Schindler became one of the committee's contacts, smuggling letters and money into the Kraków ghetto on their behalf. During a visit by Schindler to Budapest in November 1943, they learned that Schindler had been bribing Nazi officers to let him bring Jewish refugees into his factory in Poland, which he ran as a safe haven. This further encouraged the committee, after the invasion of Hungary, to try negotiating with the SS.’’

[Braham, R. L. “The Official Jewish Leadership of Wartime Hungary.” In Patterns of Jewish Leadership in Nazi Europe, 1933-1945. Proceedings of the Third Yad Vashem International Historical Conference, edited by Y. Gutman and C. J. Haft, pp. 267-285. (Jerusalem, 1979).  Braham, Randolph L. The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).  Cohen, Asher, translated by Carl Alpert. The Halutz Resistance in Hungary 1942-1944. (New York: Social Science Monographs, Boulder, and Institute for Holocaust Studies of the City University of New York, 1986).  Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry. (Central European Times Publishing, 1948).  Rozett, Robert. “Child Rescue in Budapest,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 2 (1987), pp. 49-59.  Vago, B. “Budapest Jewry in the Summer of 1944: Otto Komoly’s Diaries.” Yad Vashem Studies, 8 (1970), 81-105.]

Ottó Komoly Relief and Rescue Committee of Budapest

Ottó Komoly was a Hungarian Jewish engineer, military officer, Zionist, and humanitarian leader in Hungary. He is credited with saving numerous children during the Nazi occupation of Budapest 1944-1945.

Komoly became the Chairman of the Zionist Federation in Hungary. In Early 1943 he co-founded the Aid and Rescue Committee, which aided hundreds of Jews fleeing prosecution in Poland and Hungary. After Germany invaded Hungary in March 1944, Komoly was appointed head of the International Red Cross department A in charge of helping Jewish children. With the help of the embassies of Switzerland Sweden and other neutral countries, the International Red Cross created 35 refugee centers for orphaned children, where about 6000 children and more than 500 volunteers working there were saved from deportation and murder.

On the political front, Komoly worked for the neutrality of Hungary in the war. He tried to influence the government using his military status and his connection with the son of Hungarian leader Miklós Horthy. Under his leadership, the Aid and Rescue Committee organized non-Jewish protests against Nazi policies in Hungary, especially among the clergy and political leaders.

On January 1, 1945, during the Soviet Siege of Budapest, Arrow Cross militia picked him up from his house. Nothing else is known about him, and it is assumed that he was murdered by the Arrow Cross authorities.

Ujvary Group

See also Papal nuncio Angelo Rotta

Braham, 1981, pp. 1423-1424:

“The Nuncio also authorized the use of pre-signed blank safe-conduct certificates to be issued for rescuing Jews from the Óbuda brickyards, where the victims had been concentrated before deportation, and from the death-march columns that were being driven toward Hegyeshalom.” 76

“In pursuit of these objectives, he cooperated with the IRC, whose main representative was Sandor Gyorgy Ujvary. A writer-journalist and publisher of Jewish background, Ujvary established contact with the Nuncio via Janos Toth, the liaison between the Nunciature and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.’’ 

“Ujvary had become associated with the IRC in October and continued to head its Jewish rescue section until the capital’ s liberation in February 1945. In this capacity he was involved in the protection of the IRC-sponsored children’s homes and in the distribution of baptismal certificates, which he obtained from Mrs. Laszlo Katona, a devout Catholic woman who managed a printing shop in Kassa. When the death marches began early in November, he decided to expand his rescue operations by involving the Nunciature as well.’’

“When he reviewed his scheme for the "illegal" distribution of the pre-signed safe-conduct certificates, the Nuncio reportedly reassured him by stating: " What you are doing, my son, is pleasing to God and to Jesus, because you are saving innocent (1424) people. I give you absolution in advance. Continue your work to the honor of God." 77

“Ujvary's effectiveness was enhanced by his role as liaison between the IRC and the gendarmerie, a position he had obtained through the cooperation of Lieutenant Colonel Laszlo Ferenczy, the officer in charge of the deportations from the provinces. He exploited his triple role by establishing good relations with Andras Szentandrassy, a high-ranking police officer who was the commander of the Óbuda brickyards, through whom he had succeeded in saving many Jews just before their deportation. These Jews, supplied with baptismal certificates, were usually hidden in convents, monasteries, and other church institutions. These rescue related endeavors had enjoyed the support of many notable Hungarians, among them Baroness Gizella Apor and Countess Maria Pejakevich. Ujvary’s rescue activities within the framework of the Nunciature had been particularly helpful along the death route to Hegyeshalom. Equipped with a letter of authorization signed by the Nuncio and with pre-signed blank safe-conduct certificates in his possession, Ujvary and his associates succeeded in saving thousands of Jews before they were to be handed over to the Germans. 78 Among his closest collaborators were Tibor Baranski, a textile merchant associated with the IRC, and Dr. Istvan Biro, a Transylvanian member of the House of Representatives. Shortly after the establishment of the Budapest ghetto, Ujvary also organized (December 7) a Department of Cooperation, whose task was to unify the rescue operations of the Nunciature with those of the neutral states under the umbrella of the IRC.’’ 79

“Acting in cooperation with Sections A and B of the IRC, the Department of Cooperation had devoted special attention to the protection of children and of children's institutions. Toward this end, Ujvary had been in touch with Baron Kemeny, the Nyilas Foreign Minister. His close associates, including Milan Kosztich and Jozsef Eszterhazy, had maintained contact with Zoltan Bagossy, Kemeny’s deputy, who reportedly was also a leader of a Nyilas terror group. When the Nyilas authorities decided just before the beginning of the Soviet siege of Budapest to transfer the Jewish children into the ghetto, the Nuncio and the representatives of the neutral states forwarded their third and last collective protest memorandum to the Hungarian government. The memorandum, dated December 20, implored the government to (1425) " allow all children (together with their mothers when the children are not yet weaned) to remain outside the ghetto in the refuges organized by diplomatic missions or in the various Red Cross institutions." 80 The appeal was only partially heeded; thousands of children, especially those in the buildings administered by Section A of the IRC, were taken into the ghetto.’’

Lévai, 1948, pp. 371-374:

“The "death march" to Hegyeshalom began. Tens of thousands soon followed the transports on the high road to Vienna, via Gyor, covering 25 to 30 kilometres a day. Soon the high roads were covered with thousands of corpses of the deported Jews, who were weakened by privation, dysentery, typhoid and shot or mercilessly beaten to death by the Nyilas men.’’

“The Apostolic Nuntio now permitted Sandor Ujvary, a voluntary worker of the International Red Cross, to take hundreds of blank safe-conducts with him, when, accompanied by (371) nuns, he took convoys of motor lorries with medicine, dressings and food to the miserable deported Jews.’’

“Ujvary obtained the Nuntio’s permission by telling him quite frankly how he worked with forged legitimations, faked certificates of baptism and other documents, and how he tried to rescue the sick and exhausted Jews from the hands of the Nyilas in the hour of their greatest need.’’

“The Nuntio said: ‘My son, your action pleases God and Jesus, as you are rescuing innocent people. I grant you absolution in advance. Continue your work to the glory of God!’”

“Thus the small detachment of the International Red Cross started on its way. It consisted of Sandor Ujvary, author; Dr. Geza Kiss, textile merchant; Dr. Istvan Biro, lawyer and deputy for Transylvania. They gave following account of their journey:

‘Wherever we went on the main roads, we witnessed the most dreadful scenes. Endless columns of deported persons were marched along: ragged and starving people, mortally tired, among them old and wizened creatures who could hardly crawl along. Gendarmes were driving them with the butt-end of their rifles, with sticks and with whips. They had to cover 30 kilometres a day, until they came to a "resting-place". This generally was the marketplace of a town. They were driven into the square and spent the nights in the open, huddled together and shivering with cold in the chill of a November or December night. The daily food consisted of a generally inedible plateful of thin soup and nothing else. One of these stations was in Gonyu. On the morning following the "rest" we saw the number of corpses, which would never again arise from the frosty ground of the market-square. Baron Vilmos Apor, the Bishop of Gyor, knew about these horrors and did everything he could to help. He organised collections and instructed the clergy of his diocese to try and assist the deportees passing through in any manner possible.’”

“This group of rescuers had set itself the task of distributing medicine and food among the deportees driven towards Hegyeshalom. This was not often possible without encountering difficulties. The Arrow-Cross and the Gendarmerie tried to frustrate their work at all costs, they were often in danger of being arrested, they were called "Jewish hirelings." Another report reads as follows:

‘In Gonyu we saw that a part of the deportees were driven on board the ships anchored in the Danube over night. Many-in their great distress-committed suicide. In the still of the night one scream was followed by the other: the doomed people were jumping into the Danube, which was covered with drifting ice. They could not stand the tortures any longer, they preferred to commit suicide. With our own eyes we saw the gendarmes driving the Jews, who arrived in pitch-darkness, over the narrow gangways covered with ice, so that scores of them slipped and (372) fell into the icy river. Rescuing or helping was quite out of the question. A great number of Jews perished in that manner. There were good-hearted Hungarian peasants in the village, through which the deportees had to pass. It was difficult to approach the marching column, as the Nyilas men and the gendarmes refused to allow any attempt to offer help. In spite of these difficulties we succeeded, on several occasions, in rescuing Jews From the column and hiding them From the gendarmes. They were clad in peasant garments and sometimes one could not help smiling on beholding such typically Jewish-looking 'peasants'.''

“Some 12,000 feet of 40 mm-film were shot for the Nuntio-each foot an unrefutable witness of the horrors, tortures, cruelty and sufferings endured by the Jews of Budapest, who were transported to Germany "on loan" in accordance with Szálasi’s decree "to work for the benefit of Hungary as compensation for the war material supplied to Hungary." It is evident that this catch-word was simply used to cover up the real aim; work was quite out of the question and Szálasi and his gang simply handed the Jews of Budapest over to be exterminated.’’

“In Hegyeshalom the deportees were partly accomodated in an enormous barn behind the town hall and partly in "Biro puszta.'' This was the last station in Hungary, the next one was already in Germany. Here, therefore, lay the last chance of releasing anyone. In the Town-Hall of Hegyeshalom the Lazarist priest Father Kohler fought to save the lives of the deportees. This high-spirited priest devoted all his time and energy to this task. The Ujvary group, as agreed with Father Kohler, pushed its way into the crowd, selecting those who were in the worst condition and who evidently could no longer endure privation and torture. They filled out the blank Apostolic safe-conducts in their names and claimed their release. After much debating and quarrelling-in the course of which Father Kohler was called a Jew and "a servant of the Jewish Pope"-they succeeded in rescuing 4,700 people out of the tens of thousands. These 4,700 were put into freight-trucks and returned to Budapest, which again involved much begging and bribing of gendarmes.’’

“Here are a few extracts from the reports about Hegyeshalom:

"In Hegyeshalom we were surrounded by armed Nyilas men. They were most aggressive, abusing us for bringing medical stores for the Jews, when, according to them, there were not even enough lor Christians. Whilst this scene was going on, several Freight trucks with rescued Jews stood in the station awaiting the signal to start off for Budapest. We were afraid that if we debated the question of medical stores much longer, the infuriated gendarmes and Nyilas men might, in their anger, drive the rescued Jews out of the trucks. Ujvary, used to quick decisions, suddenly took the side of the Nyilas and shouted: 'They are right! We won't give the medicines to the Jew we'll rather let our Nyilas brethren (373) have them!' His companions at once understood what was at stake and started to distribute the medical stores among the Nyilas men and gendarmes, and whilst these were crowding round and jostling each other for the free gifts, the trucks packed with the Jews left for Budapest without further molestation."

“The next report gives an account of a scene well worth mentioning:

"The Nyilas men once again attacked Father Kohler, rating and abusing him for saving Jewish lives and threatening violence. The Father bravely laced the armed Nyilas men and shouted: 'I am not afraid of you, shoot if you dare!' The Nyilas men were so impressed by the daring behaviour of the priest that they sneaked away.''

“It was a common experience during these rescue trips to find that Jews, who had been brought home by means of safe-conducts, were re-arrested and taken back to Hegyeshalom. There were even cases of one and the same deported Jew being brought back to Hegyeshalom three times.’’ (374)

Angelo Rotta the Apostolic Nuntio, Budapest

Genaro Verolino

Sandor Ujvary, a voluntary worker of the International Red Cross

Baron Vilmos Apor, the Bishop of Gyor,

Dr. Istvan Biro, textile merchant

Dr. Geza Kiss, lawyer and deputy for Transylvania

Father Kohler, Catholic priest

[Braham, Randolph L. The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981, Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry. (Central European Times Publishing, 1948 pp. 371-374.]

War Refugee Board, US Department of the Treasury, 1943-45

The United States War Refugee Board was created in response to the failure of the US State Department and other branches of the US government to aid and protect refugees in the war.  The US State Department, in fact, virtually obstructed the immigration of refugees to the safe haven of the United States.  President Franklin Roosevelt created the WRB after revelations disclosing the State Department's complicity in the murder of millions of Jews.  By the end of the war, the WRB played a crucial role in saving thousands of Jews and other refugees.  Thousands were evacuated from Nazi-occupied territory, as were more than 20,000 non-Jews.  More than 10,000 refugees were protected within Axis Europe by clandestine activities financed by the WRB.  Further, the WRB took measures to protect refugees holding Latin American passports and visas.  Diplomatic pressure by the WRB, reinforced by its program of threatening Nazis with post-war prosecution, was instrumental in saving thousands of Jews in Transnistria who were moved to save areas in Romania.  The WRB placed similar pressures and helped end the deportation of the Jews of Budapest, Hungary.  Thousands of Jews in Budapest survived the war, in part due to the efforts of the WRB.  Raoul Wallenberg was acting as an agent of the WRB. 

The most successful areas of rescue by the WRB were in Romania, Transnistria and Budapest.

Braham 1981 pp. 1455-1458:

“On January 22, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9417, establishing the War Refugee Board (WRB) operating under the (1455) jurisdiction of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and War. The Order stated that "it is the policy of this government to take all measures within its power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death or otherwise to afford such victims all possible relief and assistance consistent with the successful prosecution of the war."

“The WRB was placed under the leadership of John W. Pehle, the head of Foreign Funds Control in the Treasury Department and empowered to collaborate with private organizations, American and international agencies, and foreign governments in pursuing its objective. The establishment of the WRB marked, officially at least, the end of the U.S. policy of indifference.’’ 186

“The Western Allies and the Destruction of Hungarian Jewry. The views and policies of the WRB reflected the President's new resolve on playing a more active American role in providing relief and rescue for Nazi victims. 187 Established after the bulk of European Jewry had already been destroyed, the WRB faced its first major test in the case of Hungary.’’

“The WRB began its operations with great zeal, expressing its concern for the treatment of the Jews of Hungary even before the German occupation. When it learned late in February 1944 that the Kallay government seemed to be yielding to German pressure " to deport foreign Jews and close its borders to refugees from Poland and elsewhere," the WRB expressed the American government's disapproval and warned it on March 7 via the U.S. legations in Lisbon and Bern. 188 Its real test came after the German occupation of Hungary on March 19, 1944. Its good intentions notwithstanding, it proved no match for the Nazis and Hungarians bent on the quick implementation of the Final Solution program.’’

“The first alarm about the possible fate of Hungarian Jewry, coupled with specific suggestions for action by the Allies, was sent to the Western powers by Gerhart Riegner on March 21. His telegram to the heads of the World Jewish Congress in Britain and the United States read:

‘Most anxious about destiny Hungarian Jewry, the only important section European Jewry still in existence, because of recent political (1456) developments. Am suggesting worldwide appeal of Anglo-Saxon personalities [both] non-Jews and Jews, including chiefs of Protestant [and] Catholic churches to the Hungarian people warning them not to allow application of policy of extermination of the Jews by the German butchers or Hungarian quislings and to help Jews by all possible means in order to prevent their falling into the hands of the Germans. Warning should insist upon the fact that the attitude of the Hungarian people toward the Jews will be one of the most important tests of behavior which Allied nations will remember in the peace settlement after the war. Similar broadcasts should be made every night in Hungarian language during the next weeks.’’’ 189

“The Western powers complied. As part of the psychological warfare campaign devised by the WRB, President Roosevelt issued a statement on March 24, condemning the Nazis and their allies for the heinous crimes they had committed in the course of the war. In connection with Hungary, the President declared:

‘In one of the blackest crimes of all history... the wholesale systematic murder of the Jews of Europe goes on unabated every hour. As a result of the events of the last few days, hundreds of thousands of Jews, who while living under persecution, have at least found a haven from death in Hungary and the Balkans, are now threatened with annihilation as Hitler’s forces descend more heavily upon these lands. That these innocent people, who have already survived a decade of Hitler' s fury, should perish on the very eve of triumph over the barbarism which their persecution symbolizes, would be a major tragedy.’”

“In an attempt to dissuade the Hungarians from collaborating, the President warned that " none who participate in these acts of savagery shall go unpunished. " 190 That same day, Secretary of State Hull urged the Hungarians to resist the Germans, implying that only thus could Hungary " hope to regain the respect and friendship of free nations and demonstrate its right to independence." 191 The British government clung to its White Paper policies regarding Palestine immigration. Sir Harold MacMichael, the British High Commissioner in Jerusalem, reiterated on March 1, 1944, that the existing quota of 75,000 immigrants could (1457) not be exceeded, and that no further immigration quotas were planned after the expiration of the current one on March 31. Although he suggested that the 18,300 immigration permits not yet taken up be issued to refugees, he was reluctant to go along with the specific suggestions for their allocation by the Zionist leaders. 192 Nevertheless, eager not to appear totally callous, the British followed the U.S. lead. After Sidney Silverman, a member of the House of Commons and president of the British Section of the World Jewish Congress, raised the question of the anti-Jewish measures in Hungary, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden (later Lord Avon) associated himself with the American President. In his statement of March 30, Eden emphasized that the " persecution of the Jews has in particular been of unexampled horror and intensity" and repeated the determination of the Allies to bring to justice all those guilty of such crimes. Like Roosevelt, Eden also called "upon the countries allied with or subjected to Germany to join in preventing further persecution and cooperate in protecting and saving the innocent." 193

“The Allies’ warnings and declarations bad no effect on the Nazis and their Hungarian hirelings who had dedicated themselves to the realization of the Final Solution program. While they were implementing their plans, the WRB was engaged in a series of rescue-related activities that turned out to be useless-at least as far as the provincial Jews of Hungary were concerned. The WRB continued to warn the Hungarians (April 12), explored the possibility of providing escape routes via partisan-held Yugoslav territories, contacted the Turks for the issuance of transit visas, and demanded that persons holding documents issued by any North or South American republic be accorded all rights and privileges of such nationals. On the theory that the presence of foreigners in official or unofficial capacities might have a deterrent effect, the WRB requested the IRC (March 25) to " send effective representation to Hungary in order to protect the well-being of groups facing persecution." On May 25-26, following receipt of reports on the beginning of the mass deportations, the WRB instructed the American missions in Cairo, Bern, Lisbon, Madrid, and Stockholm to prevail upon the governments of the neutral states "in the interest of most elementary humanity, to take immediate steps to increase to the largest possible extent the number of... diplomatic and consular personnel in Hungary and to distribute them as widely as possible throughout the country. " 194 (1458)

“The WRB’s expectations about the presence of foreign observers unfortunately proved unfounded. The determination of the Nazis and their Hungarian accomplices, the reluctance of the IRC and the neutral powers to effectively act, and the time consumed by diplomatic exchanges all conspired against the Jews. By the time Wallenberg arrived in Budapest on July 9, all of Hungary (with the notable exception of Budapest) bad already been made judenfrei.’’

“The effectiveness of the WRB in the pursuit of relief and rescue operations was limited by the restrictions resulting from its general policy framework: it could undertake no measures that might be construed as inconsistent "with the successful prosecution of the war" or as being in violation of British and American immigration policies relating to Palestine and the United States. The negative effect of these policies was clearly reflected in the attitude and reaction of the Allies to the Brand mission, the revelations of the Auschwitz Reports, the demands for the bombing of Auschwitz, and the so-called Horthy offer relating to the emigration of Jews.’’

Notes

186. For further details on the attitude of the Western Allies, see Fein, Accounting for Genocide, pp. 166-185. According to recently declassified documents, the United States had been fully familiar with the fate that had befallen the Jews of Hungary during the war. See, for example, 30-page report the research and analysis group of the Office of Strategic Services had prepared on October 19, 1944. National Archives, Washington, Report 2027, Record Group 226, Doc. 191. I, Box 4. 

187. British and American critics of the Administration eager to impugn the President's motives rushed to point out that 1944 was a crucial election year. 188. Summary Report of the Activities of the War Refugee Board, p. 2. 189. Telegram No. 1249, March 23, I 944, from Norton to the British Foreign Office. PRO, Fo. 371 /39258, p. 61.

190. Th e New York Times, March 25, 1944. The flyers with the text of the President's statement were dropped from the air over Hungary and other Axis-controlled countries. Summary Report on the Activities of the War Refugee Board, p. 3.

191. The Department of State Bulletin, 10(March 25, 1944)248: 278.

192. J. S. Conway, Between Apprehension and Indifference: Allied Attitudes to the Destruction of Hungarian Jewry. The Wiener Library Bulletin, London, 27 (I 973- 74)30/ 31: 39. See also the memorandum titled "Immigration" by the Zionist leadership, dated May 22, 1944, in the Weizmann Archives, Rehovot, Israel.

193. Great Britain. House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth Series, 398, March 30, 1944, pp. 1561-1564.

194. Summary Report of the Activities of the War Refugee Board, pp. 3-10. The American Representatives in the neutral capitals, especially Bern and Stockholm, were the conduits of many of the reports that emanated from Budapest and elsewhere concerning the fate of Hungarian Jewry.

[Braham, Randolph L. The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). Gutman, Yisrael (Ed.). Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 38-39, 41, 157, 191, 239, 459, 595, 693, 953, 989-991, 1232, 1240, 1303, 1545, 1549, 1557-1558, 1589, 1596-1598, 1660, Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry Central European Times Publishing, 1948, Penkower, Monty Noam. The Jews Were Expendable: Free World diplomacy and the Holocaust.  (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), pp. 116-117, 129-142, 147, 164, 178, 181, 194, 202-203, 209, 226, 235, 245-246, 251-252, 255, 262. Rothkirchen, Livia (Ed.). “Rescue efforts with the assistance of international organization: Documents from the archives of Dr. A. Silberschein.” Yad Vashem Studies, 8 (1970), 69-80. Hurwitz, Ariel. “The struggle over the creation of the War Refugee Board (WRB).”  Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 6 (1991), 17-31.]

Henry Morgenthau, US Secretary of the Treasury

Henry Morgenthau was the Secretary of the United States Treasury.  He was the highest-ranking Jew in President Roosevelt’s cabinet.  He was instrumental in the creation of the War Refugee Board in January 1944.  As early as the fall of 1942, news about the treatment of Jews in Eastern Europe began to arrive in Washington.  Morgenthau blamed the State Department for thwarting efforts to admit Jews who should have been legally able to enter the United States under the existing quotas.  After discovering the complicity of the State Department in preventing Jewish immigration, Morgenthau prepared a report entitled “A Personal Report to the President.”  It was delivered to Roosevelt on January 16, 1944.  After the meeting, Roosevelt established the War Refugee Board.  Morgenthau was empowered to organize this rescue effort under the auspices of the US Treasury Department.

[Gutman, Yisrael (Ed.). Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1990). Laqueur, Walter (Ed.) and Judith Tydor Baumel (Assoc. Ed.).  The Holocaust Encyclopedia. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 13-16. Wyman, David S. The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945. (New York: Pantheon, 1984), pp. 82-83, 183-187, 203-205, 210-211, 214-215, 225-228, 239, 256, 287. Morse, Arthur D. While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy. (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 79-80, 84-86, 87-93, 324, 329, 382. Penkower, Monty Noam. The Jews Were Expendable: Free World diplomacy and the Holocaust.  (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), pp. 14, 24, 55, 95, 125, 130-134, 139-143, 147, 199, 249, 251, 262-264. Levin, Nora. The Holocaust: The Destruction of European Jewry, 1933-1945. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968), pp. 669-672. Hurwitz, Ariel. “The struggle over the creation of the War Refugee Board (WRB).”  Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 6 (1991), 17-31.]

John Pehle, Executive Director, War Refugee Board (WRB)

John Pehle, while an administrator with the US Treasury Department, discovered documents that implicated the US State Department in actively preventing the legal immigration of Jewish refugees to the United States.  After the founding of the WRB, Pehle was made the Executive Director, with a staff of 30 employees.  Pehle supervised the overall operation of the WRB.  By the end of the war, some sources claim the WRB may have saved as many as 200,000 Jewish refugees.

[Laqueur, Walter (Ed.) and Judith Tydor Baumel (Assoc. Ed.).  The Holocaust Encyclopedia. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 13-16. Gutman, Yisrael (Ed.). Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 504, 990, 1549, 1596. Wyman, David S. The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945. (New York: Pantheon, 1984), pp. 210-214, 203-205, 224-225, 244, 258, 364, 286-287, 291, 294-297, 304, 324. Morse, Arthur D. While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy. (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 81-85, 90, 92, 97, 310, 313-314, 318, 323-326, 329, 333-337, 340-341, 346, 348, 353, 356, 359-360, 362, 372, 377-379, 382-383. Penkower, Monty Noam. The Jews Were Expendable: Free World diplomacy and the Holocaust.  (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), pp. 56, 117, 126, 129-130, 132, 139-142, 164-165, 170, 174, 188, 192, 197-198, 201-205, 208-209, 212, 251, 258, 286. Hurwitz, Ariel. “The struggle over the creation of the War Refugee Board (WRB).”  Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 6 (1991), 17-31.  Feingold, Henry. The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1944. (New Brunswick, NJ:(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970), pp. 183, 228, 239-241, 245, 248, 251-254, 257, 259-260, 262-263, 265, 270, 273-274, 277-283, 288, 292. Bauer, Yehuda. American Jewry and the Holocaust. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981), p. 401, 403-404, 409, 411.]

Josiah E. Dubois, Jr. War Refugee Board (WRB)

Josiah E. Dubois, Jr., was an official in the US Treasury Department and an assistant to Henry Morgenthau.  He and John Pehle discovered information in secret reports and internal memos that indicated that the State Department had intentionally suppressed information about the murder of Jews in Eastern Europe.  Dubois further discovered that the State Department had intentionally undermined virtually all efforts to rescue Jews.  Dubois wrote an extensive report, which he delivered to Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau.  This document was entitled, “Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of this Government in the Murder of the Jews.”

[Gutman, Yisrael (Ed.). Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 990-991, 1549. Laqueur, Walter (Ed.) and Judith Tydor Baumel (Assoc. Ed.).  The Holocaust Encyclopedia. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 13-16. Wyman, David S. The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945. (New York: Pantheon, 1984), pp. 182, 186-187, 190n, 203n, 239, 258, 287. Morse, Arthur D. While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy. (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 88, 313, 324, 340-341. Penkower, Monty Noam. The Jews Were Expendable: Free World diplomacy and the Holocaust.  (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), pp. 130-133, 199. Hurwitz, Ariel. “The struggle over the creation of the War Refugee Board (WRB).”  Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 6 (1991), 17-31.  Feingold, Henry. The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1944. (New Brunswick, NJ:(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970), pp. 239-241, 245, 267-268. Bauer, Yehuda. American Jewry and the Holocaust. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981), p. 401.]

Randolph Paul, War Refugee Board (WRB)

Randolph Paul, along with Josiah E. Dubois, Jr., of the U.S. Treasury Department, alerted Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau to the thwarting of refugee immigration to the United States by the State Department.

These officials at the US Treasury Department discovered that State Department officials were obstructing proposals for Jewish relief efforts in Romania and France.  They also discovered evidence of earlier State Department efforts to inhibit and shut the flow of information from Switzerland about Hitler’s final solution.

In a separate finding, it was discovered that Assistant Secretary of State Long was found to have given a Congressional committee highly inaccurate and inflated estimates of the number of refugees who had entered the United States since 1933.

Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau (and friend of Roosevelt) approached Roosevelt with this damning information about the State Department’s failure to act, gross procrastination and general obstruction of actions that could have led to the rescue of European Jews. 

A report was written by Josiah Dubois and was presented by Morgenthau to the President.  On January 22, 1944, President Roosevelt issued and Executive Order creating the War Refugee Board headed by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of War.

[Laqueur, Walter (Ed.) and Judith Tydor Baumel (Assoc. Ed.).  The Holocaust Encyclopedia. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 13-16. Gutman, Yisrael (Ed.). Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1990), p. 990. Laqueur, Walter (Ed.) and Judith Tydor Baumel (Assoc. Ed.).  The Holocaust Encyclopedia. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). Hurwitz, Ariel. “The struggle over the creation of the War Refugee Board (WRB).”  Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 6 (1991), 17-31.  Bauer, Yehuda. American Jewry and the Holocaust. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981), p. 401.]

Field Representatives of the War Refugee Board (WRB)

Dr. Robert C. Dexter

Dr. Robert C. Dexter was the War Refugee Board’s agent in Portugal.  He was formerly the European representative of the Unitarian Service Committee and had convinced the Portuguese government to admit large numbers of Jewish refugee children who had escaped from France through Spain.  Many of these children lacked proper identification papers.  Dexter complained that the War Refugee Board would have been more successful had they had adequate representation in Spain and had backing of the US Embassy there.

[Morse, Arthur D. While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy. (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 334. Bauer, Yehuda. American Jewry and the Holocaust. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981), p. 213.]

Iver Olson

Iver Olson was the War Refugee Board (WRB) representative in Sweden 1944-1945.  Olson recruited Swedish private citizen Raoul Wallenberg to head the WRB’s rescue efforts of the Jews of Budapest in 1944-1945.  The rescue of Jews in Budapest was one of the most successful actions of the WRB during World War II.

[Gutman, Yisrael (Ed.). Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 1439, 1549, 1596. Laqueur, Walter (Ed.) and Judith Tydor Baumel (Assoc. Ed.).  The Holocaust Encyclopedia. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). Wyman, David S. The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945. (New York: Pantheon, 1984), pp. 229-231, 241, 243. Koblik, Steven. The Stones Cry Out: Sweden’s Response to the Persecution of the Jews, 1933-1945. (New York: Holocaust Library, 1988), pp. 49, 51, 63, 73-75, 124, 158-159, 252-253, 261-267. Morse, Arthur D. While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy. (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 348-349, 363. Penkower, Monty Noam. The Jews Were Expendable: Free World diplomacy and the Holocaust.  (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), pp. 200, 267-270, 273-274, 276, 279. Bauer, Yehuda. American Jewry and the Holocaust. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981), pp. 404, 421.]

Roswell McClelland

Ross McClelland worked with the American Friends’ Service Committee and coordinated relief efforts in the French concentration camps, including Les Milles.  McClelland was a member of the Nimes Committee.  Later, Roswell McClelland was the representative of the War Refugee Board in Geneva, Switzerland.  He was involved in numerous rescue activities, including the negotiation with SS official Kurt Becher for the release of Jewish internees in concentration camps at the end of the war in March and April 1945.  Roswell McClelland’s wife was active in the rescue of Jews as well.

[Bauer, Yehuda. American Jewry and the Holocaust. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981), pp. 220, 397, 404, 406, 412-415, 420, 422-424, 429-430.  Gutman, Yisrael (Ed.). Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1990), p. 122, 157, 459, 953, 1253, 1596.  Hurwitz, Ariel. “The struggle over the creation of the War Refugee Board (WRB).”  Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 6 (1991), 17-31. Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry Central European Times Publishing, 1948. Morse, Arthur D. While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy. (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 330-332, 358-359, 372-373, 381, 383. Penkower, Monty Noam. The Jews Were Expendable: Free World diplomacy and the Holocaust.  (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), pp. 187, 191, 202, 208-211, 213, 218, 223, 234, 236, 258, 260-261, 263, 277.  Ryan, Donna F. The Holocaust and the Jews of Marseille: The Enforcement of Anti-Semitic Policies in Vichy France. (Urbana, IL: The University of Illinois Press, 1996), p. 151.  Wyman, David S. The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945. (New York: Pantheon, 1984), pp. 36, 232-233, 237, 245-250, 284-286, 289, 294, 324.]

Ira Hirschmann, Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People in Europe, 1943, and War Refugee Board (WRB) representative in Turkey, 1944-45

Ira Hirschmann was an early American activist in helping to save Jewish refugees in Europe. 

Ira Hirschmann attended the Evian conference in France in July 1938.  Witnessing the hypocrisy of the Western powers and their reluctance to save Jews, he volunteered to go on missions to save Jews as a private citizen.  Later, in July 1938, he went to Vienna, Austria, and vouched for hundreds of Austrian refugees, which allowed them to leave the country.

He volunteered and was appointed with the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People in Europe, which was also known as the Bergson Group. 

Hirschmann was later appointed head of the Middle East Delegation of the War Refugee Board (WRB) stationed in Istanbul, Turkey.  Hirschmann worked throughout the period 1944-45 for the rescue of Jews in Nazi occupied territories of Central and Eastern Europe.  He helped Jews throughout the Balkans and in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary.  He worked with Vatican Cardinal Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli and US Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt and Yishuv representative Chaim Barlas in Turkey to help save Jewish refugees.  Hirschmann was responsible for a success in March 1944 when he persuaded Alexander Cretzianu, the Romanian ambassador to Turkey, to insist that the Romanian government transfer 48,000 Jews in Transnistria to a safe zone in Romania.  In 1946, Hirschmann was appointed to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) to inspect Jewish displaced persons (DP) camps.

[Hirschmann, Ira A. Life Line to a Promised Land. (New York: Vanguard Press, 1946).  Hirschmann, Ira. Caution to the Winds. (New York: David McKay Co., 1962). Hirschmann, Ira A.  The Embers Still Burn. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1949).  Shaw, Stanford J. Turkey and the Holocaust: Turkey’s Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933-1945. (New York: New York University Press, 1993).  Gutman, Yisrael (Ed.). Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 669-672. Laqueur, Walter (Ed.) and Judith Tydor Baumel (Assoc. Ed.).  The Holocaust Encyclopedia. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). Morse, Arthur D. While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy. (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 314-321, 329, 332, 356-358, 365-366, 382-383. Penkower, Monty Noam. The Jews Were Expendable: Free World diplomacy and the Holocaust.  (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), pp. 163-174, 188, 200. Levin, Nora. The Holocaust: The Destruction of European Jewry, 1933-1945. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968), pp. 560, 587-589, 630, 634-635, 658-659.  Feingold, Henry. The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1944. (New Brunswick, NJ: (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970), pp. 33, 221, 246, 254, 262, 272, 281-292. Bauer, Yehuda. American Jewry and the Holocaust. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981), pp. 395, 404-406.  Friling, Tuvia, translated by Ora Cummings. Arrows in the Dark: David Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv Leadership, and Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust (Vols. 1 and 2). (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005.]

The Working Group, Slovakia

The Working Group was a successor organization to the Jewish Center (Ústredna Zidov) in Slovakia.  It was headed by Gisi Fleischman and Rabbi Michael Dov Weissmandel.  It was founded in February 1942 to aid and rescue Jews.  It was responsible for negotiating with Slovak and Nazi authorities to save Jews.  It initiated the Europa Plan.  Other members of this organization were Andrej Steiner, Rabbi Armin-Abba Frieder, Oscar Neumann, Vojtech Winterstein, Wilhelm Furst, Zvi Feher, and Dr. Tibor Kovacs.  The Working Group to a limited degree helped to end some deportations to the death camps in Poland from Slovakia.  The Working Group also provided aid, including food and medicine, to Jews who had been deported.  The Working Group also made attempts, unsuccessfully, to save the Jews of Greece. The Working Group also disseminated the Auschwitz Protocol throughout Europe.

Gisi Fleischman (1897-1944), Zentrales Sozials Fürsorge-Komitee für die Juden in Slovensko; Vice President, Procovna Skupina (“Working Group”); Stredna Zidov (Jewish Center); JDC Representative. In early 1942, two Jewish community leaders began a rescue operation to save Jews in Slovakia. They were Gisi Fleischman and Rabbi Michael Dov Weissmandel.  They called their group to save Jews the “Action Committee.” They later called themselves “The Working Group.”  They attempted to prevent the deportation of Jews in part by bribing Slovakian officials. 

After the beginning of deportations from Slovakia in March 1942, the Working Group was able to thwart the deportation by bribing Dieter Wisliceny, an SS officer and Nazi governor of Slovakia. Fleischman raised money for this through the Hechalutz movement and the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in Switzerland.  The deportations were halted from October 1942 to September 1944.  Their success raised the morale of the Working Group members and motivated them to plan a more audacious rescue.  Fleischman and Weissmandel helped to disseminate the Auschwitz report about the murder of Jews in the Auschwitz death camp.  They also tried to have the train tracks to Auschwitz bombed.

In the beginning of October 1944, Fleischman was sent on one of the last trains to Auschwitz. She was murdered upon arrival.

Michael Dov Weissmandl was an Orthodox rabbi of the Oberlander Jews of present-day western Slovakia. Along with Gisi Fleischmann he was the leader of the Bratislava Working Group which attempted to save European Jews from deportation to Nazi death camps during the Holocaust and was the first person to urge Allied powers to bomb the railways leading to the Auschwitz death camp.

With the help of diplomats, Weissmandl was able to smuggle letters or telegrams to people he hoped would help save the Jews of Europe, alerting them to the Nazi destruction of European Jewry. He managed to send letters to Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, and he entrusted a diplomat to deliver a letter to the Vatican for Pope Pius XII. He originated the proposal via Rabbi Solomon Schonfeld in London to bomb the rails leading to Auschwitz, but this, along with subsequent suggestions from others, was ultimately not implemented.

He and his Working Group helped distribute the Auschwitz Protocols. The recipients didn't do anything with the report with the exception of Moshe Krausz in Budapest who forwarded it to George Mantello in Switzerland via Romanian diplomat Florian Manilou. Mantello publicized its content immediately upon receipt. This triggered large-scale local demonstrations in Switzerland, sermons in Swiss churches about the plight of Jews and a Swiss press campaign of about 400 headlines protesting the mass murder of Jews. The events in Switzerland and other considerations led to threats of retribution against Hungary's Regent Miklós Horthy by President Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and other leaders. This was one of the reasons Horthy halted the Hungarian death camp transports.

Weissmandel survived the war and died in the United States in 1956.  Weissmandl’s wife and five children perished in the war.