Politics of Genocide, by Randolph Braham

THE POLITICS

OF GENOCIDE

The Holocaust in Hungary, Volume 2

Third Revised and Enlarged Edition

RANDOLPH L. BRAHAM

Social Science Monographs, Boulder

Distributed by

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW YORK

2016

_____________

Selected chapters, with illustrations and an Introduction by Eric Saul containing additional biographical information.

Whoever saves a single soul, it is as if they had saved the whole world.

- The Talmud (Sanhedrin 4:5)

Map of Hungary with provinces

Introduction

This document contains selected chapters from the original version of Randolph Braham’s Politics of Genocide, originally published in 1981 and updated for a number of editions, which we have extensively illustrated with period photographs, maps, and documents.

Our purpose in disseminating this document is to provide a background for creating a database of rescuers and rescue organizations that aided Jews in Hungary during the Nazi and Arrow Cross terror actions. It focuses principally on the rescue of Jews in Budapest during this period.

This database includes Jews who rescued their fellow Jews as well as Jewish organizations.

Braham’s manuscript is still under copyright, so we are offering it under the doctrine of fair use, for research purposes only.

Many of the rescuers in this manuscript have not been officially acknowledged by any Holocaust institution. We will be using this manuscript and other resources to produce a master roster and registry of rescuers and rescue organizations, which we will be submitting to the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC, and to Yad Vashem, The World Holocaust Remembrance Center in Jerusalem.

It is our hope that through this research, there will be a greater understanding of the rescue efforts that resulted in the survival of more than 100,000 Jews of Budapest. This was one of the largest rescues of the Shoah.

Jewish women released from a deportation action in Budapest

It is of the highest importance not only to record and recount, both for ourselves and for the future, the evidences of human degradation, but side by side with them to set forth the evidences of human exaltation and nobility. Let the epic of heroic deeds of love, as opposed by those of hatred, of rescue as opposed to destruction, bear equal witness to unborn generations.

- Sholem Asch

Rescue in Hungary

Hungary joined the Axis powers in 1939. Soon thereafter, it received numerous territorial concessions, including nearly half of Transylvania. In December 1941, Hungary declared war on the United States. In January 1942, Hungary sent troops to attack the Soviet Union.

In 1939, approximately 403,000-455,000 Jews resided in Hungary, out of a population of 9,106,000 (4.4%-5.0%). Jews were a major part of the Hungarian middle class. After the acquisition of former Czech and Romanian territories, more than 650,000 Jews were added to the population of greater Hungary.

Approximately 725,000 Jews lived in Hungary in 1944, including 325,000 in territories that the country had regained from Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia from 1938 to 1941. The Second Jewish Law of 1939 furthermore classified 100,000 Christians who had either one Jewish parent or two Jewish grandparents as Jews (source in Hungarian).

The Jewish community remained virtually intact until the German invasion in the spring of 1944. In fact, Hungary was a safe haven and refuge for Romania and Slovakian Jews.

In March 1944, the reign of terror began. SS Colonel Adolf Eichmann was given the task of deporting the Hungarian Jews. In March through July 1944, more than 430,000 Hungarian Jews were murdered at Auschwitz. In the winter of 1944-1945, 30,000 Budapest Jews died on death marches and in actions. More than 569,000 Hungarian Jews were murdered within Hungary and its territories.

By July 9, 1944, only 230,000 Jews survived, most of whom were in Budapest.

Hungary – Budapest

After the deportation of the Jews in the Hungarian countryside, Eichmann planned to deport the surviving Jews of Budapest to Auschwitz by the end of July 1944. The war, however, was going badly for Germany. The Russians were advancing from the East, the Allies from the West. With the end of the war nearing, Regent Horthy of Hungary began to resist Eichmann and the deportations.

Round up of Jews in Budapest

By the end of July 1944, the deportations of Hungarian Jews had ceased. Nevertheless, Eichmann and his SS kept up their reign of terror against the Jews of Budapest. Hungarian Jews were herded into ghettos and makeshift concentration camps. The round up of Jews was carried out district by district by collaborating Hungarian Arrow Cross, with Eichmann and his SS men supervising. Eichmann and his SS troops were surprised by the cruelty of the Hungarian Arrow Cross.

Eichmann continued to abduct Jews for forced marches out of Budapest. Even so, there was relative calm at this time. The work of Verolino, Rotta and the other neutral diplomats was not over; the worst was yet to come.

By the end of August 1944, SS commander Heinrich Himmler ordered Eichmann to stop the deportation of Hungarian Jews. A few days later, Hungarian Regent Horthy appointed General Gezá Latakos, a stalwart Horthy loyalist, as the new Prime Minister. He was given instructions to stop the persecution of the Jews. Again, the worst seemed to be over for the Jews of Budapest.

During this period of relative calm, Eichmann acted on his own murderous authority. He defied Himmler in coordinating continued deportations. He continued persecutions, including the round up and murder of Jews. On August 30, Eichmann was ordered to withdraw from Budapest with his SS command.

On October 12, Horthy planned to sue for a separate peace with the Allies. The situation improved greatly for the Jews of Budapest. Many Jews even stopped wearing the Star of David.

The Nazis discovered Horthy’s attempt to negotiate with the Allies. Immediately, the Germans brought thousands of troops into Budapest and initiated a coup against Horthy. The Germans deposed Horthy and installed the fascist Hungarian Arrow Cross party in power, with Ferenc Szálasi as Prime Minister.

On October 15, 1944, a new reign of terror descended on the Jewish community in Budapest.

At the same time, Eichmann returned to Budapest and told the Jewish community leaders, “You see, I am back, our arm is still long enough to reach you.” Immediately, widespread arrests and pogroms against Jews resumed. Nearly 200 people were murdered by members of the Arrow Cross. Arrow Cross leaders cooperated with the Nazis in the murder and deportation of the Jews.

Eichmann was delighted with the cooperation and the enthusiastic participation of the Hungarian fascist party. During this period, Jews were terrorized by bands of Arrow Cross thugs who roamed the city beating, robbing and killing.

On October 20, 1944, Eichmann again began the mass round up of Jewish men. His plan was to deport the Jews of Budapest on mass death marches. They were to be taken to the Austrian border to dig trenches and build fortifications against the advancing Russian army. Hundreds died of exhaustion and starvation on these marches.

Diplomats of the neutral missions and their volunteers traveled tirelessly up and down the roads between Budapest and Hegyeshalom, the route of the death marches. They brought truckloads of food, medicine and clothing. Diplomats carried blank protective passes that they issued on the spot. Thus they saved many thousands of Jews from almost inevitable death.

Hundreds of Jews served as volunteers with the neutral diplomats. They operated safe houses, hospitals, kitchens, etc. They printed and distributed thousands of the safe conduct or protective passes. Numerous Jewish organizations worked to save their fellow Jews in besieged Budapest.

The courage that the neutral diplomats and their volunteers displayed during the German occupation was remarkable. They would walk up to trains loaded with deportees. In front of the SS and Arrow Cross officials, they would hand the deportees “safe passes.”

In October-November 1944, the neutral diplomats established numerous “diplomatic” safe houses, leased in the name of the country with the shield and flags of the country prominently displayed on the front door. They even claimed extra-territoriality, which they did not have. When Nazis and Arrow Cross soldiers tried to raid these safe houses, the diplomats and their volunteers were able, in most cases, to keep them out.

These buildings under diplomatic protection, along with the protective passes, were the most important tools in saving large numbers of Jews. The Swiss, Swedish, Vatican, Spanish and Portuguese buildings gave shelter to at least 40,000 and perhaps as many as 70,000 Jews. The exact number will never be known.

The lives of diplomats in Budapest were in constant jeopardy. The Arrow Cross did not consistently recognize the authority of the diplomatic missions to protect Jews in Budapest.

Close to 17,000 Jews were murdered by the Arrow Cross between October 15 and the liberation of Budapest in the middle of January 1945.

In Budapest, 124,000 Jews survived due to the efforts of numerous organizations and individuals, including neutral diplomats, the Vatican, the Red Cross, and Jewish rescue organizations. This was the largest Jewish community surviving in Europe.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the following individuals and families for their cooperation in providing information on and eyewitness accounts of their involvement in the rescue of Jews in Budapest. This information was used in the preparation of this Introduction and for providing material used to illustrate the document. We further acknowledge their participation in the Visas for Life: The Righteous and Honorable Diplomats Project.

György Adam

The Ambassador Per Anger family, Per Anger

Colonel José Arturo Castellanos family

Minister Dr. Harold Feller

David Gur

The Consul Carl Lutz family, Agnes Hirschi

The Alexander and Elizabeth Kasser family, Mary Mochary

Consul General Hans Keller

The Otto Komoly family, Tomi Komoly

Valdemar and Nina Langlet family, Per Forsberg

The George Mandel Mantello family, Enrico Mantello, Andrea Mantello

The Minister Dr. Carlos Almeida Afonseca de Sampayo Garrido family

The Ambassador Don Angel Sanz Briz family,

The Simon Wiesenthal Center, Rabbi Abraham Cooper

The Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt family, Peter Rosenblatt, Laurene Sherlock

The Swiss Foreign Ministry

Dr. Theo Tschuy

The Raoul Wallenberg family, Guy Von Dardel, Louise Von Dardel

Chapter Twenty-Six

The Szálasi Era

(1150)

Food and Supplies

The feeding of the ghetto population presented an especially difficult problem for the Jewish leadership. Toward the end of November, the Central Jewish Council established a Division of Public Feeding (Nepelelmezesi Osztaly) under the leadership of Stockler. Two self-sacrificing individuals - Szidonia Feldman and her assistant, Jozsef Halpern - were placed in charge of the operation. Their responsibilities included the establishment of public kitchens, the acquisition of fuel and food, and the supply of water. The problem of feeding increased with the expansion of the ghetto population.

By far the largest public kitchen facility was the one that was originally established by the Orthodox Jewish Community to help feed the poor of the capital. During the early phase of World War II, the Orthodox Public Table (Orthodox Nepasztal), as the facility was called, had expanded to serve many of the refugees from Austria, Poland and Slovakia, as well as the Jews interned at Kistarcsa, Garany, and Csepel. Following the establishment of the ghetto, the kitchen's facilities were further expanded through the addition of five 700-liter kettles. 109

Next in size was the so-called Stern kitchen, which used the facilities of the former Stern Restaurant at 10 Rumbach Sebestyen Street. Then there was the Skreck kitchen and a number of smaller ones located at 5, 12, and 22 Sip Street. In theory, the ghetto dwellers were to receive 100 to 150 grams of bread a day. The bread was at first supplied by the Communal Food Works (Kozsegi Elelmiszeruzem); later, it was supplied by smaller bakeries within the ghetto (1 Hollo Street, 9 Sip Street, and 25 Nagydiofa Street) whenever the International Red Cross was able to provide the necessary flour.

With coke and coal almost nonexistent, the fuel problem was largely "solved" by the Soviet bombardments: 110 the buildings destroyed by the raids would be stripped of wood. The kitchen employees had to compete with the other dwellers of the ghetto who were equally eager for some fuel.

During the Soviet siege, many of the utilities were damaged or totally destroyed. Water for cooking and dishwashing was taken from the relatively few buildings that still had running water, or from the natural wells in the ritual-bath facilities in the ghetto (16 Kazinczy Street). A number of artesian wells, which had been abandoned after the installation of the water system in Budapest, were reactivated. They supplied many buildings, including those containing public kitchens.

By far the greatest difficulty was caused by the lack of food. Its acquisition was financed by the municipality, the International Red Cross, and the internal reserves of the community.

On December 2, Rosta informed the Jewish leaders that the daily ration specified for the Jews was 150 grams of bread, 40 grams of flour, 10 grams of oil, and 30 grams of legumes. Jews were also to receive 600 grams of salt per month and 100 grams of meat per week "if available." The food allocated to the Jews contained 690 to 790 calories - prison inmates received 1,500. (This calorie level was allegedly determined by Vajna.) However, even this limited quantity of food was not always made available to the ghetto population, which would have starved had it not been for the food deliveries arranged by the representatives of the neutral powers. 111 The International Red Cross was particularly concerned with the feeding of the children, many of whom had been relocated into the ghetto from its protected children 's homes. The main warehouses of the Red Cross were often the target of Nyilas raids.

Some of the supplies were purchased by exempted Jews or Jews who had special permits to leave the confines of the ghetto. With the cooperation of the Red Cross, a special committee was formed on December 8 to supervise purchases and the allocation of supplies from the warehouses. Its members included Otto Komoly, then acting as a leading Red Cross official, Mrs. Joel Brand, Wilhelm, Bauer, Lajos Vas, Lajos Stockler, and Farago. Also active in these endeavors were Pal Graber, Istvan Kurzweil, Jozsef Pasztor, Jeno Varadi, and Miklos Vida. On December 18, the Red Cross decided to establish an office within the ghetto (at 17 Wesselenyi Street) with about 50 employees.

Delivery of food shipments was frequently prevented by the Nyilas who manned the main gates of the ghetto. When called upon by Locsey to bait this interference, Janos Bata, the local Nyilas leader, expressed anger over the "seditious" activities of the Jews. Bata was particularly upset that the Red Cross had supplied some cheese and eggs for the ghetto's children when these items were no longer available in Budapest itself. Occasionally some food found its way into the black market, both within and outside the ghetto, but the price was prohibitive for almost all the Jews. The official price of bread, for example, was 1.5 became more aggravated after that period due to the increased intensity of the Soviet attacks and the growing brutality of the Nyilas.

The scenes at the makeshift hospitals evoked images of Dante's inferno. The number of emergency cases increased daily and the hospital beds were soon filled. Patients had to be laid all over the floor. Soon even the nurses' and the doctors' quarters were filled with patients. Drugs were in short supply and sanitary and toilet facilities were inadequate. There was a constant water shortage. And during the last weeks of the siege, it was impossible to bury the dead.

Most of the patients arrived in the makeshift hospitals in critical condition. There were hundreds of suicide cases, mostly among the converted and highly assimilated Jews - those who suddenly found their world in shambles; others were brought in with serious injuries following armed attacks by the Nyilas - some of them after having been shot into the Danube, or injured in the wake of Soviet bombardments. Still others suffered from a variety of chronic illnesses associated with old age, malnutrition, or infection. Emergency surgery was frequently performed on kitchen tables covered by sheets and often without anesthetics. The surgical team composed of Drs. Gyorgy Frank, Jozsef Roth, and Laszlo Tauber worked near miracles. After Christmas day, electricity was no longer available; many of the emergency operations had to be performed by the light of home-made candles or flashlights. The hospitals had a maternity section as well as other specialized services under the competent care and guidance of a number of self-sacrificing physicians and assistants. 114

114. Among the most prominent of the physicians active in the ghetto, in addition to the surgical team cited above, were Drs. Dezso Acel, the ghetto's chief physician, Jeno Barsony, Zoltan Barta, Laszlo Benedek, Glancz, Ferenc Groszman, Lajos Levy, Nemet, and Hugo Richter. Drs. Acel and Barta were killed shortly after the liberation during a grenade attack that hit the hospital. Among the nurses and administrative personnel special mention must be made of Magda Clausius, Ibi Gal, Ilonka Grungold, Vera Kolchner, Mrs. Samu Lowenstein, and Mrs. Tibor Reiner.

[…]

Special services and social welfare programs were organized for the various denominations of converted Jews. Especially active in this sphere were Jakab Raile of the Catholic Church, Gyula Nagy 117 and Sandor Borsos of the Reformed Church, and Ferenc Sreter of the Lutheran Church. A number of missionary priests and ministers offered salvation through conversion. Many others, including Father Raile, were also involved in rescue and relief work. 118

In addition to ministering to the spiritual needs of the ghetto dwellers, many rabbis also consoled the sick and the disabled. The religious education of children was the responsibility of teachers and rabbis who had responded to the appeal by the Central Jewish Council. Classes were normally held in empty commercial establishments near air-raid shelters, where the children were also fed. As in the Yellow-Star buildings a few months earlier, the emphasis was on preparing children for their Bar Mitzvah. 119 The elders of the community made a special effort to celebrate Hanukkah. The lighting of the candles in commemoration of the Temple's rededication in 165 B. C. had a welcome though short-lived uplifting effect upon the dejected population of the ghetto.

Notes

103. Ibid., pp. 143 - 145. The source also identifies the buildings included in each district.

104. Ibid., pp. 142 - 143.

105. For the location of the police precincts, see ibid., pp. 147-148.

106. In January 1945, at the height of the Soviet siege, the situation got so far out of hand that the Central Jewish Council was compelled to issue an order requesting compliance with all demands of the ghetto police. For the text of the order, see ibid. p. 110.

107. On December 16, for example, armed Nyilas gangs invaded the buildings at 10 Rumbach Sebestyen Street, 5 Klauzal Square, and 30 Klauzal Street. The raids were "justified" by their allegation that the Jews had hidden arms. Ibid., pp. 84-85.

108. Ibid., pp. 85 and I 55- 156.

109. At the time of the occupation, the Nepasztal was headed by Mor Weisz. The effectiveness with which the internees of the various camps were served was to a large extent due to the activities of [Reverend] Sandor Boros. During the Nyilas era, the Nepasztal continued to function thanks to the heroic efforts of men and women like Mor Weisz and Samuel Lowinger, Jozsef Friedmann, and Aranka Katz, the kitchen head. Boros, who settled in Givat Mordechay in Israel sometime after the war, outlined his wartime activities in a memorandum addressed to Miksa Domonkos. A copy of this memorandum is on file in RG-52.

110. The headquarters of the Central Jewish Council was hit by a mortar shell in the afternoon of December 10. Several ghetto buildings were bombarded on December 20 and 21 and many more after the encirclement of Budapest by Soviet forces on December 25. Among those who died on December 10 were Mrs. Endre Szebenyi, Klari Ormai, and Lici Muller - all employees of the Council.

111. Testimony of Stockler in the case against Vajna in 1946. Karsai, Itel a nep. p. 267.

112. On December 30, 1944, when the ghetto 's population was approximately 50,000, there were 5,644 children, 5,957 patients, and over 10,000 old people who needed special diets.

113. The public kitchens played a vital role during the ghetto 's life. Their effective operation in the midst of great adversity is due not only to the devotion and sense of duty of the managers, cooks, and kitchen personnel, but also to the heroic endeavors of the leaders and officials of the Jewish Council. The kitchen's capacity increased with the passage of time. On January 10, 1945, for example, the public kitchens distributed 58,845 portions. Of these, the Orthodox Public Table was responsible for 23,000, the Stern Kitchen for 15, 131, the Skreck Kitchen for 12,757, and the kitchens at 5 and 22 Sip Street, for 2,836 and 5, 121 portions, respectively.

127. The draft legislation was championed in the lower house by Robert Haala, a Nyilas deputy. The representatives of the Christian churches opposed the law because, among other things, it violated the prerogatives of the ecclesiastical authorities. C. A. Macartney, 2: 468; Teleki, Nyilas uralom Magyarorszagon, pp. 141 - 142.

128. On December 23, 1944, the Soviet government announced the formation in Debrecen of a "Provisional National Government of Hungary" headed by General Dalnoki Bela Miklos and a 230-member Hungarian Provisional National Assembly composed of 72 Communists, 57 Independent Smallholders, 35 Social Democrats, 12 National Peasants, 1 Peasant Unionist, 19 trade union representatives, 8 bourgeois party representatives, and 26 deputies representing various smaller parties and organizations. ln his policy declaration of the following day, General Miklos promised the repeal of all antidemocratic laws, including the anti-Jewish laws, and the punishment of traitors and war criminals. C. A. Macartney, 2: 464.

129. Otto Winkelmann, the Higher SS-and Police Leader in Hungary, was also concerned about protecting the long-range economic interests of the Reich. In a lengthy note addressed to Himmler on December 26, he requested that all agencies dealing with Hungarians on all matters, including the possible transfer of Hungarian enterprises and industries to Germany, be subordinated to him. NA, Microcopy, T- 175, Roll 59.

130. Ferenc Fiala, Zavaros evek (Troubled Years) (London: Aranyi Maria, 1965), p. 92.

131. The exact details of the 27 Wesselenyi Street massacre have been recorded in a memorandum prepared at that time by Rabbi Bela Berend. Around 10:40 P.M. on January 11 a gang of six to eight individuals dressed in German, Nyilas, and Honved uniforms entered the cellar where they first robbed and then killed 26 women, 15 men, and a child. They also killed a couple in another apartment. For Berend's memorandum, see Levai, A pesti getto, pp. 129- 130. Several statements on the Wesselenyi Street massacres, including the one by Emo Szalkay, the former head of the ghetto police, are included in the files of Berend 's postwar trial. Fovarosi Birosag (Court of the Capital), Budapest, NB. 2600/ 1946, pp. 42- 81.

132. For some details on Kun, see Janos Pelle, Kun pater, "a bosszu angyala" (Pater Kun, the "the Angel of Revenge"). Hetek, Budapest, 19 (August 28, 2015)35: 16- 17.

133. Szalai, a long-time member of the Arrow Cross Party, had been won over by the Jewish leadership toward the end of the war. He performed a number of valuable services for the Jews, including possibly the saving of the ghetto. Indicted for war crimes after the war, Szalai was exonerated by the Budapest People 's Tribunal (Nb. XVll.255/ 1945) in October 1945. His defense was supported by leaders of the Jewish community in recognition of his help during the Budapest ghetto period. The judgment of the court and several related documents are on file in RG-52. After the war Szalai lived under the name of Paul Sterling in Los Angeles, where he died in 1994.

134. The Jews arrested in various raids in Buda were normally taken to the Nyilas House at 46 Kapas Street or to the Radetzky Armory at Palffy Square. Their treatment was no different from that suffered by Jews in the Nyilas houses in Pest. Among those who were tortured to death at Kapas Street were Geza Steinhardt, a noted comedian, and Bela Elek, an official of the Swedish Legation who had saved hundreds of Jews during the death-marches to Hegyeshalom. Lajos Levy, see Antal Toszeghi, "Levy Lajos arckepe" (A Portrait of Lajos Levy). In: Evkonyv 1983 / 84 (Yearbook 1983-84). Sandor Scheiber, ed. (Budapest: Magyar Izraelitak Orszagos Kepviselete, 1984), pp. 369- 384.

115. The head of the Budapest Burial Society was Pal Lunzer, who was arrested shortly after the German occupation and kept as a hostage in Kistarcsa. From there he was deported to Auschwitz on July 19, 1944, in the transport smuggled out of Hungary by Eichmann. For further details surrounding the arrest and deportation of Lunzer, see Az Ember (The Man), New York, July 1, 1961. On the extraordinary deportations from Kistarcsa, see chapter 25. 116. Levai, A pesti getto, pp. 139 and 164-167.

117. ln the 1970s, Reverend Nagy served as the pastor of the First Hungarian Reformed Church of New York. For his recollections of the ghetto period, see his " Kepek a szomoru emlekil budapesti gettobol" (Reflections on the Sorrowful Days of the Budapest Ghetto). Megujhodas (Revival), Budapest, (February 15, 1947)

118. For details on Jakab Raile, see chapter 29.

(1017) Pressure on Horthy.

The domestic and foreign elements opposed to the anti-Jewish measures were obviously dissatisfied and disheartened by the indecisive and inconclusive nature of the Council of Ministers ' meeting. They kept up a relentless pressure on Horthy, who by then had been fully acquainted with the realities of the Final Solution, to halt the deportations. The Regent had been told of the horrors of the anti-Jewish campaign, among others, by his son, Miklos Jr., who had learned of them from Erno Peto, one of the leading members of the Central Jewish Council. Peta' s connection with the Horthys was through his son-in-law who, although Jewish, had served as secretary to young Horthy in the 1930s. Sometime in June 1944 Peto was introduced to Horthy Jr. by Dr. Dezso Onody, who was then serving as his secretary. At the Castle, which he had visited in secret, Peto revealed in great detail the horrors of the deportations from the provinces and the realities of Auschwitz as described in the Auschwitz Reports - a copy of which had been in his possession since the previous month. Horthy Jr. promised to reveal all he had heard to his father and gave Peto his secret telephone number. Peto was one of the few leading Jewish figures who had maintained close contacts with the Regent 's son until October 15, 1944, when the latter, too, became a prisoner of the Germans. 25

Aside from Peto and the leaders of the Christian churches, Horthy was also induced to act by Count Morie Esterhazy 26 and by Count Istvan Bethlen, his confidant and friend who had been in hiding at the time. Toward the end of June 1944, Bethlen submitted a long memorandum to Horthy in which he reviewed the need for the replacement of the Sztojay government and the means by which to achieve it. One of the major tasks of the new government, Bethlen argued, was (1018)

to put an end to the inhuman, stupid, and cruel persecution of the Jews, which does not behoove the Hungarian character, but with which the current government has besmirched the Hungarian name before the eyes of the world and which has given rise to the most loathsome corruption, robberies, and thieveries, into which, unfortunately, a considerable part of the Hungarian intelligentsia was also drawn. Unfortunately it will be hard to erase this stain from our good reputation, but these barbarities must be ended, because otherwise Hungarian Christian society itself will become incurably infected. 27

Concurrently with the ever-increasing pressure at home, Horthy was also subjected to ever-louder protests against the deportations and to specific demands for the cessation of all anti-Jewish measures from abroad. These protests and demands acquired a new dimension in July. Whereas until that date as a rule only the leaders of foreign countries were acquainted with the realities of the anti-Jewish persecutions through their diplomatic representatives in Hungary, in July these countries ' general population also became privy to the barbarities associated with the ghettoization and deportation of the Jews. Until that time the world press, including that of the Western Powers and the neutral countries, had provided only occasional references to the persecutions in Hungary. Although the leaders of these foreign countries, like the many individuals both in and out of governmental service, had by then been fully acquainted with the realities of Auschwitz (Chapter 23), they prevented the news from being widely publicized. The breakthrough came late in June, when an abbreviated version of the Auschwitz Reports, together with a summary of the ghettoization and deportation activities in the provinces, were sent by Moshe (Miklos) Krausz, the head of the Budapest Palestine Office (Palesztina Hivatal), to Switzerland (Chapter 23).

Copies of these materials were distributed to a number of influential church and political leaders and to the leading newspaper publishers and editors in Switzerland. 28 Practically overnight a press campaign was launched against the barbarous persecution of the Jews, ridiculing the so-called "chivalrous" character of the Hungarians. The newspapers provided gruesome details about the ghettoization and deportation processes and about the realities of Auschwitz and other concentration (1019) camps. They emphasized the incompatibility of the anti-Jewish measures not only with the previous reputation of Hungary, but also with the fundamental laws of humanity and Christianity. 29 The details provided by the Swiss press were picked up by newspapers in the Allied and neutral countries, providing additional momentum for action.

The Pope was finally induced to act. He addressed a personal plea to Horthy on June 25. President Franklin D. Roosevelt followed suit on June 26 and the King of Sweden on June 30. The President of the United States demanded an immediate end to the deportations and a cessation of all anti-Jewish measures, threatening further armed reprisals in case of refusal. Roosevelt' s ultimatum threatened that "Hungary 's fate will not be like that of any other civilized nation... unless the deportations are stopped." Shortly thereafter, the President' s message was reinforced by an unusually heavy air raid on Budapest on July 2. 30

Seriously perturbed as Horthy must have been over this reaction, perhaps the most important reason for his decision to do something about mitigating if not entirely ceasing the anti-Jewish persecutions was the swiftly deteriorating military situation, which threatened the collapse of Hungary together with its Nazi allies. The expeditionary forces of the Western Allies, after their successful invasion of Normandy on June 6, bad occupied Cherbourg; the Soviet forces, maintaining their relentless offensive, had occupied Vitebsk on the Dvina River and were about to cross the Dnieper; the Japanese fleet had suffered a major defeat at the Marianas Islands.

The Crown Council Meeting of June 26. In response to all these factors, including the inconclusive character of the Council of Ministers meetings of June 21 and 24, Horthy convened a Crown Council meeting for June 26 under his chairmanship. The draft statement that was prepared for him by Gyula Ambrozy, the head of the Governor 's Cabinet Office (Kormanyzoi kabinetiroda), included the following points on the Jewish question:

A review of the domestic and international protest against the Jewish persecutions to be summarized by Arnothy-Jungerth. (1020)

An expression of desire to halt the deportations, or at least if the Germans insisted on their continuation to have them handled by the German units themselves without the participation of the gendarrnerie. This was to be reviewed by Lieutenant General Faragho.

A request that the Jewish labor forces needed by Hungary be left in the country together with their families. This was to be reviewed by Lieutenant General Gusztav Hennyey, the chief of the labor service unit in the Ministry of Defense.

A wish that the exempted Jews as well as those to be exempted in the future not be taken illegally into the ghettos or deported.

An expression of desire that Endre should be relieved of the handling of the Jewish question and that Baky should be relieved of his position as Secretary of State. 31

At the Crown Council meeting of June 26, Horthy reviewed the domestic and international protests against the Jewish persecutions and specifically referred to some of the excesses that had taken place in the course of the deportations, including those at Komarom and Kiskunhalas. These were subsequently elaborated upon by Arnothy-Jungerth. Faragho maintained that the atrocities were the consequence of German actions. Sztojay, Imrédy, and Remenyi-Schneller spoke up in support of the Germans. Horthy, according to Arnothy-Jungerth's recollections of the meeting, was quite annoyed and ended the discussion by stating:

I shall not tolerate this any further! I shall not permit the deportations to bring further shame on the Hungarians! Let the Government take measures for the removal of Baky and Endre! The deportation of the Jews of Budapest must cease! The Government must take the necessary steps! 32

However, one of the first steps Sztojay took that same day was to advise the Hungarian representatives in the friendly and neutral capitals (Ankara, Bucharest, Sofia, Zagreb, Bern, Vichy, Madrid, Lisbon, Copenhagen, Helsinki, and Bratislava) bow to respond to the " allegations that appeared in the enemy and neutral press about the deportation of (1021) Hungarian Jews to Germany. They were instructed to give the following explanation:

In view of the position of the labor market in Hungary as well as the full share this country takes in the war, the government has not been able to raise the contingent of Hungarian workers for Germany but has wished to comply with the requests of the Germans by placing Jews at their disposal. It was on the grounds of this agreement that Jews were sent to Germany for work. Experience having proved that in foreign countries the Jews' willingness to work diminishes when they are separated from their families the members of their families were sent along with them. 33

This telegram appears to be the only available official document proving that the deportation of the Jews was the consequence of an agreement between the Germans and the Hungarians. 34

On June 28, the Council of Ministers met again to follow up on the Crown Council meeting and on the recommendations of the Regent. Arnothy-Jungerth gave a report on the American warning note of June 26 (which had been delivered via Maximilian Jager, the Swiss Minister in Budapest) and on the petition from the Vatican. He further reviewed the offers by the Swedish Red Cross on behalf of 300 to 400 Jews, by the Swiss for the emigration to Palestine of about 7,000 Jews, and by the American War Refugee Board to help the Jews in the ghettos and camps. Acting in the name of the Foreign Ministry, Amothy-Jungerth recommended that the Council accept the foreign offers in principle and reproached the Council for the haste with which the Jewish question was being solved in Hungary. He pointed out that though Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria had been invaded by the Germans respectively in 1939, 1940, and 1941, respectively, those countries still bad relatively large numbers of Jews - Slovakia 18,000 to 20,000, Romania 250,000 to 300,000, Bulgaria 40,000.

In spite of the opposition of Imrédy, Jaross, Jurcsek, and Remenyi Schneller, the Council of Ministers approved the recommendations of the Foreign Ministry concerning the Swedish and Swiss emigration schemes but rejected the offer of the American War Refugee Board. 35 However, the Council of Ministers, like the Crown Council meeting the day before, took no action to halt the deportations. (1022)

That same day, in accordance with the resolutions of the Council of Ministers, Sztojay personally banded Veesenmayer a note which incorporated the details of the Swedish and Swiss offers; Sztojay realized that with all the good will of the Hungarians, they could not fulfill their assumed obligations without the cooperation of the Germans. The note (322 /res. pol. 1944), dated June 27, summarizes the Hungarian government' s conception of the foreign schemes for rescuing or assisting Hungarian Jews at the time:

Recently several international welfare and humanitarian organizations have applied to the Hungarian government for permission to carry out welfare activities in the country.

They are pursuing humanitarian goals and thus want to extend aid to the Jews as well. Among them are the following activities:

1. On June 11, 1944, the Swedish Minister in Budapest requested of the Royal Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Hungarian government take a position on the activities planned by the Swedish Red Cross, whose objectives include:

(a) The placement, feeding, and clothing of orphaned and abandoned children in children's homes to be established through the Hungarian Red Cross.

(b) Aid for persons who were bombed out and left homeless and without means.

(d) Facilitating the emigration to Sweden and Palestine of Jews who have relatives in Sweden or have had business relations with Sweden over a longer period.

About 300 to 400 Jews are involved.

2. The emigration of Jews to Palestine. The emigration to Palestine, initiated by the Palestine Immigration Committee, of persons to whom the English government had offered entry (1023) permits. Entry permits that are issued will be forwarded to the Swiss Legation in Budapest by the Swiss government. On April 26, 1944, the Legation requested the Hungarian government to issue exit permits for the following Jews who are already in possession of immigration certificates to Palestine:

(a) One thousand children under 16 years of age, and 10 percent of adults as accompanying personnel.

(b) Nine families per week (approximately 30 to 40 persons).

(d) One thousand four hundred and fifty families.

A total of approximately 7,000 people is involved.

Accordingly, so far there has been regular emigration from Hungary such that about 400 to 500 people left the country for Palestine each month. Now the Swiss Legation is inquiring whether the Hungarian authorities would permit this activity to continue.

The Turkish Minister to Budapest communicated that he was authorized to issue transit visas to a large number of Jews passing through on the way to Palestine.

3. The American War Refugee Board, through the intermediation of a third party, has approached the Hungarian Legation in Bern for the transmission of the following proposals:

(a) It wishes to send clothing, food, and other articles via the Red Cross to the Jews and other (English, American) internees and political prisoners in ghettos and camps.

(b) It proposes financial assistance to the Jews combined with the repayment in Pengos of Hungary 's indebtedness in dollars.

(1047) […]

The number of converts in the early 1940s was so large that they felt compelled to form their own organizations under the auspices of the various churches. One of the primary objectives of these organizations was the promotion of social welfare among the converts. In the summer of 1942, the Good Shepherd Mission (Jo Pasztor Misszio) was established under the leadership of Jozsef Elias to serve the needs of those converted to Protestantism. The Holy Cross Society (Szent Kereszt Egyesulet) was established under the leadership of Jozsef Cavallier for serving those converted to Catholicism. 95

The somewhat privileged position enjoyed by the converts became a matter of life and death following Hungary's entry into the war in June 1941. Between this time and the German occupation in March (1048) most new converts were those who became subject to the military- related labor service laws. As converts they were usually placed in special labor service companies (although some served in mixed companies with Jews) and wore white armbands in contrast to the yellow armbands worn by the Jews. As members of these special white armband companies, they were very unlikely to be sent to the front lines in Galicia and the Ukraine, which in many cases meant almost certain death (see Chapter l0).

Following the German occupation, conversion took on a new dimension. Since the Christian churches had launched a fairly well-organized drive to have the converts exempted from the measures that had been adopted against the Jews, many decided to find protection under the umbrella of Christianity and were ready to convert to whichever Christian denomination proved receptive to their pleas. 96 Io the provinces, where the masses were not really aware of the impending disaster, the ghettoization-deportation process was so swift that there was little if any time for escape by conversion. Moreover, the Jews who were first subjected to this process lived in the northeastern part of the country and were among those most devoted to Judaism. Also, during this phase of the Holocaust in Hungary, when the Hungarian institutions of coercion were wholeheartedly cooperating with the Germans, exploiting the silence of Horthy, conversion offered no real means of rescue. The converts, like all others who were identified as Jews under the Nuremberg- type racial Third Law of 1941 (see Chapter 6), were treated just like those who clung to their ancient religion. Exceptions were usually made only in the case of converts who were married to Christians. The attempt at salvation through conversion often failed because of the malevolence of local officials or the ideologically motivated anti-Semites. 97

Conversion emerged as a means of escaping further prosecution only after Horthy's decision to halt the deportations on July 6 and the consequent establishment of the Association of the Christian Jews of Hungary. In response to vociferous demands by the leaders of the Christian churches, the converts received a number of governmental guarantees, including the suspension of their "dispatch for labor abroad" and their separation from the Jews. But by this time only the Jews of Budapest and those in the labor service companies were still in the country. Although the government stipulated that the privileges were to apply (1049) only to those who had converted before August 1, 1941, many of the capital's Jews nevertheless decided to escape the burdens of Judaism by embracing Christianity. The lines of would-be converts waiting outside the rabbinical offices on Wesselenyi Street and the parishes of the Christian churches on Nagymezo and Profeta Streets surpassed those of 1938 and 1939. 98 They were often so long that they aroused the interest of the Germans, who threatened appropriate countermeasures.

According to various reports, the " conversion fever" was triggered by a rumor that those converted up to July 11 would be immune to further persecutions. 99 The rumor had a basis in fact, for, as Veesenmayer reported in his telegram of July 8 (two days after the deportations were halted), Horthy had assured him that after the separation of the converts be would "soon" permit the deportation of the Jews of Budapest. 100 The telegram was obviously based on the agreement between the Sztojay government and Cardinal Seredi. In response to an intensive pressure campaign by the Christian churches (unfortunately it was a campaign among officials, not the public) culminating in the Cardinal 's threat to issue a pastoral letter to be read in all Catholic churches in the country, Sztójay clarified the position of the government in line with Horthy's decision. In his note to the Cardinal dated July 7, Sztójay emphasized that the converts would be allowed to form their own organization and above all that in case the deportations resumed, the converts would be exempted (Figure 25.1). 101 As the news of this governmental decision leaked out, the number of Jews eager to convert increased precipitously.

The German and Hungarian officials in charge of the Final Solution opposed this decision and launched a campaign to disseminate the Nazi view that equated the racial identity of the converts with those clinging to their faith. Their intention, of course, was to include the converts too in the Final Solution program as well. Toward this end, they also managed, via Bosnyak, to maneuver Rabbi Bela Berend, one of the members of the Central Jewish Council, into giving an interview that was published in the July 29, 1944 issue of Hare (Battle), the Hungarian anti-Semitic journal (see Chapter 14). (1050)

The natural tendency of many Jews to avoid persecution by conversion aroused great controversy in both the Jewish and non-Jewish communities. Many of the Jews eager to convert had been keenly aware of the realities of the deportations from the provinces and had lost faith in the ability of their lay and religious leaders to assure their survival. Like the Marranos during the Spanish Inquisition, many of the "converted" Jews clung secretly to their ethnic identity, if not religious faith, and merely professed to accept Christianity in order to escape persecution. Nevertheless, their behavior disturbed both the leaders and the devout stratum of the Jewish community. The leaders appealed to them to retain their loyalty to Judaism and to avoid the disruption and disharmony they might cause within the community by their conversion. 102 The devout condemned them for their cowardice and opportunism.

Ironically, the anti-conversion position of the devout Jews was as vociferous as that of the anti-Semites, if for different reasons. (1051) as the former wanted to retain the unity of the Jewish community, the anti-Semites agitated against conversions in order to assure the total success of the Final Solution program. They were vehemently opposed to the churches' offering any help or any means of rescue to Jews. They were eager to prove that a Jew remained a Jew even after conversion and as such subject to the draconic anti-Jewish measures. As the anti- conversion campaign took on an ominous tone, ordinary Christians often denounced Jews for their attempts to circumvent the anti-Jewish laws through an "insincere" conversion. 103

With the easing of the deportations threat after July 9, the churches themselves adopted a more restrictive position. The hierarchies of the various churches reminded their subordinate parishes to abide by the traditional rules and regulations relating to conversions, including the determination of the attitude and sincerity of the applicants and their completion of religious studies. In most cases, the Christian churches required an approximately six-month preparatory program of study and training in the faith. 104

The tougher position adopted by the Christian churches and the relatively more lenient policies of the Lakatos government led to a significant decline in the number of conversions. Following the Szálasi coup on October 15, the Nyilas went on a rampage without distinguishing between devout, converted, exempted, or protected Jews. Embracing Christianity now took on a new, informal form. Many of the Jews managed to acquire forged Christian (not conversion) certificates or identity papers with which they survived the ordeal. It was one of the many forms of resistance at the time against the design of the Nazis and their Hungarian accomplices to effectuate the Final Solution program.

In contrast to the Nyilas mobs which contained large numbers of armed adolescents, many among the official leadership continued to differentiate between various categories of Jews. The " protected" categories included most of those who were originally covered by the special exemption system introduced by the Horthy regime.

[…]

Ferenczy to the "Rescue" Horthy's decision to end the deportations early in July and the domestic and foreign diplomatic and military pressures underlying it (1058) made a tremendous impression on Hungarian officials, including some who had been actively involved in the deportation of the Jews from the provinces. Drawing the logical conclusion from the untenable military position of the Axis, they began to see the handwriting on the wall. With the Red Army then moving inexorably toward the Carpathians and with the Western Allies fanning out from their beachheads in Normandy, many Hungarian officials finally became convinced that Germany would ultimately lose the war. They no longer believed in the Fuhrer's assertions about the inevitability of final victory for the Reich, or in German reassurances about the deployment of new "wonder weapons." Thus, by adopting an opportunistic anti-German posture, some of the Hungarians had hoped to mask the despicable crimes they had committed only a few months earlier.

One of the most prominent among such officials was Lieutenant Colonel Laszlo Ferenczy, the liaison between the Eichmann-Sonderkommando and the Hungarian authorities and the gendarmerie officer in charge of the ghettoization and deportations from the provinces. 132 Shortly after the completion of the deportation from the communities surrounding Budapest, Ferenczy, presumably reassessing the domestic and international situation, decided to ingratiate himself with the Regent and with the leadership of the Central Jewish Council. He had hoped to persuade the Regent that he was a patriot eager to protect Hungarian national interests against encroachment by the Germans, and to assure the Central Jewish Council that he was the savior of the Jews of Budapest. He was thus most eager to meet with the Regent and the leaders of the Council. Since he could not approach the Regent directly, he decided to first inform his immediate superiors in the government - the Minister of the Interior and the Prime Minister 133 - about the Germans' apparent intention to expand the scope of the occupation if the Final Solution program was not completed. In his view at the time, the Germans seemed so eager for the deportation of the Jews of Budapest that they were ready to transform Hungary into a protectorate to achieve it. He outlined the details of the Germans ' designs in a lengthy memorandum he first submitted to Jaross. It was also around this time that Ferenczy had first asserted that he had become convinced that the Jews "deemed unsuitable for work" were indeed being exterminated in Auschwitz. 134 Ferenczy based his new-found conviction on Eichmann 's response to this (1059) request to visit Auschwitz "to see for himself how the Hungarian Jews were being screened and assigned for labor. "Eichmann had agreed to the request, but with the proviso that the visit could only take place 30 days after the departure of the last transport of Jews from Hungary.

Ferenczy' s appeal to Jaross and Sztójay for permission to see Horthy was left unheeded. 135 He therefore decided to exploit the connections that the leaders of the Central Jewish Council bad with the Palace, and to take the opportunity to persuade the Council leaders of bis readiness the save the Jews of Budapest. He found a chance to get in touch with the leaders of the Council around the middle of July, about the time when Eichmann and his SS associates were planning the deportation of Jews from the Kistarcsa camp. The opportunity for the contact was provided on July 9 by the arrival in Budapest of Raoul Wallenberg, one of the authentic heroes of the Holocaust era.

Wallenberg had brought with him a list of 630 Hungarian Jews whose immigration into Sweden was being sponsored by friends, relatives, or business associates there and for whom the Swedes had issued the necessary visas. When this list was given to Ferenczy for handling, along with the Swiss list of 2,000 Jews approved for emigration to Palestine, he had a good pretext for approaching the Council. Accordingly, sometime during the middle of July he telephoned the Council and requested that one of its members come to see him. Unaware of the details of his plans but fully conscious of his criminal role in the earlier deportations, the members of the Council were understandably apprehensive about Ferenczy's intentions. Istvan Kurzweil, a leading member of the Council 's Housing Department, volunteered to see him. 136 Ferenczy told the astonished Kurzweil about the opportunity for 2,630 Jews to leave the country with the approval of the German authorities and the cooperation of the neutral countries. Ferenczy also assured him that arrangements had already been made by his office to allow the emigration in the very near future. He requested that "for reasons of security" the Council make available a number of modern Yellow-Star houses exclusively for these Jews.

The Council received Kurzweil's report with ambivalent feelings. The members did not want to jeopardize the possible emigration of a relatively large number of Jews, but they were nevertheless fearful that Ferenczy' s plan was just a ruse which would lead to the renewal of (1060) deportations. They decided to proceed very cautiously, eager to ascertain the true character and implications of Ferenczy's request. They insisted on first receiving the lists of individuals involved, claiming that without their personal data they could not make arrangements for relocation. To their great surprise, Ferenczy immediately handed over the Swedish list. A few days later, under pressure from Ferenczy's office, the Council leaders set aside a number of Yellow-Star houses on Pozsonyi Road for the Jews slated for emigration to Sweden. These would become the first so-called "protected" (vedett) houses, which later served as the nucleus of the "international ghetto" (nemze tkozi getto) during the Szálasi era (see Chapter 26). They were also the source of a major conflict among the Jewish leaders.

A short time later, Kurzweil and Ferenczy had a second meeting, this time with several other members and officials of the Council (including Peto, Bela Berend, and Gabor) and with Captain Leo Lulay, Ferenczy' s deputy. Ferenczy informed the Jewish leaders about the changed situation, the dominant role the Germans had played in the deportations, and the "life-and-death struggle" he and his close associates were waging against the Gestapo. To camouflage his own criminal role in the Final Solution program, he inquired, feigning naivete and innocence, about the realities of Auschwitz inasmuch as he was unable to travel there to obtain first-hand information. 137

Speaking for the group, Peto enlightened him about the German extermination camps and reminded him of the tenuous military position of the Axis, intimating that Hungary might suffer at any peace conference because of its cruel treatment of the Jews.

After this meeting, Ferenczy 's contacts were restricted mostly to the three leading figures of the Council (Peto, Stern, and Wilhelm), although on some occasions he also met Rezso Kasztner, Lajos Stockler, and the Zionist leader Otto Komoly. 138 Some of the talks were held at Stern's home, in the greatest secrecy. Ferenczy again tried to persuade the Jewish leaders of his own innocence by "proving" that the deportations and all the horrors associated with them were the exclusive responsibility of the Germans. 139 Taking advantage of his changed position and bolstering his ego by singling him out as the possible savior of the Jews of Budapest, the Jewish leaders worked out with Ferenczy a secret plan for preventing further deportations. According to the plan (1061) the Hungarian authorities, including the gendarmerie, would simulate continued cooperation with the Germans, but when it came to the actual deportation of the Budapest Jews the combined gendarmerie-military forces of Hungary would in fact intervene to prevent their removal.

Since neither the Jewish masses nor the other members of the Central Jewish Council had any idea of the secret understanding between Ferenczy and the top Jewish leaders, the appearance of gendarmes on the streets of Budapest, coupled with rumors about impending deportations, caused near panic among the Jews of the capital. Lajos Stockler, who was appointed to the Council on June 22, was particularly upset by the failure of the leadership to call an Executive Committee meeting on the issues confronting the remaining Jewish community. He gave public expression to his feelings on several occasions. 140

In the meantime, Stern and his close associates continued to work out the details of their clandestine deal with Ferenczy. On one occasion they also discussed the possibility of active resistance against the Germans and their Hungarian hirelings, the Nyilas, with the collaboration of organized labor. The support of the latter was promised by two prominent trade union leaders of Hungary - Lajos Kabok, the Social Democratic member of the lower house, and Sandor Karacsonyi, the head of the Iron Workers (Vasasok) - who also met Ferenczy at the behest of the Jewish leaders. (Both were killed by the Nyilas in the fall of 1944.)

Ferenczy and Lulay prudently insisted that all the plans be kept secret even from the members of the Sztójay government, as otherwise they might be jeopardized. Peto, who had already established close personal relations with Horthy Jr., kept the Regent's son fully informed about all developments.

In the course of one of the meetings with the Jewish leaders, Ferenczy requested their help in obtaining an audience with the Regent. Through the good offices of Horthy Jr. a meeting was set up for early in August; Ferenczy also saw the Regent three more times that month. He brought him up to date on the activities of the Gestapo in Hungary and the troop strength of the various German units in the country. 141 During his first meeting with the Regent Ferenczy also submitted the text of a protest note, in German, which he had prepared with the cooperation of the Council and planned to transmit to Veesenmayer. Designed to (1062) crystallize the new position of the Hungarian government on the Jewish question, the note included five major points:

The Hungarian government would remove the Jews from Budapest to various camps in the provinces, but would not hand them over to the Germans for removal from the country.

The Eichmann-Sonderkommando was to be recalled from Hungary.

All political and legislative leaders in German custody were to be surrendered to the Hungarian judicial authorities.

The Pest County Jail was to be transferred to Hungarian control.

The Germans were to surrender all Jewish wealth and warehouses confiscated since the occupation.

The note, according to Ferenczy, was edited as per Horthy's suggestion into a diplomatically more acceptable form by Denes Csopey, the bead of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but reportedly was not handed to Veesenmayer until late in August. 142 These issues were once more discussed in the Council of Ministers on August 10. The views of the Foreign Ministry were expressed that same day in a memorandum addressed to Istvan Barczy, the Council's State Secretary. Forwarded over the signature of Csopey, the memorandum aimed to provide a solution to the German offer to consent to the emigration of a limited number of Jews if Hungary agreed to the resumption of the deportations. 143

The post-Sztójay officials were apparently convinced of Ferenczy's change of heart. On August 29, 1944, Minister of the Interior Miklós Bonczos formally appointed him to be in charge of Jewish affairs. 144 The Jewish leaders, however, were more skeptical. Their suspicions about Ferenczy's double-dealings were fully corroborated shortly after the Nyilas coup. With Szalasi in power, Ferenczy once again assumed an openly active role in the anti-Jewish drive. The leading members of the Central Jewish Council, who knew too much about Ferenczy's (1063) revelations to the Regent, had to run for their lives, for the gendarmerie officer did not want to become the subject of blackmail or to have any potentially "dangerous" witnesses around. The prevailing evidence clearly indicates that Ferenczy never really intended to switch sides. His primary objective in getting access to Horthy had reportedly been his desire to obtain details about the Regent's plan for a volte face and transmit them to the Germans, whose trusted informer be always was.

New Deportation Threats

The Eichmann-initiated deportation of Jews in the Kistarcsa camp in defiance of Horthy's orders in mid-July emboldened the experts in charge of the Final Solution to resume their preparation for the deportation of the Jews of Budapest, which they rescheduled for August 5. 145 The Kistarcsa incident, coupled with the preparatory work taking place in Bekasmegyer - the entrainment center from which the Jews of the Budapest suburbs had been deported earlier in the month - created a very depressing atmosphere among the Jews of the capital. As rumors ran rampant about the imminence of the deportation, they prepared themselves physically and psychologically for the worst. Their fears proved unfounded at this time, though, mostly because the Hungarian gendarmerie was no longer as readily available to the Germans as it had been before July 8. Moreover, Baky and Endre had by this time been relieved of jurisdiction over Jewish affairs and Ferenczy was visibly searching for an alibi.

The passing of the August 5 deadline and the replacement of Minister of the Interior Jaross by Miklos Bonczos two days later were greeted with great relief. This was, however, temporary; on the night of August 9, Fulop Freudiger, along with his family and some friends, escaped to Romania, and the news spread rapidly throughout the Jewish community on the following day. Freudiger had managed to escape with the aid of Dieter Wisliceny, with who he had been on reasonably good terms since shortly after the German occupation thanks to the intermediation of Rabbi Weissmandel of Bratislava (see Chapter 14). Because of his close contact with Jewish leaders abroad and with Wisliceny, Freudiger was widely believed to be one of the best-informed members of the Jewish community. Accordingly, his sudden departure was (1064) construed as a harbinger of imminent deportation. Aside from the panic that it created among the uninformed Jewish masses, Freudiger's escape resulted in the arrest of some leaders of the Council. Janos Gabor was arrested almost immediately after Freudiger's escape became known; by coincidence, he had been visiting Eichmann's office at the time. On August 18 the Gestapo also arrested Peto, Stern, and Wilhelm, who only the day before had been exempted from wearing the Yellow Star. The latter two were freed the following day after the resolute intervention of Horthy, but Peto was mistreated and kept in custody until August 21.

The departure of the Freudiger family elicited considerable controversy both during and after the war. Freudiger's opponents had argued - and continue to argue - that he fraudulently used the passports the Romanian government had placed at the disposal of Romanian Jewish nationals living in Hungary. Freudiger, however, consistently maintained that the documents he and his family used were provided through Eugene (Jeno) Meisner, a relative who had then lived in Bucharest. 146

Notwithstanding the governmental reorganization of August 7, the Jewish question continued to preoccupy the Hungarian authorities both internally and in their dealings with the Germans. At the August 10 meeting of the reorganized Council of Ministers, Arnothy-Jungerth again took the initiative in outlining the position worked out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 147 He argued for the adoption of a policy that would put the Jewish question to rest. In his view, this was required for domestic political reasons and for reasons connected with German-Hungarian relations. He also claimed that the change in policy would enable Hungary to meet its commitments to the neutral countries and the International Red Cross with respect to the possible emigration of the Jews on the Swedish and Swiss lists.

In Arnothy-Jungerth's view, the Jewish question could be put to rest if the Regent were to issue a declaration specifying the measures he would be ready to adopt in return for certain commitments on the part of the Germans. According to Arnothy-Jungerth, there were 164,000 Jews registered in Budapest's Yellow-Star houses, of whom 20,000 were converts and 10,000 were scheduled for emigration. He suggested that the problem of the remaining 134,000 could be solved as follows: that: (1065)

Approximately 50,000 to 60,000 Jews, identified as "Galician and infiltrated," were to be offered to the Germans.

The Jews in the labor service units and their families (wives, children, and possibly parents) were to be retained, but those not actively employed were to be placed in ghettos in the countryside "like the 45,000 German Jews in Theresienstadt."

Jews legally exempted from the anti -Jewish laws as well as those, up to a given number, exempted by Horthy 's special dispensation, were to be retained in the country.

As a quid pro quo, the Germans were to issue a declaration stating

As a result of these measures, the Jewish question would be considered solved and the Sonderkommando would be recalled.

All direct contacts by the Germans with the Jewish Council would be severed and no unilateral deportations like those of Kistarcsa and Sarvar would be undertaken.

Direct negotiations with Jews relating to various emigration schemes not involving the Hungarian authorities would be discontinued. 148

The emigration of the specified Jews covered by the initiatives taken by the International Red Cross, the Swedish Red Cross, and the Swiss government would be permitted.

The deported Jews would remain alive.

The property of the deported Jews would be recognized as part of the Hungarian national wealth.

In addition to the position paper, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also prepared the draft letters for submission to the Germans. According to these drafts, "the Jewish labor force needed for the German war effort" was to be placed at the disposal of the Germans beginning on August 28. 149 (1066)

In the meantime, the German-Hungarian discussions on the possible resumption of the deportations were continuing at the diplomatic level within the framework of the Ferenczy scheme. Twice postponed, the deportation of the Jews of Budapest was rescheduled for August 25. 150 Shortly after the governmental reorganization of August 7, Sztójay assured Veesenmayer that the deportations would be resumed "within eight to 14 days." A similar promise was made by Bonczos to Eichmann on August 13. The August 25 date was selected on the assumption that by then the exit visas for the Swiss and Swedish groups would be available.

Excluded from the deportation would be all Jews with foreign citizenship (they were to be interned on August 26) and about 3,000 "exempted" Jews in whom Horthy had shown a special interest. 151

Even those Jewish leaders who were privy to the secret understanding with Ferenczy again feared imminent disaster. Their anxiety increased after learning that Peto, upon his release from jail, had been ordered to prepare a list of the leaders, officials, and employees of the Council and to submit it to the Eichmann-Sonderkommando headquarters on the Svabhegy. To stall for time, the Council prepared such a list, containing over 1,000 names, but did not include anyone's address. The request for the missing information was not received until the day before the scheduled deportation.

The Sonderkommando in Hungary appears to have been in a vengeful mood. Practically everywhere else in Nazi-dominated Europe, including the Hungarian provinces, the SS had tried to gain cooperation from Council members. They would be among the last to be taken into the ghettos, and were usually deported with the last transport. In Budapest, however, the Jewish political leaders had continuously tried to strengthen their ties to Hungarian political, military, and governmental leaders in hopes of keeping their community alive until the end of the war. Specifically, their objective was to enlist the Hungarian authorities' aid to prevent the deportation of the remaining Jews. The SS recognized the increasing influence of the Jewish leaders as reflected in Horthy's decision to bait the deportations and in the Kistarcsa incident. It therefore concluded that, in Budapest, the successful deportation of the Jews required the prior elimination of the Jewish leadership. (1067)

Some of the details of the Germans' plans were reviewed by Ferenczy when he met with Peto and Wilhelm on August 24. He confirmed that the SS bad decided to give priority to the deportation of the Council members and their families. He also gave them other details of the planned operation, including the order in which the districts were to be evacuated and where the camps surrounding Budapest, from which the deportations were to take place, would be established. The entire process was scheduled to be completed by September 18. 152

The top leaders of the Central Jewish Council became extremely apprehensive. While they recognized that Ferenczy had legitimate reasons to collaborate with them, they were not absolutely convinced that, given his prior record, he would carry out his new commitment. They were also plagued by the nightmarish feeling that Ferenczy might in fact be an agent provocateur working for the SS in a bizarre plot to double-cross Horthy and his allies. Their apprehension of these top leaders was matched by the frustration and anger felt by the other leaders of Jewry who were not privy to the secret arrangements with Ferenczy. The panic felt by the Jewish masses grew day by day as the rumored deportation deadline approached. 153 Accordingly, the leaders of the Central Jewish Council decided to take all possible precautionary measures complementing the scheme worked out with Ferenczy. They also pleaded with their friends among Hungarian officialdom and the representatives of the neutral countries and the Vatican to intercede against the resumption of the deportations. The latter obliged. An unusually blunt note, signed by the Apostolic Nuncio Angelo Rotta, Minister of Sweden Carl Ivan Danielsson, representative of Portugal Carlos de Liz-Texeira Branquinho, representative of Spain Angel Sanz-Briz, and representative of Switzerland Antoine J. Kilchmann, was sent to the Hungarian government. It emphasized that the world bad been aware of the realities behind the deportations, euphemistically referred to by the Hungarians as "supplying labor for Germany. " Dated August 21, it read as follows:

The undersigned representatives of the neutral powers accredited to Budapest have learned with painful surprise that the deportation of all the Jews of Hungary is to be started so on. We also know, and from an absolutely reliable source, what deportation means in most cases, even when it is masked as labor service abroad. (1068) Aside from the sad fact that the new deportations in your country will deal a death blow to the reputation of your country, which is already seriously damaged by the deportations effectuated so far, the representatives of the neutral powers, motivated by feeling s of human solidarity and Christian love, feel duty-bound to lodge a strong protest against this unjustly motivated and inhumanely implemented process, as it is absolutely impermissible that people should be persecuted and sent to their death simply for their racial origin. We demand that the Royal Hungarian Government put a definitive end to this process, which for the honor of humanity should not have been permitted in the first place. We express the hope that Hungary, pursuing its ancient traditions, will return to the chivalrous and deeply Christian principles and methods that have secured it such a high place among the civilized nations. 154

The anxiety of the Jews was heightened by plans for the relocation of the "protected" Jews into special Yellow-Star houses on Pozsonyi Road with the concurrent transfer of the "unprotected" occupants to the apartments thus vacated. This exchange was viewed as still another ominous sign of the impending disaster. The relocation issue became the source of a vehement dispute among the Council members. One of the leaders who had been particularly upset over the selection of the buildings on Pozsonyi Road was Lajos Stockler. Emerging as the champion of the "unprotected" Jews, Stockier thought it would be a great injustice to the inhabitants of the affected houses, who had been assigned there just a few weeks earlier, to be relocated once again for the benefit of a relatively small number of newly privileged Jews, many of whom had good personal relations with leading members of the Council.

Heeding Ferenczy's warning, however, the Central Jewish Council proceeded with its relocation plans. According to its resolution of August 23, overall responsibility for the relocation was entrusted to Jeno Bleier. He was to be assisted by Erno Szalkai and Vilmos Vasadi, who would act as liaison men with the Swedish Legation. Overall administrative responsibility for the "protected houses" on Pozsonyi Road was entrusted to Gyorgy Bognar. Only Jews in possession of the Council's relocation certificates and of the Protective Passes (Schutzpässe) issued by the Swedish Legation were to be permitted entry into the selected houses. 155 (1069)

In the meantime, the German -Hungarian discussions relating to the planned deportations of the Jews of Budapest were continuing in the midst of mutual suspicion. While the Germans, in accordance with the Fuhrer's directive, insisted that the bulk of Budapest Jews be deported before they would issue exit visas for the few thousand Jews on the Swiss and Swedish lists or that at least both operations occur simultaneously, the Hungarians were eager to ensure the emigration of these few thousand Jews in order to acquire some international goodwill and to stall on the issue of mass deportation. One of the reasons that Hungary resolutely refused to start the deportations as scheduled on August 25 was that Romania had extricated itself from the Axis Alliance only two days earlier. Hungary 's historical enemy had not merely asked for an armistice, but had actually joined the Allied powers and had shortly thereafter declared war on both Germany and Hungary.

Horthy had a lengthy talk with Veesenmayer on August 24 during which he pointed out that he had often warned the Fuhrer about the unreliability of the Romanians. He also discussed with him the possibility of a governmental reorganization. 156 With respect to the Jews of Budapest, the Regent told him that be would " shortly" have them transferred from the capital to the interior, but that his conscience forbade him to allow their deportation to Germany. The message from the other spokesmen of the Hungarian government was the same. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs apparently informed all its representatives abroad that "there will be no more deportations. " 157 Bonczos informed Eichmann on August 24 that in accord with Horthy's instructions and "in contrast to his earlier position" the Jews of Budapest would be transferred from the capital into five large camps yet to be built somewhere outside the city, but would not be deported to Germany. Eichmann, obviously shocked, requested the RSHA to recall the Sonderkommando, as it had become superfluous. 158

Himmler's response was a telegram addressed to Otto Winkelmann, the Higher SS-and Police Leader in Hungary - it was delivered at 3:00 A.M. on August 24 - by which further deportations from Hungary were forbidden. 159 Following Romania's change of sides, the Reichsführer-SS had become especially eager not to offend the Hungarians and, despite Hitler's more intense ideological position on the Jewish question, had decided to safeguard Hungary's alliance in the Axis camp (1070) even at the expense of a partial failure of the Final Solution program. Himmler's decision did not, of course, denote a fundamental change in his attitude towards the Jews; it merely reflected a tactical retreat, based upon military considerations that aimed at safeguarding the position of German troops in Romania and elsewhere in the Balkans by assuring that their supply lines and avenue of escape via Hungary were not cut off. The Final Solution program was to be resumed after the expected stabilization of the military situation.

The decision of the Hungarian government to prevent the further deportation of Jews was officially communicated to Veesenmayer on August 25 by Lajos Remenyi-Schneller, who had been serving as Acting Prime Minister. 160 At practically the same time, Ferenczy was given almost exclusive jurisdiction over the handling of the Jewish question in Hungary. He so informed the Central Jewish Council in a note dated August 28, emphasizing that from that day forward no other representative of any Hungarian or "allied" (i.e., German) organ or organization could negotiate with the Council or issue orders or instructions to it. These functions were thenceforth to be carried out exclusively by him as a representative of the Ministry of the Interior. 161 The following day Bonczos notified all the prefects and requested that they cooperate fully with Ferenczy in the implementation of his duties. 162 The actions of Remenyi-Schneller, Ferenczy, and Bonczos were already a clear reflection of the spirit and policies of the new government Horthy was about to formally appoint.

The Lakatos Government

When he had consented to the establishment of the Sztójay government in March 1944, Horthy presumably believed that its members, although ultra-reactionary and pro-Axis in their ideological orientation, would pursue policies that would advance the national interests of Hungary as he understood them. Under the control and direction of the openly pro-Nazi elements, however, the government very quickly became a servile tool of the Germans, who consequently exercised de facto sovereignty during the first months of the occupation. To a large extent this was also due to Horthy 's failure to exercise his powers and exert his leadership; he conveniently decided to abstain from " (1071) involvement in certain questionable acts." The disastrous consequences of his abstentions and his government's servile policies became clearly visible by June. Undoubtedly, Horthy's awareness of his country's deplorable condition was also advanced by the spectacular successes of the Allies on both the western and eastern fronts.

Around the middle of June Horthy, convinced that for all practical purposes the Axis had already lost the war, began to toy more seriously than ever before with the idea of changing the government and thereby assuring a new course for the country's policies. His resolution to act on the matter was reinforced by a lengthy memorandum he had received later that month from his trusted adviser, Count Istvan Bethlen. Bethlen reviewed the disastrous policies that were pursued by the Sztójay government, often on the initiative of Imrédy, Jaross, Remenyi - Schneller, Kunder, or Endre. He suggested that the government be replaced and that "conscientious and strong men" should be appointed who would:

Place "honest and energetic men, irrespective of party politics," into leading positions.

Liquidate the war "in an honorable manner."

Put an end to the "inhumane, foolish, cruel persecution of the Jews." The memorandum also described the difficulties underlying the anticipated transfer of power and the measures required to overcome them. Bethlen went so far as to make concrete suggestions regarding appointees for various positions in the government. 163

Horthy first intended to replace the Sztójay government early in July, following Baky's coup attempt; be considered it again on July 17. Hitler's stern warnings and the fear of possible total occupation of the country, however, dissuaded him from carrying out his intentions that month. As a result of Bethlen's realistic counsel, Horthy decided to approach his goal cautiously, first by partially reorganizing the government through the dismissal of Jeno Ratz on July 19, the replacement of the outspoken pro-Nazi elements, including Imrédy, Jaross, and Kunder on August 7, and then sending Sztójay on a two-week "medical furlough." The German reaction to these preliminary moves was, unexpectedly, (1072) quite subdued. Presumably Hitler was preoccupied with domestic problems following the unsuccessful attempt on his life on July 20, as well as being increasingly concerned over the constantly deteriorating military situation. By August 29, Horthy decided that the time had become propitious for the formal appointment of General Geza Lakatos, the former commander of the First Hungarian Army, as Prime Minister.

In recognition of Hungary's delicate position as a member of the Axis Alliance eager to find an honorable way out to the war, the Lakatos government was a well-balanced one. To pacify the Germans, Horthy retained Remenyi-Schneller and Jurcsek; however, to advance his own objectives, he also appointed some new members who were clearly anti Nazi, including Ivan Rakovszky and Gusztav Hennyey. 164

An immediate and far-reaching consequence of the Lakatos appointment was the purging of many higher ministerial officers who had served as supporters or agents of the Nazis, including Baky, Endre, and Mihaly Kolosvary-Borcsa. Among the new appointees replacing them were more trusted men like Bela Horvath, Baron Peter Schell, and Endre Hlatky. Schell, a close friend of Lakatos who had for many years been the Prefect of Kassa, became Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior; 165 Hlatky, the former Prefect of Bihar County, became Secretary of State for the Press. 166 Of equal, if not greater, importance was the concomitant replacement of most right-wing municipal and county prefects who had sympathized with or openly supported Imrédy or the Nyilas or the Right extremists within the ruling Hungarian Life Party (Magyar Elet Partja - MEP).

Upon his appointment, Lakatos summarized his program as follows:

Continuation, as honorable Hungarians, of the struggle in defense of the frontiers.

Absolute preservation of peace and order.

Increase of production. 167

Lakatos' declarations were obviously and primarily made for foreign, especially German, consumption. The tasks with which he actually been entrusted by Horthy could not be publicized. They included: (1073)

The reestablishment of Hungarian sovereignty.

Preparations for Hungary's extrication from the war.

The immediate cessation of the Jewish persecutions. 168

With the inauguration of the Lakatos government, the anti-Jewish pressure in Budapest eased. Following the removal of Baley and Endre, Jewish matters in the Ministry of the Interior became the responsibility of Gyula Perlaky, a Ministerial Counselor. In accordance with the policies of the new government, Perlaky arranged to free the Jews being held in Horthyliget 169 as well as the 220 hostages held in Kistarcsa. 170 A delegation headed by Lajos Stockler paid a visit to Gusztav Hennyey, the new Foreign Minister, requesting that the government find a way to help the deported Jews. 171 Through the cooperation of various Red Cross organizations, Hennyey was instrumental in inducing the Swedish authorities to send parcels to various concentration camps. Although the gifts were stolen by the Germans on arrival, the Jews were grateful: in a statement to Hennyey, Stockler declared that "after a long time, this has been the first benevolent gesture of the Hungarian government toward the Jews, who know how to appreciate it. " 172 Another sign reflecting the new trend in the government 's Jewish policy was the decision to permit Jews greater freedom of movement during the upcoming High Holy Days and in connection with their work. 173

Lakatos summarized the position of his government on the Jewish question in his inaugural speech of September 21 before a joint session of the Hungarian Parliament:

With regard to the regulation of the Jewish question, we are in the process of implementing a procedure that will assure, through the strict application of legal means, the gradual employment for useful work of the most harmful elements and of the unemployed. 174

During the debate that followed the inaugural speech, the Jewish question was raised by Tibor Korody, a member of the lower house, who had been elected as a Nyilas deputy and who had changed his position over the summer and had maintained close relations with Komoly in an attempt to ease the lot of the Budapest Jews. 175 He startled the lower (1074) house by demanding the repeal of the "illegal measures" that had been adopted by the government and by suggesting a review of the entire Jewish question. The following excerpt from the parliamentary minutes reflects the scope of his statement and its reception:

During the past six months we have seen the adoption of a large number of decrees from which the nation received no benefit, (A voice from the extreme left [the side of the hall where the Nyilas were seated]: "But you did!") and whose only aim was to harm others, namely Jewry. (Loud interruptions from the extreme left).

We all know that the innumerable Jewish decrees that were adopted and implemented during the six months brought no improvement in the war situation either. (Continuous noise. The president uses his bell.) On the contrary, they denote the sabotaging of our total effort, for in this country, here in Budapest, during the greatest manpower shortage, there still live 250,000 Jews whose labor force could be exploited; these were compelled during the past six months merely to consume because in the absence of freedom of movement they could not engage in production. (Noise from the extreme left. Ferenc Rajniss: "Make them bank directors again! That's the wisest thing! " Lajos Csoor: "Surely not that! ") To reestablish a balance, immediate repeal is needed for all the above-mentioned decrees that were issued without any basis in law or legality, and it is absolutely necessary at least to submit them to Parliament for evaluation (Laszlo Budinszky " This is destructiveness! " Ferenc Rajniss: "Where is your green shirt?" A voice from the extreme left: "It turned yellow! " Laughter.)

I therefore respectfully request the acceptance of my proposal in order that Parliament may declare whether it agrees with the government' s program or not. (A voice from the extreme left: " What are the Jews paying you?" Noise.) 176

As expected, the lower house rejected Korody's motion. The Jewish question took on a new dimension under the agreement that was reached between the Germans and the Hungarians at the end of August. Following the Hungarians' resolute intervention to prevent the deportations that had been scheduled for August 25, the Germans reluctantly agreed to yield jurisdiction over the handling of Jewish affairs to the (1075) Hungarian authorities, to terminate direct contacts between the Sicherheitspolizei and the Central Jewish Council, and to gradually liquidate the internment camps. The Hungarians, for their part, agreed to the removal of the Jews from Budapest and to their mobilization for useful employment. 177

Mobilization for Labor

During the few weeks immediately before and after the formation of the Lakatos government, what remained of the Jewish community was tom between two conflicting feelings. On the one hand, they feared that the gendarmes and Ferenczy were in fact acting in collusion with the Germans and that the agreement relating to the concentration of the Jews of Budapest in the countryside was but the prelude to their eventual deportation. On the other hand was hope that, in view of the rapidly changing military situation, Horthy would stand by his resolution and prevent any further deportations. With the easing of the pressure following the original decision to halt the deportation early in July, the Jewish leaders devoted increasing attention to improving the living conditions of the people they led. With the material and monetary resources of the community almost exhausted, they tried to use the intercession of political, governmental, and church leaders to obtain more freedom of movement for the Jews and, above all, to obtain permission for the gainful employment of the physically and mentally fit Jews. A plea to this effect was included in their lengthy memorandum they had addressed to the government on July 24.

The military successes of the Allies coupled with the systematic bombings of Budapest provided a propitious climate for the political and Christian church leaders who intervened on the Jews' behalf. Late in July, the Council of Ministers instructed the Ministry of Defense to recruit through the Budapest municipal authorities 2,000 Yellow-Star wearing laborers and skilled workers for rubble-clearing operations. 178 Within the Central Jewish Council, the recruitment and administration of the labor service became the responsibility of the Veterans' Committee (Hadviseltek Bizottsaga). The recruited Jews received a daily meal and a per diem monetary allowance; their services were generally equivalent to those rendered by Jews in the labor service companies. By the (1076) first half of August, the headquarters of the Central Jewish Council at 12 Sip Street had become an official "labor service recruitment center" operating under the jurisdiction of Section XI of the Ministry of Defense. 179 Toward the end of the month, the rubble-clearing operations became intertwined with the general mobilization of the Jewish labor force for possible use in defense and related projects.

The Germans, in the meantime, were still pursuing their ultimate objective relating to the Jewish question, and were becoming increasingly impatient with the lack of movement relating to the implementation of the agreement on the "resettlement" of the Budapest Jews. They tried to exploit the issue of Jewish immigration under the Swedish and Swiss schemes as a lever to pressure the Hungarians into beginning the resettlement program. In view of their considerably weakened state by the end of August, however, they were no longer in a position to impose their will. Nevertheless, for tactical reasons, they insisted on at least a token resettlement of 1,000 Jews. 180 Their tactics apparently aimed at establishing the principle of resettlement per se; if their test case proved successful, they expected to follow it up first by mass resettlement into the Hungarian countryside and then by deportation.

The Jewish leaders were aware of the agreement regarding resettlement and all the possible pitfalls. Since they had to take some risks by cooperating with Ferenczy, they decided, having concurrently taken appropriate precautionary measures, to pay lip service to the agreement by appearing to be busily implementing it. They took full advantage of one of the provisions, which called for the establishment of camps that were up to "European standards." At that time, they bad the full cooperation of the Ministry of Defense, which had already been the source of rescue for many thousands of Jews during the deportation from the provinces. The Jewish leaders consequently decided to work toward the assignment at first of only a small number of Jewish units to build the concentration camps. The members of these units were to be selected on the same basis as those who were selected for the rubble-clearing detachments. The concentration of the Budapest Jews was to be initiated only after the completion of the camps and their verification by the Red Cross as being up to "European standards."

The first authoritative news about the nature and dimension of the Jews' mobilization for labor was published on September 7. The (1077) papers emphasized the difficult position of Hungary and the intolerable situation under which thousands of Jews had been living for months without work or income while the country was suffering from an acute shortage of labor. They reported that henceforth all Jews between the ages of 14 and 70, irrespective of sex or exemption status, would be employed "for defense work within the country" after undergoing an examination of their fitness. 181

The following day, the newspapers provided additional details about the recruitment procedures. Special examination commissions were to evaluate the Jews and assign them to various defense work projects in accordance with their skills. Those selected for labor were to receive the remuneration normally accruing to labor servicemen. Those unfit for defense work were to be concentrated in camps in the countryside under the supervision of the Red Cross and possibly employed in local enterprises requiring no special skills. Skilled workers were expected to be employed in defense-related industries and to be housed in Yellow-Star buildings. Unemployable Jews, including children and the aged, were to be housed under the supervision of the Red Cross. 182

Supervision over the organization and implementation of the plan for the Jews' mobilization for labor was entrusted to Colonel Janos Heinrich of the Ministry of Defense. This very decent and well-meaning officer, who was under the command of Major General Emo Horny, 183 worked in close collaboration with Captain Ede Gobbi. The latter worked out the details of the mobilization program, including the specification of the recruitment centers' activities. The medical evaluation of the labor recruits was the responsibility of Dr. József Doby, a military physician. The Central Jewish Council was represented on the recruitment board by Ferenc Schalk, who did everything in his power to drag out the recruitment proceedings. Although under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, the program was administered by officials of the Central Jewish Council, including Antal Adorjan, Ferenc Faludi, Rezso Muller, Frigyes Ripper, and Lajos Stockler. The rightist elements within the Hungarian administration resented Colonel Heinrich's "pro-Jewish" activities and arranged for his transfer to combat duty late in September. 184

The registration of all Jews born between 1874 and 1930 was to be the responsibility of the air-raid wardens. It was also to be their (1078) responsibility to take the registered Jews under their jurisdiction to the recruitment centers and to present them to the recruiting officers along with the lists they bad prepared. The following categories of Jews were not required to serve:

Exempted military personnel.

War invalids (at least 50 percent disabled).

Retired military personnel. Persons with foreign citizenship.

Self-employed artisans working for defense industries.

Members of the Rubble-Clearing Organization (Romeltakarito Szervezet).

The members and employees of the Central Jewish Council and of the Association of the Christian Jews of Hungary.

Workers in the service of the Demographic Statistical Office (Nepmozgalmi Nyilvantarto Hivatal).

Workers employed by various state agencies, including the railways.

Workers employed by the Germans if in possession of certificates issued by Wilhelm Neyer of the Todt Organization.

Workers employed in war industries.

Persons performing religious functions. Engineers, pharmacists, physicians, veterinarians, rabbis, teachers, and professors.

Persons exempted by the Governor. 185

Concurrently with the mobilization activities that were pursued under the jurisdiction of Colonel Heinrich, an intensive campaign for the "successful" implementation of the concentration program was being pursued by Ferenczy. He revealed bis special eagerness to fulfill the Hungarian commitment to the Germans by working for the concentration of those under 14 and over 70 in camps outside of Budapest. These (1079) were to be followed by the "unemployable" Jews of working age. He suggested an abandoned estate near Tura, northeast of Budapest, as a possible area of concentration for the first few thousand Jews from Budapest. Ferenczy's zealousness induced the Jewish leaders to do everything in their power to delay and possibly prevent the concentration of the Jews. They rightfully feared that once concentrated, the Jews would become easy prey for deportation. Since the Hungarian declarations relating to the German-Hungarian agreement stipulated that an important role would be played by the Hungarian Red Cross, the Jewish leaders decided to approach Dr. Lajos Langman, the chief physician of the organization, to make sure he understood the background and possible implications of the concentration and to propose specific recommendations for its delay or avoidance. Their memorandum read as follows:

The idea of placing the unemployable Jews into provincial camps in connection with the mobilization of Budapest's Jewry for labor has a long historical antecedent. Originally, following the entry of German troops, the Hungarian government agreed with the Germans that the solution of the Jewish question would fall under German jurisdiction. It was on this basis that the Hungarian and German authorities effectuated the deportation of the provincial Jews. After that only the Jews of Budapest remained and systematic deportation was therefore halted on July l0. Deportations thereafter took place only occasionally, without the knowledge or permission of the Hungarian authorities, and in fact against their will. Thus, at the end of July 1,400 people were taken from Kistarcsa, and early in August 1,500 people from Sarvar by the Germans, who appeared suddenly, surrounded the camps with their forces, cut telephone lines and, notwithstanding the protestations of the camp commanders, placed the prisoners into prepared freight cars and took them immediately out of the country.

Following protests and pressures by leading domestic personalities and by the whole outside world, the Hungarian government reached another agreement with the Germans toward the end of August under which the Jewish question was placed under the jurisdiction of the Hungarian government. In this connection the government, interested in utilizing the Jewish labor force to the country's advantage, undertook to remove the Jews from Budapest (1080)

On September 3, Lieutenant Colonel Ferenczy informed us officially that the mobilization for labor would take place, but that the concentration in the provinces would not. On the fourth, he instructed us that the recruitment would begin, on the fifth he stated that the unemployable persons would be transferred into provincial camps after all and that the recruitment would begin on the seventh. The recruitment has been going on ever since. On the basis of the well-known communique, the Hungarian Red Cross is also involved in the concentration. As the communique reveals, the role of the Red Cross revolves around the establishment of the provincial camps. It is also the responsibility of the Red Cross to "care for, supervise, feed, and provide health services to" children under working age. One may thus conclude that the Red Cross will play a decisive role in (1) the selection of campsites; (2) the supply and furnishing of the camps; (3) the accommodation of those transferred there; (4) the feeding of the inmates; (5) the provision of health services; and (6) general social welfare services.

Inasmuch as the entire operation was undertaken under increasing German pressure and presumably not in accordance with the preferences of the Hungarian government or the interest of all Hungarians, it would be desirable to be thorough in its implementation and thereby assure the concurrent delay of camp construction. In this connection, the activities of the Red Cross offer many opportunities.

Referring to the points above,

(I) The sites must be selected so that they are located in larger provincial centers in order to avoid a possible repetition of a Kistarcsa-type event;

(2) The camps must satisfy all humane and hygienic requirements, including the availability of sufficient drinking water, satisfactory kitchens, and adequate sanitary facilities. If these facilities are not available then work toward their establishment should be performed at the selected sites whatever the length of time required;

(3) At the time of the relocation emphasis must be placed on the avoidance of overcrowding and the breakup of families; (1081)

(4) One of the most important tasks of the Red Cross involves the food supply; it can help improve the lot of the "resettled Jews" through the organization and effective operation of the supply system that would permit the Jews to acquire food supplies themselves;

(5) Health services would be provided by the physicians transferred to the camps, with the Red Cross merely providing general supervision. Hospitals and suitable health-related equipment are absolutely essential;

(6) With reference to social services we are thinking primarily about the employment of the resettled Jews, i.e., about providing employment for every person in accordance with his work capacity. Related to this are supervision of the working period and provisions to ensure that children, the sick, and the aged shall not work beyond their physical capacity and at the expense of their health. Also related to the issue of social services are the matter of setting up of visiting rules and the establishment of mail service between camps as well as between workers and their families. 186

In addition to the Red Cross, the Jewish leaders also got in touch with many political, church, and government leaders, including Horthy. 187 Through the intermediation of Miklos Mester and Gyula Ambrozy, Samu Stern paid Horthy another visit, incognito, around the middle of September to warn him of the great danger that the concentration of the Jews would present. He pointed out that once the Jews were concentrated, the Hungarian government, "with all its good will," might not be able to prevent their deportation. 188 It was also possible, he argued, that the Germans might bomb the camps, using disguised aircraft markings as they had done in Kassa in June 1941. 189 The arguments advanced by Stern must have made an impact on the Regent, for the head of the Central Jewish Council left with assurances that there would be no more deportations or concentrations. 190

In the meanwhile, the Germans became increasingly annoyed with the obvious procrastination of the Hungarian government and pressed on relentlessly with their demand for the total evacuation of Jews from Budapest. In a telegram to the German Foreign Office on September 15, (1082) Veesenmayer complained not only about the failure of the government to carry out its commitments, but also about the activities of the representatives of neutral countries on behalf of the Jews. 191

The Germans continued to rely on Ferenczy for information. While dealing with Horthy and the Jewish leaders with whom he opportunistically displayed an ostensibly fierce anti-German position, Ferenczy was in fact in close contact with the Germans. In a memorandum of September 26, Theodor Horst Grell, the expert on Jewish affairs in the German Legation, emphasized Ferenczy's reassurance that the Jewish leaders themselves were now ready to cooperate in the removal of the Jews from Budapest because otherwise, they feared, their problem might be "solved" by the Germans following the return of the Eichmann-Sonderkommando. 192 Ferenczy also assured Grell that he was committed to the relocation of the Jews and demanded "symbolic German support" for his efforts. 193

In another secret memorandum, dated September 28, Grell was even more optimistic about the final outcome, having been told by Ferenczy that a new drive was planned against the Jews of Budapest in which 14 so-called "flying commissions" (fliegende Kommissionen), each able to seize between 400 and 500 Jews a day, would systematically search every house. The first transport of around 5,000 Jews was expected to depart within four to five days. An addendum to the memorandum listed the planned assembly centers in Budapest as well as the "evacuation centers" - i.e., concentration camps - in the provinces.

According to the memo, the Jews of Budapest were to be assembled at eight strategic locations and removed shortly thereafter to camps located near Alsonemedi, Galpuszta, Maglod, Olio, Dunaharaszti, and Tura. 194 Grell assured his superiors that the operation had in fact already begun that very day with the removal of an unspecified number of Jews by trucks. He envisioned the daily removal of 250 and 350 Jews. 195 Reporting on still another meeting with Ferenczy on September 30, Grell appeared somewhat more pessimistic. He requested guidance because he felt that Ferenczy was using an excuse to postpone the promised deportations. Grell must have misinterpreted Ferenczy's intentions, which were basically identical with his own. While at first Ferenczy had indeed complained that he was unable to begin the relocation of the Jews of Budapest because the camp at Tura had been taken over by a (1083) Wehrmacht unit, a week later, on October 7, he suggested that the Jews be instead placed in a ghetto similar to that of Warsaw. 196

Grell's various memoranda were submitted to the German Foreign Office by Veesenmayer on October 10, with a cover letter in which he complained that in spite of the various assurances given by the Hungarian authorities "not one single district has been properly cleared of all Jews." He noted that at least a beginning could have been made in the evacuation of Jews from Budapest "if more energy and fewer humanitarian considerations... had prevailed." Veesenmayer suggested that the German attitude be changed and that new measures be initiated "in order to carry out the evacuation of the remaining Jews from Hungary or Budapest either by German forces themselves or through pressure on the Hungarian government 197 Relaying Veesenmayer's messages to Ribbentrop, Horst Wagner, the head of Inland 11, attributed the Hungarians' reluctance to carry out the anti-Jewish program to their desire "to establish an alibi... for future eventualities." Wagner presumed that the solution of the Jewish question in Hungary required the involvement of SS troops and inquired whether Himmler should not be consulted in this matter. 198

The Germans' annoyance and frustrations over the failure to complete the Final Solution program were matched by their anger over the Hungarians' almost overt attempts to extricate themselves from the war. The Germans were fully informed about all the discussions that were taking place under the chairmanship of the Regent 199 and of all the decisions of the Council of Ministers in this respect. The Hungarians began to consider the idea of cutting their losses in the middle of the summer, when they became fully convinced that the Axis had lost the war. The drive acquired special momentum after the Romanians, acting more discreetly and more resolutely, anticipated the Hungarians with their dramatic volte-face move of August 23, 1944. This added a new and unexpected dimension to the problem, for the Hungarians now had to be concerned not only with their possible extrication from the war but also with the fate of Transylvania. These two concerns were among the most difficult problems confronting the new Lakatos government.

Owing to German pressure and the desire to advance its national security interests (including at least the retention of northern Transylvania, if not the reacquisition of the rest) Hungary decided early in (1084) September to move into southern Transylvania. It was a desperate attempt, doomed to failure. The ill-equipped Hungarian forces were no match for the combined Soviet-Romanian troops, who were not only well supplied with armor and other equipment but were also enjoying the momentum of a long string of military victories. 200

During their brief occupation of some parts of southern Transylvania some Hungarian units, led by ultra-rightist officers, engaged in anti Jewish excesses reminiscent of the barbarities of the Iron Guard era. Their brutality was particularly evident at Sarmas, which was occupied by Hungarian troops on September 5. Three days later the local Jews were required to post a Yellow Star on their front doors. On September 9 a group of local anti-Semites meeting at the house of Iuliu (Gyula) and Ecaterina (Katalin) Varga, the town's pharmacist, decided to eliminate the Jewish community. Among those actively involved in the decisions relating to the roundup, expropriation, and massacre of the Jews were Captain Laszlo Lancz, the commander of the Zilah gendarmerie unit that occupied the town; Lieutenant Vekardi, his deputy; Lieutenant József Biro, the newly appointed county head; Mayor Sandor (Alexandro) Szallay; and Deputy Mayor József Cziraly. The town 's 126 Jews - 31 men, 52 women, and 43 children - were first concentrated in the barns of Ion Pop, where they were held for about eight days; during this time, their homes were assigned to non-Jews by Szallay. On the night of September 16-17 the Jews were taken to the nearby Suscut Hill, where they were massacred by gendarmes under the immediate command of Lieutenant Vekardi. 201 The Hungarian troops' incursion into Southern Transylvania also resulted in the death of 17 Jews in Marosludas and of six Jews in Arad. 202

Threatened by the approaching Red Army, and with Budapest and other strategic Hungarian cities under almost constant bombardment, the Hungarian government spent virtually the entire Lakatos era "finding an honorable way out of the war." The Germans, who were fully aware of all the supposedly secret moves, make all necessary preparations not only to forestall the "stab in the back" but also to replace the Lakatos government by an exclusively Nyilas one. The ill-fated attempt by Horthy for a volte-face on October 15, 1944, which was as naive politically as it was unprepared militarily (Horthy, out of a misplaced sense of honor, told Veesenmayer of his intentions without taking any (1085) viable military contingency measures), put an end to an important chapter in Hungarian history. It not only brought about the downfall of the Lakatos regime 203 and the end of Hungary' s traditional social and political system, but also began a new tragic chapter in the history of Hungarian Jewry. 204

Notes

1. Horthy Miklos titkos iratai (The Confidential Papers of Miklos Horthy), Miklos Szinai and Laszlo Szucs, eds. (Budapest: Kossuth, 1963), p. 450.

2. Prime Minister Sztojay also served as the de Jure Foreign Minister. However, Arnothy-Jungerth acted as the de facto Minister, having received a free hand in the operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 213.

4. For the complete text of the letter, see Horthy Miklos titkos iratai, pp. 454--456.

5. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 214.

6. Horthy Miklos titkos iratai, pp. 444--449. The document was found, without identification, in the offices of the Regent's Cabinet Bureau.

7. Ibid., pp. 450-454.

8. RLB., Doc. 180.

9. See minutes of the June 10, 1944 meeting of the Council of Ministers in H N A, Roll 1.

10. For the minutes of the June 21, 1944 meeting of the Council of Ministers, see ibid. For the text of Arnothy-Jungerth’ s statement, see also Jeno Levai, Feher konyv. Kulfoldi akciok zsidok megmentesere (White Book. Foreign Campaigns for the Rescuing of Jews) (Budapest: Officina, 1946), pp. 48-49. In his Zsidosors Magyarors zagon, Levai identified the meeting of June 21 as having taken place on June 19 and that of June 23 as having taken place on June 21.

11. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarors zagon, p. 214. See also Az Endre- Baky-Jaross per (The Endre- Baky-Jaross Trial). Laszlo Karsai and Judit Molnar, eds. (Budapest: Cserepfalvi, 1994), p. 496.

12. These statistical data are in error. The number of those deported from the territories of the Army Corps cited in the text was around 362,000. The total number of Jews deported from Hungary until June 9, when the deportations were halted, was a little under 440,000. For a review of the figures relating to ghettoization and deportation, see Table 19.1.

13. There is no evidence that a partisan group ever intervened to block either the ghettoization or deportation process. Endre probably twisted the incident that took place in Satoraljaujhely, where a number of distraught Jews refused to enter the freight cars and lay down on the tracks. They were all shot by the gendarmes in charge of the entrainment. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 142.

14. This reference in Endre's statement is probably due to pressures in this connection from the Hungarian Red Cross (Magyar Voroskereszt), which, on June 20, 1944, applied to Prime Minister Sztojay for permission to set up refreshment and first aid stations at the major railway hubs along the deportation routes. The letter, signed by Elemer Simon, the national head of the Hungarian Red Cross, and Mrs. Istvan Horthy, the Governor's daughter-in-law in her capacity as the chief volunteer nurse of Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun County, stated that the Association of the Jews of Hungary did not have sufficient means to set up such facilities and that the International Red Cross Committee might one day question the Hungarian Red Cross about whether it had done everything possible to help the suffering human beings applying for such help. The application was supported by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by the time the Prime Minister's Office forwarded the request to the Foreign Ministry on July 14, the deportation of the provincial Jews had already been completed. Vadirat, 3: 186-188.

15. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, pp. 214- 218. A copy of the report is on file in RG-52.

16. Munkacsi, Hogyan tortent?, p. 164.

17. According to Faragho no complaints were ever filed against the gendarmerie, but he was compelled to investigate one case in Nagyvarad, where some negative comments were uttered by a few among the thousands of prominent Christians who had hidden Jewish wealth. Faragho also expressed his pride over the discipline of the gendarmes, claiming that "if we take into account that we have already transferred more than 400,000 Jews for labor and for resettlement, then the violations committed by a few among the 20,000 gendarmes must be considered as zero." HNA, Roll I.

18. Mester reportedly complained that the exemptions granted to many Jews were being ignored by the local authorities who would insist on getting instructions to this effect from either Baky or Endre. Mester allegedly further suggested that the handling of the Jewish question be transferred from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior to another department. The minutes of the Council meeting do not record these positions. For details on Mester 's alleged wartime views, see his lengthy February 18, 1977, interview in Peter Bokor's Vegjatek a Duna menten (End Game A long the Danube) (Budapest: RTV-Minerva-Kossuth, 1982), pp. 126- 181. See also Miklos Mester, Arckepek. Kettragikus kor arnyekan (Portraits. In the Shadow of Two Tragic Eras). (Budapest: Tarsoly Kiado, 20 I 2), 816 pp.

19. Levai, Feher konyv, pp. 52- 53.

20. Zaidi fled Hungary on January 15, 1944, after he had been condemned to 11 years' imprisonment for his role in the Delvidek massacres. He returned to Hungary with the German occupants as a member of the Waffen SS. See Chapter 6.

21. During their trials in 1946, Jaross and Sztójay gave conflicting versions of the Council's decision of June 23. Sztojay claimed the Council decided to end further deportations and permit the emigration of Jews to neutral countries, whereas Jaross claimed that while Sztojay expressed an opposition to further deportations at that meeting, no decision had then been taken to end them. Munkacsi, Hogyan tortent ?, pp. 166- 167. See also Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, pp. 219- 221.

22. Az Endre- Baky-Jaross per, op. cit., p. 565.

23. See minutes of the June 24, 1944 meeting of the Council in HNA, Roll I. For further details about the Council meeting, including references to Jaross's and Jurcsek's statements, see Levai, Feher konyv, op. cit., pp. 50-51, and Munkacsi, Hogyan tort enl?, pp. 163- 164.

24. Munkacsi, op. cit. See also Elek Karsai, Itel a nep (The People Judge) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1977), pp. 204-208.

25. Statement by Emo Peto in HJS, 3: 54-56.

26. Count Esterhazy prepared a number of memoranda on the Jewish persecutions and personally submitted them to Horthy. He was also influential in inducing the Nuncio, who lived on an estate in Csakvar, to mobilize the representatives of the neutral countries to exert pressure on Horthy and the Hungarian government and to inform their own governments and the world about the persecutions in Hungary. Munkacsi, Hogyanlorient?, pp. 171 - 172. The Nuncio, who was the dean of the diplomatic corps in Budapest, had been critical of Hungary's anti-Semitic policies since 1941. After the German occupation, he emerged as one of the most energetic critics of the anti-Jewish drive.

27. Horthy Miklos litkos iratai, p. 460.

28. See Zoltan Tibori Szabo, "Auschwitz-jegyzokonyvek: kikhez jutottak el, es mikor?" (The Auschwitz Reports: Who Got Them and When?). In: T- V, pp. 172- 202. o. See also his: "The Auschwitz Reports: Who Got Them and When?" In: The Auschwitz Reports and the Holocaust in Hungary ). Randolph L. Braham and William J. vanden Heuvel, eds. (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 2011), pp. 85- 120.

29. For example, see the following articles: Georges Rigassi, " Les Juifs Persecutes" (The Persecuted Jews), Gazelle de Lausanne (Journal of Lausanne), July 8, 1944; "Darfman schweigen?" (Can One Remain Silent?), Ne ue Zurcher Na chrichten (News of Zurich), July 5, 1944; " Die Ritter" (The Knights), St. Gallener Tagbla/1 (St. Gallen Daily), July 20, 1944.

30. On the attitude of the USA and the other members of the Grand Alliance toward the persecution of Hungarian Jewry, see Chapter 3 1.

31. Vadirat, 3: 3- 6.

32. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 221.

33. Eugene (Jeno) Levai, Eichmann in Hungary (Budapest: Pannonia Press, 1961), p. 119. See also Levai, Feher kony v, pp. 54-55. On June 27, one day after Sztojay's telegram was sent, the Radio Monitoring Service of the Hungarian Telegraphic Agency (A Magyar Tavirati froda Radiofigyelo Szolgalata) reported that a group of former Hungarian ministers abroad had made a joint declaration condemning the measures being taken against the Jews and other opponents of Nazism. The declaration, which was read in the Hungarian language broadcast of the Voice of America on July 17, was sponsored by Gyorgy Barcza, Baron Gyorgy Bakach-Bessenyei, Count Gabor Apor, Antal Ullein-Reviczky, Ferenc Ambro, Gyorgy Szabo, Andor Wodianer, and Laszlo Velics, the pre-occupation Hungarian ministers to London, Bern, the Vatican, Stockholm, Madrid, Helsinki, Lisbon, and Athens. The declaration was also sponsored by I. Bogdan, a counselor of the Hungarian Legation in Athens. For text of the declaration, see Vadirat, 3: 270.

34. Whereas Veesenmayer had rejected the suggestion of Paul Karl Schmidt, the Chief of the Information and Press Division of the German Foreign Office, to provide "external causes and reasons" for the deportations as necessary (Chapter 19) in early June. by the middle of July he too was eager to "explain " the deportations in order to counteract the "vicious propaganda directed against Hungary. " Like Sztojay, Veesenmayer also planned to exp lain that the "surplus labor" created by the anti-Jewish measures in Hungary was being shipped to Germany on the basis of an "agreement." Veesenmayer's planned communique would have explained how well supplied the Jews were and how humanely they were treated during their transportation to Germany. Ribbentrop, however, vetoed the publication of any communiques at all on this matter. RLB, Docs. 200 and 202.

35. Levai, Feher konyv, pp. 56- 71. This negative position on the War Refugee Board offer was subsequently altered. In his July 18 communication to Hungary 's representatives abroad, Sztojay claimed that the Hungarian government had authorized the International Red Cross to enact some of the proposals advanced by the WRB, including the sending of children under 10 years of age to Palestine. For further details, see below and Chapter 3 I.

36. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszcigon, pp. 222- 224; Vcidirat, 3: 199-204. Veesenmayer relayed the communication to the German Foreign Office on June 29. For the reaction of the German Foreign Office and of the Fuhrer, see below. For further details on Horthy 's decision to halt the deportations, see below; on the Swedish and Swiss offers, see Chapter 31.

37. See minutes of the Council of Ministers' meeting of June 28 in HNA, Roll I.

38. Vadirat, 3: 5. Endre stated that after his removal, the handling of the Jewish question was entrusted to Laszlo Szilagyi, a ministerial counselor in the Ministry of the Interior. See Endre's statement of December 17, 1945, in connection with the trials in Kolozsvar of Laszlo Gyapay, Laszlo Vasarhelyi, and Laszlo Csoka, the mayors of Nagyvarad, Kolozsvar, and Szatmamemeti. The original of the statement is on file in RG-52. Other sources, however, claim that the handling of the Jewish question after Endre 's removal was entrusted to Gyu la Perlaky, another ministerial counselor in the Ministry of the Interior. For further details, see below.

39. Foll owing the ouster of the Lakatos government and the overthrow of Horthy on October 15, 1944, both secretaries returned to power as part of the new Szálasi regime. See Chapter 26.

40. RLB, Doc. 183.

41. Ibid., Docs. 187- 188.

42. According to a number of historians, the main objective of the gendarmes' presence in Budapest was not the attempted coup against Horthy, but the roundup and deportation of the Jews. If Baky 's main objective was the coup, these historians argued, why was he allowed to remain in power until the end of August, that is until the appointment of the Lakatos government? See, among other things, Baky 's testimony during his war crimes trial in Az Endre-Baky-Jaross per, op. cit., p. 454. See also Ferenczy 's testimony on this subject, ibid., pp. 227- 228.

43. Ferenczy's statement to the Political Police Division (Politikai Rendeszeti Osztcily ) of Budapest after the war. Faragho denied having attended the meeting, claiming that he never dealt with either Eichmann or Endre on the deportation of Jews. Concerning Faragho's actual involvement in the plot, see C. A. Macartney, 2: 304. For further details on Faragho's involvement in the anti-Jewish drive, see Az Endre-Baky-Jaross p er, op. cit., pp. 54 1- 543 and 616.

44. For further details, see Ferenczy's statement to the Political Police Division on November 17, 1945, relating to the trial of Jeno Peterffy. Ferenczy asserted that the general plan for the deportation of Jews of the Budapest and neighboring cities had been worked out by Endre, Eichmann, and Lieutenant General Gabor Faragho. Taken by the Political Police Division, the statement is also available in Dosar Nr. 40029, Vol. 2, p. 182.

45. While Munkacsi (Hogyan torten/?, p. 177) places these events on July 5-6, Levai claimed (Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 228) that they took place on July 7 and 8.

46. The armored battalion that was ordered to Budapest by Major General Karoly Lazar and his fellow officers was led by Major Ferenc Koszorus. With the prevention of the coup the danger that had confronted the Jews of Budapest also disappeared. For further details on Koszorus's role in the rescue of the Jews, see Laszlo Karsai, Koszorus es a pesti zsidok (Koszorus and the Jews of Pest). Nepszabadsag, Budapest, July 8, 2014.

47. Munkacsi, Hogyan torten! ?, pp. 175 - 179; Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorsz agon, pp. 227- 230; Memento. Magyarorszag 1944 (Memento. Hungary, 1944), Odon Gati et al., eds. (Budapest: Kossuth, 1975), pp. 63-65. 48. Gyorgy Ranki, 1944. marcius 19 (March 19, 1944); 2nd ed. (Budapest: Kossuth, 1970), p. 273.

49. For the minutes of the July 5 meeting of the Council of Ministers, see HNA, Roll I. See also Vadirat, 3: 63-64.

50. RLB, Doc. 192. Veesenmayer assured Jaross that there were no plans to deploy additional SS troops to Hungary since the deportation of the Jews of Budapest was the responsibility of the Hungarians themselves.

51. Ibid., Doc. 166. The timing was corroborated by Veesenmayer in a telegram of June 13 in which he gave a detailed accounting of the deportations until that time. Ibid., Doc. 174.

52. Ibid., Docs. 168- 169.

53. Ibid., Doc. 171.

54. Ibid., Docs. 172- 173. For further details, see Chapter 19.

55. Ibid., Doc. 186.

56. The more lenient treatment of the Jews in these countries became the subject of an intensive diplomatic campaign in the summer of 1944. Ibid., Docs. 194 and I 96- 197. See also Chapter 28.

57. For details on the deal between the SS and the owners of the Weiss-Manfred Works, see Chapter 16.

58. RLB, Doc. 187.

59. Memorandum by Winkelmann dated July 7, 1944. Ibid., Doc. 188. 6

60. Ibid., Docs. 190-191.

61. Ibid., Docs. 324-326.

62. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem had requested the Hungarian government on June 22, 1944 to prevent the emigration of Jews to Palestine. On July 14, the Hungarians assured the Mufti via Sandor Hoffmann, the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, that they would carefully consider the request. Vadirat, 3: 159. See also Mate Kulifai, A palesztin Hitler (The Palestinian Hitler). Hetek, Budapest, 19(October 30, 2015)44: 18- 21.

63. Ibid., pp. 158 - 160.

64. Ibid., pp. 189- 190.

65. Ibid., pp. 197- 204.

66. Levai, Zsido sors Magyarorszagon, pp. 233 - 234.

67. For information on Bethlen' s memorandum to Horthy submitted at the end of June, see below.

68. The Confidential Papers of Admiral Horthy, pp. 316- 319.

69. RLB, Docs. 198- 199.

70. General Miklos was received by Hitler on July 21, the day after the dictator escaped an assassination attempt. According to Horthy, the General informed of the Germans that "if Hungary was not given the aid that had been promised her, she would have to withdraw from the war." Horthy, Memoirs, p. 222.

71. NA, Microcopy T-120, Roll 4203, Frames K.209133-134.

72. RLB, Docs. 200 and 202.

73. See Schulenburg 's telegram of July 27. Ibid., Doc. 203. For details on the Jagers/ab Project, see Chapter 11.

74. Ibid., Doc. 204.

75. ln their memorandum of July 24, the Jewish leaders outlined the desperate physical and psychological state of the Jews of Budapest following the deportation of the Jews from the provinces. They also mentioned the desirability of allowing able bodied Jews to work for the benefit of the community and the country, and pointed out that they were ready to emigrate if this would avert the danger of deportation. For text see Munkacsi, Hogyan tortent?, pp. 203- 206.

76. Vadirat, 3: 329- 330.

77. Budapesti Kozlony, (August 8, 1944) 178: I. The Germans were, of course, fully informed about the impending governmental changes. Veesenmayer was particularly eager to retain Imrédy in the government. See Kaltenbrunner's note of August 4, 1944, address ed to Ribbentrop. NA, Microcopy T-120, Roll 4203, Frames K.209118- 120.

78. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszag on, p. 236; Munkacsi, Hogyan tortent?, p. 189.

79. For example, the technicians and physicians of the X-ray department of the Jewish Hospital at Szabolcs Street in Budapest were accused of hiding a radio transmitter among their equipment, and a number of engineers and officials at the General Hungarian Hard Coal Mines (Magyar Altalanos Koszenbanya - MAK) were accused of having engaged in sabotage activities.

80. RLB, Doc. 150.

81. Among the camp officials who showed an understanding for the plight of the Jews were Florian Szemzo, the camp administrator, and his assistant Kenyer, as well as the chief detective assigned to the camp, Varga, who was in close touch with Miklos Gal, the MIPI representative, until they were both arrested in June 1944. Bela Jamborfy, Vasdenyei's deputy, showed a less understanding attitude.

82. Brody took over as the MIPI representative at Kistarcsa after the arrest of his predecessor Miklos Gal, who was deported from Sarvar earlier in the summer and never returned.

83. On July 17, 280 of the 1,500 Jews who had been returned to Kistarcsa on July 14 were transferred to the camp at Sarvar.

84. For further details on the deportation from Kistarcsa, see £ -A, pp. 779- 780.

85. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, pp. 235- 239; Levai, Fekete konyv, pp. I 82- 185; Munkacsi, Hogyan torten! ?, pp. 194-197; Memento. Magyarorszag 1944, pp. 60- 75; Vadirat, 3: 422-423; Statement by Imre Reiner, Israel Police, Bureau 06, Eichmann Trial Doc. 347, pp. 23 - 27. For Fullop Freudiger's recollection of the incident, see his "Five Months." ln: The Tragedy of Hungarian Jewry. Essays, Documents, Depositions. Randolph L. Braham, ed. (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, I 986), pp. 271 - 273.

86. Friedrich Born, Bericht an die Internationale Komitee vom Roten Kreuz in Genf (Report to the international Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva) (Geneva, June 1945), p. 28. See also Notiz uber die Situation der Juden in Ungarn (Note on the Situation of the Jews in Hungary), an International Red Cross document dated November 14, 1944, available in Yad Vashem Archives M-20/47.

87. An exception, of course, was the activity in support of the refugees who had fled to Hungary, and the operations of the Vaada. For further details on the attitudes of Hungarian Jewry before and after the German occupation, see Chapter 3.

88. For a listing of the Jewish authors purged in the spring of 1944, see Appendix 4. See also Vadirat, I: 276-281, and 2: 102- 105, 195 - 196 and 323 - 325.

89. See list of anti-Jewish decrees in Appendix 3.

90. Vadirat, 3: 380-381.

91. Ibid., pp. 447, 449-450, 501, 508- 509, 561 - 562, and 563.

92. Ibid., pp. 446-447. 93. Magyarorszagi Zsidok Lapja, 6(August 24, 1944)34:

3; (August 31, 1944)35: 3; (September 7, 1944)36: 3; (September 28, 1944)39: 2; (October 5, 1944)40: l; (October 12, 1944) 41: 2, 3.

94. Levai, Fekete konyv, pp. 33, 37, and 74-75. In the other larger Neolog communities, the rate of conversions was about the same. Aside from conversions, the demographic status of Hungarian Jewry was worsened by negative changes in the death-birth ratio and by emigration following World War I. For pertinent demographic data see ibid., pp. 74-75; Zsido Vilagkongressus, No. 10, 1948, 10 pp., and Zeev Rotics, " Be ' shule ha' netunim ha ' statistiirn al hamarot hadat be ' rekev yehudei Hungaria be'shanim 1900- 1941 " (Jewish Conversion in Hungary. Remarks on the Statistical Data for 1900-1941. In: Dapim lecheker tekufat hashoa (Studies on the Holocaust) (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1978), I: 222- 228.

95. The Good Shepherd Mission is frequently also identified as the Good Shepherd Committee (Jo Pasztor Bizottsag). For details on these organizations, see Chapter 30.

96. Whereas only 176 Jews converted in Budapest between January and March 19, 1944, the day of the German occupation, 788 converted within one month after the occupation. See declaration by Rabbi Zsigmond Groszmann in A Magyar Zsidok Lapja, 6 (April 20, 1944) 16: 5. On May 31, Rabbi Groszmann recorded the conversion of a Roman Catholic woman named Terez Szabo to Judaism - a rather unusual phenomenon during the Nazi era.

97. See, for example, the reports on the "abuse" of conversions in Szeged as reflected in the correspondence between the police, the county prefect, and the Minister of the Interior. Csongrad County Archives (Csongrad Megyei Leveltar), Szeged.

98. Officially there were 4,770 conversions registered in Budapest; howe ver, approximately 80,000 Jews were in possession of various types of " conversion certificates" of which most were forgeries. Levai, Fekete konyv, p. 190.

99. "'Tauffieber' der Budapester Juden" ("Conversion Fever" of the Jews of Budapest). NA, Microcopy T-120, Roll 4664, Frames Kl509/350353. See also " Miert?" (Why?), an editorial in Magyarorszagi Zsidok lapja, 6(July 13, 1944)28: I.

100. RLB, Doc. 190.

101. For the text of Sztojay's note, see Jeno Levai, Szurke konyv zsidok megmenteserol (Gray Book on the Rescuing of Hungarian Jews) (Budapest: Officina, n.d.), pp. 52-53.

102. See, for example, the editorial in Magyarorszagi Zsidok lapja cited above as well as that published in the issue of (August 10, 1944) 32: I.

103. For samples of such denunciations, see Vadirat, 3: 215 - 21 8 and 257 - 25 8.

104. Ibid., pp. 195- 156, 211 - 214, 459, and 593 - 597. See also Levai, Fekete konyv, pp. 190-191. For a thoroughly documented overview of the entire spectrum of conversions in Hungary, see Zeev Rotics, Conversions in Hungary Before and During the Holocaust. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Haifa, September 1987.

105. See, for example, Article 4 of Decree No. 1.200/1944. M.E.; 9 of 1.210/1944. M.E.; 5 of 1.220/1944. M.E.; 3 of 1.240/1944. M.E.; 6 of 1.300/1944. M.E.; 9 of 1.370/1944. M.E.; 1.450/ 1944. M.E.; 6 of 1.490/1944. M.E.; 14 of 1.600/1944. M. E.; 6 of 1.530/ 1944. M.E.; 13 of 1.540/1944. M.E.; 7 of 1.580/ 1944. M.E.; 7 of I 08.500/ 1944. K.M. For the subject matter of these decrees, see Appendix 3.

106. Vadirat, I: 250.

107. Decree No. 1.730/1944. M.E. Budapesti Kozlony, (May 13, 1944)108. See also Vadirat, I: 250-253.

108. An Order whose members were ex-servicemen who had been awarded the title of "Valiant" during the Horthy era. Some Jews applied for exemption on grounds other than those specified by the law. Most frequent were elderly Jews who applied on the grounds that their sons were serving in the military or labor service system. See, for example, the application of Markusz Boskovitz addressed to Lajos Csatay in August 1944, in Vadirat, 3: 408--410.

109. The review of the eligibility and status of exemptions was the responsibility of a committee appointed by the Minister of the Interior. It was composed of a chairman, four regular members, and four alternate members. Only one regular and one alternate member were appointed at the recommendation of the military-dominated National Valiants' Bench. Before granting a final exemption, the Minister of the Interior normally requested the prefect of the county or municipality for a statement relating to the applicant's moral and patriotic attitudes since the receipt of the decorations or medals. See Decree No. 1.530/ 1944.M.E. of April 26, in Budapesti Kozlony, (April 30, 1944)97. See also Vadirat, I: 274- 276, and 3: I 0-19 and 42--49.

110. In many cities, the mayors acted to remove the exempted Jews from the ghettos pending the decision of the Ministry of the Interior. In most cases, the Ministry rejected the petitions for exemption. See, for example, the request advanced by the Mayor of Baja (56 szam/res. 1944), dated May 24, 1944, in the Bacs-Kiskun County Archives (Bacs-Kiskun Megyei Leve/tar), Kecskemet. See also the June 3, 1944 communication by the Mayor of Szekesfehervar addressed to the local police (29. kt. 1944) in the Fejer County Archives (Fejer Megyei Leve /tar ), Szekesfehervar.

111. Vadirat, 3: 556- 557. Munkacsi, Hogyan torten! ?, p. 232.

112. Vadirat, 3: I 10- 111. For lists of exempted Jews, see HNA, Roll 17.

113. Vadirat, 3: 158- 160.

114. For the text of Decree 2.040/ 1944. M.E. see Budapesti Kozlony, (August 22, 1944) 189. This decree did not specifically or automatically cover the exempted persons' immediate family. These were covered by Decree No. 3.670/1944. M.E. of October 11, which went into effect four days later, the last day of the Horthy regime. Ibid., (October 15, 1944)235.

115. Vadirat, 3: 426-427.

116. Among Mester 's most loyal collaborators in the handling of exemption cases in the Ministry were Gusztav Csomor, Andras Molnar, Szabolcs Lorinczy, Endre Giday, and Laszlo Simon. Levai, Sziirke kony v, p. 111.

117. Among these were academicians and scientists like Karoly Goldzieher, Pal Oravecz, Bela Purjesz, Frigyes Riesz, and Istvan Rusznyak. Among the writers and artists were such well-known figures as Ivan Boldizsar, Jeno Heltai, Emo Ligeti, and Kalman Rozsahegyi. Some, including Purjesz and Rusznyak, were actually brought back from Strasshof after their deportation from Szeged. Others, like Karoly Marot, and Rozsahegyi, were even allowed to resume their professional activities. For additional names of artists, writers, and scientists exempted in 1944, see ibid., pp. 108 - 109.

118. By October 15, 1944, when the Horthy regime was toppled by the Szálasi coup, 6,998 exemption certificates had been issued. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 257.

119. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking, 1963), pp. 117- 118.

120. See, for example, Komoly 's comments on this issue in HJS, 3: 209 and 212.

121. Vadirat, 3: 563.

122. These Jews were reminded that the exemption system did not obviate the provision of the Third Anti-Jewish Act and the legal measures dealing with property relations. Magyarorszagi Zsidok Lapja, 6 (September 7, 1944)36: 2.

123. Vadirat, 3:490-491.

124. See, for example, the appeal by Bishop Sandor Raffay, which was addressed to Horthy on September 8 on behalf of a group of converted Jews. Ibid., p. 527.

125. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 256.

126. Ferenc Herczeg, a noted writer of rightist-nationalist inclination, intervened on behalf of his publisher, Istvan Farkas, the owner of the Singer & Wolfner Publishing House. He was shocked to learn that the German s would try to have him returned if " Mr. Farkas had not yet gotten into the crematorium." Ibid., pp. 270- 271.

127. Ibid., pp. 257- 258. See also RLB, Doc. 207, and Vadirat, 3: 528.

128. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 258.

129. Decree 3,780/1944. M.E. of October 25, 1944. Budapesti Kozlony, (October 20, 1944)247: 1.

130. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, pp. 310 and 332.

131. Decree No. 577.600/ 1944.11.B.M. Concerning the Authorization of New Exemptions and the Upholding of Exemption Documents (Mentesito okiratok megerositese illetoleg uj mentesitesek engedelyezese). A copy of the decree is on file in RG-52.

132. For some biographical details on Ferenczy, see Chapter 13.

133. Sztojay in fact received Ferenczy twice, once in the company of Istvan Antal and the second time in the presence of Bela Imrédy, Balint Homan, and Lajos Remenyi Schneller. On both occasions Ferenczy tried to place all blame for the deportations and the associated atrocities on the Germans and on his superiors Baky and Endre, by then already removed from power. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 268.

134. During his trial in 1946, Ferenczy claimed that he first heard of Auschwitz "around June 20, 1944," through a labor serviceman named Rosenberg, "who brought along a letter from Auschwitz." See pp. 5-7 of the proceedings of the Ferenczy trial (XVJII.037/1946) in the Ministry of the Interior (Beliigym iniszterium), Budapest.

135. This account is based on his testimony at his postwar trial as reproduced in Munkacsi, Hogyan tortent?, pp. 190- 191.

136. Ibid., p. 191. In his postwar memoirs, Peto claims that Ferenczy was visited by a delegation consisting of himself, Kurzweil, and Janos Gabor. HJS, 3: 60.

137. ln his deposition of April 19, 1946, which he gave just prior to his execution, at a time when the Hungarian authorities were planning to indict the members of the Jewish Council and of the Vaada for collaboration, Ferenczy claimed that had Peto contacted the Regent earlier, the provincial Jews would have been saved just as those of Budapest were. He also accused the Council leaders of failing to establish contact with him in order to prevent or postpone the deportations and claimed that they were only interested in saving the rich. See his deposition in Th e Tragedy of Hungarian Jewry, op. cit., pp. 310- 314.

138. Komoly first met Ferenczy on August 23 through the good offices of Lula y. For Komoly's account, see HJS, 3: l 56ff. For further details on Komoly 's role in 1944 see Chapter 29. On Stockler 's account of his dealings with Ferenczy, see his "Getto elott - getto alatt" (Before the Ghetto - During the Ghetto). Uj Elet (New Life), Budapest, January 22- April 17, 1947.

139. For Stern's and Peto's account of their dealings with Ferenczy, see HJS, 3: 33-41 and 60-67, respectively.

140. Stockler expressed his disappointment in a letter to Stern dated August 14, and in several notes and memoranda, including those dated August 22 and 28, emphasizing that he was not ready to assume collective responsibility for decisions in which he was not involved. See his "Getto elott - getto alatt." For text of his August 28 memorandum, see Vadirat, 3: 485-487.

141. By the summer of 1944, German troop strength in Hungary was quickly diminished and no longer represented a real threat. On one occasion in the summer, the Germans, eager to dissuade the Hungarians from attempting to extricate themselves from the war and to prove their strength for possible unilateral deportations, had staged an impressive military parade in Budapest involving columns of tanks, armored vehicles, and cannons. In actual fact the Germans were bluffing, and the parade consisted of a limited number of units going around in circles to give the appearance of great strength.

142. Munkacsi, Hogyan tortent?, pp. 180-194, 192- 200 and 216---218. According to Munkacsi, a copy of the note was left with the Council. This author was unable to locate the document in any sourcebook or archive. A draft of the proposed governmental position paper on the treatment of the Jewish question, incorporating some of the points made in Ferenczy's draft, was indeed prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Vadirat, 3: 451-453). According to the documentation submitted during the Veesenmayer trial in 1948, a similar five-point demand was submitted to Veesenmayer on August 24 by Remenyi-Schneller, then Acting Prime Minister. C. A. Macartney, 2: 321.

143. For details, see Chapter 31.

144. See Bonczos's Decree No. 6255/1944. eln. of August 29, 1944, in HNA, Roll 46.

145. The experts in charge of the Final Solution presumably acted in accordance with the deliberations in the Council of Ministers meeting of August 2. At that meeting, Jaross had argued in support of bringing the deportations to completion while Sztojay declared that the deportations would be resumed within one or two weeks. HNA, Roll 1.

146. See his "Five Months." ln: The Tragedy of Hungarian Jewry, op. cit., pp. 266- 267, 273 and 276---285. See also his August 20, 1944, letter to Rezso Kasztner. Ibid., pp. 289- 294. For Kasztner ' s views on the passport issue, see Der Kasztner Bericht (The Kasztner Report), pp. 166---167. Shortly after the end of the war, Freudiger settled in B'nei B'rak, Israel, where he died on March 15, 1976.

147. The position paper was prepared by the Political Department headed by Csopey. Following the decision by the Council of Ministers, the details were to be communicated to the Regent by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Interior. Vadirat, 3: 373- 375.

148. Reference here is clearly to the Kasztner negotiations with the SS. For details on these, see Chapter 29.

149. Vadirat, 3: 375- 380. According to another draft, prepared around August 23, the government was to offer the Germans 55,000 to 60,000 labor servicemen "whose families were already in Germany" as well as Jews who had a criminal record or who in the judgment of the Hungarian authorities represented a danger to public safety. Ibid., pp. 451-453.

150. Most official German and Hungarian sources identify August 25 as the date scheduled for the resumption of the deportations (RLB, Doc. 209); Jewish sources refer to August 26.

151. RLB, Docs. 208-210.

152. Munkacsi, Hogyan tortent?, pp. 219- 220.

153. On the scheduled deportation date, the panic was especially severe. According to a rumor originating with Jeno Bauer, one of the officials of the Council, every Yellow-Star house would be occupied by two gendarmes. Vcidirat, 3: 485-486. Stockier claimed that the deportation plan was devised by Ferenczy in order to make his pet project - the concentration of the Jews of Budapest in specially designated provincial camps - more palatable to the Jews. See his "Getto elott - getto alatt."

154. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 274.

155. Vadirat, 3: 427-431. See also Stockier, "Getto elott - getto alatt. " For further details, see Chapters 29 and 31.

156. Probably to distract Veesenmayer 's attention from his plans to bring about the establishment of a military-dominated government, Horthy told him that he planned to appoint Jurcsek, an outspoken Germanophile, as Deputy Premier. Apparently, Veesenmayer took Horthy's statement at face value, since on that same day he contacted Jurcsek to work out with him the composition of the proposed new government. RLB, Doc. 212.

157. Vadirat, 3: 433.

158. RLB, Doc. 213. According to a hand-penciled note on the document, Rolf Gunther, Eichmann 's deputy in Berlin, reassured the Foreign Office that "a part of the Kommando would, in any case, remain (in Hungary) as observers."

159. Ibid., Doc. 214. In his telegram of August 25, Veesenmayer requested Ribbentrop to verify Himmler 's instructions to Winkelmann and to issue directives with respect to "the other Fuhrer orders." In an interview during the late 1970s, Wilhelm Hott) claimed that it was actually Himmler and not Horthy who had saved the Jews of Budapest! See Peter Bokor, Vegjatek a Duna menten, op. cit., p. 192. See also p. 356. Sztojay also claimed credit for the saving of the Jews of Budapest. See Istvan Kelemen, Interjuk a racs mogott. Beszelgetes a haborus fobiinosokkel (interviews Behind the Bars. Discussion With the Major War Criminals). (Budapest: Muller Karoly, 1946), pp. 45-46.

160. In an attempt to facilitate the replacement of the Sztojay government, the Regent had authorized a two-week vacation for the Prime Minister "to enable him to recover from his illness. " Remenyi-Schneller's appointment was made on August 12. Budapesti Kozlony, (August 13, I 944) I 83: I.

161. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 278.

162. Vadirat, 3: 489.

163. Horthy Miklos titkos iratai, pp. 457-466.

164. The proposed changes had been discussed with Veesenmayer, who insisted on the inclusion of Bardossy, Endre, Ruszkay, and Szálasi as well as on the retention of Sztojay in some capacity. He did not get his way. The government decided upon by the Hungarians consisted of: Lajos Remenyi-Schneller, Minister of Finance; Lajos Csatay, Minister of Defense; Bela Jurcsek, Minister of Agriculture as well as Minister of Food Supplies; Miklos Bonczos, Minister of the Interior; Ivan Rakovszky, the Bethlenite former President of the Administrative Court, Minister of Religious Affairs and Education; Gabor Vladar, Minister of Justice; Lieutenant-General Gusztav Hennyey, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Oliver Markos, Minister of Trade and Transportation; and Tibor Gyulay, the Secretary-General of the Budapest Chamber of Commerce, Minister of Industry. Budapesti Kozlony, (August 30, 1944)197: 1- 2.

165. On October 12, Schell succeeded Bonczos as Minister of the Interior.

166. Budapesti Kozlony, (September I 0, 1944)206: I.

167. C. A. Macartney, 2: 324-327.

168. Ibid., p. 320.

169. Among those freed from Horthyliget were 11 of the 55 journalists and lawyers who had originally been interned at Csepel through the involuntary intermediation of the Central Jewish Council. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 284.

170. A petition for the freeing of all the hostages and all those " illegally" arrested and interned since the German occupation was submitted by the Central Jewish Council on July 28. For text, see Levai, Fekete konyv, pp. 207 - 208.

171. The delegation included Andor Balog, Istvan Foldes, Albert Geyer, Sandor Groszmann, Dezso Sandor, Jozsef Sebestyen, Miklos Szego, and Miklos Vida. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 284.

172. ibid. See also Lajos Stockier, " Getto elott - getto alatt."

173. During the first two days of Rosh Hashanah (September 18 and 19) and on Yorn Kippur (September 27) the Jews of Budapest were allowed outside their homes from 9:00 A.M. to 7:00 P. M., and on the eve of the Holy Days from 5:30 P.M. to 7:00 P.M. Vadirat, 3: 545. Gainfully employed Jews were issued special certificates by Police Headquarters after July 27, which allowed them more freedom of movement. (On that day it was also announced that all personal identification cards that had been issued after March 20, 1944 would become invalid on August I.) Similar arrangements were made by Istvan Kultsar, the Government Commissioner for Matters Relating to White-Collar Unemployment (Ertelmisegi Munkanelilis eg Ogyeinek Kormanybiztosa) on behalf of employed Jews, through Decree 188.358/ 1944 EMK. Budapesti Kolony, (August 3, 1944)174: 15.

174. Vadirat, 3: 563. By that time the parliament had been transformed into a docile instrumentality of the regime, inasmuch as all political parties had been dissolved on August 24.

175. Korody, a journalist by profession, represented Szabolcs and Ung Counties. For some details on Korody ' s dealings with Komoly, see Chapter 29.

176. Vadiral, 3: 564-565.

177. Most sources claim that the agreement was signed by the Lakatos government soon after its inauguration. (Cf. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarors zagon, p. 277 and Munkacsi, Hogyan tortent? p. 224.) Lakatos, on the other hand, claims that the agreement was signed by the outgoing Sztojay government (NG-1848). No German documents have so far been found to substantiate this agreement. In his telegram of August 30, Veesenmayer informed Ribbentrop - probably on the basis of Remenyi-Schneller's or Jurcsek's statement - that the new Hungarian government bad decided to begin the concentration of the Jews on September I and their removal of September 2. RLB, Doc. 215. See also C. A. Macartney, 2: 327.

178. Magyarorszagi Zsidok Lapja, 6(August 3, 1944)31: 3.

179. Ibid., (August 10, 1944)32: 3. While the Jewish labor squads had originally been slated exclusively for rubble-clearing in Budapest, they gradually came to be employed for other purposes and in other localities as well. See, for example, FAA, 2: 618-625 and 641-643.

180. Vadirat, 3: 499. The Germans ' demands increased the following day. At the September 27, 1944, meeting of the Council of Ministers, the Foreign Minister declared that "the Germans had demanded the delivery of at least 1,500 Jews and that the Central Jewish Council of Budapest must undertake to line them up." HNA, Roll I. 10

181. Magyarorszagi Zsidok Lapja, 6(September 7, 1944)36: 3. It should be noted in this context that most of the able-bodied males of 18 to 48 were already in the regular labor service companies.

182. Munkacsi, Hogyan torten!?, p. 226.

183. For details on Horny's role in the labor service system, see Chapter 10. For some details on Janos Heinrich, see Maria Ember, Egy mentesi kiserlet tortenete (The History of a Rescue Attempt). Magyar Nemzet, Budapest, (May 17, 1986): 10.

184. Aki rangjat es eletet kockaztatta (Who Risked His Rank and Life). Uj £ let (New Life), Budapest, May 15, 1986.

185. Munkacsi, Hogyan lorient ?, pp. 227- 229.

186. Ibid., pp. 230-232. In another memorandum, the Jewish leaders provided Dr. Lyman with brief background information on the various Hungarian and German officials involved in the ghettoization and deportation process, including Ferenczy, Lulay, Eichmann, and Krumey. Ibid.

187. Much of the groundwork for the mobilization of the Hungarian political, governmental, and church leaders was done by Otto Komoly. Acting as the representative of the International Red Cross, Komoly, in contrast to Kasztner who pursued the SS line, followed the Hungarian line, which proved much more productive. He maintained close and effective relations with Miklos Mester, Reverend Albert Bereczky of the Reformed Church, Mrs. Zoltan Tildy, and many other leaders. Among his close associates were Sandor Torok, the head of the Christian Jews, and members of the Vaada, which he also headed. It was often the position that was worked out by the various groups headed by Komoly that Samu Stern presented to the Regent. See Komoly's diary covering August 21 through September 16, 1944, in HJS, 3: 147- 250. See also Bela Vago, "Budapest Jewry in the Summer of 1944. Otto Komoly's Diaries." In: YVS, 8: 81 - 105. For further details see Chapter 29.

188. Stern's interventions on behalf of the Budapest Jews raise a number of controversial questions concerning his failure to do so on behalf of the provincial Jews. While it is plausible that Horthy was inaccessible during the first few months of the German occupation, having conveniently decided to distance himself from the anti-Jewish measures enacted by the government, the question still remains as to why Stern failed to contact him during the second half of June when Horthy was already reasserting himself and many of the Jewish communities in Trianon Hungary were still in the country.

189. Reference is to the alleged German bombing of Kassa in June 1941 by aircraft with Soviet markings, to provide an alibi for Hungary 's entry into the war against the USSR. For further detail s, see Chapter 6.

190. Munkacsi, Hogyan tortent?, p. 236. See also Stern 's statement in HJS, 3: 39-41.

191. RLB, Doc. 217.

192. The Eichmann-Sonderkommando, though recalled, was only formally but not actually dissolved. Wisliceny was reassigned to his original post in Bratislava; Dannecker was ordered to remain in Budapest to carry out some unspecified functions; even those who were recalled to the RSHA headquarters in Berlin were advised to stay in Budapest another week "in anticipation of a political change in the country." See Grell 's memorandum of September 29, 1944. Ibid, Doc. 220.

193. Ibid., Doc. 218.

194. The eight assembly centers were identified as follows: 5 Csaky Street; the synagogue on ontohaz Street; the synagogue at 55 Arena Road; 4 Jokai Road; 32 Akacfa Street; the synagogue at 2 Bethlen Square; the former internment camp at 39 Pava Street and 46 Columbus Street. The camp at Tura was expected to be used after its evacuation by the Honvedseg. Ibid., Doc. 219.

195. Ibid.

196. Ibid., Docs. 221 and 381.

197. Ibid., Doc. 224.

198. Ibid., Doc. 225.

199. Horthy held many of his secret meetings in the company of his closest advisers, including Bethlen, Count Morie Esterhazy, Count Gyula Karolyi, Baron Zsigmond Perenyi, and Kalman Kanya. Among the military he especially trusted Csatay, Hennyey, Lakatos, Szilard Bakay, and retired Generals Vilmos Roder, Istvan Naday, and Hugo Sonyi.

200. The Hungarian troops succeeded in occupying Arad on September 13, a large city they held on to until September 22. During this period they compelled approximately 70 percent of the 10,000 Jews remaining in the city to wear the Yellow Star of David. Along the Hungarian troops, the leading figures of the Eichmann -Sonderkommando, including Abromeit, Dannecker, Eichmann, Hunsche, Novak, and Wisliceny also came to this region, ostensibly to organize "the repatriation of I 0,000 ethnic Germans. " See Gh. Kovacs (Eichner), Eichmann si planuita deportare a evreilor din Arad Timisoara (Eichmann and the Planned Deportation of the Jews of Arad and Timisoara). Minimum, Tel Aviv, (September-October 1993): 40. See also Novak 's testimony during his trial in Vienna on January 22, 1961.

201. For details on the Sarmas massacres, see Matatias Carp, Sarmas. Una din cele mai oribile crime fasciste (Sarma~. One of the Most Horrible Fascist Crimes) (Bucharest: Socec, 1945), 47 pp., illus. See also S. Al. Bacher, The Slaughter of Sarmas. Tricolorul (The Tricolor), Toronto, 2 (September 1982) I: 6- 7. See also Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera, The Anatomy of a Massacre: Sarmas 1944. Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual, Vienna, 7(1990): 41-62.

202. E -E, p. 33.

203. For Lakatos' account see his statement of June 10, 1947, issued in connection with Veesenmayer 's trial in 1948 by the Nuremberg Military Tribunal (NG-1848). For Lakatos's statement on the background of his premiership and on his six-week tenure, which was written for his Nyilas captors at Tihany on October 28, 1944, see Peter Gosztonyi, Lakatos Geza beszamoloja miniszterelnoki tevekenysegerol (The Account of Geza Lakatos on his Activities as Prime Minister), Ujlatohatar (New Horizon), Munich, 5 (1970): 440-458. Lakatos died in exile in Adelaide, Australia, on May 21, 1967, at 77 years of age.

204. For a detailed account of the negotiations involved in Hungary's attempt to extricate itself from the Axis Alliance, see C. A. Macartney, 2: 319-443. See also Zvi Erez, "The Jews of Budapest and the Plans of Admiral Horthy - August-October 1944. " In: YVS, 16: 177 - 203.

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

TREATMENT OF HUNGARIAN

JEWS ABROAD

The Pre-Occupation Era: An Overview

DURING THE Kallay era, Jewish Hungarian nationals abroad enjoyed the effective if not always wholehearted protection of the Hungarian state even if they lived in the sphere of influence of the two main Axis partners. This was quite remarkable, since the Jewish nationals of many other states were included in the anti-Jewish measures directed against the local Jews.

Miklos Kallay

The German authorities in Nazi-occupied Europe did not always respect their obligations under international law. In many cases, they simply ignored the official position of the Hungarian government and clandestinely included Hungarian Jews in the transports directed "to the East for labor." This was especially true in September-October 1942, when the West European Jewish communities were being liquidated. At the time-almost half a year before the crushing defeat of the Hungarian and German armies at Voronezh and Stalingrad in January-February 1943-the Hungarian authorities themselves were not yet protecting their Jewish nationals abroad with much energy.

Admiral Horthy

The first, rather timid, demands on behalf of Hungarian Jews abroad were made soon after the news of the inclusion of Hungarian Jews in the deportation from Western Europe in September-October 1942 had reached Hungary. However, the campaign that really annoyed the Germans was not launched until 1943, after the crushing defeat of the Hungarian forces near Voronezh. The German policy toward the Jewish nationals of allied and neutral states was to include them in the general anti-Jewish measures unless their governments agreed to repatriate them by a certain deadline. These deadlines were extended a number of times. Hungary complied with the German demands to a certain extent, allowing the repatriation of smaller groups of Jews whose Hungarian (1204) citizenship was fully established. Most of the Hungarian Jews awaiting clearance or repatriation from Nazi-dominated Western Europe had been held in camps such as Drancy in France and Westerbork in the Netherlands. With the expiration of the final repatriation deadline in October 1943, most of them were sent to either Buchenwald or Ravensbrück, but not as "Jews in penal detention" (Strafjuden). They were to be kept in these camps until the Nazis had an opportunity to "transport them to the East."

In Italy and the Italian-held areas, the Hungarian Jews had an even better chance of protection because of the greater humanitarianism of the Italians as well as the closer relations enjoyed by Hungary and Italy-both of which feared German expansionism. During his April 1-3, 1943, visit to Rome, Prime Minister Miklos Kallay was reportedly assured by Mussolini that the Hungarian Jews in Italy would not be discriminated against and would enjoy the same treatment as other Hungarian subjects.

Döme Sztójay

The situation changed radically soon after the German occupation of Hungary on March 19, 1944. Shortly after the beginning of the mass deportations on May 15, the Sztojay government yielded to the Germans and stated that it was no longer interested in its Jewish nationals in Nazi-dominated Western Europe. After their "evacuation to the East," the only sizable number of Hungarian Jewish nationals still living in the Axis world were those residing in Romania, Slovakia, and to a lesser extent Croatia. 1 At the time of the mass deportations from Hungary, the situation of the Jews in Romania and Slovakia was quite tolerable. In fact, many of the Jews who had previously escaped from those countries during the anti-Jewish drives of 1940-1943 were now returning there-mostly illegally-together with a number of native Hungarian Jews.

The relatively lenient treatment of the Jews in these countries became a source of embarrassment to the Germans. When Horthy decided to halt the deportations early in July, the Hungarians used the treatment of the Jews in Romania and Slovakia as one of the excuses for their action. On July 6, when Döme Sztójay

confirmed to Veesenmayer that Horthy and the Hungarian government had decided to halt the deportations, he in fact emphasized that the step was motivated, among other things, by the more lenient treatment of the Jews in Romania and Slovakia. 2

Edmund Veesenmayer

Five days later, [Edmund] Veesenmayer sent an urgent telegram to the Foreign Office (1205) complaining about the difficulty of carrying out the Final Solution program in Hungary. He was particularly bitter over the fact that the Germans had demanded of the Hungarians "to proceed ruthlessly against the Jews," while allowing the Romanians and the Slovaks to treat their Jews more humanely. Inland II reacted immediately by approaching the German legations in Bucharest and Bratislava, but to no avail. The Romanians, shrewdly preparing to change sides, became even more tolerant. The Slovaks also became more cautious, though at the end the Jews, like many of the Slovak patriots captured after the unsuccessful uprising at Banska Bystrica and elsewhere in Slovakia in late August 1944, were once again subjected to deportation.

[“Edmund Veesenmayer (12 November 1904 – 24 December 1977) was a high-ranking German SS functionary and Holocaust perpetrator during the Nazi era. He significantly contributed to the Holocaust in Hungary and in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). Veesenmayer was a subordinate of Ernst Kaltenbrunner and Joachim von Ribbentrop, and worked with Adolf Eichmann. He was involved in dismembering Czecho-Slovakia in 1939, in the establishment of the Ustaše-run NDH puppet state following the April 1941 German invasion of Yugoslavia, and in the selection and installation of the 1941–1944 puppet regime of Milan Nedić in the German-occupied territory of Serbia. After World War II Veesenmayer was tried and convicted at the Ministries Trial; in 1949 he was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, but was released after serving two years.

At the beginning of 1941 he was attached to the German diplomatic staff in Zagreb. Here, he arranged (with Ustashe leader Slavko Kvaternik) the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia, four hours before the Germans entered the city. What Ante Pavelic meant by "independence", as Veesenmayer reported to Berlin, was firstly to obtain German recognition of Croatia; and secondly, an opportunity to thank Hitler in person and promise him "to live and die for the Führer". Veesenmayer played an important role in the persecution and murder of Croatian and Serbian Jewry. He was involved in an operation to overthrow the Hungarian government in 1944. On 15 March 1944, he was promoted to SS-Brigadeführer and became Reich plenipotentiary after the German occupation of Hungary. From March to October the same year he was involved in organizing the Final Solution for Hungary's Jews.

In a telegram dated 13 June 1944 he reported to the Foreign Office: “transport Jews from Carpathian Mountains and Transylvania space … with a total of 289,357 Jews in 92 complete trains of 45 cars”. On 15 June 1944, Veesenmayer told Joachim von Ribbentrop in a telegram that some 340,000 Jews had been delivered to the Reich. He also announced that after the final settlement of the Jewish question, the number of deported Hungarian Jews would reach 900,000.”]

Romania: From Adoption to Rejection of the Final Solution

It is one of the ironies of history that Romania, a country with a long tradition of official anti-Semitism, emerged as a haven both for its indigenous Jews and for many refugees. Following the rise of Nazi influence in the Balkans in the mid-l930’s, Romania had adopted an anti-Jewish program which was particularly vicious during the short-lived Goga-Cuza regime. Sizable losses in Jewish lives, however, did not occur until after September 1940, when Romania had suffered considerable territorial losses to the Soviet Union (Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina), Hungary (Northern Transylvania), and Bulgaria (Southern Dobrudja). The fury and frustration engendered by the territorial losses were channeled by the ultra-Right radical elements against the Jews, who were labeled, as was fashionable at the time, "agents of Bolshevism."

Ion Antonescu with German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, June 1941

On September 6, 1940, the royal dictatorship of King Carol II was replaced by a new National Legionnaire State (Statul Nafional Legionar) headed by General (later Marshal) Ion Antonescu, who soon acquired the title Conduciitor (Leader). 3 The drive for the Romanianization of the economy and the "aryanization" of Jewish property was soon accompanied by small pogroms in various parts of the country. A major pogrom took place late in January 1941, before Romania' s entry into the war, when the Iron Guard (Garda de Fier)-the Romanian Nazi party led by Horia Sima-rose in an attempt to overthrow Antonescu. (1206) of Jews were massacred in a brutal fashion in several parts of the country, including Bucharest and Jassy (lai).

In the interim between the unsuccessful coup and Romania's involvement in the war against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the anti-Semitic drive had largely been restricted to the economic sphere. One of the most important measures enacted against the Jews was the decree of March 27 under which their real estate holdings were expropriated. The instigator of many of the anti-Jewish measures was Radu Lecea, the General Commissar for Jewish Questions.

Gustav Richter SS-Oberscharführer in the Sicherheitsdienst (SD)

In his drive against the Jews Lecea closely collaborated with SS-Sturmbannführer Gustav Richter, the SS expert on the Jewish question in the German Legation in Bucharest.

The situation changed drastically after Romania joined the Third Reich in the war against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Flushed by their early military successes and driven by feelings of revenge, many Romanian units vented their hatred of the Jews and in some cases even outdid the Germans in their brutality. The Jews were subjected to an especially barbarous treatment in the recaptured areas of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia and in the conquered territories in the Ukraine. Like the SS-Einsatzgruppen, and sometimes in close cooperation with them, the Romanians were also involved in the mobile killing operations against Jews, "distinguishing" themselves in Balti, Cemauti, and Odessa. In the latter city, Romanian units reportedly massacred from 60,000 to 80,000 Jews. 4 During the early phase of the war, Iron Guard extremists also committed atrocities in several communities in Old (i.e., pre-1918) Romania. In Jassy, for example, thousands of Jews were murdered during the pogroms of June 29-30, 1941, with the estimates ranging from 4,000 to 8,000.5 The killings by the German and Romanian military units continued all along the invasion routes, decimating if not completely annihilating the Jewish populations of the " liberated" cities and villages.

To rid itself of the "alien" Jews, the Antonescu government selected Transnistria, the Romanian-occupied part of the Ukraine between the Dniester and the Bug, as a major dumping ground. The first expulsion s of Jews took place in August 1941. The well-planned and effectively organized mass deportations began in the fall of that year, and continued through the spring and summer of 1942. At their peak, the various con (1207) centration camps of Transnistria-most of which were established before the German extermination camps became operational-contained approximately 185,000 Jews. 6 Except for the slightly over 10,000 Jews who were " mistakenly" picked up in Dorohoi County in Old Romania, almost all the deportees were from Bukovina, Bessarabia, and the Herta region-the recaptured areas that had formerly been ceded to the USSR. The number of Romanian and Ukrainian Jews murdered during the Antonescu era cannot be established with any degree of exactitude. The figures cited by historians of the Holocaust range from 280,000 to 380,000. 7

The Jews of Old Romania (Muntenia, Oltenia, and Moldova), Southern Transylvania, and Southern Bukovina fared much better. Although they were subjected to great economic hardship and although the men in many places were compelled to do forced labor in specially organized labor companies, they were, with a few exceptions, not forced to wear the Yellow Star and were not concentrated into ghettos. 8 At war's end, nearly all of the Jewish communities in these areas had survived almost intact. 9

Following the Wannsee Conference of January 20, 1942, the Germans began to pressure Romania to institute stem measures against the Jews. Unlike most of the other countries in the German sphere of influence, however, Romania decided to retain its sovereignty on the Jewish question, pursuing its own "Romanian " approach to the "solution" of the problem. In mid-1942 the Germans had the impression, for a while at least, that the Romanians were ready to go along with the German approach and adopt the Final Solution program. According to a communication from Luther to Ribbentrop, Weizsaecker, and Wormann, dated August 17, 1942, deportations were to begin in the Transylvanian towns of Arad, Timisoara, and Turda, in which a relatively large number of Hungarian-speaking Jews had lived. However, the Romanian government changed its position shortly after Lecca's return later that month from Berlin, where he was allegedly snubbed by German officials. It is all but impossible to determine how Lecca’ s treatment in Berlin might have influenced the Romanian decision-making process. Nevertheless, by that time the Antonescu government had lost its earlier enthusiasm for the adoption of the German version of the Final Solution program. Indeed, the Romanians became determined to retain their authority in (1208) this matter, considering the "solution" of the Jewish question as a strictly domestic issue. From the autumn of 1942 on, the Romanians continued and in some cases even intensified-their expropriation program, but they no longer showed interest in anything more drastic measures against the Jews.

This change in the Romanians' position on the Final Solution is historically remarkable since it was initiated quite a few months before the crushing of the German and Romanian armies in and around Stalingrad.

Manfred von Killinger, the German Minister in Bucharest

On December 12, 1942, Manfred von Killinger, the German Minister in Bucharest, reported to the German Foreign Office that, according to Lecea, Marshal Antonescu was ready to allow 75,000 to 80,000 Jews to emigrate to Palestine in return for a payment by the Jews of 200,000 lei (approximately $1,336) per emigrant. According to Killinger, the Marshal was eager to collect 16 billion lei ($107 million) for the Romanian State, and concurrently to get rid of a large number of Jews "in a comfortable manner."

The German Foreign Office and the RSHA did everything in their power to bring about a reversal of the new Romanian position on the Jewish question, but to no avail. On January 14, 1943, Heinrich Millier, the head of the Gestapo, assessed the situation in Romania very pessimistically. Six days later, Himmler himself concluded that nothing else could be done in Romania and suggested the recall of the Germans' Jewish expert from Bucharest. The German Foreign Office, however, continued its strenuous efforts to induce the Romanians to change their minds and "recognize the importance of the Jewish menace." 10

Muller and Himmler had assessed the situation correctly, as the subsequent actions of the Romanians soon revealed. The situation of the surviving Jews of Transnistria gradually improved and toward the end of 1943, following the Red Army's crossing of the Dnieper and advance toward the Bug, the camps were dissolved and the one-third of the deportees who had survived the ordeal was repatriated. The Romanian authorities became increasingly interested in schemes for Jewish emigration to Palestine and became even more tolerant toward their own Jews. In 1944, when various Romanian political and military leaders were actively engaged in finding an effective and reasonably quick way out of the Axis, Romania also became a haven for thousands of Jewish refugees from neighboring countries, including Hungary. 11 (1209)

Romania as a Haven for Hungarian-Jewish Refugees

According to a report by G. Bertrand Jacobson, the HICEM-HIAS representative in Bucharest, dated December 28, 1944, approximately 1,500 Hungarian Jews had clandestinely crossed the Romanian border from the beginning of the mass deportations in Hungary to that date. Most of the refugees had lived in Bucharest, Arad, and Timisoara at the time. In addition to these escapees, there were 11,200 other Hungarian Jews in Romania: approximately 3,200 Jewish labor servicemen, who had been employed at the copper mines in Bor, 12 had been allowed to cross into Romania following their liberation by Tito’s forces in late summer-early fall 1944; as were about 8,000 labor servicemen who had been liberated by the Soviet-Romanian troops. Jacobson also reported that in addition to the 12,700 Hungarian Jews in Romania there were also approximately 4,000 to 8,000 liberated Hungarian Jewish labor servicemen in Northern Transylvania at that time. The number of the latter continued to increase with the victorious advance of the Soviet-Romanian troops.

Hungarian Jewish labor battallion

When the draconic anti-Jewish measures were introduced in Hungary following the German occupation on March 19, 1944, Romania emerged as a potential place of refuge. The Germans were also aware of this and on March 30 they had alerted all their agencies about the possible illegal flight of Hungarian Jews into neighboring Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. 13 They also began an intensive campaign aimed at persuading Romania to take effective countermeasures.

The Romanian government ostensibly complied on May 29, when it enacted a harsh law that mandated the death penalty for Jews entering Romania fraudulently and for those who aided them. 14 The Romanians, with a few exceptions, nevertheless continued to treat incoming refugees with a considerable degree of indulgence. They had in fact issued confidential instructions to their border control authorities to facilitate the admission of Jewish refugees from Hungary. 15 On June 2, 1944, the Prime Minister of Romania advised the Romanian delegate to the International Red Cross that he might give formal assurances that Jewish refugees from Hungary would be allowed to enter Romania notwithstanding formal declarations to the contrary, and that " their safety would be looked out for by the Romanians." 16 The Romanians’ level of tolerance continued to increase until August 23, when Romania finally (1210) took the decisive step and extricated itself from the Axis alliance. From that time on, the status of the Jews, both indigenous and foreign, became radically different.

General Constantin Sanatescu

The new anti-Nazi government headed by General Constantin Sanatescu undertook not only to abolish the anti-Jewish measures, but also to protect its North-Transylvanian Jewish nationals still under German-Hungarian domination.

In the interim between the German occupation of Hungary and Romania's extrication from the Axis alliance, the initiative for the rescuing of Hungarian Jews was taken by the Hungarian-speaking Jews of Southern Transylvania and the Hungarian-Jewish refugees in Bucharest. The latter acted in close cooperation with the International Red Cross as well as the Zionist and official leaders of the Jewish community of Romania.

During the early phase of the Jewish persecutions in Hungary (March-June 1944), the rescue effort was carried out mainly by the leaders of the Jewish communities of Southern Transylvania bordering Hungary. Some of the largest ghettos in Hungarian-held Northern Transylvania, for instance those of Nagyvarad, Kolozsvar, and Maros-vasarhely, were very close to the Romanian border. Nevertheless, only a few thousand Jews availed themselves of the opportunity to escape into Romania. Among the reasons for this were the absence of most able-bodied males (who were in the labor service companies), the reluctance of the physically fit to leave behind the very young and the older members of their families, the risks associated with the illegal border crossing, and the failure of the Jewish leaders of Hungary to keep the masses informed of the dangers confronting them (see Chapters 23 and 29).

The few thousand Hungarian Jews who did succeed in escaping into Romania used various means. Some were well off and bribed the guards; others had good contacts with Romanian diplomatic officials; still others followed the leadership of Zionist couriers (shlichim). A considerable percentage of those who dared cross the borders illegally were Jews of Southern Transylvanian background. The main crossing points to the rescue centers in Romania were Arad, Beius, Brasov, Ginta, Sighisoara, Timisoara, and Turda. Of these, Arad and Turda were the busiest ones. The major problems confronting those involved in the rescue operations included the lodging and (1211) protection of the refugees at the crossing points and their subsequent successful transfer to Bucharest.

These problems were largely solved through Jewish officials' well-established contacts with local Romanian authorities and through skillful illegal activities, including the production of forged documents. 17

Romanian peasants, many of whom had also been oppressed by the Hungarians, often helped Jews crossing the border. The Romanian consular officials in Kolozsvar and Nagyvarad, who had good friends among the border patrol officers in Romania, were also of great help. In many cases, it was due to the benevolence of the Romanian consular officials that the Hungarian Jewish escapees could go through the border unchecked by the frontier guards. Mihai Marina, the Romanian Consul in Nagyvarad, and his staff members were among the Romanian officials who had closely followed the anti-Jewish measures the Hungarians had adopted, including the ghettoization and deportation of the Jews of Northern Transylvania. 18

Vespasian V. Pella the Romanian Ambassador to Switzerland,

When Professor Vespasian V. Pella, the Romanian Ambassador to Switzerland, stopped over in Nagyvarad on the way back to his consular office, the local Romanian and Jewish leaders made sure he received a lengthy report about the Jewish persecutions in Hungary. The report included the observations of the Romanian officials and a statement by Dr. Miksa Kupfer, a physician in the ghetto of Nagyvarad, about the horrible conditions that prevailed in the local ghetto. Upon his return to Bern, Pella forwarded the report to the International Red Cross, which made use of it when it appealed to Hungary to change its anti-Jewish course. Presumably Horthy took the report into account when he halted the deportations on July 6.

Despite the Romanians' benevolence, crossing the border was a risky affair. For one thing, not all of the officials were sympathetic to the plight of the Hungarian Jewish refugees. Moreover, Romania was still a member of the Axis; occasionally, Romanian officials, acting on their own or under pressure from the German commando units, extradited Jewish refugees. Some of the Jews were caught while still on Hungarian territory. 19 However, the risks associated with crossing the border were far less than those associated with the deportation. Unfortunately, most of the Jews lingering in the many ghettos had not been aware of any escape or rescue opportunities. (1212)

While the rescue committees operating along the Romanian side of the border had been busy helping the Hungarian Jewish escapees during their first few days and providing them with documents, a Committee for the Aid of Jewish Refugees from Northern Transylvania (Comitetul de asistenfa a refugiafilor evre i din Ardealul de Nord) was organized in Bucharest under the aegis of the Zionist Aliyah Office. The Committee was headed by Erno (Ernest) Marton, the former editor-in-chief of Uj Kelet (New East-The Hungarian-language Jewish daily of Kolozsvar that was shut down by the Hungarian authorities in the fall of 1940), and a former member of the Romanian parliament. Marton himself had escaped into Romania in May 1944 with the aid of a Romanian consular official shortly after Kasztner had visited Kolozsvar and reportedly informed the city’s Jewish leaders about the realities of the Nazis’ Final Solution program.

Wilhelm Filderman

The Committee acted in close cooperation with the traditional leaders of Romanian Jewry, including A. L. Zissu and Wilhelm Filderman. 20 During the pre-armistice period, its primary functions were to look after the personal safety of the escapees, to ensure the departure of many of them to Palestine, and to establish and maintain contact with major Jewish organizations abroad for the acquisition of funds and other material support.

Although by the time the Committee was formed the Romanian government had already repatriated most of the survivors of Transnistria and was showing considerable tolerance toward the Jews, the operations of the Committee had to be very circumspect. The government was under great pressure by the Germans, who were reluctantly reconciled to Marshal Antonescu's opposition to the Final Solution program but were seriously upset about the government's plans concerning the emigration of Jews to Palestine and the impact of Romania's policies on the deportations from Hungary.

Mihai Antonescu, Romanian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

By late spring 1944, the Romanian leaders had become convinced that allowing the emigration of the Jews was the wisest policy from both domestic and international points of view. Mihai Antonescu, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, was a leading exponent of this view. Under his initiative and chairmanship a Ministerial Conference was held on June 9 to discuss the Jewish question with emphasis on the possible emigration of the Jews. Among the participants were General (1213) Dumitru Popescu, Minister of the Interior; General Constantin Vasiliu, Under Secretary for Police and Public Security; General Sova, Under Secretary for the Navy; and Radu Lecea. The outcome of the meeting was revealed in a letter Mihai Antonescu had addressed to Zissu on June 17:

‘The Ministerial Commission for the Regulation of General Emigration, which was established under a directive of Marshal Antonescu, acted positively on the issue of emigration.

‘An emigration office was to be established under the chairmanship of Zissu with advisors and officials to be selected by him. 21

The transport contracts were to be handled by the Romanian Maritime Service (Serviciul Maritim Roman-SMR).

‘The departure of four foreign-flag ships then moored in Constanta was approved in principle, on condition that they be used primarily for the transport of the orphans from Transnistria, Jewish political refugees from abroad who could not stay in Romania, and other refugees. 22

The new Romanian policy on emigration angered the Germans not only because it went counter to their Final Solution program, but also because it was in conflict with their policy toward the Arabs. Moreover, the Germans were upset over the relatively tolerant treatment of the indigenous and foreign Jews in Romania, which the Hungarians had used as one of their excuses to halt the deportations early in July. German Foreign Office officials in Berlin and Budapest, alarmed over Romania's changed position on the Jewish question, waged an intensive campaign in June and July to correct the situation. 23 Their hectic diplomatic maneuvers of the period were also reflected in the reports sent to Berlin by Volksgruppen leader Andreas Schmidt and his colleagues about the deteriorating situation in Romania and especially about the activities of Mihai Antonescu. 24

On June 30, Thadden, following Veesenmayer’ s frequent communications, approached Killinger, requesting confirmation of the news allegedly emanating from the Romanian General Consulate in Kolozsvar (1214) that the Hungarian Jewish escapees in Romania were being treated as political refugees and allowed to leave for Palestine. 25 Killinger confirmed this on July 14.26 The day before, Wagner had approached both Killinger and SS-Gruppenführer Heinrich Muller, the Gestapo chief, complaining that the Romanian government had condoned the emigration of Hungarian Jews to Palestine. 27 On July 26, Killinger had no alternative but to confirm that Jews were indeed being allowed to leave Romania with the consent of Marshal Antonescu, that Hungarian Jews were moving around freely in the country, and that the tolerance toward the Jews was generally on the increase. 28 On August 8, Wagner approached Ribbentrop, proposing to forward through Killinger a request to the Marshal for the full application of the anti-Jewish laws that had been enacted in Romania. 29 Wagner received Ribbentrop's consent on August 14, 30 but by that time Romania was on the verge of quitting the Axis.

The Antonescu government's position toward the Jews during the last few months before the volte-face on August 23 was summarized in a statement given to the Romanian Committee in Geneva through Grigore Gafencu and Vespasian V. Pella. 31 According to the highly confidential statement:

‘The Romanian government was according the greatest possible kindness to the Jewish refugees from Hungary and was allowing 2,500 of them to leave Romania that year.

‘It had made a number of strong and repeated representations to the Hungarian government on behalf of Romanian Jewish nationals in Hungary and Northern Transylvania; it had also repatriated several thousand Romanian Jewish nationals from France, who otherwise would have been deported to Germany.

‘It welcomed the Jewish refugees from the territories that were occupied by the Red Army and was permitting the transfer of 3,000 Jewish children to Turkey.

‘It had permitted the Jews in Transnistria to receive large quantities of food and drugs since 1943. (1215)

‘It had taken measures to avoid all incidents between German soldiers and Jews in the Romanian sector of the Eastern front.

‘It was allowing the Jews of Romania to continue working in their professions; some even worked for the state.

‘It required the Jews who were exempted from military service to make a monetary contribution proportionate to their wealth. Part of the money so collected by the Jewish national organization was used for aid to the Jews. Jews who could not contribute were allowed to render socially useful labor.

‘It had violated some of the property rights of the Jews under the impact of certain pressures, but such properties were transferred not to other private individuals but to the state.

‘It was permitting the emigration of Jews as organized by the Jews themselves and had placed a number of ships at their disposal.’

Given the attitude of the Sztojay government in Hungary, the position of the Romanian government toward the Jews was quite extraordinary. Naturally, the Romanian position reflected a degree of opportunism along with its relative humanitarianism. Realizing relatively early that the Axis had lost the war, the responsible Romanian leaders, including Mihai Antonescu, 32 decided quite logically to acquire some good will for their country by changing, among other things, their anti-Jewish stance. In support of this position they were actively encouraged by the highly respected leaders of the opposition-the heads of the historical parties of Romania, including Iuliu Maniu, Dinu Bratianu, and Emil Hatieganu.

Just before Romania changed sides on August 23, 1944, Zissu and Filderman separately were asked by Mihai Antonescu to render a service to the Romanian nation. Zissu was requested by Under Secretary of State Ovid Vladescu, acting in behalf of Antonescu, to contact the Jewish organizations in Britain and America and convince them to induce the Western Allies to pressure the Soviet Union into easing the (1216) armistice conditions. 33 When Zissu decided to consult Filderman, he was informed that the President of the Jewish Community had already acted following the receipt of a separate request by Antonescu and that in fact a letter of his addressed to Reuben B. Resnik, the AJDC representative in Istanbul, had been picked up by a courier of the government at 5:00 A.M. In his letter, Filderman urged "in the interest of the Jewish people" that, after an armistice agreement is signed, Romania be occupied and administered not only by the Russians, but also by the British and Americans "as was the case in Italy." 34

Following the coup of August 23, the Committee for Refugee Affairs acquired legal status. From that time on, it concentrated its efforts on legalizing the status of the refugees and on providing them with monetary and material assistance through the AJDC. Late in October, when almost all of Transylvania had been liberated by the combined Soviet-Romanian forces, the Committee was consolidated into a General Jewish Committee of Northem Transylvania (Curatoriu gene ral evreesc al Ardealului de Nord), known in Hungarian as the Eszak-Erdely i Zsido Kuratorium. Designed to represent all the Jews of the region, the Committee' s sphere of activities encompassed administrative, legal, and economic functions. It also claimed to represent the social and political interests of the liberated Jews. 35 One of the primary concerns of the Committee, which was also headed by Marton, was to help bring about the liberation or at least the easing of the lot of the Northern Transylvanian Jews still in German and Hungarian hands. Toward this end it worked closely with Romulus Pop, the new Minister of Minorities, and Ionel Pop, the newly appointed High Commissioner for the Administration of Liberated Transylvania (lnalt Comisar pentru administrarea Transilvaniei eliberate). On November 4, 1944, the High Commissioner approved the establishment of a Special Department on Jewish Questions in the Liberated Territories (Serviciu special pentru probleme leevree li din te ritoriile eliberate ).

The main functions of the Special Department, as specified in the High Commissioner’s Decision No. 5, were to organize relief work for the Jews in Northern Transylvania, inventory the property of the Jews in the liberated areas (with an eye toward preserving and returning the confiscated goods to their legitimate owners), submit proposals for the redressing of wrongs caused by the Hungarian anti-Jewish laws, collect (1217) data relating to the Jews deported by the Hungarian authorities, and study the means for the return and aid of the deportees.

The Special Department, like the Committee, was placed under the leadership of Marton, who acted as Technical Counselor (Consilier tehnic). 36 These two new forums of North Transylvanian Jewry undertook an intensive campaign, including the submission of memoranda, designed to help the North Transylvanian Jews still in German camps or under the control of the Szálasi government. Viewing these Jews as Romanian citizens, one memorandum called for the exchange of Romanian Swabians or Saxons-most of who had sympathized, if not actively collaborated, with the Nazis-for the Jewish deportees. Another called for identifying the Germans in Romania as well as the Jews in German and Hungarian hands as POWs; a third suggested the possibility of holding the Germans in Romania as hostages to pressure the Nazi authorities into yielding on the North Transylvanian Jews. These memoranda were submitted to Grigore Niculescu-Buzeti, the new Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Appeals were also addressed to the Vatican, the International Red Cross, and the Great Powers. The latter were requested to adopt retaliatory measures against the Germans and the Hungarians and possibly to exchange German POWs under their control for North Transylvanian Jews.

These efforts proved essentially fruitless, although the Sanatescu government approached both Germany and Hungary on these matters through Switzerland. In their note of November 7 addressed to the Hungarian government, for example, the Romanians stated that:

‘They had information to the effect that the German and Hungarian governments intended to liquidate the Jews deported from Northern Transylvania and that the survival of the Romanians who were taken to Germany for labor was greatly endangered.

‘They had requested the International Red Cross to urgently investigate this matter.

‘The Swiss were requested to induce the Hungarian government to consent to these investigations. (1218)

‘They regarded the Hungarian and German minorities in Romania as co-responsible for the fate of the persons mentioned in the first point and were ready to take just reprisals. 37

The Germans ignored the Romanian note, but the Hungarians responded almost immediately. In its reply of November 15, the Szálasi government cynically denied the allegations of the Romanians. At the time, when the Nyilas terror was at its height in Budapest, the Hungarians brazenly asserted that the North Transylvanian Jews were not being deported but were merely being mobilized for labor; that their lives, like the lives of Hungarian Jews still in Hungary, were not in danger; and that in fact their lot was much better than that of the "aryan" Hungarians, for the Jews were working at a great distance from the front, while the latter had to endure great sacrifices on the battlefield. The Nyilas claimed that they had on their own invited the International Red Cross to investigate the situation of the Romanians and Jews in Germany, and that Hungary would welcome such and invitation on the part of the Romanians-presumably to investigate the status of the Hungarians in Romania. The Nyilas claimed that the veiled threat of reprisals was intended merely to justify in advance the Romanians’ planned actions against the Hungarian minority in Romania. 38

The Committee achieved no tangible success along these diplomatic lines. It became increasingly apparent that the fate of the North Transylvanian Jews, like that of all other victims in Nazi-Nyilas hands, depended on the military successes of the Allies. The Committee therefore concentrated its attention on helping the refugees in Romania, and the Jews in the liberated areas. It was assisted by the AJDC, the International Red Cross, and the Romanian government. Following the liberation by the combined Soviet-Romanian forces of large parts of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, the Romanian government placed a special train at the disposal of the Committee to help in the repatriation of the Jews liberated from the Nazi camps. 39 In the spring and summer of 1945, the Committee also aided the liberated Jewish communities of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. 40 (1219)

Slovakia: A Pioneer of Anti-Jewish Measures

For a while at least, the only other possible refuge for Hungarian Jews beside Romania was Slovakia. A creation and loyal ally of the Third Reich, Slovakia was one of the first countries to emulate the Nazis' anti Jewish policies. 41 In fact, soon after the establishment of the "independent" Slovak State in March 1939, Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky, the new Foreign Minister, assured Hermann Goring that the Jews of Slovakia would be treated in the same way as the German Jews. Indeed, the " solution of the Jewish question" became one of the main preoccupations of the new government. 42 The policies of the government, in this as in all other respects, were influenced if not determined by the German Legation in Bratislava, which was first headed by Manfred von Killinger (March 1939-January 1941) and then by Hanns Elard Ludin. The Legation's special advisor on the Jewish question was SS-Hauptsturmführer Dieter Wisliceny, who arrived in Bratislava on September 1, 1940. A leading member of the Eichmann-Sonderkommando, Wisliceny had played an important role in the liquidation of the Jews of Slovakia, Greece, and Hungary.

The anti-Jewish drive in Slovakia began soon after the establishment of the new state by the enactment of a decree relating to the definition of Jews (April 18, 1939). This definition, which reflected the views of Dr. Bernhard Losener as incorporated in the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, was subsequently adopted as part of the so-called Jewish Code (Zidovsky kodex; Judenkodex), which was promulgated as Law No. 198/ 1941 on September 9, 1941.43

During the first phase of the anti-Jewish campaign, the Jews of Slovakia were subjected to a ruthless "aryanization" program spearheaded be the Central Economy Office (Ustredny Hospodarsky Urad-UHU). 44 About two-thirds of the 15,000 Jews of Bratislava were expelled from the city in October 1941, and forced, together with thousands of others left unemployed in the wake of the "aryanization " process, to "do productive work" in labor camps. The largest of these camps-established in the fall of 1941 and originally designed as entrainment-deportation centers-were located in Sered', Novaky, and Vyhne. Smaller camps were established at Bava, Zilina, Deges, Nitra, Svaty Jur, Lab, and Zohor. (1220)

The second and more radical phase began shortly after the Wannsee Conference of January 20, 1942. Slovakia had the dubious distinction of being the first country to deport masses of Jews to Auschwitz. Between March 26 and June 1942 the Slovak authorities deported approximately 52,000 Jews. 45 Most of the remaining Jews eventually received special identification in the form of "protective letters" (Schutzbriefe) certifying that they were essential to the nation's economy. In spite of German pressure, the mass deportations were not resumed. Smaller transports were "smuggled" out, but the total number of deportees between June 1942 and March 1943 was under 6,000. 46

By 1943, the deportation of the Jews had become somewhat unpopular. The economy was under great strain, the war was not going very well for the Axis, and news bad begun to filter in after July 1942 that the deported Jews were in fact being liquidated rather than resettled. The source of this news was none other than the Vatican; this made a tremendous impression on this overwhelmingly Catholic country.

Hitler and Prime Minister Tuka (right)

Pressed by the Catholic bishops, Prime Minister Tuka expressed to the Germans his desire that a mixed commission inspect one of the camps in which the Jews had been "resettled." Embarrassed by the request, the Germans decided to ease, for a while at least, their pressure on Slovakia. In December 1943, however, Edmund Veesenmayer, Ribbentrop's troubleshooter and later Reich Plenipotentiary in Hungary, managed to persuade Tiso to have the 16,000 to 18,000 remaining Jews placed in special camps by April 1,1944; the approximately 10,000 converted Jews were to be placed in a separate camp.

During this turbulent period in Slovakian history, the status of the Jews in Hungary was quite good despite the many anti-Jewish measures in effect at the time. Following the adoption of the "aryanization" program and especially after the beginning of the deportations in March 1942, a relatively large number of mostly Hungarian-speaking Slovak Jews sought and found refuge in Hungary. By November 1943, their number reached approximately 8,000, close to 10 percent of the total Jewish population of Slovakia.

Until the German occupation of Hungary the situation of the Slovak Jews in Hungary was relatively tolerable.

Ferenc Keresztes Fischer, Hungarian Minister of the Interior

Many of them enjoyed the protection of the Hungarian state, the sympathy of Ferenc Keresztes Fischer, the enlightened Minister of the Interior, and the support of the (1221) Hungarian Jewish community. Following the occupation, their fate became intertwined with that of the Hungarian Jews. Although the Slovak government gave lip service to their protection, it was in fact only interested in protecting some of the "valuable" Jews (see Chapter 27). Ironically when the situation in Slovakia stabilized following the suspension of the deportations, the country emerged as a refuge not only for those who bad originally escaped from there, but also for many Hungarian Jews.

Slovakia: The Temporary Haven

Aware of the switch in the anti-Jewish postures of the two countries, the RSHA lost no time after the occupation of Hungary in informing the authorities in Bratislava about the "danger" of possible illegal crossings by Jews along the Slovak-Hungarian border. Similar warnings were sent to Bucharest and Sofia. 47

Since the Slovak government showed no interest in its Jews abroad, many of the Slovak Jewish refugees in Hungary were included in the Final Solution program. Some of the refugees, however, together with a number of Hungarian Jews, managed to cross the borders into Slovakia illegally, especially along the eastern parts of the border. This alarmed the German authorities in Hungary. On June 14, at the height of the mass deportations from Hungary, Veesenmayer approached the German Foreign Office, requesting a meeting with Ludin to bring about the simultaneous liquidation of both Jewish communities. 48 The positive answer of Ribbentrop arrived the same day. 49 However, the unavailability of Wisliceny and Eichmann, who at the time were busy with the deportation of the Jews of Hungary, necessitated a postponement of the proposed meeting. It was rescheduled, only to be postponed once again because of unexpected developments in both Hungary and Slovakia. Horthy had decided to halt the deportations on July 6; with the fast approach of the Soviet forces coupled with the increasingly daring forays of the Slovak partisan units in Slovakia, the military situation of the Axis had deteriorated to such an extent that the Germans became extremely apprehensive. 50

Veesenmayer’s eagerness to meet with Ludin was presumably motivated by his chagrin over the handling of the Jewish question in (1222) Slovakia, and especially over the flight of some Hungarian Jews. He bombarded the Foreign Office with complaints about the alleged difficulty of carrying out the anti-Jewish measures in Hungary because of the leniency manifested toward the Jews by both Romania and Slovakia. 51 The Slovaks, pressured by the German Foreign Office, made one major concession by showing no interest in most of their Jewish nationals in Hungary and allowing them to be included in the general deportation measures. 52 As to the Hungarian Jews who managed to escape to Slovakia, Alexander (Sano) Mach, the Deputy Prime Minister, assured Ludin that their number was small, inasmuch as the Slovak borders with Hungary were under heavy guard. As a further concession, Ludin requested the reassignment of Wisliceny to Bratislava to help him with the solution of the Jewish question. 53 Veesenmayer, however, remained adamant in his position, disputing the contentions about the treatment of Slovak Jews in Hungary and Hungarian Jewish refugees in Slovakia. He continued to insist that the implementation of the anti-Jewish program in Hungary was being made difficult by the leniency with which the Jews were being treated in Slovakia and Romania. 54

Hungarian Council of Ministers, headed by Lajos Remenyi-Schneller

The changing attitude of the Hungarian government six weeks after the halting of the deportations was reflected, among other things, in its renewed interest in the few bona fide Jewish Hungarian nationals abroad. On August 25, 1944, for example, the Council of Ministers, which was then headed by Lajos Remenyi-Schneller acting on behalf of the ailing Sztojay, decided to extend the validity of the passports held by Hungarian Jews living in Slovakia. 55

General Geza Lakatos

Ironically, by that time, when the situation of the Jews in Hungary was gradually improving under the policies of General Geza Lakatos, the conditions in Slovakia were taking a sharp turn for the worse. Unexpected developments played into the hands of Ludin and Veesenmayer, enabling them to see the attainment of their cherished objective: the liquidation of the remaining Jewish community of Slovakia together with most of the Hungarian Jewish escapees.

Slovakia: The Tragedy Completed

The dilatory way in which the Slovak authorities handled the German pressures was to a large extent grounded in a realistic assessment of the military situation at the time. By June 1944, the Red Army (1223) was fast approaching the eastern borders of the country, revitalizing the Slovak underground forces. Acts of resistance and sabotage became ever more frequent and daring. The underground forces, numbering from 12,000 to 15,000 at their peak, included in addition to the Slovak patriots a considerable number of French and Soviet escapees from various concentration and POW camps, and volunteers from several other national groups. Among these were a few thousand able-bodied Jews from the remaining community of Slovakia, mostly escapees from the work camps. 56 As the movement expanded, Soviet and British commandos were parachuted into Slovak territories to help train the fighters. To assist in Jewish rescue operations, a special commando of four Palestinian parachutists from a British unit arrived toward the middle of September. 57 The partisan forces were also joined by thousands of soldiers who had deserted the regular Slovak Army.

The partisan struggle acquired a momentum of its own, compelling the Slovak government, then headed by Jozef Tiso, to declare martial law on August 11 and finally appeal to Hitler (August 25) for urgent military assistance to help quell the uprising. On August 29, SS units under the command of SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger arrived in Slovakia to cope with the situation. That same day the uprising became general, with the insurgents' radio station in Banska Bystrica, the center of the resistance movement, calling on the people to join in the fight against the Germans. In his capacity as Wehrmachtbefehlshaber in Slovakia, Gottlob Christian Berger 58 was assisted by two SS officers especially concerned with the solution of the Jewish question: SS-Obersturmbannführer Josef Witiska (Dr. Vitezka), the SIPO and SD boss of Slovakia and the chief of Einsatzgruppe H; and SS-Hauptsturmführer Anton Alois Brunner, a leading member of Eichmann's "dejewification" squad. 59 While Witiska's units participated in the struggle against the partisans, they were particularly concerned with the roundup of Jews in the areas under their control.

With the fall of Banska Bystrica on October 28 and the collapse of the uprising, the anti-Jewish measures acquired an ominous tone. The Jews not rounded up earlier were now picked up by Brunner's forces that were assisted by the Slovak Hlinka Guards. Most of these Jews were taken to Sered'; from there they were gradually deported to Auschwitz and other German concentration camps. 60 Between October 1944 and (1224) March 1945, approximately 13,500 Jews were deported. Among these were the several thousand Jews the Germans had captured during the uprising and an undetermined number of Hungarian Jewish refugees. 61

Notes

1. The number of Hungarian Jews in Croatia in 1944 is unknown. At a meeting of August 25, 1944, the Hungarian government decided to revalidate the passports of the Hungarian Jews in Croatia. Vadirat, 3: 477.

2. RLB, Doc. 187.

3. Antonescu's official position was Chief of State (Seful de Stat). His rule is often referred to as the " regime of the legionnaires" (regimul legionarilor).

4. For a detailed account of the Romanian involvement in the massacre of the Jews of Odessa, see Dora Litani, "The Destruction of the Jews of Odessa in the Light of Romanian Documents. " In: YVS, 6: 135-154. See also Radu loanid, The Holocaust in Romania. Th e Destruction of Jews and Gypsies Under the Antonescu Regime, 1940-1944 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), pp. 177-182.

5. For details, see Matatias Carp, Pogromul (The Jassy Pogrom ) (Bucharest: Socec, 1947), 162 pp. For a slanted " revisionist" version, see Aurel Karetki and Maria Covaci, Zile fnsingera te la lasji (Bloody Days at Jassy) (Bucharest: Editura Politica, 1978), 127 pp. See also Ioanid, op. cit., pp. 62-109. According to the late historian Jean Ancel, one of the leading experts on the Holocaust in Romania, the number of those murdered in Jassy was approximately 14,000. See his Preludiu la asasinat. Pogromu l de la la:j i, 29 junie 1941 (Prelude to Murder. The Porgrom of Jassy, June 29, 1941). (Jassy: Yad Vashem-Polirom, 2005), p. 11.

6. Matatias Carp, Transnistria (Bucharest: Socec, 1948), 476 pp. See also Ioanid, op. cit., pp. 176-224, and Jean Ancel, Transnistria (Bucharest: Editura Atlas, 1998), 3 vols.

7. According to the findings by the Wiesel Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, the number of Romanian and Ukrainian victims murdered during the Antonescu era ranged between 280,000 and 380,000. See Comisia internationala pentru studierea Holocaustului in Romania: Raport final. (International Commission for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania: Final Report). Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, and Mihail E. Ionescu, eds. (Bucharest: Editura Polirom, 2005), p. 388. Radu Ioanid established the number of those massacred at 285,000. See his The Holocaust in Romania, p. 289. According to Raul Hilberg, the number of the Romanian and Ukrainian Jews murdered during the Antonescu era was 270,000. See his The Destruction of the European Jews, 3rd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), vol. 3, p. 1321. According to Carollancu, the number of victims was 264,000. See his Shoah in Romania. Evre ii fn limpul regimului Antonescu, 1940-1944 (The Shoah in Romania. The Jews During the Era of Antonescu, 1940-1944) (Jassy: Editura Polirom, 2001), p. 30. Finally, according to Jean Ancel, the number of Romanian and Ukrainian Jewish victims was 420,000. See 1225 his Contribufii la istoria Romtinie i. Problema evreia sci'i, 1933-1944 (Contributions to the History of Romania. The Jewish Problem, 1933-1944) (Bucharest: Editura Ha sefer Yad Vashem, 2003), vol. 2, p. 402.

8. In some cities in the northern part of Romania, including Bacau, Botoani, and Jassy, the local military authorities compelled the Jews to wear the Star of David. See Alexandru Florian, "Treatment of the Holocaust in Romanian Textbooks." In: Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Post communist East Central Europe. Randolph L. Braham, ed. (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1994).

9. According to a statistical study showing the demographic evolution of Romanian Jewry, no more than approximately 15,000 of the 312,972 Jews (1930 census) of Old Romania, Southern Transylvania, and Southern Bukovina (i.e., the Romani a ruled by Marshal Antonescu) perished during the war. See Sabin Manuila and Wilhelm Filderman, Regional Development of the Jewish Population in Romania (Rome: Stabilimento Tipografico F. Failli, 1957), 15 pp. The authors, the former General Director of the Central Statistica l Institute of Romania and the former President of the Jewish Community of Romania, respectively, conclude that "no other country... [under] Nazi domination can show so large a proportion of survivors as does Romania.

10. See, for example, the telegram of February I 0, 1943, by Fritz Gebhard Hahn, Secretary of Legation in the German Foreign Office, addressed to the German Legation in Bucharest, RLB, Doc. 95.

11. For details on the treatment of the Jews in Romania, see Matatias Carp, Cartea neagri. Sufe rinfe le evreilor din Romtinia, 1940-194 4 (B lack Book. Facts and Documents. The Suffering of the Jews of Romania, 1940-1944) (Bucharest: Socec, 1946), 380 pp.; Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1961), pp. 485-509; Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution (New York: The Beechhurst Press, 1953), pp. 394-411. See also Th. Lavi, " The Background to the Rescue of Romanian Jewry During the Period of the Holocaust." In: Jews and Non-Jews in Eastern Europe. Bela Vago and George L. Mosse, eds. (New York: Wiley, 1974), pp. 177-186.

12. Jacobson’s report was forwarded to the State Department by Burton Y. Berry, the U.S. Representative in Romania. The Germans apparently managed to intercept or copy it, since it was placed in the Richter Files (on file in RG-52).

13. Documents, dated April 20, 1944, from the Richter Files (Roll 3, Vol. 18), on file in RG-52. At this time, the ghettoization of the Jews was already in full swing in Carpatho-Ruthenia and northeastern Hungary.

14. Monitorul Oficial (Official Gazette), Bucharest, May 29, 1944. On June 6, Richter in formed the SIPO and SD leader in Berlin about the new law. Richter Files. According to the recollections of Radu Lecea, Marshal Antonescu had not been awa re of the influx of Hungarian Jews or of their protection by the Romanian authorities. See hi s Eu i-am salvo/ peevreii din Romtinia (I Saved the Jews of Romania) (Bucharest: Roza Vanturilor, 1994), 289 pp.

15. Telegram no. 3867 of June 17, 1944, from Leland Harrison, the American Minister in Bern, to the U.S. Secretary of State.

16. Summary Report of the Activities of the War Refugee Board with Respect to the Jews of Hungary (Washington, October 9, 1944), p. 14. (Typesript.) The report was 1226 prepared by Lawrence S. Lesser, the assistant of John W. Pehle, the head of the War Refugee Board (WRB). Reports on the increasingly benevolent position of Romania toward the Jews were periodically carried in The New York Times. See, for example, the issues of April 1 ("40,000 Refugees Escape to Rumania ") and April 11, 1944 ("Steinhardt Helps 245 More Exiles").

17. For a detailed account of the activities of the rescue committee of Turda, see Arnold David Finkelstein, Fenysugar a borzalmak ejszakajaban (A Ray of Light in the Night of Horrors) (Tel Aviv: P. Solar and J. Nadiv, 1958), 400 pp. The author, the former secretary of the Jewish community of Turda, shared the leadership of the committee with Arieh (Eldar) Hirsch and Majsi (Carol) Moskovits. He expressed disdain for the leaders of the Kolozsvar Rescue Committee (Mentesi Bizottsag), including Rabbi Mozes Weinberger (later Carmilly), Emo Hatszegi, and Erno Marton who, he claimed, " exploited the material means and available escape routes almost exclusively for their own rescue" (p. 294). The book also contains an account of the nearly miraculous escape of Rabbi Jozsef Paneth of Nagyilonda from the ghetto of Des together with nine members of his family (pp. 302-323).

18. Among the consular officials who visited the various counties of Northern Transylvania to acquaint themselves with the ghettoization and deportation process were Mihai, Vasile Hossu, Ion Ioaiu, Alexandru Olteanu, and Ion Romacan. Mihai Marina, Nu puteam rlirnine impasibili! (We Could Not Remain Impassive!), Magazin fstoric (Historic Magazine), Bucharest, (June 1976) 6: 39-41. See also pp. 37-38. One of the Romanians involved in the rescue of Jews was Aurel Socol, a leading figure of Iuliu Maniu's National Peasant Party (Partidul Na/iona/ Tiiriin esc ) in Northern Transylvania. For his account on the illegal transfer of Jews across the Hungarian-Romanian border, see Furtunii asupra Ardea/ului (Storm Over Transylvania) (Cluj: Revista "Tribuna," 1991 ), I03 pp. (See especially, pp. 6 1-68). For some other examples of Romanian rescue activiti es, see Rem mbet: 40 de ani de la mas acrarea e vre ilor din Ardea/ul de Nord sub ocupaJia horthys tii (Remember. Forty Years Since the Massacre of the Jews of Northern Transylvania Under Horthyite Occupation) (Bucharest: Federa\ia Comunitli\i lor Evreie~ti din Republica Socialistli Romania, 1985), pp. 44-50. For a slanted "revisionist" account see Adrian Riza, "Fascism antifascism pe meleaguri Transilvane" (Fascism and Anti-Fascism in Transylvanian Regions). Almanahul "Luceaforul" ("Luceaflirul " Almanach), Bucharest, 1986, pp. 64-92. The rescue activities of the Halutzim are discussed in the next chapter.

19. One of the groups of Jewish refugees apprehended by Romanian border guards and returned to the Gestapo in Northern Transylvania included Eva Pamfil, nee Semlyen, and several members of her family in Kolozsvar. They were placed in the Kolozsvar ghetto and deported shortly thereafter to Auschwitz. See Eva Pamfil’s letter in the Raoul Sorban File in the Department of the Righteous at Yad Vashem, Jerusalem. For examples of additional incidents of this kind, see Finkelstein, Fenysugar a borzalmak ejsz akajaban, pp. 205-223. See also RLB, Doc. 284.

20. Among the members were Martin Hirsch, J. Schmetterer, Leon Goldenberg, Paul Benedek, and D. Lampel. Bela Yago, "Political and Diplomatic Activities for the Rescue of the Jews of Northern Transylvania." In: YVS, 6: 155. In addition to Zissu and (1227) Filderman, the heads respectively of the Zionist and communal organizations, an active rescue role was played by Jean Cohen and Leon Itzcar.

21. Shortly after the emigration scheme began, a number of technical and jurisdictional difficulties arose, especially with respect to deciding who would be chosen to make the voyage to safe havens. On July 21, Zissu was approached by Ira A. Hirschmann, the Special Attache of the USA associated with the WRB, who expressed his concern for the quick movement of the vessels agreed to by the government. For the text of Hirschmann’s letter, see The Jewish National and University Library, Jerusalem, Heb. 40 1253 / 30. For further details on the WRB’s involvement, see Chapter 31.

22. The Germans were fully aware of the Romanians’ involvement in the emigration schemes. A set of documents relating to the meeting of June 9 was forwarded by Killinger to the Foreign Office on July 17. NA, Microcopy T-120, Roll 4203, Frames K789/K209065-099; See also RLB, Doc. 317. Wagner briefed Ribbentrop on these matters on July 28. NA, Frames K789/K209100-101.

23. RLB, Docs. 194, 196, 197, 282, and 284.

24. NA, Microcopy T-120, Roll 4203, Frames K789/K209100-1l7. Soon after Romania's turn-about of August 23, the Volksgruppen leaders were arrested and placed in special detention camps. Ibid., Frame K209217.

25. RLB, Doc. 316. Thadden sent a copy of his communication to Eichmann that same day. NA, Microcopy T-120, Roll 4355, Frame K2l3558.

26. RLB, Doc. 317.

27. Ibid., Doc. 196; NA, Microcopy T-120, Roll 4355, Frame K213505.

28. RLB, Doc. 318.

29. Ibid., Doc. 319.

30. NA, Roll 4355, Frame K2 I 3510. The note was signed by Reinebeck, a leading official in the Foreign Minister’ s office.

31. Copies of the statement were forwarded by Josef Mandi, the brother of Georges Mandel-Mantello, then diplomatic representative of El Salvador in Switzerland, to the Schweizer Hilfscomite for die ungarischen Juden (Swiss Committee for the Aid of Hungarian Jews) in Zurich and to the International Red Cross. Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, Archives, M-20/47.

32. For an evaluation of the various leaders of wartime Romania, see Alexandre Safran (former Chief Rabbi of Romania), "The Rulers of Fascist Romania Whom I Had to Deal With. " Ln: YVS, 6: 175-180.

33. Minutes of Zissu’s discussion with Antonescu and Vladescu as taken and signed on August 23, 1944, by Emo Marton and Leon Itzcar. Available at The Jewish National and University Library, Jerusalem, Heb. 40 1253/30.

34. Ibid.

35. Rena Jterea Noastra (Our Rebirth), Bucharest, (October 20, 1944): 1.

36. Ibid., (November I 0, 1944): 4.

37. RLB, Doc. 354.

38. Ibid., Doc. 355.

39. The first train for the repatriation of liberated concentration camp inmates left Romania under the leadership of Jacob Schmetterer on April 12, 1945, and returned to Nagyvarad eight days later with 202 deportees. The second train, to Birkenau-Auschwitz (1228) and Kattowicz, left on April 25 and returned 18 days later with 405 deportees; the third train left on May 15. Marton’s report on the activities of the Committee dated May 22, 1945, Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, Archives Film JM/2625/1.

40. Ibid.

41. According to the census of December 15, 1940, 88,951 of the approximately 2, 500,000 inhabitants of Slovakia were Jewish. About 12,300 Jews were identified as entrepreneurs and shopkeepers, 22,000 as private employees, and a few thousand as government employees and professionals. Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, p. 460.

42. Among the state and government officials most active in the " solution " of the Jewish question were President Josef Tiso, Prime Minister Vojtech (Bela)Tuka, and Foreign Minister Ferdin and Durcansky. Special roles were played by Sano Mach, the Minister of the Interior; Dr. Geiza Konka and later Dr. Anton Vasek, the heads of the Jewish Division of the Ministry of the Interior; and Augustin Moravek, the chairman of the Central Economy Office.

43. For details on the provisions of the Jewish Code, see Livia Rothkirchen, The Destruction of Slovak Jewry (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1961), pp. xviii-xix. The Hungarian Jew is h leaders, like the Hungarian authorities, were well aware of the persecution of the Slovak Jews. See, for example, Maria Schmidt’s "The Destruction of Slovakian Jews as Reflected in Hungarian Police Reports." In: Studies on the Holocaust in Hungary, Randolph L. Braham, ed. (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1990), pp. 164-174.

44. Rothkirchen, pp. xiv-xv. For details on the " aryanization" program, see also Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, pp. 460-462.

45. Ibid., p. 467.

46. According to Korherr, the SS statistician, the number of deportees from Slovakia reached 56,691 by the end of 1942 and 57,545 by March 31, 1943. Ibid., p. 468.

47. Secret RSHA note (IV B 4 b-23 14/43g 82) dated March 30, 1944. Richter Files.

48. RLB, Doc. 175.

49. NG-2829. Also in NA, Microcopy T-120, Roll 4355, Frame 1<213983.

50. For references to the correspond encerelating to the scheduled meetings of Foreign Office representatives, see RLB, I: lxx ix.

51. Ibid., Docs. 194, 197, 320, and 32 1.

52. Ibid., Doc. 310. (Ludin note dated July 21, 1944). See also Chapter 27.

53. Ibid., Doc. 322 (Ludin telegram of August 4, 1944). On August 8, Wagne r suggested that Ludin and Veesenmayer meet with Wisliceny to settle the question of the Hungarian Jewish escapees in Slovakia. Ibid., Doc. 319.

54. Ibid., Doc 323 (Veesenmayer's note to the Foreign Office, dated August I 0, 1944).

55. The decision also extended to Hungarian Jews living in Croatia. There are no data relating to the number of Hungarian Jewish nationals who lived "legally" in these countries. For the minutes of the Council’s meeting, see Vadirat, 3: 477.

56. Rothkirchen, The Destruction of Slovak Jewry, pp. xliii-x lvi. (1229)

57. The four parachutists were Jews of Slovak origin: Chaviva Reik, Zvi Ben Ya'acov, Rafael Reiss, and Chaim Chermesh. After the resistance was crushed late in October 1944, they were executed together with a group of local Jewish fighters. Ibid., pp. xliv-xlv.

58. After approximately four weeks in Slovakia, Berger, having played a crucial role in the suppression of the uprising, was replaced by SS-General Hermann Hoffie.

59 For details on Alois Brunner, see Mary Felstiner, "Alois Brunner: 'Eichmann’s Best Tool'." In: Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual. Vol. 3 (New York: Kraus International Publications, 1986), pp. 1-46.

60. When the camp was evacuated in January 1945, a few thousand deportees were sent to Ravensbrück, Sachsenhausen, Bergen-Belsen, and Theresienstadt. Some had been sent to these camps as early as November 1944, when the gassing facilities of Auschwitz were destroyed.

61. According to Vitezka’s report of December 9, 1944, 4,653 of the 18,937 prisoners captured were Jewish. Of these, 2,257 were immediately subjected to "special treatment" (Sonderbehandlung). Rothkirchen, Destruction of Slovak Jewry, pp. xlvi-xlvii. According to a source cited by Reitlinger (in The Final Solution, p. 392) of the 18,937 prisoners reported by Vitezka, 9,653 were identified as Jews; of these 8,975 were transferred to concentration camps and the remainder subjected to "special handling."

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

RESCUE AND RESISTANCE

The Domestic Climate for Rescue and Resistance

THE WARTIME LEADERSHIP of Hungarian Jewry has often been censured for failing to do anything meaningful to forestall or at least to minimize the catastrophe. Though aware of the dimensions of the Nazis' Final Solution program, it failed to prepare any contingency plans of rescue or possible resistance. The attitudes and perceptions of these leaders, like those of Hungarian Jewry as a whole, continued to be shaped by a myopic view of the community's position in Hungary since 1867. As a result, when the Hungarian community still remained relatively intact and well-off while the communities in neighboring countries were being destroyed, the Hungarian Jews were developing a false sense of security. To the very end they deluded themselves-constantly rationalizing that they would somehow survive the war, albeit under less favorable economic conditions.

When disaster struck with the German occupation of Hungary on March 19, 1944, the Hungarian Jews soon discovered that they were no less vulnerable than their brethren elsewhere in Nazi-dominated Europe had been. One by one, the major pillars upon which they based their hope collapsed. The conservative-aristocratic ruling faction of the Hungarian Right on which they counted so heavily for their continued protection was eliminated; the leftist and progressive opposition which they expected would take a stand against the Nazis remained-postwar Hungarian communist historiography notwithstanding-an impotent shell. Finally, the Christian neighbors with whom they thought they had shared a common destiny for over a thousand years remained basically passive. This was especially true in the provincial communities, where the ghettoization, concentration, and deportation of the Jews were carried out at an extremely rapid pace. (1231)

Attitude of the Hungarian Christians

The generally passive, if not openly hostile, attitude of the relatively large percentage of the Christian population was shaped by many factors. Subjected for over two decades to a vicious anti-Semitic propaganda campaign, a considerable number of the unenlightened population developed a distorted picture of the Jews' historical role in Hungary. In the course of time, many Christians came to accept the ultra-rightist image of the Jews and blamed them for all the failures and shortcomings of Hungary. As in Germany, they viewed the Jews both as harbingers of communism and as champions of plutocratic capitalism. They tended to blame all Jews for the abortive proletarian dictatorship of Bela Kun, even though the overwhelming majority of Hungarian Jewry sided with the Magyars in condemning the Bolshevik adventure and having been identified as both "bourgeois-capitalists" and as devotees of Judaism, proportionally suffered even more than the Christians.

Also even though the great majority of the Jews lived on the edge of poverty, the general public tended to equate all Jews with the small percentage that had played a conspicuous role in the professions and in banking, industry, and commerce. The distorted image also included the notion that Jews shunned manual labor, preferring to exploit the work of others.

In the years before the Holocaust, this anti-Jewish bias was reinforced by the vicious campaign of the German-financed ultra-rightist press, the constant preoccupation of the state radio stations with the Jewish question, the agitation of the representatives of the extremist parties and movements, and the policy declarations of anti-Semitic parliamentarians. The preoccupation with the Jewish question and the demands for its effective solution became ever more frequent following the Anschluss and especially after the declaration of war against the Soviet Union late in June 1941. An Axis partner, Hungary closely observed Nazi Germany's approach to the solution of the Jewish question and at first showed great eagerness to adopt at least some of its features. Anxious to prove its acceptance of Hitler s New Order for Europe, Hungary adopted a Nuremberg-type law-the so-called Third Anti-Jewish Law in 1941-and "resettled" approximately 18,000 "alien" Jews, most of who were murdered near Kamenets-Podolsk in late August 1941. These draconic measures, like the many others that preceded and (1232) followed them, came to be accepted by large segments of the Hungarian people as necessary and desirable for the advancement of Hungary's national interests.

The avalanche of ever harsher anti-Jewish decrees that were adopted almost immediately after the German occupation on March 19, 1941, did not catch the Hungarians totally unprepared. Even the ultimate objective of the Germans-the roundup and deportation of the Jews-was not all that surprising, for such steps had been called for in the Hungarian Parliament several years earlier.' Having been psychologically and politically prepared, many segments of the Hungarian population in fact looked forward to some of the anti-Jewish measures .2 Those with more rapacious instincts applauded the ghettoization-deportation program, hoping to take over the homes, professional offices, and businesses of Jews. No sooner were the Jews placed into ghettos then a veritable competition arose for the acquisition of their apartments and businesses. The competition was especially keen among professionals who were eager to acquire well established offices, equipment, and luxury apartments .3 Christian businessmen joined the bandwagon by requesting the allocation of Jewish businesses or the distribution of their stock. 4

A segment of the population viewed the measures enacted against the Jews with disgust; but feeling helpless to prevent them, they usually internalized their indignation. A few officials, however, including some prefects, protested the measures by resigning from their positions. 5 The passivity of the majority was not necessarily because of a lack of concern for the Jews; quite often, it resulted from fear inspired by the quisling government. As part of the anti-Jewish drive, the Christian population was threatened with heavy fines and penalties, including internment, for hiding or protecting Jews or their property. Furthermore, most Christians, like most Jews, had no inkling about the ultimate scope of the Final Solution program. The press and radio were silent on the deportations. Most Hungarians who witnessed the ghettoization, concentration, and entrainment of the Jews had been convinced that their removal from their homes involved their eventual relocation "to some distant places where they would be finally made to do physical labor."

Dome Sztojay

In contrast to such German-occupied countries as Denmark-a country with a long tradition of democracy, pluralism, and toleration-and even to such Axis-allied states as Bulgaria, Italy, and Romania, (1233) where the persecuted Jews received considerable aid from both the people and the indigenous authorities, 6 in Hungary the Sztojay government exceeded the Germans' expectations in its anti-Jewish initiatives and zeal. Ironically, the once-dreaded labor service system emerged as a source of rescue for Jewish men 20 to 48 years of age. Many of them, and in some places even those younger and older, were called up for duty at the time of the ghettoization, saving them from deportation.

A rather large segment of the Christian population openly collaborated with the Nazis. Only a comparatively small number dared to publicly criticize the inhumanity of the measures that were enacted against their Jewish neighbors with whom they had lived in harmony and friendship for many generations. In evaluating the attitude of the Christians in Szeged, a city in which the overwhelming majority of the Jews were assimilated, Jozsef Pal wrote:

Unfortunately, among the citizens of Szeged only a few passed the test well. Sympathy and solidarity were manifested only by a minority, and readiness to help by even fewer. The majority, who were immersed in their own concerns, viewed the anti-Jewish measures with indifference, and a smaller minority was visibly glad about these measures. There were those who assisted the slavish governmental organs with denunciations in order to prevent the Jews’ attempts to circumvent the measures enacted against them. 7

The situation was even worse in the communities in which the Jews were less assimilated. But there were also a number of Christians who risked their freedom, and some even their lives, by hiding Jews 8 or bringing food to their former neighbors, friends, or employers in the ghettos and entrainment centers. In some cases, these Christians were beaten savagely and some were actually forced to join the Jews on the journey to Auschwitz. 9

However, those who denounced the Jews for ideological, pseudo patriotic or opportunistic reasons far outnumbered the good Samaritans. The pervasiveness of denunciations made an impression even on Imre Csecsy, the bourgeois radical politician. In the April 10, 1944, entry of his diary, Csecsy wrote: (1234)

‘I heard from someone that within two weeks the Gestapo received 27,000 anonymous denunciations. High-ranking German officers, who were involved in the invasions of Poland, Holland, Belgium, Norway, and Denmark, stated in amazement that they had not experienced such a thing anywhere else. Oh my beautiful Hungarian race, it is your glory that you surpassed Europe's every nation in denunciations! 10

During the occupation, the German and Hungarian units in charge of the Final Solution received from 30,000 to 35,000 denunciations against Jews from all parts of the country. The Hungarian Political Police (Magyar Politikai Rendorseg), headed by Peter Hain, investigated approximately 7,000 of the denunciations and arrested 1,950 Jews. Of these, 940 of the richer ones were handed over to the Gestapo, which promptly confiscated their property. 11

The wave of denunciations followed Laszlo Baky’s appeal of April 15, 1944:

‘It is in the national interest that the anti-Jewish decrees be carried out one hundred percent. I therefore request every honest Hungarian’s cooperation in the implementation of the decrees. Those who become aware that the decrees issued in connection with the Jewish question are being violated, circumvented, or evaded must, as their patriotic responsibility, report this to the nearest security (gendarmerie, police) organ. 12

Those with rapacious instincts, among them many Volksdeutsche, received an additional boost from the Fuhrer who suggested that Hungarians engaged in anti-Jewish activities be rewarded with confiscated Jewish capital. 13 The enthusiasm and extent to which the Hungarians responded to the appeals for "cooperation" astonished the Germans. They confessed that in no other country had they encountered so large a number of denunciations. 14 During one of his encounters with Freudiger, Dieter Wisliceny, a leading member of the Eichmann-Sonderkommando, reportedly remarked: "The Hungarians really seem to be the offspring of the Huns; we never would have succeeded like this without them. " 15

A similar sentiment was voiced by the representative of the German Security Police in Marosvasarhely. In describing the mood of (1235) the Szekelyfold population, he emphasized that the local Hungarians demanded, in view of the rapidly approaching front, a "quick and radical solution of the Jewish question since the fear of the Jews' revenge is greater than that of Russian brutality." 16

A generally favorable assessment of the population's reaction to the escalating anti-Jewish measures was also provided by the Hungarian Right radicals: "The majority and better strata of Hungarian society have received the announcement of the decrees with joy and feel that the long years of struggle waged against Hungarian Jewry socially, culturally, and politically have not been in vain." 17 This assessment became even more positive after the launching of the ghettoization drive. Upon his return from an inspection tour of the ghettos of Northern Transylvanian, Laszlo Endre declared: "The population in all cities and communities has hailed the government measures with genuine delight...; the population has rejoiced and has frequently supplied means of transportation to speed resettlement and get rid of the Jews." 18

Those Hungarians who were actively involved in the anti-Jewish drive might have made a larger segment of the population than did those actively or openly associated with the defense of rescue of Jews, but they nevertheless constituted but a small minority. Aside from those who were obviously motivated by greed and envy, there were those who were driven by personal feuds; still others were misguided by perverted patriotic or ideological considerations. 19

When the Jews were forcibly removed from their homes in the early morning hours and driven to the local ghettos or concentration centers carrying their bundles packed with essential clothing and food, they were often jeered by Christians lining the streets. Expressions of sympathy were relatively rare. The more decent Hungarians simply drew the curtains over their windows.

The general lethargy and passivity of the masses, like the hostility of the rabble-rousers, reflected, among other things, two fundamental factors: the effectiveness of the ultra-rightist propaganda apparatus and the absence of meaningful underground anti-Nazi leadership.

The ultra-rightist radio and press-in large part originally financed by the Germans-fostered a climate of virulent anti-Semitism, which was fully exploited by the Nazis and their Hungarian accomplices. The propaganda campaign was spearheaded after the occupation by the Royal (1236) Hungarian Propaganda Office for National Defense (Magyar kiraly i Nemzetvedelmi Propagandahivatal), which was headed by Istvan Antal, the Minister of Justice. 20

There was no active resistance to speak of in Hungary. The leaders of the minute and ineffective leftist parties were themselves under arrest or in hiding, and no effective plans were made or implemented for resisting the Nazis. Effective discussions for some kind of resistance or rescue began only after Horthy had halted the deportations early in July 1944. Even these discussions, initiated mostly by Zionist leaders, were rather limited in scope and involved primarily sympathetic church leaders, some disenchanted rightist figures, and Social Democrats.

Jusztinian Cardinal Seredi

Several statesmen and church leaders took a courageous stand against the Jewish persecutions. But most of these, including Jusztinian Cardinal Seredi, and

Count Istvan Bethlen

Count Istvan Bethlen, chose to communicate their opposition in confidential notes to Horthy or the Sztojay government. Only a few, mostly churchmen and statesmen in exile (for whom it did not take too much courage), had dared to publicly criticize the inhumanity against the Jews. 21

With public opinion thus neutralized or openly in concurrence with the anti-Jewish measures, the Sztojay government found it easy to place the instruments of state power at the disposal of the German-Hungarian units in charge of the Final Solution. Enjoying the support and cooperation of the civil service, police, and gendarmerie, the leaders of these units had no difficulty in carrying out the Final Solution program in the provinces at lightning speed. Without this level of Hungarian support, the Eichmann-Sonderkommando could not possibly have carried out its sinister mission in Hungary.

Levai, one of the experts on the Holocaust in Hungary, summarized the interplay of these factors as follows:

‘Owing to their insignificant numbers, the Nazis were practically unable even to supervise the deportations, let along to carry them out. The marking of the Jews with the Star of David, their roundup into ghettos and concentration camps, were made possible only by the fact that the gendarmerie-although well-acquainted with the situation and numbering some 20,000 men-could everywhere be sure of the aid of the local police. Even then the process could not have been carried through if the Christian population had shown (1237) resistance. Thus it must be assumed that-quite apart from the part the Regent and the Sztojay government had played-the chief causes for the complete sell-out of the Jews were the anti-Semitic propaganda with which the Hungarian population had been inundated for scores of years, the stirring up of their hatred and, last but not least, the rousing of the rabble's rapacious instincts. 22

This assessment was corroborated by both Otto Winkelmann and Edmund Veesenmayer in their testimonies as witnesses in the postwar trial of Hungarian war criminals. Winkelmann testified on December 22, 1945, during the trial of the Jaross-Endre-Baky trio:

‘It was very important for Germany that Hungary become a transit territory, especially with regard to the oil fields in Romania and the maintenance of contact with the German troops fighting in the Balkans. For this reason, I believe that the anti-Jewish measures would not have been carried out had the Hungarian government opposed them. 23

‘Veesenmayer testified in a similar vein the day before:

‘Eichmann immediately communicated to the Hungarian government the German desire that the Jews be removed from Hungary. I could not say whether the influence of Hungarian personalities was involved in this; however, I had learned from Winkelmann that Endre had already been in Berlin earlier, that is, before the dispatch of Eichmann. In any case, the setting up of the concentration camps was not a German demand but merely a wish, and there would not have been any further consequences if the Hungarians had not met this wish. This is sufficiently proved by the fact that when Horthy took a vigorous stand the deportation of the Jews of Budapest did not occur, which allows one to conclude that if the Hungarian government had intervened earlier with the same amount of energy the Germans would have desisted from the deportations. While the deportations were in fact a German demand, the center of gravity was with the Hungarian gendarmerie and the Hungarian authorities, inasmuch as 1944 was already a critical year for the Germans and by that time Germany no longer had sufficient forces at its disposal to be able to enforce its demand. The Germans would surely have continued to exert pressure on the Hungarian government, (1238) but without the latter’s consent they would have been unable to do anything. Or even if they had attempted to undertake something, the operation would surely not have been so smooth and especially not so quick, since as previously mentioned, the Germans did not have sufficient forces for it at their disposal. This is because the implementation of the deportations required not military but police personnel and the Germans would have been unable to contribute these. The removal of the Jewish population from the border regions might indeed have been a German wish, but that could only have come from the military. 24

Veesenmayer's assessment of the Hungarians' involvement in the implementation of the Final Solution program in Hungary is corroborated by Laszlo Endre himself. In his report on the progress of the anti-Jewish operations addressed to Prime Minister Sztojay on June 20, 1944, Endre provided ample evidence relating to the involvement of the Hungarian authorities in the speedy "solution" of the Jewish question in the Hungarian countryside. While the German witnesses were obviously attempting to cover up their own roles in Hungary by placing almost all the responsibility for the deportations on the Hungarian authorities, the currently available evidence indeed shows that without the wholehearted cooperation of the Quisling Sztojay government and the passivity of the Christians the Eichmann-Sonderkommando would not have been in a position to achieve its anti-Jewish objectives in Hungary. 25

Jewish Self-Help

The Jews' attempts to help themselves in the struggle for survival took various forms-both individual and collective. The former was more common in the countryside, the latter in the capital. In Budapest, the rescue efforts were, for a variety of reasons, relatively better organized and more effectively directed. In the first place, the opportunities for successfully surviving with Aryan identification papers were much greater in the capital than in the countryside, where everyone knew the local Jews. Moreover, by the time the organized rescue campaign was launched in the capital, Horthy had already halted the deportations and the country returned, albeit only for a short time, to a semblance of normality.

Ferenc Szálasi

Following the Szálasi coup of October 15, 1944, the rescue (1239) campaign entered an acute phase. The rescuing of Jews from the clutches of the Nyilas murder squads that terrorized the city became mostly the task of young Halutzim. Their acts of heroism provided by far the finest hours of the resistance.

In the provincial communities, the opportunities for rescue were far fewer. For one thing, many of the large Jewish communities were in the Great Hungarian Plain, where the terrain was not conducive to hiding. Moreover, the ghettoization and concentration of the Jews in the provinces started less than a month after the German occupation, with the leaders of most communities unaware of the meaning and ultimate scope of the anti-Jewish measures. Even among those who had been alerted about the possible danger awaiting them by courageous young Zionist couriers from Budapest, most chose to heed the reassuring messages conveyed by the traditional central leadership of Hungarian Jewry. They were understandably less inclined to believe the apocalyptic warnings of the young Halutzim they did not know than the comforting messages of their trusted leaders with whom they had closely cooperated for many years. They were, of course, unaware of the fact that the organ through which they had received the official communications-A Magyar Zsidok Lapja (The Journal of Hungarian Jews)-was in fact a thoroughly censored paper primarily serving the interests of the Nazis.

A few provincial Jews took the warning of the Halutzim seriously and escaped from the ghettos or entrainment centers. Most but by no means all were relatively young men from the villages who had trusted friends among the peasants or were familiar with the surrounding mountainous terrain; the largest number of escapees were from ghettos close to the borders with Romania and Slovakia. A number of provincial Jews tried to escape the deportations by building hiding places within the ghettos, 26 and an indeterminate number managed to escape to Budapest and melt into the crowds, usually by means of forged Christian identification papers. A handful of daring Jews succeeded in escaping to Switzerland by hiding in produce-laden freight cars. 27

The total number of escapees was relatively small. Most of the men between 20 and 48 years of age had been in labor service companies stationed within the country, along the fronts in the Ukraine, or in the copper mines of Bor, Yugoslavia. Within the ghettos, families were usually resolved to stay together come what may. A number of (1240) families in fact managed to escape across the border intact; 28 their number would undoubtedly have been larger had the leaders of the ghettos along the borders, including those of Kolozsvar, Marosvasarhely, and Nagyvarad, clearly informed the masses about the fate the Nazis really were planning for them. While many of the lay and spiritual leaders of these ghettos managed to save themselves by various schemes, the ghetto dwellers were reassured, partly through a rumor intentionally spread by the gendarmerie that they were being relocated to either Mezotur or a place called Kenyermezo, where they would be employed as agricultural workers for the duration of the war.

Under the extraordinary conditions of the time, most Jews were psychologically ready to accept without question the Nazis' reassuring lies. Some among the persecution-wise Polish and Slovak refugees proved more adept at saving themselves. Some built bunkers in and around Budapest and stocked them with food and weapons; others returned to their former homelands, where the anti-Jewish drive was by then at a standstill. Their attempt to warn the Hungarian Jews about the looming disaster proved unsuccessful.

A number of well-to-do Jews tried to save themselves and their families by buying off the SS or top-ranking Hungarian police or gendarmerie officers. By far the most spectacularly successful of such deals involved the rescue of 47 members of the Chorin, Mauthner, Kornfeld, and Weiss families, many of them converted Jews, in exchange for the transfer of the Weiss-Manfred Works to the SS (see Chapter 16). Some other rich Jewish families were less successful. After they had paid large sums of money to be flown by a Gestapo plane purportedly to Palermo and then on to Egypt, they were arrested on the way to the airport, robbed of their remaining valuables, and eventually deported. Some of them were killed upon their arrival in Auschwitz-Birkenau. 29

The Jewish Council

Although created by and generally construed as an instrumentality of the SS and of their Hungarian hirelings, the Central Jewish Council (Kozponti Zsido Tantics) also emerged as a major source of relief and rescue-especially for the Budapest Jews after the completion of the deportations from the provinces. 30 During the first crucial period (1241) of the German occupation, the members of the Council were preoccupied with fulfilling the incessant and increasingly exorbitant demands of the Germans. The Hungarian authorities flatly refused to deal with them, claiming that the handling of the Jewish question had become the exclusive responsibility of the SS. Deprived of their rights as citizens and subordinated to the Eichmann-Sonderkommando, the Council members nevertheless tried to do what they could for the Jews. They became involved in a desperate, and generally futile, attempt to prevent or at least delay or minimize the ultimate catastrophe they had feared. Like many people in Hungary at the time, the Council members also believed at first that with the inexorable advance of the Red Army the country might be liberated before the Germans had a chance to carry out their sinister designs. But when they realized the zeal with which the German and Hungarian squads in charge of the Final Solution were going about their work they tried to save those who could still be saved. It was a Sisyphean task, for, with Horthy in self-isolation, the conservative-aristocratic wing of the Right eliminated, and the new Hungarian authorities fully collaborationist, the Council leaders had to rely on their own constantly dwindling resources. They tried to get into the good graces of the Nazis by fulfilling with servility all their exorbitant demands for goods and money. As was the case in some ghettos in Poland, they also tried to persuade the Germans that the Jews would be economically valuable if retained within the country. The Germans were reminded of the crucial role the Jews had been playing in the economy of a country whose industrial and agricultural production was to a large extent subordinated to the German war effort.

The Germans were of course eager both to further expand their economic and military exploitation of Hungary and to achieve their murderous racist objectives. The Council members found themselves in an increasingly unenviable position: many of the instructions they had to carry out were clearly related to the Nazis’ sinister designs. While they were spared the agonizing tasks imposed upon their counterparts in Poland, Lithuania, and elsewhere with regard to the selection of Jews for deportation and certain death, they were often used indirectly for this purpose. They were used to lull the Jewish masses into a false sense of security and as a conduit for the distribution of hundreds of summonses to Jews selected by the squads in charge of the Final Solution for (1242) “special treatment." Though many of these Jews-lawyers, journalists, and businessmen-ended up in Auschwitz, the Council members rationalized their involuntary involvement as relatively beneficial. They argued that since the summonses were distributed promptly by Jewish couriers, the victims had some time to settle their affairs, prepare some food and clothing, and make arrangements for escape. The Nazi-Hungarian units, in their view, would have picked them up faster and without any prior notice.

One of the Council members, Fulop Freudiger, the representative of the Orthodox Jews in the Council, was particularly active in rescue work during the deportations from the provinces. In addition to his involvement in the Zionist-oriented rescue effort, Freudiger managed through his contacts with Dieter Wisliceny to save close to 80 prominent, mostly Orthodox, Jews-rabbis and communal leaders-from the ghettos of Debrecen, Kassa, Nagyvarad, Nyiregyhaza, Papa, Sopron, and Szekesfehervar just before their scheduled deportation. 31

During the Nyilas era, the most indefatigable members of the Council working on behalf of the persecuted Jews were Domonkos, Lajos Stockler, and Rabbi Bela Berend. The latter, pursuing a rather unorthodox course, was particularly active through his dealings with Jozsef Sarosi, the local Nyilas leader in the Budapest ghetto area. Peto, Stern, and Wilhelm, who had dominated the Council before the coup, were in hiding at the time.

The Council's relief and rescue operations were carried out mostly through its specialized committees. While primarily responsible for the implementation of the various Nazi-imposed demands, they tried to do everything in their power to minimize the suffering of the Jews. With the passage of time, their functions acquired ever greater importance. They faced a gargantuan task during the relocation of the Jews into Yellow-Star houses and especially during the Szálasi era, when the ghetto of Budapest was established. The officials associated with MIPI were particularly active in helping the internees in various camps and, like the Halutzim, managed to free a number of Jews by providing them with forged identification papers. 32 The physicians in Council-supported makeshift hospitals worked tirelessly to save the lives of disease-ridden and starving ghetto dwellers and the countless Jews brutalized by the Nyilas. 33 (1243)

While the Central Jewish Council's role had a questionable, if not generally harmful, effect upon the provincial Jewish communities, 34 its efforts on behalf of the Jewish community of Budapest were much more successful. However, the claim of several of its members that by its actions, including the re-establishment of contact with the Regent, the Council played a crucial role in halting the deportations cannot be substantiated. While the Auschwitz Reports, which the Council members had submitted to Horthy after an unforgivable delay must have influenced the Regent’s decision to halt the deportations on July 6, the main impact toward this end was provided by the documentation that Miklos Krausz had sent to Switzerland on June 19, 1944. It was this documentation that eventually elicited the responses from the Pope, President Roosevelt, and the King of Sweden, all protesting the persecution of the Jews in Hungary, and partially motivating Horthy to act. 35

The Relief and Rescue Committee: The Kasztner Line

The Budapest branch of the Relief and Rescue Committee (Vaadat Ezra ve 'Hatzalah)-the Vaada-was established in January 1943. Until the German occupation on March 19, 1944, the Vaada's work revolved mainly around rescuing and helping the persecuted Jews of the neighboring countries (see Chapter 3). It maintained close contact with the "Working Group" (Pracovna Skupina), the illegal body which operated within the framework of the Bratislava Jewish Council, and with several Jewish underground leaders in Poland, as well as with the representatives of various major Jewish organizations in Palestine, Turkey, and Switzerland. It exchanged and disseminated documents, eyewitness accounts, reports, and memoranda relating to the destruction of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe. It also helped smuggle Polish, Slovak, and other Jewish refugees into Hungary, and provided the refugees with food, shelter, and identification papers. It used its influence with the "progressive" forces within Hungary to ease the lot of Hungarian Jews, including those serving in the labor service system. In addition, it maintained a well-developed communication and courier network that included members of the German and Hungarian intelligence services in Budapest. (1244)

Saly Mayer of the American Jewish Joint (AJDC)

The Vaada had contacts with foreign Jewish organizations and with agents of the German and Hungarian intelligence services, and its leaders were consequently among the best-informed persons in Budapest. They were acquainted not only with the details of the Final Solution program, but also with the complexities of the national and international political and military situation. They kept the representatives of the major Jewish organizations in Istanbul and in Switzerland fully informed about developments throughout Nazi-dominated Europe. Among the recipients of their periodic reports were the Jewish Agency leaders in Istanbul, and Saly Mayer of the AJDC, and Nathan Schwalb of the Hehalutz in Switzerland. 36

Since the Vaada leaders were fully aware of the international political and military situation in early 1944, the German occupation did not catch them by surprise. They were also alerted about it five days earlier by Josef Winninger, a converted Jew in the service of the German Military Intelligence Service in Budapest. 37

Otto Komoly

At the beginning of 1944, the Vaada leadership was composed of Otto Komoly (President), Rezso (Rudolph) Kasztner (Executive Officer), Dov Weiss (Secretary), Jeno Frankel, Moshe Rosenberg, Siegfried Roth, Uziel Lichtenberg, Josko Baumer, Joel Brand, Moshe Schweiger, and Samuel Springmann. 38 They represented the major Zionist parties in operation in Hungary, each of which, though limited in membership, had its own distinct views and tactics. As a result cooperation within the Vaada and between the Budapest and the Istanbul branches of the Vaada 39 was not always harmonious. The conflict inherent in interparty political differences was usually exacerbated by sharp personality conflicts among the leaders. Because of these difficulties, the effectiveness of the Budapest Vaada often suffered, eliciting critical and reproachful notes from Istanbul. 40

The German occupation compelled the Vaada leaders to subordinate their internecine fights to the immediate tasks of rescuing Hungary's Jews. One of the first steps they took was to institute a system whereby each leader was assigned specific functions and responsibilities, which were determined according to his particular expertise and domestic and international contacts. Komoly, for example, was entrusted with the pursuit of the " Magyar line"-establishing contact with, and soliciting support from, Hungarian governmental, political, and church leaders. (1245)

Miklos (Moshe) Krausz

Although he was not formally in the leadership of the Vaada, Miklos (Moshe) Krausz, the Executive Secretary of the Palestine Office-the Budapest branch of the Jewish Agency's Aliyah (Emigration) unit-was asked, according to Kasztner, to get in touch with the representatives of the neutral countries. 41 Kasztner and Brand were assigned-or perhaps arrogated to themselves-the most controversial task: the establishment of contact with the occupiers. In the course of time, this SS or Kasztner line was also adopted by Hansi Brand and Andor (Andreas, Andre or Bandi) Biss.

After the occupation, the work of the Vaada was overshadowed by the activities of Kasztner and Brand. Friends and yet rivals, these two relatively ordinary individuals, upon whom history had bestowed such fateful roles, differed in background and personality. In terms of education, erudition, and political expertise, Kasztner was superior to Brand. Born in Kolozsvar in 1906, Kasztner was a lawyer and journalist by profession, having worked for 15 years (1925-1940) for the Uj Kelet (New East), the Hungarian-Jewish daily of his home town. Shortly after the Hungarian annexation of Northern Transylvania in September 1940, Kasztner moved to Budapest. An ardent Zionist by conviction, and an idealistic but opportunistic politician by inclination, he soon acquired a pivotal role in the reinvigoration of the relatively weak Zionist movement of Hungary. His standing in the community was enhanced by his marriage to the daughter of Dr. Jozsef Fischer, the president of the Jewish community of Kolozsvar and a former member of the Romanian Parliament. A man of unbounded political ambitions with some inclinations toward a bohemian lifestyle, Kasztner bad a large number of faithful friends, as well as many bitter enemies who conspired against him. Dictatorial and jealous by nature (reportedly, be could not gracefully acknowledge the success of others), Kasztner unwisely monopolized the negotiations with the SS. He may have been guided by an SS-imposed directive for secrecy " in order not to jeopardize the success of the deal," and therefore contacted the traditional leaders of Hungarian Jewry only when he needed their financial assistance. It is likely that, motivated by a strong subconscious drive for grandeur, he had hoped to emerge as virtually the sole rescuer of close to one million Jews.

Brand, who was one of Kasztner’s closest friends and as sociates in the rescue operations, claimed that Kasztner, who tended to be (1246) slapdash, was not an easy man to work with, and that he seemed to many people as "the prototype of the snobbish intellectual who lacks the common touch." He was a poor mixer in social gatherings and, according to Brand, also quite unpopular with the young Halutzim. 42 Kasztner had a sharp analytic mind but, gifted as he was, he did not possess that strength of character which ultimately distinguishes the great man from the average one. Nevertheless, Brand admits, in his dealings with the SS and especially with the leaders of the Sonderkommando, Kasztner often displayed great skill and courage in championing the cause of rescue.

Joel Brand was born in April 1907 in Naszod, Transylvania, then part of Hungary. Although quite bright, he never completed his studies; in his youth, he was reportedly more interested in adventure and politics. He embraced Zionism after a stint in the leftist movement in Weimar Germany. He joined the communist party before the Nazis' seizure of power and soon achieved a leadership position in Thuringia. 43 According to one source, he even served for a while as a Committee agent. 44 Presumably in this capacity, he visited many parts of the globe, including the United States, the USSR, Japan, and the South Seas Islands. He returned to his native Transylvania shortly after Hitler’s seizure of power. According to Biss, Brand was expelled from Romania because of his communist background. He moved to Budapest, where together with his wife, Hansi Hartmann Brand, he operated a medium-sized glove-manufacturing plant. Although the success of their enterprise bad diverted them from their original plan to emigrate to Palestine, the Brands remained actively involved in Zionist affairs.

After the Anschluss in March 1938 and the defeat of Poland in September 1939, the Brands became particularly interested in refugee affairs, organizing a variety of rescue and relief activities. Their concern for the refugees acquired a personal tone in the summer of 1941, when approximately 16,000 to 18,000 "alien" Jews were being resettled by the Hungarian authorities in the then occupied parts of Galicia. Among these were Hansi’s sister and brother-in-law, whom the Brands managed to rescue just before the massacre that took place near Kamenets Podolsk in late August (see Chapter 6).

Joel Brand's contact for this rescue operation was Jozsef Krem, a member of the Hungarian Counterespionage Service, who (1247) interested in human smuggling operations after having been paid handsomely for his first exploits. This underground operation, initiated by Brand, dove-tailed with one organized by Samuel Springmann that involved the Abwehr representatives in Budapest. Consequently, when the Tiyul ("Trip") rescue section of the Vaada was established in January 1943, Brand became the logical individual to head it.

Until the German occupation of Hungary, Tiyul was primarily concerned with the smuggling of Jews out of Poland and Slovakia; shortly after the occupation, its foremost concern became rescuing Jews within Hungary. Under Menachem Klein, a Hungarian-speaking Slovak refugee who succeeded Brand after the latter bad left for Istanbul on his" blood for trucks " mission, Tiyul became one of the centers for the production and distribution of Aryan personal documents, including identification cards, marriage certificates, and military discharge papers. It was also engaged in a re-Tiyul program which enabled a number of Polish and Slovak refugees to return to their former homelands, where the situation of the remaining Jews at the time was-temporarily at least-much better.

The Vaad’s negotiations with the SS have emerged as one of the most controversial chapters in the history of the Holocaust. The Vaada's rescue position was based on perfectly logical assumptions at the time. During the first phase of the occupation, when the Hungarian authorities categorically refused to see or to deal with the representatives of Jewry, emphasizing that the handling of the Jewish question bad become the exclusive responsibility of the Germans, the Vaada leaders concluded that their best chance was to deal directly with those who seemed to wield real power in the country. At the start of the negotiations on April 5, the Vaada leaders were not yet fully aware that the German forces directly under the control of the Eichmann-Sonderkommando numbered less than 200; that without the support of the Hungarian instruments of state power, the SS could not possibly carry out the ghettoization and deportation program; that Wisliceny, Eichmann, and the other representatives of Himmler' s agency had no independent decision-making power over the anti-Jewish drive, but were authorized only to make relatively minor concessions in order to assure the ultimate success of the Final Solution program; and that the negotiations with the SS would (1248) help lull the Jewish masses into a false state of optimism, deterring them from other possible avenues of escape.

The first contact with the SS was established two days after the occupation. Freudiger had approached Wisliceny at the Astoria Hotel, the headquarters of the Sonderkommando, on behalf of his brother Samuel who had been arrested the day before. Freudiger's bold move was based on his awareness that Wisliceny had been successfully bribed by the leaders of the Bratislava "Working Group." 45

Rabbi Michael Dov Beer Weissmandel of the Working Group

In negotiations conducted with Wisliceny by Gisi Fleischmann and Rabbi Michael Dov Beer Weissmandel of the Working Group, Wisliceny-then in charge of the deportations from Slovakia-had been approached in an attempt to spare the remaining Jews.

Gisi Fleishmann of the Working Group

Sometime in June 1942, when approximately 52,000 Slovak Jews-two-thirds of the community-bad already been deported, Wisliceny informed Fleischmann and Weissmandel that the Germans were not interested in the deportation of any more Jews, provided the Germans received certain payments from abroad. The deportations in fact stopped shortly after part of the money demanded by Wisliceny had been paid.

The Slovak Jewish leaders, now convinced that the catastrophe of the Jews could be avoided or at least mitigated, did not know that the halting of the deportations in Slovakia bad little to do with their bribing of Wisliceny.

Giuseppe Burzio

What had actually brought it about was the following: by June 1942, the leaders of the Slovak state had been informed by various sources, including Giuseppe Burzio, the Papal Nuncio, that the deported Jews were in fact being liquidated rather than merely resettled.

[Monsignor Giuseppe Burzio was the Papal Nuncio in Bratislava, Slovakia, 1940-1945. Burzio was 39 at the time of his posting. On October 27, 1941, Burzio sent a report to the Holy See that Jews were being systematically murdered. He further reported from Pressburg (Bratislava) of the imminent deportation of 20,000 Slovakian Jews. In March 1942. he sent a new report about the deportation of Slovak Jews to Poland. In the report, he stated that this deportation meant certain death. Burzio’s protests of the mistreatment and deportation of Jews were addressed to Slovakian Prime Minister Tuka. Ironically, Tuka was an ordained Catholic priest. Burzio sent a copy of the Auschwitz Protocols to the Vatican in Rome in May 1944. Burzio was responsible for implementing the rescue of a number of Slovakian Jews. After the war, Burzio served as Nuncio to Bolivia from 1946-1950 and to Cuba from 1950-1954. He left Vatican diplomatic service. He became a canon of the Lateran Basilica in Rome. He died in 1966.] VFL

Slovakian Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka

When Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka, pressed by the Catholic bishops, suggested that a mixed commission inspect one of the camps in which the Slovak Jews were supposedly being resettled, the Germans-to avoid embarrassment and, above all, to avoid jeopardizing the Final Solution program then in progress elsewhere in Europe-decided to suspend the deportations in Slovakia until a more auspicious time. A communication to this effect was sent to Berlin on June 26, following a meeting one day earlier between Tuka, Wisliceny, and Hanns Elard Ludin, the German Minister in Bratislava. The communication emphasized that the suspension of the deportations was due to the Slovak leaders’ opposition. 46

Weissmandel and Fleischmann, convinced that the deportations had been halted because of the bribing of Wisliceny, extended the frame (1249) of their negotiations in October 1942 to include the other persecuted Jewish communities of Europe. The "Europa Plan," as this scheme came to be known, called for the suspension of the deportations of Jews to Poland from all over Europe in exchange for the payment of two million dollars. The Plan did not cover Poland, where, according to their SS negotiation partners, the Final Solution program was to continue. In their quest for the first installment of $200,000 and other assistance for Slovak Jewry, the leaders of the Working Group, including Fleischmann, came to Budapest a number of times in 1942 and 1943. Although the Hungarian Jewish leaders were not as generous and understanding as the Slovak Jewish leaders had expected them to be (see Chapter 23), they became fully acquainted with the plight of the Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe and with the details of the negotiations with Wisliceny. 47

During the first week of the occupation, Wisliceny returned briefly to Bratislava to pick up a " letter of recommendation" from Rabbi Weissmandel. Writing in Hebrew, Weissmandel lamented that it was Hungarian Jewry's turn to suffer the fate that had earlier befallen many other Jewish communities in Europe. He nevertheless counseled the Hungarian Jewish leaders to negotiate with Wisliceny within the framework of the Europa Plan, emphasizing that Wisliceny could be trusted. Weissmandel offered his advice even as the destruction of the European Jewish communities continued. 48 A righteous and courageous man, Rabbi Weissmandel was, of course, motivated by the noblest of intentions. Like most of those who dealt with Wisliceny in Slovakia and in Hungary, he too had been convinced that this sly colleague of Eichmann’ s could be trusted and that the Germans would fulfill their obligations under the Europa Plan-if only the Jewish leaders of the free world would deliver the necessary sums. He wrote heartbreaking letters to the Jewish leaders in Switzerland, practically accusing them of complicity in the mass murders for having failed to heed his desperate appeals for funds.

On May 22, 1944, Rabbi Weissmandel addressed a letter (cosigned by Gisi Fleischmann) to the Halutz leaders in Geneva in which he reviewed in detail the fate awaiting the Hungarian Jews deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau. The letter included some details based on the Auschwitz Reports (see Chapter 23) and on accounts by eyewitnesses. It also included an urgent appeal-" in the name of those already (1250) murdered and of those condemned to death"-to the Jewish leaders of the free world to see to it that:

1. All states, whether at war or not, should most resolutely warn the Germans and the Hungarians to stop their genocidal activities and to tell them that the world is aware of what they have done and are planning to do;

2. The Pope should solemnly warn the Hungarian government and people;

3. The world press should constantly focus on the mass murders committed in Belzec, Malkin, and Auschwitz-the same way as the Germans had done it in connection with the lies of Katyn-and it should launch a forceful propaganda campaign of warning;

4. The Council of the International Red Cross should announce that unless it were allowed to assume supervisory control in Auschwitz and Birkenau it would exclude Germany from its membership;

5. The sites of the mass murders which are clearly visible in Auschwitz should be bombed because, as the attached drawings reveal, that would significantly hinder further murders,

6. The Allies should continuously and regularly bomb the main rail lines, especially those that link East Hungary with Poland and generally all lines linking Hungary and Germany and especially the main railroad line of Csap-Kassa-Eperjes Medzi laborce;

7. The Allies should continuously and regularly bomb all the bridges and railway stations in Carpatho-Ruthenia, especially those of Kassa, Csap, Eperjes, and Medzi laborce in order to prevent the movement of tens of thousands of soldiers between Poland and Romania.

Rabbi Weissmandel and Gisi Fleischmann emphasized the urgency at band since 12,000 lives were being lost each day and, in a (1251) conclusion, requested that the Halutz leaders raise the needed funds and bring about the realization of their suggestions. 49

Rabbi Weissmandel and his colleagues who lived in the midst of the bloodletting understandably failed to realize the inability of the Jewish leaders in the free world to covertly forward large sums of money and above all to publicize the Nazis’ Final Solution program about which they had been receiving detailed and accurate reports.

Dieter Wisliceny

The Slovak Jewish champions of the Europa Plan were not and could not be aware of the fact that Wisliceny was not only untrustworthy, but also a rabidly anti-Jewish Nazi who had been acting in collusion with the other members of the Eichmann-Sonderkommando and with his superiors in the RSHA in a monstrous scheme designed to mislead, exploit, and finally liquidate the Jews. 50

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[On 1 October 1931, Wisliceny became a member of the NSDAP and of a formation of the SA. In 1934, he switched from the SA to the SS and became a member of the SD. Wisliceny eventually rose to the rank of SS-Hauptsturmführer (captain) in 1940; he worked in the Reich Security Head Office Referat IV B4 under Adolf Eichmann. During implementation of the Final Solution, his task was the ghettoization and liquidation of several important Jewish communities in Nazi-occupied Europe, including those of Greece, Hungary and Slovakia. Wisliceny also re-introduced the yellow star in occupied countries; the yellow star being used to distinguish Jews from non-Jews.

Wisliceny was an important witness at the Nuremberg trials. His testimony would later prove important in the successful prosecution of Eichmann for his complicity in the Holocaust in Israel in 1961.]

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Wisliceny's arrival in Budapest excited not only Freudiger-but also the Vaada leaders who were familiar with this Nazi's alleged "public record"-though equally unaware of the real reasons why the deportations from Slovakia had been halted. Kasztner and his colleagues approached Wisliceny via Schmidt and Winninger, inquiring whether the Sonderkommando would be ready to deal with the illegal Vaada for an alleviation of the anti-Jewish measures in economic terms.

The offer was promptly discussed by the Sonderkommando leaders, who immediately saw in the inquiry another opportunity to smooth the way for an orderly and revolt-free implementation of the Final Solution program and to lay their hands on as much Jewish wealth as possible. The latter was one of the reasons why the SS desperately tried to keep the Hungarians in the dark about the negotiations with the Jewish leaders. The Germans also valued the international contacts and the presumed foreign currency sources of the Zionists more highly than they did the limited resources of the domestically oriented Council leaders. They were therefore happy to enter into negotiations with the Zionists.

The first contact between the SS and the Zionists took place on April 5, the day the Jews were first required to wear the Yellow Star of David. Kasztner and Brand met Wisliceny, Schmidt, and Winninger in the latter's apartment. Also present was SS-Hauptsturmführer Erich Klausnitzer, a Gestapo agent presumably assigned to safeguard the general interests of the SS. Kasztner inquired about the conditions under which the Sonderkommando might abstain from carrying out its (1252) anti-Jewish plans. Wisliceny assured him that while Jews could not avoid wearing the Star of David and their influence would have to be eliminated in all spheres of life, they would be neither placed into ghettos nor deported "unless the Hungarians appealed directly to Berlin over the head of the Sonderkommando." 51

As in Bratislava, Wisliceny played his despicable role well. He gave no hint that only the day before the Hungarian officials in the Ministry of the Interior, who were acting in collusion with him and the other members of the Sonderkommando, had already taken the first concrete measure toward the implementation of the Final Solution: they instructed the local police and gendarmerie units to bring about the registration of the Jews for their planned ghettoization. Secret instructions for their roundup were issued three days later (see Chapter 17).

As part of the proposed bargain, Wisliceny demanded $2 million, the same amount as be had agreed with the Slovak Jewish leaders for the Europa Plan. Of this sum be wanted $200,000 in Pengos within a very short time as proof of the Zionists’ goodwill and financial liquidity. Schmidt and Winninger also demanded ten percent of the amount for the Wehrmacht and a commission for themselves. Wisliceny insisted that they be paid at the black-market rate; the total came to approximately 6.5 million Pengos.

Samu Stern, President of the Central Jewish Council

Shortly after his first encounter with Wisliceny, Kasztner met with Samu Stern, the President of the Central Jewish Council, and with Karoly Wilhelm and Emo (Zvi) Szilagyi to discuss the merits of the proposals. Stern took it upon himself to collect the money, but managed, after a few weeks' effort, to raise only five million Pengos; the remainder was covered by the Vaada from its own resources. The first installment, three million Pengos, was delivered to Hermann A. Krumey and Otto Hunsche, Eichmann's close associates, along with Kasztner's pleas that the agreement with Wisliceny be upheld. At that time Wisliceny was already in Munkacs, the headquarters of the leaders in charge of the implementation of the Final Solution. With the expertise won in Slovakia and elsewhere, he served as the chief advisor in the campaign for the roundup and ghettoization of the Jews in Carpatho-Ruthenia and northeastern Hungary.

One immediate upshot of the negotiations was that the Vaada leaders, like the members of the Central Jewish Council, were supplied by the SS with Immunity Certificates (lmmunitats-Ausweise). While (1253) these represented a great personal privilege for their possessors, they also afforded an opportunity for more effective rescue and relief work, which would have been inconceivable without the freedom of movement the certificates assured.

By April 21, when Kasztner met the SS for the third time to deliver to Krumey and Hunsche the second installment of 2.5 million Pengos, 52 the ghettoization of the Jews of Carpatho-Ruthenia, which had begun on April 16, was already in full swing. Schmidt himself informed Kasztner, if he needed any further corroboration, that the ghettoization was a fait accompli.

Clearly, the SS could not, or would not, keep its side of the bargain. To ease the impact of the ghettoization on Kasztner and his colleagues, the SS freed a number of prominent Jews, including Rose Binet and Miklos Krausz, respectively the secretary and executive officer of the Palestine Office. During the April 21 meeting, Krumey, pursuing the same objective, conveyed an offer by the Sonderkommando which gradually emerged as a central theme in the further negotiations between the Vaada and the SS. Krumey asserted that the Germans were ready to permit the emigration of a certain number of Jews either to America or any neutral state that was willing to admit them. Kasztner was in a position to respond immediately, for he had been aware of the March 16, 1944 telegram from Chaim Barias, the head of the Istanbul Vaada, addressed to the Budapest Palestine Office to the effect that a ship was in Constanta ready to pick up 600 holders of Palestine immigration certificates. The Germans knew of this plan because Charles Lutz of the Swiss Legation had approached them earlier at Krausz’s behest to obtain the necessary exit permits. 53

While some Sonderkommando leaders were bargaining, others were busy completing the ghettoization program and finalizing the deportation schedules. In fact, the first transports filled with able-bodied Jews had been directed from the Kistarcsa and Sarvar internment camps to Auschwitz at the end of April. Shortly after the departure of these two transports, Krumey tried to distract Kasztner from the looming catastrophe by triumphantly announcing Berlin's concurrence with the emigration of the 600 certificate holders. Krumey also offered to permit an additional 100 Jews to emigrate, providing he received a per capita payment of 100,000 Pengos. (1254)

The preparation of the list of 600 emigrants unleashed a major dispute within the Zionist community. The Palestine immigration certificates were normally sent to, and distributed by, the Palestine Office, which was directed by Miklos Krausz, a Mizrachi leader, acting under the guidance of a Board of Governors consisting of representatives of the major Zionist parties. 54 Conveniently ignoring the fact that the Vaada leadership also had a similar composition, Kasztner entrusted Komoly and Szilagyi-influential leaders in both organizations-with the allocation of the certificates. 55 Kasztner had presumably feared that party factionalism would render the Palestine Office impotent. The animosity that had characterized Kasztner’s earlier relations with Krausz, reflecting clashing ambitions and deep-seated intra-Zionist party conflicts, took on venomous overtones which made any kind of truly coordinated work all but impossible. 56 In preparing the list, Komoly and Szilagyi had to consider a number of factors. In particular, approximately half of the certificates had to be assigned to Jews still in the provinces, and account had to be taken of the Polish and Slovak refugees as well as of the Jewish spiritual and lay leaders, scientists and artists, and Zionists who had played especially important roles in the life of the Jewish communities. 57

Adolph Eichmann

While the Zionist leaders wrangled over the preparation of the list, Eichmann, working with his superiors in Berlin and enjoying the full cooperation of Himmler, came forth with a grandiose new plan that went beyond the scope of Hungarian Jewry and had clearly discernible international political and military overtones. The Brand Mission With Wisliceny in the countryside directing the ghettoization process, Eichmann took over as chief negotiator for the SS. On April 25, 1944, he sent for Brand (via Winninger) and offered him a deal under which the Nazis would be ready to "sell" one million Jews in exchange for certain goods to be obtained outside of Hungary. For this purpose, he was ready to allow Brand to go abroad to establish contact with representatives of world Jewry and of the Allied Powers.

Why Brand was selected for this mission remains shrouded in mystery. 58 Brand claimed that he had met with the Vaada leaders shortly after his encounter with Eichmann. At that meeting of the Vaada, Kasztner (1255) had allegedly proposed that either Jozsef Fischer (his father-in-law and a well-known lawyer and former parliamentarian) or Erno Marton (the former editor-in-chief of the Uj Kelet, the then outlawed Zionist daily of Kolozsvar) be sent instead. Brand contended that Komoly and the Halutzim within the Vaada, including Szilagyi and Revesz, had insisted that he be selected for the mission-as the most qualified and the most trustworthy Zionist leader. On the other hand, Kasztner, whose account differs from Brand’s in many details, 59 maintained that neither the Vaada nor any other Jewish forum had any influence in the selection of the delegate representing the Jewish community in these negotiations.

Andor ("Bandi") Grosz,

Brand's cousin Biss, a Transylvanian who became active in Vaada affairs after Brand's departure, offered a still different version. Biss claimed that the SS chose Brand on the recommendation of a shady character named Andor ("Bandi") Grosz, who also used the aliases of Andreas or Andre Gyorgy and Andreas Greiner on various occasions.

Born in Hungary in 1905, Grosz was a converted Jew who in January 1942 had joined the Abwehr, the German Counterespionage Service then under the command of the anti-Hitler Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, partially as protection from the Hungarian authorities, who had been looking into his underworld and smuggling operations. By September of the same year, Grosz was also recruited by the Hungarian Military Intelligence, many of whose officers were not only anti-Nazi but also anti-German. Among these were Lieutenant Colonel Antal Merkly and Ferenc Bagyoni. The latter also acted as a courier for the Vaada, a function he shared with Grosz, who was recruited for this purpose by Samuel Springmann, his former classmate. Grosz eventually emerged as a very successful agent with multiple functions. In addition to the Abwehr, the Hungarians, and the Vaada, he also served or had close contacts with Japanese, Polish, and British and American agents and officers stationed in various places in the Balkans, especially Istanbul.

Grosz carried out his missions as an official of the Hungarian Danube Navigation Company, using a Hungarian service passport. In working for the Vaada, Grosz had established close contacts with the Vaada representatives in Istanbul, including Venya Pomerantz, Menachem Bader, and Teddy Kollek. It was allegedly through Kollek (who would later become the Mayor of Jerusalem) that Grosz met a number of British and American intelligence officers. By April 1943, (1256) when Grosz arrived in Istanbul for his second mission, he formed a link between German, Hungarian, and Anglo-American agents, allegedly all opposed to Hitler. 60

The Vaada was generally satisfied with Grosz' s performance. When he went to Istanbul be usually took along correspondence as well as documents and reports about the Final Solution program that had been sent to Budapest; from Istanbul he would normally bring back correspondence and messages to be forwarded to Poland and Slovakia; he would also bring back money. He was obviously not an ideologically motivated individual, and he usually received a percentage of the smuggled funds as reward for his services.

Grosz realized immediately after the German occupation of Hungary that power had shifted into the hands of the SS. He prudently transferred his allegiance from the Abwehr to the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst), the Budapest unit of which (Special Task Commando F) was under the command of SS-Hauptsturmführer Otto Klages (Clages, in many sources). After he established his credentials with Klages, who was presumably already familiar with his activities, Grosz was able not only to unmask the Abwehr agents who had collaborated with the Vaada, but also to undertake a mission allegedly authorized by the highest SS authorities in Berlin. As allegedly instructed by Klages and his aide Fritz Laufer (alias Direktor Schroeder, alias Ludwig Mayer, alias Karl Heinz), Grosz's mission was to arrange through his contacts in Istanbul, especially an American intelligence officer named Schwarz, a meeting between a number of high-ranking German security officers (not including Himmler who was unable to leave Germany) and an equal number of Anglo-American officers to discuss the possibility of a separate peace between the Sicherheitsdienst (sic) and the Allies. Schwarz was to be contacted first not only because Grosz bad known him through earlier meetings, but also because he, like his personal friend Laufer, was also a Czech emigrant. 61

Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler

According to several sources, including Grosz's own statement to the British, the mission was in fact initiated with the knowledge of Himmler, who reportedly had at that time already been privy to the impending coup against Hitler. 62 Himmler, aware of the fact that the collapse of the Third Reich was inevitable, allegedly tried to make use of the major Jewish organizations in the West for his peace feelers and also to acquire some merit in the eyes of the world (1257) by making some humane gestures relating to the possible freeing of a large number of Jews. 63 Like most Nazis, Himmler was also convinced that American Jewry and its affiliated international organizations had a strong, if not decisive, influence on President Roosevelt's policies. Himmler probably saw the establishment of the War Refugee Board on January 22, 1944, as a signal of America's change of policy and as a new resolve to play a more active role in the rescue of the remnant of European Jewry. 64 Himmler's role was in fact acknowledged by Veesenmayer in his July 22, 1944, telegram to the Foreign Office, forwarded shortly after a discussion with Winkelmann during which he asserted that the Brand-Grosz mission had been undertaken " as a result of a secret order of the Reichsführer-SS." 65

The Nazis' selection of Grosz as their intermediary was logical. If the Western Powers had reacted positively, the negotiations would have most probably been continued (without Grosz) at a higher official level; but if the Anglo-Americans rejected the peace feelers, the Nazis could always disavow Grosz as the shady multiple agent that he was.

Grosz also undertook an assignment for the Hungarians. Lieutenant Colonel Merkly, who wanted to set up a meeting between himself, another Hungarian officer, and the British somewhere in Istanbul, sent Grosz to arrange it. He was instructed to inform the British that the sympathies of the Hungarian General Staff lay with the Allies and that certain Hungarian elements were ready " to go over to the Allies on condition that Russian troops were not to be allowed to enter Hungary. " 66

Having been entrusted with this important mission, which the SS allegedly attempted to camouflage with the "blood for trucks" offer, Grosz presumably introduced Brand to Klages. He also told Klages that Brand was "the most important executive in the Vaada." 67 He presumably did this either because he had been unaware that the Vaada members, according to Biss, "had declared unanimously that Brand himself was by no means the man likely to succeed in so difficult a task" 68 or because he thought that Brand was the person he could most conveniently exploit for his own closely concealed personal objective: to escape to the free or neutral world. (His wife was already in Istanbul.) 69

Hansi and Joel Brand

Finally, there is an unreliable unwritten report that Brand’s selection was actually suggested by Kasztner, who supposedly wanted Brand out of his way for personal reasons. (1258)

Whatever the reasons, Brand was entrusted with the mission. Once the SS made up their mind about Brand, they wanted to make certain that neither the Abwehr nor the Hungarians learned of their plans. On May 10, they arrested Kasztner and interrogated him about his connections with the Hungarian General Staff, especially Lieutenant Colonel Jozsef Garzoly. 70 The following day, the agents of the Abwehr with whom the Vaada had usually dealt, including Dr. Schmidt, Winninger, and Rudi Scholz, were also arrested. Kasztner was freed after two days; some of the Abwehr agents were co-opted into the SS intelligence network. 71

In his discussions with Brand, Eichmann never gave any hint of Grosz’s mission. As outlined in the "blood for trucks" scheme (see below), Jews were not to be allowed to remain in Hungary, for "he had promised Endre and his friends that he would help make the country Judenrein. " The one million Jews were to be delivered via Germany after the receipt of the specified goods. According to Kasztner, those goods consisted of 200 tons of tea, 800 tons of coffee, two million cases of soap, an unspecified quantity of tungsten and other military-related materials, and 10,000 trucks. The latter, the Germans claimed, were to be used for civilian purposes or only along the Eastern front. 72 The proposal further stipulated that the first installment of 100,000 Jews would be released and the Auschwitz gas chambers blown up soon after the receipt of the Allies’ positive response. The Jews were to be allowed to leave Germany for any Allied-controlled part of the world except Palestine, for the Nazis had promised Amin el-Husseini, the Arab nationalist leader, not to permit this. 73 Almost immediately after the receipt of the offer, the Budapest Vaada communicated its contents in coded telegrams to Istanbul and Switzerland, including Pozner’s office in Geneva. 74 In a separate telegram, dated May 2, the Budapest Vaada leaders also asked Istanbul to urgently provide Turkish visas for Brand and Winninger, the Abwehr agent they then expected to accompany Brand. 75 Istanbul's response was swift and positive: "Chaim" was ready to receive the delegate of the Hungarian Jews. Practically all the Vaada leaders in Budapest believed that "Chaim" was none other than Chaim Weizmann, the head of the World Zionist Organization, and they informed Eichmann accordingly.

Chaim Barlas

Only later did they and Brand discover to their great disappointment that the Chaim mentioned by Istanbul was merely Chaim Barlas, the head of the local Vaada. (1259)

On May 15, when the mass deportation of the Hungarian Jews began, Eichmann summoned Brand for the last time. He informed him that all the travel arrangements had been completed and that he could leave the following day. After a final session with the Vaada leaders, who gave him advice for his forthcoming discussions with Weizmann and other world Jewish leaders and urged him to get in touch with Laurence A. Steinhardt, the American Ambassador in Ankara, who was Jewish, Brand was taken to Vienna by Krumey on May 17.

Brand and Krumey were accompanied by Grosz. While his presence was a source of anxiety for the Vaada leaders, Brand felt that Grosz was a lesser evil than the alternative, an unknown Nazi companion assigned by the SS.

Brand’s documents included three letters of recommendation: one signed on May 16, 1944, by Samu Stem and Fulop Freudiger, the leaders of the Neolog and Orthodox Jewish communities then serving in the Central Jewish Council; 76 one from the Vaada; and one from the United Youth (Hehalutz) Movement. He also carried $2,000 to $2,500 and a German passport. The passport, identifying him as Eugen Band, an engineer residing at Erfurt (see Figure 29.1), was handed to him in Vienna, where he was lodged for two nights in the Hotel Metropole, the Gestapo Headquarters. Brand and Grosz left Vienna on May 19 and, after two intermediate stops in the Balkans, arrived in Istanbul the same day. (1260)

The Reaction of the Free World. Brand's string of disappointments began immediately after his landing. To his great dismay, the "Chaim" he had expected was not there to meet him. Worse yet, he was not even permitted to leave the airport because be did not have a Turkish entry visa; apparently the Istanbul Vaada leaders bad either neglected or been unable to obtain it. After his problem with the Turkish authorities was temporarily solved through Grosz's and the Vaad's connections, Brand was taken to the Hotel Pera, where the Istanbul branch of the Vaada bad its headquarters. There he was met by the local representatives of the various Zionist groups and parties 77 to whom be revealed the details of the measures that had already been adopted against the Hungarian Jews as well as the specific objectives of his mission. Brand claimed that be bad also provided the leaders with a map of Auschwitz and demanded the bombing of both the extermination facilities and the railway junctions at points leading to the death camp. 78 Brand, who conceived of himself as the spokesman for and potential savior of the doomed Jews of Hungary, was disappointed by his encounter with the Zionist leaders. He later claimed somewhat unjustly that they were not only at odds with each other over policy, but also so preoccupied with Palestine that they had failed to take due notice of the massacre of the Jews in Europe. 79

The Turkish authorities continued to harass Brand, holding him in protective custody for lack of a visa between May 25 and 31. As a result, he was unable to go to Ankara to report to Ambassador Steinhardt; this part of his mission was carried out by Barlas. Steinhardt notified the U.S. State Department about the essence of Eichmann’s offer in a telegram dated May 25. 80

Thanks to the activities of the Istanbul Vaada, the Jewish leaders in Jerusalem and London received detailed though somewhat delayed reports about the "bizarre" Brand-Grosz mission. The Barlas group was urged to act swiftly and decisively not only by Brand and the Budapest Vaada, but also by the Bratislava Jewish leaders. Shortly after Brand’s arrival, they sent two cables confirming the mass deportations from Hungary and demanding the bombing of the railroads leading to Auschwitz. They further urged that the proposals brought along by Brand be given serious consideration. 81 (1261)

Moshe Shertok

The Jewish leaders in Jerusalem and London were in the meantime deciding what action to take. Moshe Shertok (later Sharett), the head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, and David Ben-Gurion, who were briefed in Jerusalem about the Brand mission by Wenya Pomerantz on May 25, got in touch with Sir Harold MacMichael, the British High Commissioner for Palestine. Sir Harold, who had dismissed the mission as a "Nazi intrigue based on far other motives than the apparent ones," nevertheless immediately notified the Foreign Office about the Jewish leaders’ communication. 82 Shertok's attempt to see Brand immediately was frustrated by the British, but he was finally allowed to meet him in Aleppo, Syria. He also received the additional assurance from the British that they would have no objection to Brand’ s return to Hungary from there. The British Intelligence Service, which kept a close eye on Brand and Grosz, was obviously anxious for a chance to interrogate both "agents of the SS."

Before his departure, Brand managed to persuade the Istanbul Vaada leaders to prepare some kind of protocol or memorandum of agreement to be forwarded to Budapest as "evidence of progress" designed to mislead the Sonderkommando. A protocol, signed on May 29, 1944, was in fact prepared. It stated that negotiations were under way to overcome the legal and political difficulties associated with the Eichmann offer, but in the meantime the Germans were urged, as part of the interim agreement, to bait the anti-Jewish drive and permit the emigration of Jews. 83 For a variety of unknown reasons, possibly because of courier difficulties, the text of the "agreement" was not forwarded to Budapest until July 5. 84 A letter incorporating the same basic ideas was sent to the Central Jewish Council on May 28.85

Pursuing his own interests and separate " diplomatic" mission, Grosz left Istanbul on June l only to be picked up by the British shortly after having crossed into Syria. 86 Brand, equipped with a British visa, left for Aleppo four days later in the company of Echud Avriel of the Jewish Agency. While the train stopped in Ankara, Brand claimed that he had been confidentially warned by Joseph Klarman and Yaakov Griffel, the representatives of the Revisionist and Agudat Yisrael Zionist groups respectively, that be was being lured into a trap. Brand was in fact taken into custody upon arrival in Aleppo on June 7. He was not even allowed to meet Shertok and two other Jewish Agency officials until June 10. (1262) On that day, in the presence of the British, the Jewish officials heard the same account about the plight of Hungarian Jewry and the nature of his mission that Brand had given the Istanbul Vaada leaders the month before.

Brand was soon informed by Shertok that he would have to remain in British custody and be taken to Cairo for further debriefing 87 (The British had reneged on their earlier promise to Shertok, citing reasons of war.) Brand was not consoled by Shertok' s promise that he would immediately fly on to London to take up the matter with the Jewish and governmental leaders of the Western world. Brand reportedly insisted on being allowed to return home both for the sake of his family and for what he believed to be the best interests of Hungarian Jewry.

Shertok was favorably impressed with Brand, identifying him as a "very solid type... (who)... breathes honesty. " He characterized Grosz, however, as " an irresponsible fellow who would sell his own mother for money." Having completed a report on his discussions with Brand, Shertok returned to Jerusalem on June 13 and reviewed the case before the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency the following day. On June 15, he and Ben-Gurion saw the High Commissioner for Palestine again and insisted that Jewish lives might be saved if the Germans were given the impression that important negotiations were impending. Recognizing that they would have to find someone without a government connection, Shertok suggested that the Germans might be met by a representative of the War Refugee Board of the United States, of the Intergovernmental Committee, or of the International Red Cross. Shertok also requested that Brand be allowed to return home and that he (Shertok) be permitted to fly to London on a priority basis. Shertok received the permission a week later; he left Cairo on June 25 and arrived in London two days later. 88

Deportations from Hungarian countryside to Auschwitz

In the meantime the deportations from Hungary were proceeding at the rate of 10,000 to 12,000 a day. The Vaada leaders in Budapest were in despair over the apparent failure of the Jewish and governmental leaders of the free world to respond quickly to, what they thought, was a "serious" German offer. While it is quite probable that the Germans would not have stopped their anti-Jewish drive even if they had received a prompt and positive reply, in the absence of any answer and with their emissaries apparently either unwilling or unable to return, (1263) they had no incentive at all to cease their anti-Jewish operations. Long weeks were allowed to pass before the Jewish and the Western leaders had finally agreed on a basically noncommittal line of action designed to save some Jewish lives by gaining time-a transparent technique the Germans immediately recognized.

During this period, an agonizingly long time was consumed in seemingly endless communications. Messages from Budapest were sent to the Hehalutz or the Palestine Office in Geneva or the Vaada in Istanbul, which usually forwarded them to headquarters in Jerusalem. In important cases, such as the Brand mission, the central Vaada leader (Gruenbaum) usually transferred responsibility to the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency. After a line of action was agreed upon, clearance had to be obtained from the High Commissioner for Palestine, who would communicate it to the Foreign Office in London; the Foreign Office, in turn, would inform Chaim Weizmann after appropriate consultations with other agencies, including the War Cabinet. Once a decision was reached at the top, the same procedure would be followed in reverse sequence. In the Brand case, moreover, policy had to be synchronized with that of the Jewish leaders in America and of the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Vaada leaders in Budapest, witnessing the staggering daily toll in Jewish lives, were clearly not fully aware of these bureaucratic and diplomatic difficulties, which had been compounded by the dilatory tactics of the Allies. Kasztner and Hansi Brand continued to bombard the Istanbul Vaada with telegrams, desperately requesting the return of the two emissaries " for otherwise everything would be in vain." 89 Istanbul tried to console them by emphasizing that the messages and pleas communicated by Joel Brand were being forwarded to and carefully evaluated by the Allies. 90 Brand presumably had no inkling that in spite of the considerable though not always very forceful efforts of the Jewish leaders of the free world, the governmental leaders of the Grand Alliance had adopted a negative position toward his cause. 91 He blamed his frustrations less on the British who had detained him than on the leaders of the Jewish Agency.

Brand's Perception of the Yishuv Leaders. Brand was clearly not aware of the worldwide publicity his case had aroused. He had been (1264) held by the British until early in October, when he was finally allowed to go to Palestine.

Yitzhak Gruenbaum

For a while he kept himself busy writing reports 92 and visiting the leaders of the Yishuv and world Zionism, including Teddy Kollek, Eliyahu Dobkin, Yitzhak Gruenbaum, David Ben-Gurion, and Chaim Weizmann. 93 A bitter and disappointed man, Brand felt-and continued to feel until shortly before his death in 1964-that the chance to save a million people bad been missed because of the failure and shortcomings of these Jewish leaders and the passivity and insensitivity of the Allies. Rabbi Weissmandel shared this view, as he did the view that the proposals of the SS bad been genuine and serious. 95 Brand was particularly disappointed by the operations of the Jerusalem Vaada, the Jewish Agency’s central office for relief and rescue work, and the man who headed it-Yitzhak Gruenbaum, a former member of the Polish Sejm. He was chagrined that in the midst of the mortal danger confronting Hungarian Jewry, Gruenbaum had allegedly been preoccupied with and wrathfully indignant over the failure of the Budapest Vaada to rescue his son in Poland. This attitude induced Brand to conclude that Gruenbaum " had never really appreciated what had happened... in Hungary." 96

Brand’s singling out of Gruenbaum for special criticism is somewhat unfair, for unlike many other Jewish leaders Gruenbaum occasionally made public statements about the plight of the Hungarian Jews. For example, shortly after the beginning of the mass deportations from Hungary on May 15, Gruenbaum publicly declared that swift action by the Allies could still save approximately 1.5 million Jews in Hungary and Romania. 97 He regularly forwarded the communications received from Istanbul or Switzerland about the tragedy of Hungarian Jewry to the Jewish leaders of the United States and Britain, requesting urgent intervention-possibly the bombing of Auschwitz and of the rail lines leading to the camp. 98 He also urged that Brand and Grosz be allowed to return to Hungary. 99 Following the Szálasi coup, Gruenbaum in fact bypassed the world Jewish leaders and appealed directly to Churchill and Stalin. 100

Brand's suspicions and conclusions about the Jerusalem Vaada as a whole, however, were not his alone. The benign neglect and resigned fatalism with which the Jerusalem Vaada had ostensibly treated the plight of Hungarian Je wry before and after the German occupation was (1265) documented during the postwar period. 101 The Budapest Vaada leaders were as unaware of the routine, bureaucratic way the free world had treated the events in Hungary as they were of the motivations of the SS. They were clearly mistaken in their belief in the power and influence of the international Jewish organizations (a belief shared by the SS), in the Allies' interest in the Jewish cause, and in their assumptions about the "Europa Plan" of the SS. These faulty assumptions underlay the mistakes that characterized their dealing with the members of the Eichmann-Sonderkommando and other SS leaders in their desperate effort to save Jewish lives. 102

The SS Line and Its Achievements

Brand's failure to return and the terse communications from Istanbul had convinced the Budapest Vaada leaders that the mission was an almost total failure. True, the mission had certainly afforded Brand an opportunity to provide the free world with a first-hand account of the destruction of Hungarian Jewry; however, it failed-as it was bound to-in its basic objective. The Allies, who were understandably opposed to providing the enemy with war-related materials and to becoming trapped into weakening or even splitting the Grand Alliance, refused to get engaged in any meaningful diplomatic maneuvers to save the Jews who were "offered for sale" by the SS. Neither they nor the Jewish leaders of the free world did anything tangible to arouse world public opinion until late in June. And even then, it was basically the Swiss press that took the lead under the initiative of a non-establishment Transylvanian Jew, Georges M. Mantello (see Chapter 31).

Kasztner and Hansi Brand had the unenviable task of trying to explain to Eichmann the " difficulties" associated with Joel Brand's mission. They also encountered problems with the Hungarian police, who were eager to learn details about the mission and, above all, about the cash and valuables the Vaada had given to the Germans, for by that time Jewish property had already been confiscated by and for the Hungarian state. On May 27, Kasztner and Hansi Brand were arrested together with Mrs. Kasztner and Sholem (Sandor) Offenbach, the Vaada's treasurer, and his wife. Agents of the Hungarian police picked them up at the apartment of Biss (who had begun to play a more active role after (1266) Brand's departure), which was ostensibly under German protection. That same day the Hungarians also arrested Menachem Klein, head of the Tiyul department of the Vaada. The police acquired the necessary incriminating evidence: a considerable amount of foreign currency in Biss's apartment and a variety of blank forged papers in Klein’s room. The latter find was particularly painful, for a few days earlier the Hungarians had picked up 18 Polish and Slovak Jews attempting to flee across the Romanian border with similar papers. Peter Hain, the head of the Hungarian Political Police-often referred to as the Hungarian Gestapo-had been especially eager to learn details about Brand' s mission. Toward this end, Hain’s men beat Hansi Brand so savagely that she could not stand on her feet for weeks. On the sixth day after their arrest, when the police began the interrogation of Kasztner, the whole group was suddenly freed through the interventions of the SS. Eichmann’ s cronies were clearly eager to protect those Jews who had shared certain "Reich secrets" with them. 103

The Kasztner Transport. Upon their release, Kasztner and Hansi Brand resumed their negotiations with Eichmann. Since they could not persuade him to suspend the mass deportations on the basis of the cryptic "assurances" they had received from Istanbul (and chances are that nothing would have dissuaded Eichmann from making Hungary Judenrein), they proceeded with their efforts to save at least part of the Jewish community. The negotiations were based on the Germans’ "consolation prize" that Krumey had revealed on April 21. It was tempting because the 600 holders of Palestine immigration certificates were to be allowed to leave for any neutral country or Allied-controlled territory except Palestine. The offer was confirmed or renewed by Eichmann on May 22. Some of the specifics of the offer were ironed out on June 3, when Eichmann, following the scenario previously worked out with Wisliceny, had agreed to permit some of the "prominent" provincial Jews, representing half of the Palestine immigration certificate holders, to be brought to Budapest. Eichmann promised that he would also allow a special Jewish group from Kolozsvar to come to the capital. 104 Was this one of Eichmann's devices to buy off or perhaps compensate Kasztner for his "services"? Was it his expression of gratitude for the smooth (1267) Warsaw-type uprising? Did Kasztner fail to see through Eichmann's intentions? Since the opportunity for informing the Jewish masses, both before and after the German occupation, about the realities of the Nazis' Final Solution program bad been missed and the deportations were already in progress, did he feel that it was his responsibility to save at least those few Eichmann was willing to spare?

In the midst of the despair over the continuing liquidation of the Jewish communities, Kasztner must naturally have been pleased by the opportunity to save at least a few Jews who otherwise would certainly have shared the fate of the others. And who can blame him for the understandable inclination to include in this group his own family and friends?

The original agreement called for the transfer of " approximately two hundred" Jews from the ghetto of Kolozsvar. Kasztner must have been prepared for this eventuality, for be immediately handed Eichmann a list. The Scharführer entrusted by Eichmann with the mission suggested to Kasztner, in the expectation of a bribe, that since the agreement was rather vague the final figure could be augmented.

Eventually 388 of the approximately 18,000 Jews concentrated in the ghetto of Kolozsvar were brought to Budapest in a special train on June 10. They were placed in barracks specially built in the courtyard and gardens of the Wechselmann Institute for the Deaf on Columbus Street. The Columbus Street Camp or the "privileged camp" as it came to be known, emerged as one of the safest spots for Jews in Hungary, for it was protected by five SS guards. The original list was prepared by the Vaada leaders with the cooperation of Zsigmond Leb, the former president of the Orthodox community of Kolozsvar and a member of the local Jewish Council, who was in Budapest at the time. Priority was allegedly given to those who had distinguished themselves in Jewish public life; those who were in the service of the Jewish community or had made sacrifices for the advancement of Jewish welfare; and widows and orphans of labor servicemen. The original Budapest list was partially altered and supplemented in Kolozsvar by the local Jewish leaders and by German and Hungarian officials who, for a variety of reasons (especially bribes), wanted to save their favorite Jews. Changes to the list were also needed because many on the original list had already been deported. As a result many of the Jews who were finally selected did not (1268) meet any of the selection criteria originally agreed upon. This gave rise to embarrassing and often incriminating insinuations both during and after the war. The most often voiced complaint was that those who were in charge of putting together the transport in Kolozsvar had favored their friends and families, who were neither Zionist nor prominent in Jewish life. 105

Shortly after the arrival of the Kolozsvar group in Budapest, Kasztner expanded his negotiations to save some additional Jews from the threat of deportation. He offered Eichmann jewelry, foreign currency, and Pengos worth five million Swiss francs-the total amount the Vaada thought it could raise at the time-in exchange for 100,000 lives. Eichmann, who was already playing the Brand card, had another ace up his sleeve. Kaltenbrunner had just requested him to provide a few thousand slave laborers for the agricultural and industrial enterprises in and around Vienna, which suffered from a terrible labor shortage. 106 Eichmann consequently jumped at the opportunity offered by Kasztner. To show his "good will" in connection with the Brand mission and the offer of five million Swiss francs, he informed Kasztner on June 14 that he would allow the transfer of 30,000 Jews-half from Budapest and half from the provinces-to Austria, where they would be "laid on ice" in special family work camps " pending the outcome of the negotiations." In late June, 18,000 to 20,000 Jews, mostly from the Baja, Debrecen, Szeged, and Szolnok areas, were transferred to Strasshof and other places near Vienna, where approximately 75 percent of them, including children and many of the aged, survived the war (see Chapter 21).

During the two weeks following Eichmann’ s offer, the Vaada leaders worked on putting together the transport of the "prominent Jews" and on raising the necessary funds. The latter task proved quite a problem because in addition to the five million Swiss francs, these leaders had also undertaken to pay $1,000 for each individual in what came to be known as the special Kasztner transport. To raise the needed funds, a committee of the Vaada composed of Komoly, Offenbach, Hansi Brand, and Erno Reichard, an engineer, sold approximately 150 places to wealthy Jews and converts who had managed to hide part of their valuables in spite of the confiscatory measures that were enacted by the Hungarians. (1269)

Many wealthy Jews struggled over the few seats put up for sale. The pandemonium at the Committee's offices attracted the Hungarian police; Yellow-Star-wearing plainclothesmen had infiltrated the building, learning details about the scheme that was supported by the SS. In spite of the great risks for all parties concerned, the transactions continued until the quota was filled. The lucky ones were taken to the Columbus Street camp, where they were joined by other " prominent Jews" brought in from those provincial ghettos that were not yet liquidated. Their selection was based mostly on lists submitted to the SS by the Vaada and the Central Jewish Council. These lists were altered by Wisliceny, who was in charge of the deportations. He was bought off by Freudiger who succeeded in arranging the transfer to Budapest of approximately 80 prominent Orthodox Jews from various ghettos. In addition to these Jews, several close relatives of Central Jewish Council members were also brought to Budapest under SS escort. To accommodate all those who were destined to be included in the Kasztner transport, two additional camps had to be set up in Budapest, one in the Arena Street and the other in Bocskay Street synagogues.

The valuables collected by the Vaada were delivered to the SS in three suitcases on June 20. One of those accepting the delivery was SS-Obersturmbannführer Kurt Becher, whom Kasztner later identified as the person really responsible for Eichmann's "concessions."

The exact value of the treasures handed over to the SS was never determined. Biss, who was entrusted with the settling of accounts with Becher, tried to persuade the SS to accept the currencies and jewelry as full payment. Becher, however, insisted on receiving additional goods. The Jewish leaders provided Becher with documents they had received from their foreign contacts concerning the availability for delivery of thirty tractors in Switzerland and of two freight-cars of sheep hide in Bratislava. Neither was ever delivered, although Becher was given 15,000 kilograms of coffee, which had been in storage in Budapest. 107 Following the delivery of the goods and valuables, Kasztner developed a mutually beneficial relationship with Becher that lasted until the end of the war. The relationship was particularly valuable since Becher had a direct link to Himmler. However, it ultimately proved tragic for Kasztner. Shortly after the war, it emerged as a chief cause of his ruin and tragic death. (1270)

The transport, which was originally supposed to consist of the 600 holders of Palestine immigration certificates, gradually swelled to close to 1,700 persons. First Eichmann permitted the addition of the Kolozsvar group; then he consented to the inclusion of the nearly 200 prominent Jews retrieved from other ghettos. On June 30, the day of the scheduled departure, the transport was officially identified as consisting of approximately 1,300 Jews. However, during a delay caused by an air-raid, 450 Jews in the Bocskay Street synagogue climbed onto the train under the cover of darkness (only 150 had been authorized to leave from there), as did a few dozen other Budapest Jews who heard about the special transport.

In the end, 1,684 Jews left Hungary for the neutral or Allied world. Each "official" passenger was allowed to take along 50 to 80 kilograms of luggage. Aside from the skillful passengers who had managed to stow away, the transport carried Orthodox Jews on Freudiger's list; Neolog Jews on Stern's list; Polish, Slovak and other refugees on separate lists; Palestine certificate holders; young Zionists selected by their respective groups; "paying passengers" whose contributions largely financed the transport; those rescued from the provincial ghettos, including the Kolozsvar group; outstanding intellectuals, scientists, and artists based on a list prepared by Komoly and Szilagyi; and orphans, including 17 from Poland. The various lists included many of the family members, relatives, and friends of the Vaada and Central Jewish Council leaders, including those of Biss, Brand, Kasztner, Komoly, Offenbach, and Stern. (Eichmann allowed none of the Council members to join the group.) Among the nationally known figures were Nison Kahan, Gyorgy Polgar, and Rabbi Joel Teitelbaum, the fiercely anti-Zionist leader of the Szatmar Hasidic sect. Among the stowaways were two labor servicemen. Their freight train had been awaiting clearance for departure to the copper mines at Bor; they seized the opportunity to jump to safety. 108

The open-ended destination as well as the route of the special transport gave rise to considerable anxiety among both passengers and organizers. The Vaada leaders had suggested that the transport be directed to Palestine via Romania and Turkey, but Eichmann, claiming Germany’ s obligations to the Arabs and the Hungarians, rejected this plan. The special train, he emphasized, ostensibly had to be part of the deportation program. Consequently, he insisted that the transport (1271) be directed to West Africa via Germany, Occupied France, Spain, and Portugal. Upon learning of these conditions, and above all of the idea of an "Aliya in the form of a deportation," several prospective passengers (especially some of the persecution-wise Polish and Slovak refugees) changed their minds. However, their places were quickly filled.

The transport left late in the night of June 30. It was held up for three days at Mosonmagyarovar, near the Austrian border, where it received new route directions. For a while it appeared that instead of going through Strasshof as originally planned, the train was to pass by Auspitz (Hustopece) in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, which also bad a camp for prominent people (Bevorzugtenlager). This caused considerable panic among the passengers, who confused Auspitz with Auschwitz. 109 Their alarm was soon allayed, for the Germans bad their own interest in ensuring the safety and well-being of the group. In the end, the passengers were taken along the original route, and given warm food in Vienna and a bot bath in Linz. 110 On July 8, they arrived in Bergen-Belsen, where they were placed in a Bevorzugtenlager not far from the notorious concentration camp that contained a large number of Hungarian Jewish deportees. There, for a while at least, they were reportedly quite well off. According to some reports, they were never subjected to physical labor and received cigarettes and daily rations of bread, margarine, marmalade, and occasionally sausages. Children and the ill also received milk and adequate medical care. They also had ample opportunities for cultural activities and even enjoyed some entertainment. 111 The internal administration of the camp was in the hands of a self-appointed Council, beaded by Jozsef Fischer, whose closest associates were primarily from among the leaders of the Kolozsvar group. 112

Kasztner's Negotiations with Becher. The fate of the Bergen-Belsen group became intertwined with Kasztner's further dealings with Becher. When the Budapest Jews became threatened with the danger of deportation, both shortly before and after Horthy's decision to halt the further removal of Jews to Germany, Kasztner approached Becher at Stem's urging and gave him $20,000 to intercede with Himmler. Kasztner also showed Becher the text of the " interim agreement" he had received from Istanbul on July 7, in an attempt to continue the negotiations along the original Europa Plan. Kasztner kept the Jewish (1272) leaders in Istanbul and Switzerland fully informed about the new developments and together with Weissmandel 113 implored them to urgently raise the funds required to "assure the success" of the plan. 114

Since Brand was not permitted to return, the Vaada, acting in conjunction with the Istanbul leaders, worked out a plan for Becher and Kasztner to pursue the negotiations in Portugal. There they were expected to involve Dr. Joseph J. Schwartz, the American AJDC representative in Europe, and Eliyahu Dobkin, a Palestinian-British national who served on the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency. On July 18, however, Kasztner was again arrested and kept incommunicado for about nine days. This time he was in the hands of the Hungarian gendarmerie leaders in charge of the deportations: Lieutenant Colonel Laszlo Ferenczy and his aide, Captain Leo Lulay. They wanted to find out details of his dealings with the Germans in general and the "special transport" in particular. These gendarmerie officers also tried to convince Kasztner that they had not been aware of the realities of Auschwitz and that they were now ready to prevent the further anti-Jewish operations of the Germans, who, they claimed, " bore full responsibility for the deportations. " 115

The sudden lengthy disappearance of Kasztner left his Budapest Jewish colleagues dumbfounded, but not totally helpless. Komoly decided to take over the negotiations and made plans to go to Lisbon in his stead. 16 On July 22, Biss submitted a long memorandum to Klages-presumably for transmission to Himmler-in which he outlined the measures the SS would have to urgently take in order to assure the "success of the negotiations". 117 Freudiger involuntarily became involved in a new "offer" of trucks, which caused considerable friction between the Vaada and the Orthodox group in Budapest as well as between the HIJEF 118 and the AJDC representatives in Switzerland.

The new ploy was initiated by Rabbi Weissmandel, who was eager to calm the Germans' apprehension about the " monstrous deal" the British bad unmasked on July 20 (see Chapter 31). Rabbi Weissmandel interpreted the British revelation about the Brand-Grosz mission for Wisliceny as one that was designed merely for public opinion. He also pointed out that the Allies were, in reality, ready to comply as indicated by the " fact" that Freudiger already had 250 trucks ready for delivery in Switzerland. To assure the continuation of the possible rescue operations, (1273) Freudiger felt compelled to corroborate the story and was promptly asked by Eichmann to discuss the delivery of the trucks with Becher. Freudiger and his friends, Gyula Link and Sandor Abeles, thought it might be possible to buy 250 used trucks in Switzerland through the HIJEF rather than the AJDC. They preferred to work with the Sternbuch brothers, who were less concerned with legalistic formalities and more convinced about the chances of dealing with the Germans than was Saly Mayer, a Swiss national and the local head of the AJDC.

Roswell D. McClelland, the WRB’s representative in Switzerland,

The Sternbuch brothers submitted the essentials of the so-called Freudiger plan to Roswell D. McClelland, the WRB’s representative in Switzerland, calling among other things for the opening of a credit account of 700,000 Swiss francs through the Schweizerische Kreditanstalt. The plan encountered stiff resistance not only because the Americans, like the other Allies, had refused to participate in any " ransom" deals, but also because Mayer had rejected any "action along the lines proposed. " 119

In Budapest, the Vaada leaders became suspicious of Freudiger’s initiatives, fearing that he was in fact interested in taking over the leadership of the negotiations with Becher, and insisted that Biss should accompany him or, preferably go alone to complete the deal. 120 The crisis was solved with the sudden reappearance of Kasztner, who promptly resumed his leadership position in the negotiations.

However, the original plans had to be altered when late in July the Western Allies prohibited their nationals from getting involved in any talks with the Germans. The new chief negotiating partner, selected with the cooperation of McClelland, was Saly Mayer. His freedom of action was limited not only by the AJDC, an American-based organization, but also by the WRB and the Swiss authorities. His basic task was to drag out the negotiations and to make no firm commitments relating to the delivery of goods or money. Mayer fully agreed with this policy of delay, and carried out his task faithfully. He was temperamentally a loner and a highly suspicious person. He did not get along very well with the representatives of the various Jewish national and international organizations in Switzerland, with the possible exception of Nathan Schwalb. He was scrupulous and highly conservative in the handling of AJDC funds-which in the view of many Jewish leaders, especially those living in the Nazi inferno, made effective rescue work all but (1274) impossible. He was as fully informed, and as silent, about the Nazis' Final Solution program as the other leaders of the free world had been.

With the negotiations back on track, Kasztner urged Becher to allow the Bergen-Belsen group to travel to a neutral country as an expression of the good intentions of the SS. Mayer concurred with this request, viewing this as a test case. Becher, who returned from Berlin on August 2, informed Kasztner that Himmler was ready to permit the emigration of Jews from Europe upon delivery of goods and that the first group of 500 Jews from Bergen-Belsen was authorized to travel to a neutral country. When Mayer learned of this development, he got in touch with Heinrich Rothmund, the head of the Swiss Alien Police, on August 8, requesting permission for the group to enter Switzerland. 121

The first meeting between Mayer, Kasztner, and Becher was scheduled to take place in Switzerland on August 21, to coincide with the arrival of the first group from Bergen-Belsen. 122 Since Mayer could not obtain Swiss visas for Becher and his colleagues, the negotiations took place on a bridge linking Austria and Switzerland between Hochst and St. Margrethen, about 20 miles east of St. Gallen. Becher was accompanied by his trusted aide SS-Hauptsturmführer Max Gruson, Wilhelm Billitz, one of the directors of the Weiss-Manfred Works which Becher had acquired in May, and Kasztner. He spoke as the personal representative of Himmler regarding the offer that was given to Brand. Mayer, in turn, emphasized that he was speaking only as the representative of the Schweizerische Unterstutzungsfonds far Flüchtlinge (Swiss Support Funds for Refugees), the welfare organization that handled the distribution of money for refugees in Switzerland. His closest advisers were Pierre Bigar, a leader in the Schweizerischer Israelitischer Gemeindebund (Swiss Jewish Community Council), and Marcus Wyler, his lawyer. In accordance with his mandate, Mayer adopted a noncommittal posture, berating Becher for the atrocities committed by the Nazis and demanding that the " Germans finally put an end to their damned gassings." Becher outlined the German position along the original offer given to Brand, suggesting that the 10,000 trucks be shipped from America. He added that on their return trip the ships could take along the Jews freed by the Germans. Mayer tested Becher in order to see whether the Germans might be interested in money instead. The meeting ended on a basically negative tone, with Billitz having to save the situation by (1275) proposing that the meeting be adjourned to give both parties time for further reflection.

Becher, annoyed by the humiliation of having to negotiate on a bridge, returned to Budapest. He asked Kasztner how the "leaders of world Jewry" could be expected to deliver any goods when they could not even provide a Swiss entry visa. Nevertheless, he maintained a tone of optimism in his report to Himmler. Writing on August 25, Becher informed the Reichsführer-SS that the skepticism of the Jewish leaders about the seriousness of the German offer had been dissipated by the freeing of the first group of Jews from Bergen-Belsen. He suggested that in light of the practical impossibility of obtaining trucks, other goods needed by Germany (chromium, nickel, aluminum, ball-bearings, etc.) be accepted instead through such neutral countries as Sweden, Switzerland, and Portugal. He relayed the Jewish leaders' contention that should further " evacuations" take place the negotiations would not be taken seriously and would be considered pointless. The following day Himmler approved Becher’ s line of action. 123

The second series of meetings took place at the same spot on September 3-5, but without Becher, who refused to be "humiliated" a second time. Mayer was joined in the negotiations alternately by Wyler and Bigar. Although the basic position of the Jewish leaders was once again noncommittal, it was, for two reasons, somewhat less intransigent. First, on September 1, McClelland had informed Mayer that the WRB was ready to allocate $2 million for the negotiations. (The license for the actual use of these funds was never forwarded.) Second, following the national uprising in Slovakia on August 28, the Nazis, using the excuse of Jewish participation in the revolt, bad renewed their drive against the remnant of the Slovak Jewish community. In light of these factors, Mayer declared that he was ready in principle to deposit five million Swiss francs in the account of his Swiss organization and would try to convince the Swiss authorities to permit the SS to buy whatever goods they wanted in Switzerland. Although no deal was completed, the Germans got the impression that the Jewish leaders, and possibly their Western mentors, were interested in the Nazi offer and were ready to continue the negotiations.

The third meeting took place on Mayer's initiative. On September 26, he cabled Budapest that he was ready to open an account for the (1276) Nazis in a Swiss bank. Three days later, he met the Budapest group, which this time was led by Herbert Kettlitz. (Grtison bad been transferred from Budapest, allegedly because, on September 24, he had associated himself with Kasztner in intervening on behalf of the Slovak Jews in Bratislava.) This meeting appeared to be more productive. At least, something specific had been offered to the Germans. Becher was informed that funds would be placed at his disposal for the purchase of goods in Switzerland on condition that the deportation of the Slovak Jews be discontinued; the Germans abandon their plan to deport the Jews of Budapest; and the remainder of the Bergen-Belsen group be allowed to leave for Switzerland. 124

The optimism associated with the discussions and with the internal developments in Hungary was dispelled by the Nyilas coup of October 15. Eichmann, who had been recalled to Germany late in August, returned to Budapest to complete his "mission." The urgency of the situation in Slovakia and Hungary compelled McClelland and Mayer to readjust their tactics, but not their ultimate objective. On October 25, Mayer cabled Kasztner that he was ready for a new round of discussions-this time inside Switzerland. (The entry visas for Becher, Kettlitz, Billitz and Kasztner had been obtained thanks to McClelland.) Billitz and Kasztner arrived on October 29, Becher and Kettlitz on November 2. As was the case during his first encounter with Mayer late in August, Becher again had good news: Himmler bad authorized the departure of the remnant of the Bergen-Belsen group.

The first round of discussions was held in St. Gallen on November 4. Becher explained that the Slovak Jews had been "liquidated for military reasons" and summarized Himmler’s views regarding the Jews of Budapest and the possible freeing of certain Jews upon the delivery of goods. In line with his August 25 note to Himmler, Becher no longer referred specifically to trucks.

A far more important meeting from Becher’s point of view was held the following day in Zurich. There he met McClelland, the "personal representative of President Roosevelt," in the company of Mayer. Becher was subjected to great psychological pressure. McClelland and Mayer emphasized the good will he could generate by cooperating in the rescue of Jews in view of the inevitable defeat of the Third Reich. Becher was also given a basis to believe that his mission had not been in (1277) vain: Mayer showed him the text of Cordell Hull's telegram of October 29, in which the American Secretary of State had indicated that 20 million Swiss francs would be placed at the disposal of Mayer.

Becher was of course never informed about the conditions attached by the American government concerning the actual expenditure of the funds. McClelland and Mayer outlined their own demands, stressing the absolute necessity of putting an end to the extermination and the persecution of people irrespective of their race or creed. Becher promised to convey these demands to Himmler and left Switzerland in the company of Kasztner. Kettlitz was left behind to shop around for goods only to discover soon that the money mentioned by Mayer and McClelland was not in fact available. In response to McClelland's telegram of November 16, in which he summarized the discussions with Becher, the State Department and the WRB vetoed the deal (on November 21), stressing that "no (repeat no) funds from any source should be used to carry out such proposal. "125 Becher, who was not yet aware of these " difficulties," was quite content with the meeting with McClelland, which he thought might lead to deals transcending the Jewish question. However Kettlitz, who was soon asked by the Swiss to leave, realized the hopelessness of his mission and had so informed Becher.

Kurt Becher

In the meantime the Soviet troops were swiftly approaching Budapest and Becher became more concerned with his own record and survival than with the acquisition of goods. As a realist, he had no difficulty in seeing through Mayer's tactics though, wisely, he never revealed these to Himmler. A shrewd Machiavellian, Becher decided to acquire credit as a " savior ' of Jews. He intervened with the SS and Nyilas authorities to ease and eventually halt the foot-marches from Budapest. 126 On November 26, following his return from a visit to Himmler, he announced triumphantly that he had convinced the Reichsführer-SS about the necessity to suspend the Final Solution program. He told Kasztner that Himmler had in fact had authorized the dismantling of the gas chambers. 127 Of course, by that time the SS were desperately trying to eliminate all traces of their extermination machinery not only in Auschwitz-Birkenau but everywhere else as well. 128

In response to the cables that Kettlitz had sent to Becher about his failure to get any of the funds promised by Mayer and his inability even to meet the Swiss Jewish leader, Kasztner and Billitz tried to (1278) persuade Becher and Eichmann, who once again became actively involved in the negotiations, that the difficulties were probably due to " certain misunderstandings," which could perhaps be eliminated by another visit to Switzerland. Eichmann demanded a positive answer by December 2, stating that otherwise he would proceed against the Jews of Budapest. On November 28, Billitz and Kasztner, this time accompanied by SS-Hauptsturmführer Krell, again went to Switzerland. Kasztner would never again return to Budapest. Upon arrival the next day, they were met at the border by Kettlitz and Rubinfeld, a representative of HIJEF. (Saly Mayer had returned to St. Gallen after having waited at the border for two hours.) Rubinfeld was allegedly brought along by Kettlitz, who not only complained about Mayer’s failure to hand over any money but also because he had believed that better progress could be made by negotiating with the Orthodox. 129 Kasztner and Billitz next met Mayer as well as Schwalb and some representatives of the Sternbuch group (HIJEF), the Orthodox relief and rescue committee of Switzerland. Though Mayer had informed Kasztner on December 1 about the true state of affairs, Kasztner induced Krell and Kettlitz to tell Becher that some funds were in fact available and that the difficulties were due primarily to the failure of the Germans to keep their side of the bargain, including the transfer of the Bergen-Belsen group. 130 Mayer sent the same message to Krell on December 5. The situation was somewhat eased when the remaining Jews in the Kasztner transport were allowed to enter Switzerland on December 7, despite Kettlitz's original opposition. After the Germans again showed their "serious intentions," the Jewish leaders, including Joseph J. Schwartz, 131 who was in Switzerland for a visit, had convinced McClelland to pursue a new policy line under which the AJDC would transfer five million dollars through the Red Cross for "board and lodging" for Jews under Nazi rule.

The State Department's positive reply to McClelland's request of December 13 did not arrive until January 7, 1945. The reply reiterated the earlier restrictive conditions, emphasizing that the transfer of the AJDC funds was authorized "solely in order that Saly Mayer may have something tangible with which to hold open the negotiations and for the gaining of more precious time." 132 By the time Mayer found out about the restrictive conditions, the Soviet troops, after a month-long siege, had liberated Budapest. To appease Becher in the wake of the dilatory (1279) cables from Switzerland and to acquire his good will toward protecting the Jews in the ghetto, Biss " bought" for him 30 trucks in Slovakia from a German-Slovak import-export dealer named Alois Steger. These were German trucks that had been given to Slovakia; Becher never acquired them, though, because they were in the meantime confiscated by the retreating Wehrmacht. 133

Although he could have remained in Switzerland after the arrival of the second Bergen-Belsen group, Kasztner chose to return to the Nazi sphere. After the freeing of the Bergen-Belsen groups and the liberation of Budapest, his efforts were concentrated on rescuing the Jews still in Nazi hands, including those in the concentration camps. At first he spent much time in Vienna, from where he often went to Bratislava on behalf of the Slovak Jews. Late in January 1945, he returned to St. Margrethen for a series of discussions with Mayer, Krell, and Becher, which lasted almost till mid-February.

After Becher was appointed by Himmler to serve as Special Reich Commissioner for All Concentration Camps (Reichssonderkommissar for sumtliche Konzentrationslager) on April 6, 1945, much effort was exerted to prevent the destruction of the camps, so that their inmates might be safely transferred to Allied hands. Kasztner, who had a German passport that made no reference to his Jewish background, pursued this objective by travelling with Becher in the enclave still under Nazi control. Between April 8 and April 18, they visited Berlin, Hamburg, Bergen-Belsen, Neuengamme, and Theresienstadt. As a personal favor to Kasztner, Becher went alone to Mauthausen to free Moshe Schweiger, a Vaada leader who had been one of the first to be arrested by the Gestapo after the occupation, allegedly because of his anti-Nazi stand.

Becher's intention was to enter Switzerland in the company of Schweiger with the valuables received from the Vaada leaders. The swift advance of the Americans made this impossible. At the end, the valuables, "worth several hundreds of thousands of dollars," were handed over by Schweiger to a representative of the American OSS. 134

Others also made attempts to save Jews. The Sternbuch brothers, representing the HIJEF; Curt Trilmpy, one of Messerschmitt’s representatives in Switzerland; Dr. Jean-Marie Musy, the former President of Switzerland; 135 Felix Kersten, an Estonian of German ethnic background and Himmler's personal doctor; and Count Folke Bernadotte (1280) of Sweden all claimed credit for Himmler's decision not to destroy the concentration camps. 136

The Freeing of the Kasztner Transport. The arrival in Switzerland of the second Bergen-Belsen group on December 7, 1944, meant that the safety of the entire Kasztner transport had been assured. It also put an end to the flurry of diplomatic exchanges between the Third Reich and Switzerland, and between the RSHA and the German Foreign Office that the arrival of the first group had engendered.

Although Hitler was aware of the transfer of Jews to Switzerland (presumably he was informed by Kaltenbrunner), he apparently was under the impression that this was part of the bargain he bad suggested to Horthy on July 10, under which close to 8,000 Jews under the protection of Sweden, Switzerland, and other neutral countries would be allowed to leave Hungary in exchange for the resumption of the deportations that bad been halted four days earlier. 137 The German Foreign Office was, for a while at least, kept in the dark by the RSHA. Interestingly enough, it received the first official notification about the transfer of the first Kasztner group from the Swiss. Notwithstanding the fact that Saly Mayer had obtained the consent of the Swiss authorities via Heinrich Rothmund (August 8) for the entry of both groups, the Swiss, probably to protect their neutral status, formally complained to the Germans about not having been informed in advance of the transfer date and about the lack of personal data on the refugees (they had no identification papers) and their ultimate destination. The note led to a series of interagency and intradepartmental communications with the RSHA officials who were trying to explain the transports as part of the bargain for the acquisition of war materiel for the SS. 138

The first group consisted not of 500 Jews, as Becher had originally informed Kasztner on August 2, but only of 318, allegedly because Eichmann had sabotaged Himmler's orders. The criteria for the selection of Jews to make up the first group were suggested by Kasztner in a letter addressed to Fischer on August 3.139 The second group, consisting of 1,368 Jews and headed by Fischer arrived in Switzerland escorted by Krumey.

While in Bergen-Belsen, three members of the group died of natural causes and there were eight births. Only a few from the original (1281) transport were retained in the camp. In his pique over Brand's failure to return, Eichmann ordered the retention of his mother and two sisters. One Jew, Dr. Andreas Kassowitz, was held back because be identified himself as Romanian and the Germans wanted to use him as an exchange for a Volksdeutsche from Transylvania. The fate of Jeno Kertesz and Sandor Weisz, two lawyers from Kolozsvar, was particularly tragic. Their daughters, who bad lived in Budapest, had been among the first to be deported from Kistarcsa (April 29, 1944) and eventually ended up in Bergen-Belsen. 140 As punishment for their attempt to have their daughters transferred to them at the Bevorzugtenlager, they were transferred to Bergen-Belsen, but were kept separated from their daughters. Both died before or shortly after the end of the war. 141

The first group, which included Dr. Tivadar Fischer, a former member of the Romanian Parliament, was taken to the Military Internment Camp (Militarisches lnternierungslager) in the Hotel Belmont at Montreux. 142 After the second group arrived, the Jews were placed into two camps in Caux, near Montreux. One "collection camp" (Auffangslager) was in the Hotel Esplanade and Regina, under the leadership of Dezso Hermann, a lawyer from Kolozsvar; 143 the other camp, known as Les Rochers, was headed by Ignatz Klein. Following the group's arrival in Switzerland, some of its leaders, including Hillel Danzig, got in touch with the representatives of the major Jewish organizations and through them with the leaders of the Istanbul Vaada. Danzig, aided by Chaim Pozner, reestablished contact with Brand and intervened on behalf of 250 Zionist comrades-"the best from Transylvania and Hungary." 144

In April 1945 the Swiss authorities decided to move the Kasztner group, first to an UNRRA camp in Philippeville, Algeria, and then to Bari, Italy, reportedly to free the camps for other expected refugees. This decision was made in concert with the Americans, who bad assumed certain responsibilities in connection with the group. Hermann and Klein, acting for their respective camps, began to bombard the Swiss and above all the local Jewish organizations with petitions and memoranda, outlining the injustice of the proposed measure and threatening to stage a hunger strike and inform the Swiss press. 145 The campaign proved successful for shortly after the end of the war in Europe the members of the group were allowed to proceed to their freely chosen destinations. Many opted to go back to their former homelands; approx (1282) imately 700 certificate holders led by Jozsef Fischer left for Palestine via Bari in August 1945.

Kasztner returned to Switzerland on April 19, and the following day-one of his happiest-he was honored at a banquet at which he was hailed as a savior. 146 After the group’ s departure, he remained in Europe for a while, helping the Allies in the prosecution of war crimes trial cases. On September 13, 1945, he signed a long affidavit concerning the destruction of Hungarian Jewry, emphasizing his role in the rescue work. 147 ln the months that followed, he devoted much time to detailing his activities and achievements in a controversial and understandably self-serving report. 148

Competing Claims for Credit. Kasztner claimed credit for himself and the Budapest Vaada not only for rescuing the close to 1,700 "prominent" Jews and a large percentage of the approximately 18,000 Strasshof Jews, but also for the survival of the Jews of Budapest and many of those in German concentration camps. Credit for the latter achievements has also been claimed by several other Jewish and non-Jewish leaders. The leaders of the World Jewish Congress, for example, claimed that " no other Jewish organization had a greater share in rescue work during the war than the World Jewish Congress." This claim was vehemently disputed by Yitzhak Stembuch, who insisted that the HIJEF committee, including Hugo Donnenbaum, Dr. Ruben Hecht, and Dr. Julius Kilb, acting through Musy, had managed to persuade Himmler to allow all the Jews in the concentration camps to leave for America via Switzerland. Citing a March 6, 1945 statement by Musy, Sternbuch claimed that the only reason why the estimated 750,000 Jews were not allowed to leave (at a planned rate of 1, 800 every two weeks) was that the plan had been sabotaged by the AJDC, Saly Mayer, Nathan Schwalb, Kasztner, and Becher-a sabotage that brought about the consequent opposition of Hitler and Kaltenbrunner. 149

Credit for the rescue of the Jews of Budapest was also claimed not only by most of the organizational leaders cited above, but also by Horthy, the leaders of the Central Jewish Council, and even by some of the top Nazi and Nyilas leaders. 150 A highly unlikely person also credited with this achievement was Saly Mayer. In a press release issued on October 4, 1945 by the AJDC headquarters in New York, Mayer had been (1283) credited, among other things, with having persuaded Becher to cancel the order for the deportation of the reportedly 200,000 Jews of Budapest to Auschwitz and with having secured the entry of the close to 1,700 Jews in the Kasztner group to Switzerland. The AJDC also identified Mayer as a hero: "At one point," the release claimed, " at the risk of his life, Mayer entered Nazi Germany to carry on the discussions." 151

A similar conclusion was reached by Yehuda Bauer, who gives the lion's share of the credit for all the achievements claimed by others-including Kasztner, Kersten, and Musy-to Mayer, the very person who, ironically, had been identified by many wartime Jewish leaders as one of the chief obstacles to the rescuing of the surviving Jews of Europe. 152

Although it would be an exaggeration to identify Mayer as a "savior," the harsh criticism that had been leveled against him is clearly unfair. His abrasive personality was probably the principal reason for his having been regarded so negatively. Furthermore, his critics were presumably not fully aware of the limitations and restrictions under which Mayer had had to work during the war. After the war many of his critics tended to ignore or underestimate them.

Mayer, the free citizen of a neutral country, had adopted a "tough" position toward the SS officers he negotiated with, often lecturing, moralizing, and admonishing them with an air of arrogance that clearly was not appreciated by Kasztner and by the other leaders who had witnessed the Holocaust and were constantly operating in the shadow of death. Could additional Jewish lives have been saved had Mayer been more flexible and, like many other Jewish leaders operating under the Nazi yoke, more amenable to the " illegal" transfer of goods and money to the SS negotiators? The question cannot be answered with any degree of certainty. It is clear, however, that such behavior would not only have been completely out of character for Mayer, the old-fashioned Germanic Jew-a stickler for formal, legalistic conduct-but also in clear violation of the laws and policies of Switzerland and the Western Allies. 153

Other Lines of Rescue

Within a week after the departure of the Kasztner group on June 30, Horthy put an end to the further deportation of the Jews. Although Kasztner continued to deal with Becher, rescue via the SS had become largely discredited. The hope associated with the Brand mission gave way to apprehension, tempered by Horthy's reemergence on the political scene. The advocates of new rescue approaches became more articulate and persuasive. Some argued for the pursuit of a Hungarian line," involving the mobilization of leading Hungarian church, political, and governmental figures in the rescue effort; others preferred to involve the International Red Cross and the neutral powers along with sympathetic Hungarians; still others suggested an alignment with the emerging resistance forces as the best possible hope. During the six months that preceded the liberation of Budapest-a period almost evenly divided into three months of relative tranquility and three months of terror-these three proposals became largely intertwined. The most important relief and rescue efforts undertaken during this period were those initiated by Miklos Krausz and Otto Komoly. (1294)

The Rescue Activities of Miklos Krausz. Krausz was the executive officer of the Budapest branch of the Palestine Office. Complementing the work of the Vaada, the Palestine Office was primarily concerned with the practical aspects of emigration to Palestine, including the selection and registration of candidates, the organization of emigrant groups, the distribution of Palestine immigration certificates, the procurement of passports and visas, and the arrangement of transportation. The policies of the office were determined by a committee consisting of 11 representatives of the major Zionist parties, 181 while the executive responsibilities were exercised by a three-member presidium. In 1937, the office came under the leadership of Lipot Osztern, who also doubled as the president of the Hungarian Zionist Association. Because of his poor health, the day-to-day operations of the office were gradually taken over by Krausz. After Hungary’s entry into the war on the side of the Axis in late June 1941 and the subsequent withdrawal of the British diplomatic personnel with whom the office had dealt on matters of immigration, Osztern formally "dissolved" the office and dismissed its employees, including Krausz. Krausz and the presidium, however, refused to acknowledge this action and continued to keep the office in operation. For a while the leadership position was held by Mozes Bisseliches, a former president of the Hungarian Zionist Association, who was appointed to head the office by Osztern. Since the legality of the appointment was in question, Besseliches refused to play an active leadership role. In the summer of 1943, when Krausz planned to leave for Palestine, Brand suggested to Barlas that Komoly and Erno Marton be entrusted with the leadership. 182 However, Krausz apparently changed his mind and the difficulties continued. New plans for the reorganization of the office and the election of a president were overtaken by the German occupation. 183 During the crucial wartime period, consequently, the office had no appointed leader. Krausz filled the leadership vacuum in his capacity as executive secretary.

According to most contemporaries, Krausz was a rather capable man who had established good and useful relations with the Hungarian authorities, including the KEOKH (especially Batizfalvy) and with the British consular officials. After the departure of the British, he developed similar relations with the Swiss, who represented the interests of the Allies in Budapest. A leader of the Mizrachi, Krausz did not get (1295) along with either the committee and presidium members of the Palestine Office or with the representatives of the Hehalutz, many of whom were young Polish and Slovak refugees. The conflict was due not so much to ideological differences, though these were real, as to personality difficulties. Krausz was basically a loner, jealously guarding the secrets of his position. He appeared eager to monopolize all aspects of the office’ s work, including the technical matters relating to travel. He tended to exclude his colleagues from decision-making and to keep them in the dark about his dealings with the Hungarian and foreign officials involved in the emigration plans. The problems were compounded during the war, when the office inherited part of the responsibilities of its counterparts in occupied Central Europe and as more and more refugees entered Hungary. The competition by the refugees as well as by an increasing number of Hungarian Zionists for the limited number of Palestine immigration certificates became ever fiercer. Krausz's questionable work habits further aggravated the problems. 184

After the German occupation of Hungary, Krausz was entrusted with establishing contact with the neutral powers. Like many other prominent Jews, he was soon arrested by the Gestapo, as was his secretary, Rose Binet. Although they were freed after a short while through the interventions of the Vaada, Krausz and his wife decided to seek refuge in the Swiss Legation. As an employee of the legation in charge of emigration matters, Krausz received from the Hungarian authorities the documents exempting him from wearing the Yellow Star of David.

Swiss consul Carl Lutz in his office in Budapest

Taking advantage of his close relations with Consul Carl Lutz, who was primarily concerned with the representation of foreign interests (the representation of Swiss interests was the concern of Maximilian Jager, the Minister), Krausz initiated two actions that proved highly beneficial to Budapest's Jewry. While at first he was not opposed to Kasztner’ s negotiations with the SS, by early June he realized that they were not yielding the expected results. On June 8, he so informed the Zionist leaders at a meeting to which he did not invite Kasztner, his rival. Krausz suggested other possible avenues of rescue, based on cooperation with anti-Nazi and anti-Sztojay Hungarian politicians, and with the representatives of the neutral states. 185

The initiative for Krausz's first positive action came from Switzerland. In response to a contact established through Chaim Pozner and (1296) Georges M. Mantello, on June 19, 1944, Krausz forwarded to Switzerland an abridged version of the Auschwitz Reports together with a report on the anti-Jewish operations in Hungary up to that date. Although Kasztner and the other Vaada leaders in both Budapest and Bratislava had sent similar reports to the Hehalutz, AJDC, and World Jewish Congress representatives in Switzerland several months earlier, it was Krausz' s report that was publicized through the Swiss press. This was largely due to the efforts of Mantello (see Chapter 23). Though Krausz did not explain why he had not used his excellent contacts with the Swiss authorities in Budapest or the Vaada’s communication channels to forward for publication similar reports in April and May, he continued to boast-with some justification-that it was his June 19 report that had induced President Roosevelt, the Vatican, and the Swiss and Swedish governments to intercede and to pressure Horthy to halt the deportations. 186

Krausz' s second major achievement was interlinked with the first. As a result of foreign pressures, the Hungarian Council of Ministers decided, at its meeting of June 26, 1944, to approve the emigration of around 7,800 Jews. Of these, approximately 7,000 were sponsored by the Swiss, 300 to 400 by the Swedes, and the remainder by the War Refugee Board. The decision was communicated to Veesenmayer by Sztojay the following day. A few days later Horthy decided to halt the deportations. On July 10, Hitler, heeding the advice of Veesenmayer and Ribbentrop, decided to cooperate in the emigration of the 7,800 Jews, provided the Hungarians allowed the speedy resumption of the deportations. 187 Sztojay informed the Council about Hitler's decision on July 12.

Vice-consul Carl Lutz

Swiss Legation Budapest

Having received the official communication from the Hungarian government, Carl Lutz and Krausz worked out a plan for the registration of 7,000 Jews. 188 Although the agreement called for 7,000 individuals, Krausz and the other Jewish leaders acted in terms of 7,000 family heads, which in effect meant 7,000 families. Following Lutz’s advice that the prospective emigrants be registered in a separate place not far from the Swiss Legation, the building at 29 Vadasz Street was acquired for this purpose. The acquisition was facilitated by the building’s owner, Arthur Weisz, who was destined to play a leading role in its administration. Because Weisz had previously used the building for his wholesale (1297) glass business, it soon became known as "the Glass House" (iiveghaz). The "emigration office" was opened on July 24, when the situation in Budapest, though still serious, seemed less critical. The building enjoyed exterritorial status and was identified on the outside as: Svajci Kovetseg Jdegenerdekek Kepviselete Kivandorlasi Osz talya (Swiss Legation Representation of Foreign Interests. Department of Emigration). Placed under the overall leadership of Krausz with Weisz serving as chief administrator, the office operated with a staff of a few hundred, mostly young Zionists, who were supplied with Swiss and Hungarian identification papers. As "Swiss employees" they were exempted from wearing the Yellow Star, which gave them many privileges. They could move freely at any time of the day, travel, and even live in " non-Jewish houses."

As the news spread about the new emigration opportunities, thousands of Jews appeared for registration at the Glass House (Üvegház) in Budapest, 1944. (Figures 29.2-29.3). photo by Carl Lutz

By the end of July or early August, a Swiss collective passport including approximately 2,200 names was completed and supplied with a Hungarian exit and a Romanian transit visa. In Krausz's view these Jews were to be the first batch of the 7,000 families (40,000 Jews) who the Germans and Hungarians were reportedly willing to let go. He so informed the Jewish leaders in Geneva and Istanbul, who, in tum, began a concentrated drive to induce the British and the Americans to make possible the immigration of these Jews into Palestine. With neither Krausz nor the Jewish leaders of the free world nor the Allies having been aware of the conditions imposed by Hitler, they became involved in a long and often heated controversy over what came to be known as the "Horthy offer" on the emigration of certain categories of Hungarian Jews. 189 When the Germans realized that the Hungarians would not permit the resumption of the deportations, they demanded the removal of the Jews of Budapest into camps in the countryside as a precondition to their cooperation in the emigration scheme. Although the plan was seriously considered, it was not carried out. Around this time, Ferenczy and Lulay were trying to convince Krausz, as they had already tried to convince Kasztner and others, about their change of heart and offered to cooperate in the emigration scheme. They even offered to set aside a number of buildings on Pozsonyi Road to house the prospective (1298) emigrants. They did this following the receipt of a memo from Denes Csopey, the head of the Political Division of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 23. 190 These maneuvers led to the eventual establishment of "protected buildings" for the housing of foreign nationals, which constituted the " international ghetto" during the Szálasi era (see Chapter 26).

Figure 29.2 Thousands of Jews Lining Up in Front of the "Glass House," the Annex of the Swiss Legation at 29 Vadasz Street, Trying to Obtain "Protective Passes." Budapest, October 1944 Photo by Carl Lutz

Because of the cover and protection it offered, the Glass House became the center of rescue operations by the Hehalutz youth. The young pioneers used the building for a series of illegal activities, including (1299) the production and distribution of a variety of forged documents, the rescue of their comrades from internment camps, and the smuggling of Jews into Romania, Slovakia, and Yugoslavia. These illegal activities were not condoned by the established leaders of the Glass House and occasionally led to open conflicts with both Krausz and Weisz. These exacerbated the long-standing conflict between Krausz and the Vaada, which neither Barias nor Komoly could bridge in spite of their efforts. 191 The Hehalutz continued to use the Glass House as one of their centers for relief and rescue operations, which acquired considerable dimensions during the Szálasi era (see below).

Figure 29.3. Long Lines of Jews in Front of the "Glass House" Trying to Obtain "Protective Passes." Budapest, October 1944 (1300)

The Rescue Activities of Otto Komoly. One of the few truly outstanding leaders of Hungarian Jewry, Komoly was born in Budapest in 1892. An engineer of middle-class background, he embraced Zionism under the influence of his father, who had attended the First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897. A man of irreproachable character, Komoly played a prominent, though unfortunately not a decisively important, role during the catastrophe of Hungarian Jewry. Although he was the President of the Hungarian Zionist Association and of the Vaada, he was overshadowed in these organizations by Kasztner. He was practically the only person that all Zionist factional leaders looked upon without rancor or malice. He was a peace-maker and unifier by nature, and he did everything possible to put an end to the perennial conflicts within and among the various Zionist groups and organizations. As a captain decorated for heroism in World War I, Komoly was exempted from the anti-Jewish laws and retained his freedom of movement. He devoted all his energies to the relief and possible rescue of the beleaguered Jewish community, acting closely with Kasztner.

Komoly played a leading role in the preparation of the Kasztner transport, which also included his only daughter. He assumed a more active role after the departure of the transport and especially after Horthy had halted the deportations early in July 1944. By that time the military situation, following the Normandy landings and the advances of the Red Army, took a decisive turn in favor of the Allies and many Hungarians intensified their search for an urgent way out of the war. Among these were not only Horthy and his military and conservative political advisers, but also noted Christian church leaders and even some rightists, who ceased believing in German invincibility. Their voices began to coalesce with those of the progressive intellectuals and illegal opposition elements, including the representatives of the Smallholder, Social Democratic, and communist parties. This increasingly discernible reaffirmation of Hungarian national will emboldened some of the Jewish leaders to undertake new rescue campaigns, without abandoning Kasztner’s dealings with the SS.

The pursuit of the Hungarian line of rescue was assumed by Komoly. His background, temperament, and prestige made him the natural and logical choice for dealing with leading Hungarian figures, many of whom had by then become not only anti-Nazi but also (1301) anti-German.

Miklos Horthy, Jr.

Some of them, including Miklos Horthy, Jr., Miklos Mester, and Reverend Albert Bereczky, were in fact directly or indirectly associated with the emerging resistance movement (see below). Komoly’ s position as the leading Zionist spokesman for the surviving Jewish community had been buttressed by his association with the International Red Cross (IRC) and later with the reorganized Central Jewish Council.

As demonstrated earlier, during the immediate post-occupation period, Hungarian officials had refused to deal with the Jewish leaders and referred them to the SS. However, when Horthy halted the deportations many of these same officials had become eager to show their anti-Nazi sympathies. Perhaps no other Jewish leader was as keenly aware of these changing attitudes as was Komoly. Imrédy, for example, had declined to see him in late March and in May even though some of the country's influential politicians, including Count Ferenc Karolyi, Count Ferenc Karolyi, and Mester, had interceded on his behalf. After July, however, Komoly was besieged by several leading Rightists and even officials who had previously been involved in the anti-Jewish measures, including Ferenczy and Lulay, offering various schemes of rescue. He had no difficulty in meeting such notorious anti-Semites as Rajniss and Baky. In July and August, Komoly tried his best to prevent the concentration of the Jews of Budapest into camps outside the capital as demanded by the Germans and as suggested by the Hungarian gendarrnerie " as a means to protect them. " He was afraid that despite the good will of many of the plan's proponents, the Jews, once concentrated, could easily

be deported. During these months, he had almost daily contacts with Mester, the Imrédy-oriented rightist Under Secretary in the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Education who had turned anti-German after the occupation; Reverend [Albert] Bereczky, a courageous minister of the Reformed Church who had some links to the emerging Hungarian resistance; 192 and Tibor Korody, a journalist and Arrow Cross member of the lower house, who, like Mester, turned against the Germans in the summer of 1944. Komoly’s dealings with Hungarian political figures involved not only the Jewish question, but also military and political issues, including the possible composition and program of the envisioned post-armistice government. 193

Friedrich Born

At this time special measures for the protection of children became an important consideration in view of the lingering threat of deportation, (1302) the continuous dwindling of supplies, and the dangers associated with the rapidly approaching front. It was suggested that the children be placed under the protection of the IRC. Friedrich Born, the IRC delegate in Hungary since the middle of May 1944, was approached about this matter early in August. Since under international law the IRC's functions were primarily concerned with POW issues, a legal framework had to be found by which the agency could undertake the tasks suggested by the Jewish leaders. The solution was provided by the Spanish government, which declared its readiness to accept 500 children for resettlement in Tangier. The Swiss government also agreed to permit the entry of 500 children. The IRC was thereupon requested to take these now "foreign children" under its protection and care for them until their departure.

On August 29, Born informed Komoly of his readiness to place at his disposal a room in the IRC office at 4 Merleg Street for this purpose. Shortly after the offer was renewed on September 7,1944 a special office ("Department A") for the protection of children was opened under the leadership of Komoly. A number of buildings were bought or rented to house the children and to store supplies. The buildings and all the employees associated with them enjoyed the protection of the IRC. The financing of Komoly's Department A was the responsibility of the Central Jewish Council, which had relied on AJDC funds. 195

The value of the children’ s homes had become apparent during the Nyilas era, when they emerged as a source of refuge for thousands of children and adults. At one time, Department A was in charge of 35 buildings, 550 employees, and 5,000 to 6,000 children.

Sholem Offenbach

The department’s facilities were also used by Sholem Offenbach and his colleagues, who were concerned with the welfare of the approximately 1,000 foreign Jewish refugees (700 to 800 Polish, 70 to 80 Yugoslav, and a few hundred Slovak) still in the country, and by Dr. Osterweil, a Polish-Jewish refugee physician who was in charge of approximately 100 orphans, mostly from Poland. 196

One of the largest of the children’ s homes protected by the Red Cross was the Jewish Orphanage for Boys (Zsido Fiuarvahaz) headed by Otto Roboz, a close associate of Otto Komoly. It also provided accommodation for handicapped children who were transferred from institutions that were confiscated by the Germans. 197 (1303)

After Komoly was co-opted into the Central Jewish Council, the work of Department A was greatly expanded and closely coordinated with that of the Council in the administration and supplying of a large number of homes for children and orphans, hospitals, and public kitchens. The expansion of the department's work required its decentralization. The central office, which was under the overall direction of Komoly and staffed primarily by Zionists, had to be shifted to 52 Baross Street. Economic matters, including the supplying of the children's homes and later of the ghetto, were handled at 2 Perczel Mor, 3 Bekes, and 6 Merleg Streets. The department was also in charge of the 24 makeshift Jewish hospitals within and outside the ghetto. 198

At the height of the Nyilas terror, many of the buildings protected by the IRC were used by the young Halutzim, who had enjoyed virtual immunity as employees of Department A, for their underground rescue activities. They also served as places of refuge for many escapees from internment camps and labor service companies.

“Following the Soviet encirclement of Budapest, most of the Jewish leaders either went into hiding or moved to safer living quarters. On December 28, Komoly moved to the Ritz Hotel, where Hans Weyermann, the IRC delegate, had his residence, in order to assure constant access at a time when telephone contact was no longer possible and other means of communication and transportation were no longer available. He was not destined to see the liberation that came a little less than three weeks later. On January 1, 1945, he was picked up by three Nyilas plainclothes detectives and taken to the Nyilas House in Varoshaz Street. In spite of assurances given to Weyermann, he was never seen alive again. His murder by the Nyilas marked the tragic end of one of the most illustrious and heroic figures of Hungarian Jewry. 199

[Hans Weyermann was a merchant and the ICRC delegate. Born in Zürich. Schooling in Lichtensteig. Pharmaceutical education in Chur. 1927-1932 business school in Neuenburg. Business manager at several Swiss-owned chemical firms in Budapest. 1939 Swiss mandatory military service as corporal (“Aktivdienst”). 1941 return to Hungary. After the German occupation of Budapest in March 1944, Weyermann returned to Switzerland. In 1944-1945 he served as a delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Budapest. Weyermann intervened on behalf of the approximately 100,000 Jews in Budapest and prevented the deportation ordered by Adolf Eichmann of ca. 20,000 children to the extermination camps.- USHMM]

Non-Jewish Rescue Efforts

Except for a few comparatively isolated attempts to save individual Jews from the provincial ghettos, the rescue efforts by Christians were concentrated in Budapest. Among the reasons for this were the speed with which the ghettoization and deportation were carried out in the countryside, the general ignorance about the ultimate fate of the deported Jews, and the fear instilled in both the Jewish and Christian populations (1304) of dire consequences for failure to abide by the draconic anti-Jewish laws. 200 These stipulated severe penalties, including internment, for hiding Jews or their property. While there were not many Christian Hungarians who dared hide Jews, a relatively large number directly or indirectly criticized the actions taken against the Jews.

Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky

Among the influential Hungarians who expressed their opposition to these actions or intervened on behalf of Jews were such nationally known political figures as Bajcsy-Zsilinszky and Gyula Szekfű, and several representatives of the arts and sciences, including Imre Waldbauer of the Hungarian Academy of Music. 201

[Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky. After the outbreak of World War II, Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky became the editor-in-chief of the weekly paper Independent Hungary (Független Magyarország) in which he espoused the necessity of blocking German expansion (Living space (Lebensraum)), through the united efforts of the small states bordering along the Danube. From 1941, he was the editor of the anti-Nazi paper The Free Word (Szabad Szó), and in the same year, he was one of the major organizers of the March 15 anti-Nazi protests. On March 19, 1944, Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, at his residence, fought with a weapon to prevent arrest by the Gestapo. He was wounded in the brief gun battle, arrested, and taken away. On October 11 of the same year, his release was demanded and obtained by the Hungarian government. However, in November, he was again arrested and incarcerated in the Sopronköhida prison for trying to organize an uprising against the Arrow Cross Party government. He was executed by hanging on December 23. On May 27, 1945, he was reburied in Tarpa with honours.]

Gyula Szekfű, 1945

[Gyula Szekfű. During World War II, as a member of the Bethlen group, Szekfű joined the independence and popular front movement. From 1939 to 1944 he was the leading publicist of the conservative magazine Magyar Nemzet, which was critical of the policies of the Nazi Germany from a Christian conservative perspective. He stood up for an independent, free Hungary, writing an article entitled The Concept of Freedom for the Christmas issue of the social-democratic Népszava in 1941, which exemplified the anti-German national unity.]

The institutional approach, though also somewhat limited, was more effective in saving Jewish lives. Among the agencies of the government that contributed toward this end were the Ministry of Defense, which recruited able-bodied Jewish males into the labor service system, 202 and the Cabinet Office of the Regent, which issued exemption certificates to Jews who had contributed to the advancement of the arts, the sciences, or the economy (see Chapter 25).

Pal Szalai

With the approach of the Soviet forces, the number of those offering assistance to Jews increased. Among these were policemen and even Nyilas leaders who presumably hoped that their past anti-Jewish acts would be overlooked. Pal Szalai, the Nyilas liaison to the police, for example, emerged as one of the protectors of the Budapest ghetto, a personal act of heroism that was recognized by both the Jewish community and the postwar People’s Tribunat. 203

[Pal Szalai. In the Hungarian Boy Scouts in 1929 Szalay became friends with Károly Szabó. This friendship continued in the critical months 1944 - 1945 while Pál Szalai, high-ranking member of the police force supported Raoul Wallenberg. Szalai was from 1939 to 1942 an idealistic member of the Arrow Cross Party. He left the party in 1942 disillusioned and returned to a high-ranking police force position in October 1944 to help people in mortal danger from the Holocaust. Szalai's friend Károly Szabó was an employee of the Swedish Embassy. Dr. Otto Fleischmann Doctor of Medicine and psychologist of the Swedish Embassy motivated Károly Szabó to play active role in the rescue actions of Raoul Wallenberg. Pál Szalai supported his friend with important personal documents, signed from the German command in the Battle of Budapest. Szalai agreed to meet Raoul Wallenberg at the Swedish Embassy in the night of December 26, 1944. Szalai provided Raoul Wallenberg with special favors and government information.]

Károly Szabó

[Between 1944 and 1945 Károly Szabó was one of the typewriter mechanics of the Swedish Embassy. Dr. Otto Fleischmann, a Doctor of Medicine and psychologist, employee of the Swedish Embassy, motivated Károly Szabó to play an active role in the rescue actions of Raoul Wallenberg. Pál Szalai supported his friend with important personal documents, signed by the German command in the Battle of Budapest. Karoly Szabó's intuitive purchase decision for a leather coat was another key factor. Black leather trench coat was a means of inspiring fear and respect, and the subsequent Hollywood image of the black-clad, trench-coated Gestapo officer has entered popular culture. In Budapest's Jewish community he was known as "the mysterious man in the leather coat".

Károly Szabó attracted exceptional attention on December 24, 1944, as Hungarian Arrow Cross Party members occupied the Embassy building on Gyopár street. He rescued 36 kidnapped employees from the Budapest ghetto. This action attracted Raoul Wallenberg's interest. He agreed to meet Szabó's influential friend, Pál Szalai, a high-ranking member of the police force. The meeting took place in the night of December 26. This meeting was preparation to save the Budapest ghetto in January 1945. Pál Szalai was honored as Righteous among the Nations April 7, 2009. The last meeting between Wallenberg and Szalai, together with Dr. Ottó Fleischmann and Károly Szabó, was on the evening of January 12, 1945, at the Gyopár street Swedish Embassy at Wallenberg's "last supper" invitation. The next day – on January 13 – Wallenberg contacted the Russians to secure food and supplies for the people under his protection. He was detained by the Soviet forces on January 17, 1945.]

One of the capital's agencies that not only rescued many Jews from certain death but actually had a considerable number of Jews on its staff was the Volunteer Ambulance Service of Budapest (Budapesti Onkentes Mentoegyesiilet-BOME). The ambulance units of BOME, several of them manned by Jewish physicians and technical personnel, became particularly active during the Nyilas era, when they saved many of the Jews gunned down by armed gangs as well as Jews who attempted to commit suicide in the wake of the anti-Jewish measures. Among the officials who distinguished themselves in BOME's rescue work were Dr. Laszlo Bisits, Karoly Harkany, and Dr. Laszlo Szennik. 204

In Budapest, hundreds of Jews-especially children-were rescued by courageous members of Christian religious orders: the Jews were hidden, fed, and protected in the convents, monasteries, missions, (1305) schools, and institutes of the various denominations. Among these were the Collegium Marianum, the Collegium Theresianum, the Lazarist Fathers (Lazarista atyak), the Sisters of Mercy (Jrgalmas noverek), the Sophianum Institute (Sophianum intezet), and the Scottish Mission (Skot Misszio). 205 The priests, ministers, and nuns had acted in cooperation with many lay Christians who were eager to help the persecuted Jews. Some acted with great bravery, exposing themselves to danger and even deportation. This was the case, for example, with Jane Raining, the Scottish matron of the Girls' Home that was sponsored by the Scottish Mission. She was arrested on April 25 and deported to Auschwitz on May 15; she died there on July 17, 1944. 206 Several lower-rank members of the Hungarian clergy also risked their lives by getting involved in resistance and rescue work. Particularly noteworthy were the activities of Dezso Angyal, Andras Egyed, Geza Izay, Ferenc Kallo, Ferenc Kohler, Laszlo Remete, and Sara Salkahazi.

Father Jakab Raile

Father Jakab Raile, one of the leading organizers and leaders of the rescue work in Budapest, saved close to 150 Jews at the Jesuit Residence at 25 Maria Street. 207

Unfortunately the heroism of the many men and women involved in individual rescue activities could not compensate for the absence of collective resistance in support of the beleaguered and persecuted Jews 208

Resistance

The efficiency and speed with which the Final Solution was carried out in the provinces and the impunity with which the Nyilas perpetrated their crimes against the Jews of Budapest were largely made possible by the virtual absence of any meaningful resistance on the part of either the Jewish or the Christian population. This was due not so much to a lack of organization-although this too was wanting-as to the absence of psychological and physical preparedness and the lethargy and general passivity of the population. In a sense the Jews were too well organized, enabling the authorities in charge of the Final Solution to easily identify, separate, concentrate, and deport them.

The non-Jewish Hungarians, whose freedom of action was incomparably greater, were generally passive. Although fewer and fewer Hungarians supported the Axis as it became ever more apparent its cause was lost, a formidable segment of the population still clung to Nazism's (1306) vicious anti-Semitism in 1944. In contrast, for example, to Poland and Yugoslavia, conditions for the development of a resistance movement in Hungary were unfavorable. There were a few small-scale partisan activities in Carpatho-Ruthenia and the Bacska area, but these were primarily directed against Hungarians by Ruthenian and pro-Tito forces, respectively. 209 Hungary was an Axis-allied country which benefited from that alliance by the rectification of some of the "injustices" of Trianon. The domestic democratic and leftist forces were small, weak, disunited, disorganized, and conflict-ridden. As a result the Germans and their Hungarian accomplices had little difficulty in acting as they pleased. No armed resistance operation was ever undertaken by the Hungarians specifically to save Jews. While there were individual acts of heroism by the Halutzim toward this end, no collective armed attempt was ever made to free Jews from the ghettos or entrainment centers or to sabotage the loading facilities or the bridges and rail lines leading to Auschwitz-Birkenau.

Hungarian Resistance.

Postwar Hungarian leftist historiography would have us believe that resistance, especially in 1944-45, was both widespread and effective. Without disparaging those brave Hungarians who risked or actually gave their lives in the anti-Fascist struggle, one must conclude on the basis of the available evidence that the Hungarian resistance movement was almost nonexistent, late in formation, and basically ineffective. 210

The Social Democratic Party, which had operated legally until the German occupation and had its own organ, the epszava (The People's Voice), was as ineffective as the outlawed communist party. Its leaders, including Arpad Szakasits, Anna Kethly, Karoly Peyer, Illes Monus, and Mano Buchinger, were periodically informed by the socialist Zionist leaders about the plight of European Jewry. These Zionist leaders even offered concrete suggestions for cooperative efforts for both the wartime and postwar periods. As early as 1941 they submitted to the Social Democrats a "Memorandum on the Jewish Question" in which they made concrete proposals for cooperation and possible joint action in the struggle against Hungarian reaction and anti-Semitism and for the postwar solution of the Jewish question along social-democratic lines. 211 (1307)

Miklos Kallay

Before the German occupation, the small group of democratic and leftist leaders sought and received the protection of the [Miklos] Kallay government, though a relatively small number of communist activists were jailed or placed into internment camps. These leaders tended, however unobtrusively, to support the policies of the government, rationalizing their position by pointing to their limited options and the predicament of the country.

Istvan Bethlen

Their position was in fact quite sensible; not only were the democratic and leftist forces deplorably weak, but much of the opposition to the Reich (especially on the Jewish question) and to the Nyilas came from Kallay and his group, which included Count Istvan Bethlen and Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer, the Minister of the Interior. 212 As a result, the anti-fascist demonstrations by the leftist forces before the occupation were sporadic, local, and woefully ineffective.

Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer

On occasion, depending upon the foreign policy interests of the government, they were in fact staged with the consent, if not at the outright request, of Kallay himself. 213

The Germans were aware of the impotence of the opposition forces, which emboldened them in their plans to occupy the country. The bombastic and self-serving postwar accounts by many Hungarian "heroes" and " resistance fighters" have no basis in fact. The fact remains that the Germans succeeded in occupying the country without encountering any resistance anywhere. As Gyula Kadar, the former head of the Hungarian Military Intelligence Service, stated: "If (Hungary) had had as many’ resistance fighters’ before March 19, 1944, as it had in May 1945 and later, Hitler would not have risked the occupation of the country because he would have feared the paralysis in production and deliveries of goods and the necessity to resort to arms." 214

A more serious though almost equally ineffective drive to organize an anti-Fascist resistance movement was launched after the occupation. In May 1944, a Hungarian Front (Magyar Front) was established by the representatives of the then illegal Smallholders', Social-Democratic, and National Peasant 215 parties as well as by delegates representing various anti-Nazi legitimist, conservative, and student groups. The communist party, which experienced several organizational changes during the year, 216 was reportedly admitted only after it assured the Front leaders, including Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, that it had no Soviet-appointed delegates and that Moscow did not aim at the Bolshevization of Hungary. 217 (1308)

The Hungarian Front, headed by Zoltan Tildy, a Smallholder, adopted an anti-Nazi program based on the principle of national unity. It maintained contact and frequently synchronized its policies with the so-called "extrication bureau" (Kiugrasi iroda), which was headed by Miklos Horthy, Jr. The bureau, which reportedly operated with the tacit consent of the Regent, was the nerve center for the preparation of Hungary's disentanglement from the war. Closely associated with the bureau and the Hungarian Front were Domokos Szent-Ivanyi and Geza Soos, a former confidant of Pal Teleki in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who also headed the Hungarian Independence Movement (Magyar Fiiggetlens egi Mozga/om), a relatively small group. 218

The Hungarian Independence Movement was organized in March 1944 by the former activists of the so-called Teleki Group (Teleki csoport), a rather ineffective resistance organization established in 1942. In addition to Szent-Ivanyi and Soos, the leadership included Andras Koves and Istvan Szent-Miklosy. 219

The activities of the Hungarian Front were basically inconsequential. It prepared and submitted to the Regent a number of memoranda suggesting specific steps toward the possible volte face. 220 In an attempt to pursue the same objective, the communist party leadership established early in September 1944 a Military Committee (Katonai Bizotts ag) under the command of Captain Gyorgy Palffy. Its avowed plan was to organize an armed uprising against the Germans, acting in close cooperation with the " progressive political forces" in the country. Nothing of substance came of it.

The same can be said of the military plans worked out by representatives of an amorphous resistance group, including Horthy Jr., Tildy, Arpad Szakasits and Imre Kovacs, in conjunction with General Istvan Ujszaszy, the former head of the Military Intelligence, and Lieutenant General Karoly Lazar, the Commander of the Regent's Personal Guard. Lazar, who claimed to have been placed in charge of all troops, promised to issue arms and munitions sufficient for 15,000 men. He also discussed with Janos Beer and Gyorgy Gergely of the Central Jewish Council the possibility of arming the 26,000 Jewish labor servicemen stationed in and around Budapest. The plans collapsed in the midst of crossed signals and blunders befitting a comic opera. 221 The troops that Lazar was supposed to use "to throw the Germans out of Hungary" were (1309) never assembled, let alone armed, and the Germans remained in Hungary unmolested until they were driven out by the Red Army. Veesenmayer's postwar remark about the status of the Germans in Hungary, both before and after the coup of October 15, was quite to the point: "A day in Yugoslavia," he said, "was more dangerous than a year in Hungary. " 222 The army and the workers, like the population at large, accepted the Nyilas coup with the same tranquility they had displayed toward the occupation seven months earlier. As Professor Macartney observed, the supposedly class-conscious workers in the surviving Csepel factories continued the production of munitions and armaments "almost up to the hour when the Red Army reached their factories." 223

Shortly after Horthy's bungled attempt to extricate Hungary from the Axis on October 15, a new anti-German organization was established. The initiative came from Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, a Smallholder deputy who bad been in hiding since his release from prison on October 15. It bad both a political and a military arm. Overall political direction was assumed by the Liberation Committee of the Hungarian National Uprising (A Magyar Nemzeti Felkeles Felszabadito Bizottsaga); the military arm was under the command of Lieutenant General Janos Kiss and included a number of anti-German officers-among them Vilmos Tartsay, Jeno Nagy, and Kalman Revay. The group's plan called for an uprising to be spearheaded by certain anti-German military units and detachments of armed workers. The objective was twofold: to help in the liberation of Budapest and to form the nucleus of a new army fighting the Reich. Like the Gyorgy Palffy plan, this too came to naught. Betrayed by an agent provocateur, the leaders of the conspiracy were arrested by the Nyilas on November 23 as they were meeting in Tartsay's apartment for a strategy session. A Nyilas kangaroo court condemned them to death. 224

A similar fate befell several members of a clergy-organized resistance groups. 225

The resistance activities of the leftist-progressive forces in Hungary were largely symbolic. They destroyed a statue of Gombos, engaged in a few skirmishes, sabotaged production in a few plants, managed to fly one of their representatives to the Allies in Italy, 226 participated in the production and distribution of forged documents, supported and participated in a few Yugoslav-and Soviet-initiated minor partisan (1310) operations, and distributed some flyers calling on the population to resist the German invaders and their Hungarian accomplices. 227 However, none of these activities was ever directed toward the rescuing of Jews. The attitude of the Peace (Communist) Party (Bekepart) and the contents of the flyers distributed by its followers were poignantly summarized by Peter Gosztonyi:

Just as the question of the deportation left the Peace Party totally unmoved, the question simply did not exist in the many communist flyers distributed in l944. They called on and encouraged the " Hungarian people" to do many things, but they never said a word about giving refuge to the persecuted Jews or about preventing or delay ing the deportation trains by damaging the rail system through sabotage operations. 228

The Peace Party had, in fact, a plan to produce and distribute a flyer on behalf of the persecuted Jewish citizens of Hungary. However, it fizzled "for reasons of conspiratorial security." The plan was conceived after the deportations from the provinces were coming to an end. Designed for distribution before June 30, when, according to the prevailing rumor, the Jews of Budapest were scheduled for deportation, the flyer contained details about the horrors of the anti-Jewish measures that had been enacted by the Sztojay government. The text was prepared by Geza Losonczy and the task of mimeographing and mass-producing it was entrusted to Lajos Feher, one of the leading figures of the underground. Although Feher began the task, the failure to find a suitably secure work place compelled him to transfer the responsibility to Antal Gyenes. Gyenes reportedly completed the mimeographing of the flyer, but then had to burn all copies on orders from his "higher contact." 229 The same lack of interest in the plight of the Jews characterized the several underground papers, including Szabadsagharc (Liberation Struggle), Magyar Front (Hungarian Front), Szabad Nep (Free People), and Harco/o Banyasz (Fighting Miner). In the absence of meaningful support from the non-Jewish world, the persecuted Jews were compelled to rely upon their own meager and constantly dwindling resources to help themselves. 230 (1311)

Jewish Resistance. As in several other countries under Nazi occupation, Jewish resistance in Hungary consisted mostly of individual and collective actions of rescue. In terms of armed rebellion, sabotage, or subversion, the Jewish record of resistance is not fundamentally different from that of the so-called leftist and progressive forces of Hungary. Admittedly, the comparison is a bit unfair to the Jews-while they too were persecuted and many of their leaders were interned, the actual and potential Hungarian anti-Nazi forces never suffered from the extreme oppression under which the Jews had to live. ln fact, many of the non-Jewish Hungarians continued to enjoy freedom of movement with relatively easy access to food and arms practically up to the time of their liberation by the Soviet troops.

Resistance by Hungarian Jews was practically impossible during the German occupation. Herded into ghettos, forced to wear Yellow Star of David, and severely limited in their movement, they were physically and psychologically totally unprepared to fight back. Unaware of the Final Solution, they continued to cherish illusions about their physical safety; the warnings and recommendations of the Polish and Slovak refugees, who knew better, were left unheeded or even ridiculed. The top leaders of the Jewish community, confident in the ability of Horthy's government to safeguard the sovereignty of Hungary and to provide protection to the community, failed to take any precautionary measures. After the occupation, mass resistance was all but impossible-especially in the provincial communities.

The quick succession of anti-Jewish measures; the total isolation of the Jewish communities from one another and from the non-Jewish society; the absence of resistance on the part of Hungarian Christians; the passivity, if not hostility, of the Christian masses; the overwhelming power of the Germans; the wholehearted cooperation of the Hungarian quisling authorities in the Final Solution; the almost conspiratorial silence of the free world-these were but a few of the factors that militated against Jewish armed uprising.

To all these factors one must add the conditions that prevailed within the ghettos: isolated and hermetically sealed off within walls, guarded by gendarmes and policemen with guns, automatic weapons, and often attack dogs, the Jews were utterly powerless. In most ghettos, the overwhelming majority of the population consisted of children, (1312) women, and the aged, many of whom suffered from various handicaps; most of the men between 20 and 48 years of age were in labor service companies stationed in various parts of Hungary and along the front lines in the Ukraine, or in the copper mines of Bor, Serbia. The ghetto inhabitants were not organized for possible resistance, and did not have determined leaders able to set it in motion. Even if the conditions had been more auspicious, even if determined and self-sacrificing leadership had been available, the organization of the masses and the acquisition of weapons were made all but impossible by the barbarism with which the Jews were being treated and the speed with which the ghettos were established and liquidated. By the time of the deportations many among the Jews had lost not only the power to resist, but often the will to live as well. Some of the young men and women who might have dared to engage in resistance activities were deterred by the Nazis' barbaric reprisals, usually directed against innocent hostages. Most of the Jews, psychologically unprepared and unenlightened about the Final Solution during the pre-occupation era, had refused to believe the "horror stories" the young Halutzim had revealed to them in some of the ghettos. 231 As described earlier, they were generally more inclined to listen to the soothing advice and reassuring messages coming from the central Jewish leadership. Only a few provincial ghetto leaders took the warnings of the Halutzim seriously. But when, as was the case in Munkacs and Satoraljaujhely, a few leaders tried to resist entering the freight cars they were shot by the SS and the other Jews, horrified by the sight of the executions, entered the freight cars in an orderly fashion, surrendering themselves to their fate. 232

In spite of the tremendous odds they had faced, Hungarian Jews did manage to engage in some resistance-occasionally successful, at other times tragic. Although some sporadic acts of resistance were undertaken in a number of provincial towns, including Kolozsvar and Nagyvarad, the most daring ones took place in Budapest. Among these the mission of British-Palestinian parachutists of Hungarian-Jewish background, the illegal efforts to enlighten Hungarian public opinion, the attempts to arm the labor servicemen, and the rescue activities of the Hehalutz deserve special mention. (1313)

The Parachutists. The Jewish Agency offices in Jerusalem and Istanbul considered the possibility of sending a small mission to Hungary as early as January 1944. The mission, it was envisioned, would provide advice about and leadership for the organization of some kind of resistance and self-help in the event of a German occupation, which was presumably anticipated by the Jewish Agency leadership. The British reaction to this and several other related schemes advanced by the Jewish Agency was mixed at best. Many of the leading British officials, including Sir Harold MacMichael, the High Commissioner in Jerusalem, feared the possible postwar consequence for Palestine of the emergence of a corps of trained Jewish guerrillas. The British finally consented to the sending of a handful of Hungarian-speaking Palestinian Jews with the proviso that "they must be used as individuals under SOE (Special Operations Executive) Command, and not in groups under Palestinian Jewish direction." 233 The consent was also based on the expectation that the mission would be of service for the Allied cause as a whole. Specifically, the parachutists were expected to radio back to British headquarters military information that could be helpful in defeating the Nazis. The Budapest Vaada was informed about the plans early in 1944, when the Jewish Agency asked Dr. Moshe Schweiger, the local leader of the Hagana, the Jewish underground army, about a suitable place for the parachutists to make contact within Hungary. Schweiger identified a trusted Zionist colleague in Ujvidek, a town close to the partisan-held territory in Yugoslavia.

The three officers selected and trained by the British for organizational and intelligence operations in Hungary were volunteers who had immigrated to Palestine in the late 1930’ s. One of these was Hannah (Aniko) Szenes, formerly of Budapest, a woman of 23 years of age whose passionate Zionism belied her bourgeois, assimilationist background. Her father, Bela, was a relatively well-known author and playwright. A romantic, sensitive soul with great interest in literature and poetry, she was at the time a member of the S 'dot Yam Kibbutz, near Caesarea. 234 The others were Peretz (Ferenc) Goldstein and Joel (Emil) Nussbecher of Kolozsvar. 235 All three had parents and other close relatives still living in Hungary.

After training in Egypt they were taken to Bari, Italy; from there they were dropped, along with some other agents, over partisan-held (1314) territory in Yugoslavia on March 13, 1944. They spent approximately three months among Tito's partisans, awaiting clearance from their British superiors for the crossing into Hungary. Szenes, who was in the company of Reuben Dafni, 236 crossed the border into Hungary on June 9. She was promptly arrested, reportedly after one of the professional smugglers who had helped her over the border betrayed her. A few days later, Nussbecher and Goldstein followed; they managed to get to Budapest, where their traces were picked up by the political police. By that time, Moshe Schweiger, their major contact in Budapest, had already been in the hands of the Gestapo for a long time, and the " trusted Zionist" of Ujvidek could not be found, presumably because he had been deported together with the other Jews of that community.

Szenes was imprisoned in Budapest, where the police tried to compel her to cooperate with them by arresting her widowed mother, Katherine (Kato) Szenes. For three months they were held in separate cells in the same prison. Katherine Szenes was freed toward the end of the Lakatos era, but all efforts for Hannah Szenes' release remained unsuccessful. 237 Following the Szálasi coup she was tried by a Nyilas court and executed on November 7. 238

Equipped with false papers, Nussbecher and Goldstein arrived in Budapest around June 20. Under close surveillance by both the German and Hungarian counterintelligence services-they were presumably left unmolested at first in order to discover their contacts-they checked into a modest hotel. One of their first contacts was Kasztner, their former Zionist comrade in Kolozsvar. The following day, they went to the Sip Street headquarters of the Central Jewish Council, where they noticed that they were being shadowed. Nussbecher hid in a private apartment but was arrested on June 28. The same day, the 19-year-old Goldstein, after having been hidden for two days, was taken to the Columbus camp for "prominent Jews" where his parents had been waiting to board the train to freedom together with the other Jews selected from the Kolozsvar ghetto as part of the Kasztner transport.

The mission that had been designed, among other things, to organize Hungarian Jewish youth for resistance turned into a nightmare for the parachutists and a source of grave anxiety for the Vaada leaders. The latter felt that all their rescue schemes-the Europa Plan, the Strasshof plan, as well as the plan relating to the " prominent Jews"-were being (1315) jeopardized by their involuntary implication in an espionage affair. Kasztner and Hansi Brand were once again arrested and pressured into revealing Goldstein’ s whereabouts. Once they were allowed to go free " to think the matter over," they reestablished contact with Goldstein; reportedly, after he heard about Nussbecher's arrest and its implication for the Vaada’ s rescue mission, Goldstein decided to give himself up.

At first the three parachutists were held in the Fo Street prison, which served the interests of the Gestapo as well as of the Hungarian authorities. Among their neighbors were some of the most prominent anti-Nazi Hungarian political figures, including Jozsef Antall Sr., Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, and Lipot Baranyai. 239

The parachutists were interrogated intensively by the Hungarians and the Germans in both Budapest and Pecs. The SS was kept fully informed, as was the German Foreign Office. 240 Apparently, the Germans became convinced that Kasztner had not been directly involved in planning the mission, for they continued to deal with him and the Vaada.

After the parachutists had spent three months in prison, there seemed to be good prospects that they would be released concurrently with Horthy's extrication of Hungary from the war. But the Szálasi coup put an end to these hopes. 241 About two weeks after Szenes' execution, Goldstein and Nussbecher were entrained along with many other inmates and POWs, allegedly for transfer to Komarom. Nussbecher managed to escape and eventually returned to Budapest, where he survived the war along with other young Halutzim. Goldstein was deported and reportedly died in a German concentration camp. 242

In terms of its original objectives, the parachutists’ mission was unsuccessful. In the sense that it contributed to the anxiety and burdens of the Vaada leaders it was perhaps even counterproductive. However, the personal courage of the parachutists and their readiness to sacrifice themselves for the rescuing of Jews undoubtedly had a positive influence on many of the Zionist pioneers and unaffiliated younger Jewish intellectuals who had become disillusioned with the leadership and policies of both the Vaada and the Central Jewish Council. 243

The Attempt to Enlighten Hungarian Public Opinion. The consequences of the Jewish leaders' failure to give wide publicity to the realities of the Nazis’ Final Solution program were revealed after the (1316) German occupation. The leaders’ timid formalistic and legalistic posture, their reluctance to violate the censorship laws to the extent that they even prohibited the dissemination of news about the destruction of the Jews in the neighboring countries, their refusal to heed the warnings of the Polish and Slovak refugees, all contributed to the failure of the Hungarian Jews to take meaningful protective and defensive measures. Even after the occupation, when all signs pointed toward the imminent destruction of Hungarian Jewry, the Auschwitz Reports, which were reportedly received weeks before the start of the deportations (see Chapter 23), were treated as confidentially as the many other reports about the destruction of the Jews of Europe that had been arriving for several years.

It was only after the completion of the deportations from Carpatho-Ruthenia, northeastern Hungary, and Northern Transylvania, when the squads in charge of the Final Solution were beginning their operations in Hungary proper, that a minor revolt ensued against the Central Jewish Council. Following the suicide of Dr. Imre Varga, a young physician who unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the Council to change its course, a group of intellectuals, consisting mostly of middle-echelon officials of the Council, decided to prepare an appeal to the Hungarian Christians. The text was shown to Stern, who was willing to cooperate in its distribution " if it was approved by the censorship authorities." The other members of the Council followed Stern' s leadership. The intellectuals, including Rabbi Fabian Herskovits and Professors Fulop Grunwald, Jeno Grunwald, and Denes Laczer, defied the Council leaders and at great risk to themselves mimeographed 2,000 copies of the appeal (see Chapter 20). It is not known how many of these copies were actually distributed; many that were supposed to have been taken along by people in the Kasztner group that left Budapest on June 30 were in fact destroyed by Hungarian officers who had discovered them. A crude typewritten flyer was prepared early in July, calling upon the Jews of Budapest to resist being taken into the death camps. A similar flyer was addressed to Christian Hungarians, informing them about the deportation of the provincial Jews and imploring them to help prevent the destruction of the Budapest Jewish community. 244 It is not clear from the surviving evidence whether these flyers had actually been mimeographed and distributed. (1317)

The courage and heroism of the participants notwithstanding, the attempts at enlightening Hungarian and Jewish public opinion proved of no great value. Most of those involved were soon arrested; the bulk of the literature was confiscated.

The Plan to Arm the Labor Servicemen. Toward the end of the Lakatos era, when the leaders of Hungary were planning the country’s extrication from the Axis alliance, some of the Jewish leaders, including some former officials of the Central Jewish Council, became involved in a more dramatic form of resistance-the arming of the labor servicemen in conjunction with a planned uprising by the anti-Nazi opposition.

The first step toward an involvement of the Jewish labor servicemen in a general armed uprising against the Germans and their Hungarian allies was taken on September 18. On that day, Gyorgy Gergely, a leading official of the Council who was then associated with the International Red Cross, met Count Gyorgy Pallavicini, Jr., a Legitimist leader who served on the executive committee of the Hungarian Front. They held an exploratory discussion concerning the possibility of placing the political and physical power represented by the Jewish youth and labor servicemen at the disposal of the Front. Later discussions also involved Otto Draksich, Pallavicini’s secretary, and Count Jozsef Palffy. Equipped with the latter’s letter of recommendation, Gergely established contact on September 30 with General Karoly Lazar, the commander of the Palace Guard, who was slated to become the commander-in-chief of the envisioned resistance forces. Gergely reminded the General that there were approximately 120,000 labor servicemen within the country alone, of whom 26,000 were in or around Budapest. He suggested that the others too be directed toward the capital and armed. Upon Lazar's request, a list of the various labor service companies was prepared.

On October 15, Pallavicini informed Gergely that the moment for action had arrived and that the following morning, on Lazar's instructions, he would identify for him the military barracks that would distribute arms to the labor servicemen. Gergely was also asked to prepare a proclamation to be read to the labor servicemen and to have 20 men available the following morning as couriers to instruct the companies and distribute copies of the proclamation. The text of the proclamation was duly prepared and the couriers were reportedly assembled in the (1318) apartment of Dr. Janos Beer. The plans and all the hopes associated with them collapsed when the Regent, to the surprise of the leaders of the Hungarian Front, announced that very day-three days earlier than originally planned-Hungary' s decision to sue for an armistice. 245

Shortly after the coup on October 15-16, some labor servicemen in possession of arms barricaded themselves in two buildings-at 31 Nepszinhaz Street and 4 Teleki Square-and engaged the Nyilas in combat. The tragic result was inevitable; with the support of the German forces, the Nyilas routed the labor servicemen. They later used this incident of Jewish resistance as an excuse to unleash their terror against the Jews of the capital.

Labor servicemen were involved in other forms of resistance as well. A unit of 25 men from Company No. 101/359, the so-called Clothes-Collecting Company (Ruhagyujto Munkasszazad), for example, provided special services to the persecuted Jews. Known as Section T of the International Red Cross, this unit, led by Dr. Gyorgy Wilhelm, the son of Karoly Wilhelm, engaged in many heroic rescue operations. The men of this unit, including Istvan Bekeffi, Istvan Komlos, Istvan Radi, and Adorjan Stella, rescued Jews from the death marches to Hegyeshalom and supplied the food made available by the International Red Cross to the children’ s homes and the ghetto. Ironically, they too had to be rescued on November 29, when they were scheduled for entrainment and deportation. This was achieved through the efforts of a rescue group headed by Sandor Gyorgy Ujvary, a journalist of Jewish background, who was associated with the International Red Cross and the Papal Nuncio. 246 The rescue activities of Section T, like those of the Ujvary group, paralleled those undertaken by the Halutzim.

The Rescue Activities of the Hehalutz Youth. In contrast to the positions taken by the Central Jewish Council (see Chapter 14) and the Vaada, the members of the young Zionist pioneers (and there were only a few hundred of them) took militant action for the rescuing of Jews. By doing so they were responsible for what were by far the brightest hours in the tragic wartime history of Hungarian Jewry. They never engaged in open combat and they failed to sabotage any of the many rail lines leading to Auschwitz (they did not have this kind of power), but their heroic rescue operations can clearly be classified as acts of resistance. (1319)

The movement was under the leadership of young Zionists belonging primarily to the Hashomer Hatzair and Dror groups. The dominant role in the movement was played by young Polish and Slovak refugees who came to Hungary in 1942-1944. Among these were Neshka and Zvi Goldfarb of Poland, and Rafi (Friedl) Ben-Shalom and Peretz Revesz of Slovakia. 247 These were soon joined by a number of equally brave young Dr. Gyorgy Wilhelm who distinguished themselves during the underground struggle. Special mention must be made of the heroic activities of David (Gur) Grosz, Sandor (Alexander; Ben Eretz) Grosszmann, Yitzhak (Mimish) Horvath, Jozsef Mayer, Moshe (Alpan) Pil, Moshe Rosenberg, and Efra (Agmon) Teichmann. 248

With approximately 500 members in Budapest, the leaders of the Hehalutz concentrated their attention on rescuing individuals, mostly their comrades and Zionist sympathizers; they had become convinced that there was no hope for the Jewish masses. 249 The nature and scope of their activities varied with the changing situation. Before the occupation, the Hehalutz was primarily engaged in the rescue and "legalization" of refugees. They provided these refugees with the necessary-mostly Aryan-identification papers, and rescued a number of Jews from Polish, Slovak, and other camps. In this rescue campaign they worked closely with the Vaada, especially its Tiyul section. 250

Cooperation between the Hehalutz leaders and the Hungarian Jewish establishment and Zionist leaders was not always smooth or easy. The Slovak and Polish Hehalutz and refugee leaders were particularly scornful about the official leadership of Hungarian Jewry. Their assessment was largely shared by Gisi Fleischmann and other leaders of the Bratislava Vaada. Ben-Shalom identified Hungarian Jewry "as a particularly ugly lot" that did not want to know anything about events in the neighboring countries, although he and his fellow refugees were doing everything possible to enlighten them. 251

The Hehalutz youth as a whole did not get along with the Hungarian Zionist establishment either. Ideological differences were compounded by generational conflicts. The older, traditional leaders of the weak Hungarian Zionist movement (the so-called Vatikim) resented what they perceived as the intrusion, impatience, and militancy of the younger pioneers. The latter, in turn, became increasingly and ever more vocally scornful of the establishment leaders’ complacency and (1320) bureaucratic tendencies. While they questioned some aspects of the Vaada leadership, their ire was directed especially against Krausz, the Mizrachi leader, for his allegedly improper and incompetent administration of the Palestine Office. 252 The dispute erupted into open conflict during the Nyilas era (see below).

Just before the occupation, the Hashomer Hatzair group decided to have all its members "aryanized" in order to assure their freedom of movement. While extremely risky, this enabled them to carry out their rescue operations more effectively. Under the leadership of Moshe Rosenberg they also established a Hagana Committee (composed of Pil, Menachem (Meno) Klein, Leon Blatt, and Dov Avramcsik) which, however, was short-lived.

The German occupation of Hungary caught most of the Halutzim off guard. Their immediate concern was to assure, first and foremost, their own and their families’ safety. Because of the speed with which the anti-Jewish measures had been enacted in the countryside and the weaknesses of the Zionist movement there, the young Halutzim decided to focus on their rescue activities in Budapest. During the first phase of the occupation, the Dr. Gyorgy Wilhelm concentrated its attention on the production and distribution of forged Aryan identification papers-including even Gestapo, SS, and Nyilas membership cards. 253 For reasons of security, the leaders in charge of this aspect of the underground operations, including Dan Zimmermann, Sraga Weil, Grosz, and Teichmann, had to shift their headquarters at great risk to themselves. They naturally never wore the Yellow Star badge, which to their great consternation caused some establishment Jewish leaders to accuse them of trying to extricate themselves from the common lot. Presumably unaware of the ominous implications of the badge, some among the latter were in fact urging their fellow Jews to wear the Yellow Star in proud defiance. 254

Another important aspect of the Hehalutz work during this period was the organization of small groups of young men and women, mostly followers of one or another Zionist organization, for the smuggling of Jews into Romania and Slovakia, where the anti-Jewish drive at the time was at a standstill. Among those most active in the smuggling of Jews into Romania were as her Aranyi and Hannah Ganz (Grunfeld), members of Dror-Habonim movement. According to their postwar accounts, they were unable to persuade the establishment leaders of the Jewish (1321) communities they bad contacted in Northern Transylvania about the seriousness of the situation. Nevertheless, they managed to distribute a number of forged documents and smuggle a number of Jews across the Romanian border, including Rabbi Mozes Weinberger, the Chief Rabbi of the small Neolog community of Kolozsvar. 255 A few groups of Jews were also smuggled into Tito's Yugoslavia. After the capture of one of their comrades (Avri Lisszauer), this route was de-emphasized, especially since the Vaada leaders had protested that its use was a threat to their negotiations with the Germans. 256

Interestingly, while the Hehalutz leaders questioned some of the activities of the Vaada, they too failed to engage in the large-scale distribution of the Auschwitz Reports, which might have had a greater impact on the provincial Jewish leaders and masses than the warnings by the young Zionist emissaries. 257 Moreover, in spite of their conflicts with the Vaada, the Hehalutz leaders tried to make sure that as many of their own followers as possible were included in the Kasztner group. And in fact on the night of June 30, when the transport left Budapest, a large

number of the Halutzim managed to "illegally climb onto the train.

Much of the illegal work of the Hehalutz was directed from the headquarters of the Central Jewish Council, where the masses of people seeking help or inclusion in the Kasztner group gave them cover and allowed them to operate unobtrusively. Some of their comrades, including Jeno Kolb and Yehuda Weisz, who were associated with the Council's Information Section, had given them forged Council certificates through which a number of Jews were brought to Budapest from the provincial ghettos. Also active toward this end was the so-called Provincial Department (Videki Osztaly) of the Council, which was headed by senior Zionists, including Lajos Gottesman of the Betar and Moshe Rosenberg of the Hashomer Hatzair movements. In the relative calm that returned to Council headquarters following the departure of the Kasztner group and the subsequent halting of the deportations, a conflict erupted between the official leaders and the Hehalutz. The latter's operations had become more and more conspicuous, causing considerable consternation among the establishment leaders. Particularly vitriolic was the reaction of the leaders of the Jewish Combatants' League (Zsido Frontharcos Szovetseg), many of whose members had enjoyed exemption from the anti-Jewish laws. The Hehalutz leaders, following (1322) a heated altercation that even led to violence, moved out of the Council headquarters and continued to conduct their affairs from various public parks. 258

Glass House Budapest

After the Swiss-sponsored Glass House was established late in July, the Hehalutz gradually shifted their headquarters there. The Hehalutz leaders became staff members of the Glass House with considerable privileges, including virtual immunity. They exploited this haven to continue their " illegal" rescue operations-the organization of Tiyul groups as well as the production of forged documents, especially Swiss protective passes. This led to a conflict with the official Zionist leaders of the Glass House, above all Krausz and Arthur Weisz, the owner and chief administrator of the building. 259 The latter were eager not only to safeguard the emigration scheme for which the Glass House operation was launched in the first place, but also to scrupulously uphold all the conditions under which the Swiss had agreed to cooperate. They were also concerned about their own welfare after Magyar Szo (Hungarian Word) published an expose on the Glass House. The dispute became so intense that on September 5, Krausz and Weisz allegedly threatened to call the police to forcibly evict Pil and Teichmann. A similar incident involved Rafi Ben-Shalom on October 15. 260

Waiting for protective papers at the Glass House

Although the relationship between Krausz and the Hehalutz leaders remained tense, the latter continued to use the Glass House as the center of their operations. The relationship worsened after the Nyilas coup, when the Glass House became the refuge of close to 2,000 Jews. 261 To some extent, this was because the crowds that milled around daily included informers and occasionally even detectives, whose activities contributed to the misunderstanding and tension between the Jewish groups.

During the Nyilas era, the Hehalutz stepped up their daring efforts. Some of the young pioneers managed to acquire guns by taking advantage of the chaotic conditions on the day of the coup. Others, especially those associated with the Dror, led by Goldfarb and other Polish refugees, 262 built bunkers in various parts of the capital. Seven or eight bunkers were built; there is no information as to the number of Jews who were actually saved in them. The one built on Hungaria Boulevard was discovered by the Nyilas and in an exchange of fire there were casualties on both sides. (1323)

The production and distribution of forged papers took on a new dimension. In addition to continuing the forging of Aryan papers, the Hehalutz intensified the mass production of protective passes (Vedolevelek; Schutzpässe) and related documents that were issued by the representatives of the Vatican and the neutral states; especially valuable were copies of papers issued by the Swiss and Swedish authorities (Figures 29.4-29.11). They also reproduced all the stamps and seals used by these authorities as well as those used by the Hungarians and the Germans. (One of the stamps inadvertently led to the arrest of a number of people because it misspelled the word "Suisse" as "Susse.")

“Perhaps the most heroic actions undertaken by the Hehalutz involved the rescue of Jews from the hands of the Nyilas. Dressed in the uniforms of the Nyilas, Honved, Levente, KISKA (Kisegito Katonai Alakulat; Auxiliary Military Unit), and even of the SS, and in possession of guns and automatic weapons as well as all the appropriate orders and documents, they rescued Jews from the locked Yellow-Star houses, internment camps, and the Óbuda brickyard. They also snatched condemned Jews from prisons and even from columns being driven by the Nyilas gangs for execution along the banks of the Danube. It was in this manner that Goldfarb and Grosz were themselves rescued after their capture in December.

In cooperation with the International Red Cross (especially Komoly's Department A, with which some of the members were directly associated), the Halutzim also undertook to help supply food to the many children' s homes, to the so-called "protected houses," and to the ghetto, and to protect the warehouses with food stockpiles. One of the largest of these warehouses was in the Swiss building at 17 Wekerle Sandor Street, which was under the command of Sandor Groszman. 263 The Halutzim had used the buildings assigned to Department A as additional centers of operation. Many of their activities were helped by the mutually rewarding contacts they bad established with several Hungarian officials eager to acquire alibis just before the end of the war. Among these were Andras Szentandrassy, the commander of the camp at the Óbuda brickyard, and Captain Laszlo (Leo) Lulay, Ferenczy's deputy. Contact with the latter was occasionally maintained through Vera Gorog, the daughter of Frigyes Gorog, who was then associated with the International Red Cross. 264 (1332)

During the Soviet siege of the capital, Nyilas gangs tried a number of times to invade the Glass House in search of food and in pursuit of their murderous aims. Sometimes they were talked into leaving peacefully; at other times, however, they shot into the crowds within the courtyard. In one of these forays they killed four Jews, including the mother of Sandor Scheiber, the postwar head of the National Rabbinical Institute. Among the Vadasz Street victims were also Arthur Weisz, who was taken away through a ruse by First Lieutenant Pal Fabry and never returned, and Simcha Hunwald (alias Janos Klihne) who was shot on January 6, 1945. 265 In pursuit of their objectives, the Hehalutz members also maintained contact with the small and loosely organized non-Jewish resistance organizations. The Hehalutz provided these organizations with whatever identification papers they requested; they in tum provided the Hehalutz members with arms and occasional shelter. Among the units with which the Hehalutz cooperated was a POW group headed by a Dutch officer named Van der Walles (or Van-der-Vas) which consisted primarily of Dutch and British officers who had escaped from German camps. (It was through this group that the Hehalutz rescued Joel Nussbecher.) It also maintained contact with a communist underground group headed by Pal Demeny, and with some anti-German military and bourgeois groups represented by First Lieutenant Ivan Kadar and an officer named Fabry, respectively. 266 Unfortunately the non-Jewish resistance organizations were not very effective; this was a major factor that limited the scope and character of the Hehalutz operations as well. Another negative factor was the passivity of the general population, which in tum was largely influenced by the attitude of the Christian churches. 267

Notes

1. Demands for the removal of the Jews from Hungary were made, for example, by Matyas Matolcsy and Tamas Matolcsy, anti-Semitic brothers, in the House of Representatives of the Hungarian Parliament on November 26, 1940. Kepvise/o hazi Nap/o ( Records of the House of Representatives), Budapest, 8, session 160, p. 851 as cited in FAA, I: xxxvii.

2. See the reports by Lieutenant Colonel Laszlo Ferenczy (see Chapters 18-22) and by Laszlo Baky and Laszlo Endre (Chapter 25). See especially the report Gendarmerie Master Sergeant Ferenc Takacs had sent to Ferenczy on June 25, 1944, about the deportations from Szolnok. A copy of the report is on file in RG-52 and in the archives of Yad Vashem (0. I 5.H/231).

3. Jozsef Pal, Hamvas Endre a szegedi zsidosag deportalasa ellen (Endre Hamvas Against the Deportation of the Jews of Szeged). Szegedi Konyvtari Miihely (Library Workshop of Szeged), Szeged, (1986)1-2: 19.

4. See, for example, the recommendation forwarded by the Business Association of Zilah (Zilahi Keresked,5 Tarsulat) to the prefect of Szilagy County, dated June 20, 1944, suggesting that the stock of Jewish businesses be distributed as follows: 44 percent to veterans who served on the frontlines, 33 percent to those serving in the army, and 23 percent to others. Dosar N,: 40029, vol. 14, p. 8 1.

5. In his reports, Ferenczy also noted the resignations of these officials. See Jeno Levai, Sziirke konyv magyar zsidok megmen teserol (Gray Book on the Rescue of Hungarian Jews). (Budapest: Officina, n.d.,), pp. 101-106, and Csendortiszt a Markoban. Ferenczy Laszlo csendor alezredes a nepbirosag elott (Gendarmerie Officer in the Marko Prison. Gendarmerie Lieutenant Colonel Laszlo Ferenczy Before the People’s Court). Judit Molnar, ed. (Budapest: Scolar-Allambiztonsagi Szolgalatok Torteneti Leveltara, 2014, pp. 280-317.

6. See, for example, RAH, pp. 465-590 and 617-625. See also Frederick B. Chary, The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, 1940-1944 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972), 246 pp. On Romania, see Chapter 28.

7. Jozsef Pal, op. cit., p. 12.

8. A small number of Jews were hidden in the countryside, especially in areas with Romanian or Serbian population, and a comparatively larger number of Jews were hidden in Budapest. Among those most actively involved in the rescue were the courageous nuns and priests of various convents, monasteries, and other religious institutions and charity organizations.

9. As of January 1, 2014, Yad Vashem, the Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority of Jerusalem, has recognized 815 Hungarians as Righteous Among the Nations," awarding them various honors. See also Uri Asaf's "Christian Support for Jews During the Holocaust in Hungary." In: Studies on the Holocaust in Hungary, Randolph L. Braham, ed. (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1990), pp. 65-112. See also Magyarorszag 1944. Uldo z tetes-embermen tes (Hungary 1944. Persecution-Rescue). Szabolcs Szita, ed. (Budapest: Nemzeti Tankonyvkiado--Pro Homine-1944 Emlekbizottsag, 1994), 278 pp. and A Vilag l gazai Magyarorszagon a masodik vilaghaboru alatt (The Righteous of the World in Hungary During the Second World War). Kinga Frojimovics and Judit Molnar, eds. (Budapest-Jerusalem: Balassi Kiado--Yad Vashem, 2009), 524 pp. For further information, see the bibliographical references listed in 8-A, pp. 696-708.

10. Csecsy Imre. Naplo, 1940-1949 (Reszletek) (Imre Csecsy. Diary, 1940-1949. Segments). Kritika (Criticism), Budapest, (August 1983)8: 13-17.

11. Gyorgy Ranki, 1944. marcius 19 (March 19, 1944) 2nd ed. (Budapest: Kossuth, 1978), p. 244. A large number of the denunciations may be found in the Orszagos Leve/tar (National Archives), Budapest, under no. P 1434, Laszlo Endre Files 16-1 8. See also Jeno Levai, A Magyar zsidosag tragediaja (The Tragedy of Hungarian Jewry). VJ Elet (New Life), Budapest, May 1, 1979.

12. Levai, Zsidosors Ma gyarorszagon, p. 84.

13. RLB, Doc. 160.

14. Statement by Samu Stern. In: HJS, 3: 12.

15. Philip Freudiger, "Five Months." In: The Tragedy of Hungarian Jewry. Essays, Documents, Depositions, Randolph L. Braham, ed. (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1986), p. 257. A similar view was expressed by Wilhelm Hott (well after the war. He said that "certain Hungarians were more fanatical supporters of the deportations than even Eichmann! " See his interview in the late 1970's in Peter Bokor's Vegjatek a Duna menten (End Game Along the Danube) (Budapest: RTV-Minerva Kossuth, 1982), p. 192.

16. RLB, Doc. 251.

17. Magyarsag (Magyardom), Budapest, April I, 1944.

18. Uj Magyarsag (New Magyardom), Budapest, May 12, 1944.

19. Ranki, 1944. marcius 19, 2d ed., p. 244. For incidents of this kind, see also Genocide and Retribution, pp. 97-99, 109-112, 130-135, and 161-162.

20. For the structure and key personnel of the Royal Hungarian Propaganda Office for National Defense, see Magyarorszag tiszti cim-es nevtara, 1944, Potfozet (Title and Name Register of Hungary, 1944. Supplement) (Budapest: A Magyar Kiralyi Allami Nyomda, 1944), pp. 76-77.

21. One of the statesmen who condemned the measures adopted against the Jews was Count Mihaly Karolyi, who was then in exile in Britain. NA, Microcopy T-1 20, Roll 4664/ 2, Serial Kl 509/K350854-.

22. Eugene (Jeno) Levai, Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry (Zurich: The Central European Times, 1948), p. 139.

23. Az Endre-Baky-Jarossper (The Endre-Baky-Jaross Trial). Laszlo Karsai and Judit Molnar, eds. (Budapest: Cserepfalvi, 1994), p. 238. See also Die Hauptverhandlung g egen das Deportationstrio " Endre-Jaross-Baky vor dem ungarischen Volksg erichtshof (The Main Trial of the Endre-Jaross-Baky, Deportation Trio" Before the Hungarian People's Court). YIYO, Archives File no. 778, pp. 157-158. See also Elek Karsai, It el a nep (The People Judge) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1977), pp. 209-210.

24. Az Endre-Baky-Jaross per, op. cit., pp. 192-20 I; Die Hauptv erhandlung gegen das., Deportations trio " Endre-Jaross-Baky, pp. 141-142. See also Karsai, It el a nep, p. 210 and Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. IO I.

25. Endre’s report was used in his trial and was originally published in Kepes Figyelo (Illustrated Observer), Budapest, March 30, 1946. It was reproduced in Nepszabadsag (People's Freedom), Budapest, June 8, 1992. There is considerable debate over who bears greater responsibility for the Holocaust in Hungary. For a well-documented study stressing the German responsibility, see Gyorgy Ranki, "The Germans and the Destruction of Hungarian Jewry." In: The Holocaust in Hungary. Forty Years Later, Randolph L. Braham and Bela Yago, eds. (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1985), pp. 77-92. For an equally well-documented study stressing Hungarian responsibility, see Bela Yago, " The Hungarians and the Destruction of the Hungarian Jews," ibid., pp. 93-105. On the issue of responsibility, see also Krisztian Ungvary, A Horthy-rendszer merlege. Diszkriminaci6, szo cialpolitika es antiszemitizmus Magyarors zagon 1919-1944 (The Balance Sheet of the Horthy Regime. Discrimination Social Policy, and Anti-Semitism in Hungary) (Pees-Budapest: Jelenkor Kiado-0SzK, 2012), 649 pp., and Gabor Kadar and Zoltan Yagi, A vegso dontes. Berlin, Budapest, Birkenau 1944 (The Final Decision. Berlin, Budapest, Birkenau 1944). (Budapest: Jaffa Kiado, 2013), 279 pp.

26. In his report of July 19, 1944, the Higher SS-and Police Leader claimed that 15 Jews had been discovered hiding in the ghetto of Nagyvarad and 11 Jews in the ghetto of Munkacs. In Kassa, 30 to 40 Jews were apprehended almost two months after the first deportation train left the city. RLB, Doc. 289.

27. NA, Microcopy T-120, Roll 4665/4, Serial Kl 509/K350109-.

28. This was the case, for example, of the nine-member family of Rabbi Joseph Paneth of Nagyilonda, which escaped from the ghetto of Des. Arnold David Finkelstein, Fenysugar a borzalmak ejszakajaban (A Ra y of Light in the Night of Horrors) (Tel Aviv: P. Solar and J. Nadiv, 1958), pp. 302-323. The Rabbi’s family's escape is also described together with other incidents of escape, rescue, and heroism in " Volt egyszer egy Des... " (There Was Once Upon a Time a Des... ), Zoltan Singer, ed. (Tel Aviv: A Des es Videkerol Elszarrnazottak Landsmannschaftja, n.d.), pp. 438-446.

29. Among these were the families of Albert Hirsch, Frigyes Ribary, Henrik Hercz, Helmuth Bittner, and Armin Erdos. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 248.

30. We deal here only with the activities of the Central Jewish Council of Budapest. While the Jewish Councils of the various provincial communities did their best to alleviate the suffering of the Jews by negotiating with the local SS or Hungarian police officers, they were in existence for only a short while.

31. Freudiger, Five Months, op. cit., pp. 265-266.

32. Among the MIPI officials who distinguished themselves in this work were Gyorgy Polgar, Jozsef Pasztor, Istvan Foldes, Imre Reiner, Lajos Klein, Nandor Eichel, Miklos Gal, and Sandor Brody, Levai, Szurke konyv, pp. 185-186. See also Kinga Frojimovics, "'Testveredet ne hagydel! ' A Magyar Izraelitak Partfo go Irodaja (MlPI) miikodese Magyarorszagon a soa idejen " ("Don’t Abandon Your Brother. " The Activities of the Welfare Bureau of the Hungarian Jews). In: KL-JM, pp. 185-206.

33. Levai, op. cit., pp. 206-209. See also Chapter 26.

34. See Chapter 14 and Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, pp. 87-88.

35. For further details on the rescue operations, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 462-469.

36. Copies of these reports may be found in the archives of Yad Vashem, Jerusalem; Beth Loharnei Hagetaot; Moreshet; and the Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem. 37. Der Kastner-Bericht, p. 53.

38. Note from the Budapest Vaada to the Istanbul Vaada, dated January 20, 1944. The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, S26/I 190. By the end of the month, Weiss, Lichtenberg, Baumer, and Springmann had left Budapest for Istanbul en route to Palestine.

39. Technically, the Istanbul Vaada was a "delegation " of the Jewish Agency composed of various Zionist party representatives. For further details, see Chapter 3.

40. The conflict within the Budapest Vaada was also recognized by Komoly. See his August 25, 1943, letter to Chaim Barias in which he emphasized the differences of opinion between Brand and Baumer and their followers. The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, S26/l l90 alb. The Istanbul Vaada was particularly caustic about the Budapest Vaada s performance in the months before the occupation, especially in the field of rescue. See, for example, the exchange of correspondence in the archives of Beth Lohamei Hagetaot, Hungaria files, vols. 2 and 3. For further details on the activities of the Relief and Rescue Committee of Budapest, see the bibliographical references listed in 8-A, pp. 471-473.

41. Der Kastner-Bericht, p. 65.

42. Alex Weissberg, Advocate for the Dead. The Story of Joel Brand (London: Andre Deutsch, 1958), p. 27.

43. Andre Biss, A Million Jews to Save (London: Hutchinson, 1973), p. 35.

44. RAH, p. 7.

45. Freudiger, Five Months, op. cit., pp. 245-247.

46. NG-4407 and NG-4553. See also RAH, p. 9, and Yeshayahu Jelinek, "Slovaks, Germans, the 'Satellites,' and the Jews." Cross Currents. A Yearbook of Central European Culture, 9 (1990): 261-268.

47. For further details on the activities of the Bratislava-based Working Group, see the bibliographical references listed in 8-A, pp. 469-470.

48. Although Wisliceny asked to see Freudiger, Niszon Kahan, and Baroness Edith Weiss (the representatives of the Orthodox, Zionist, and Neolog factions of Hungarian Jewry), as recommended by Weissmandel, only Freudiger read the letter. The Baroness was already in hiding and Kahan, who had accompanied Freudiger, was not invited in by Wisliceny. The letter was destroyed after Freudiger finished reading it. Freudiger, Five Months, pp. 6-7. In a letter addressed to Emo Szilagyi in May 1945, Nison Kahan noted that be bad also read the letter. See Judit Molnar, "A Zsid6 Tanacs megalakulasa-cionista szemmel (Dr. Kahan Nison visszaem lekezesei) (The Establishment of the Jewish Council-Viewed Through Zionist Eyes. The Recollections of Nison Kahan). In her: Cs endor6k, hivatalnokok, zsidok. Valogatott tanulrnany ok a rnagyar holokauszt torteneteb ol (Gendarmes, Civil Servants, Jews. Selected Studies on the History of the Hungarian Holocaust). (Szeged: Szegedi Zsido Hitkozseg, 2000), pp. 157-1 81.

49. See, for example, his letter addressed late in May 1944 to the Hehalutz center in Geneva in Livia Rothkirchen, The Destruction of Slovak Jewry (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1961), pp. 237-242, and his July 16, 1944 letter in German translation in Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, Archives File M-20/47. See also his Min Harnetzar (Out of the Depth). (New York: Amuna, 1960), 252 pp.

50. For further details on the Europa Plan, see Dina Porat, The Blue and the Yellow Stars of David. The Zionist Leadership in Palestine and the Holocaust, 1939-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 174-188.

51. Der Kastner-Bericht, pp. 72-73. Brand, whose account is highly romanticized and full of gross inaccuracies, offers a completely different version of this first encounter with Wisliceny, asserting that Wisliceny guaranteed that there would be no deportations from Hungary, inasmuch as the Germans were the masters of Europe and the Hungarians could not initiate deportations without them. Weissberg, Advocate for the Dead, pp. 72ff. This version of Brand is also at odds with the report Brand wrote for the Vaada leaders in Istanbul, detailing the background of his and Kasztner’ s dealings with the Germans until the time of his departure. This report is available at Moreshet. Beit Edut al shem Mordechay Anielevicz, no. D.1.72 I. The report bears no date or address and it is therefore difficult to determine whether Brand wrote it just before his departure or after his arrival in Istanbul.

52. The record is not clear about the participants at the various meetings with the SS and Sonderkommando leaders. In their memoirs, Kasztner, Brand, and the other Zionist figures all attempt to portray their own role as the most important one, while denigrating or ignoring those played by others.

53. At first Krausz had contacted Jean de Bavier, the representative of the International Red Cross, at whose urging the Sztojay government approved the emigration, and requested the Germans to grant the necessary exit permits. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, pp. 94-95.

54. Brand claims that the governing body of the Palestine Office was composed of himself, Komoly, Szilagyi, and Mihaly Salamon. Weissberg, Advocate for the Dead, p. 46.

55. See Komoly's diary entry of May 2, 1944. Yad Vashem Archives, P. 31 /44.

56. For Brand’s account of the Kasztner-Krausz dispute, see ibid., pp. 48-50. For an evaluation of Krausz's position see below.

57. For further details on Kasztner’s activities, see the bibliographical references listed in 8-A, pp. 473-476.

58. According to Judit Molnar, the reason for Brand’s selection must be found in the 1945 testimony by Emo Szilagyi. Szilagyi had claimed that early in May 1944 a letter with 33,000 dollars had arrived from the West for the support of the Zionist movement and that the main addressee was Brand. The Nazis had, therefore, concluded that Brand was the most important person in the Zionist hierarchy. See Judit Molnar, Komoly Otto, Kasztner Rezso es a magyar cionistak embermento tevekenysege 1944-ben (The Rescue Activities of Otto Komoly, Rezso Kasztner, and of the Hungarian Zionists in I 944). Szazadok, Budapest, 14 (2013) I: 117.

59. For example, Kasztner claimed that Eichmann had met Brand on May 8, and that the one million Jews were to have been Hungarian Jews. Cf. Der Kastner-Bericht, pp. 86-89, and Weissberg, Advocate for the Dead, pp. 83-89.

60. Details revealed by Grosz during his interrogation by N. J. Strachan, a British Intelligence officer, in the summer of 1944. Public Record Office, London. Fo.371/42810, S.l.M.E. Report no. 2, dated June 23, 1944. For an analysis of Grosz's role based on this document, see Bela Vago. "The Intelligence Aspects of the Joel Brand Mission." Ln: YVS, 10: 111-128.

61. Minutes of Grosz's interrogation by Lieutenant N. J. Strachan, Cairo, June 24, 1944. S.l.M.E. Report no. I. PRO, Fo.371/42810, pp. 79-81.

62. Grosz informed Brand about the substance of his own mission only after their arrival in Istanbul. Weissberg, Advocate for the Dead, pp. 126-127.

63. Biss claimed that after several discussions with Klages, he had become convinced that Himmler had attempted to " get guarantees covering him and his past deeds from Washington." See his A Million Jews to Save, p. 71. 64. Natan Eck, Shoat haam ha 'yehudi b 'Europa (The Holocaust of the Jewish People in Europe) (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1977), pp. 313-314. RLB, Doc. 291. For further details on this assumption, see Yehuda Bauer, Jews for Sale? Naz i-Jewish Negotiations., 1939-1945. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 306 pp.

66. S.I.M.E. Report no. 2, p. 7

67. Biss, A Million Jews to Save, p. 73.

68. Ibid., p. 45.

69. Weissberg, Advocate for t e Dead, p. 114.

70. Citing Klages, Biss claims that Kasztner's arrest was suggested by Brand, because Kasztner " had made no attempt to hide the serious objections to the dispatch of Brand and Grosz on this mission." He further claims that " Brand and Grosz had gone so far as to reveal that Kasztner was in touch with the counterespionage services of the Hungarian army under General Ujszaszy, and that since he knew Lieutenant Colonel Garzoly well, Kasztner had no doubt informed him about the 'state secret. "' Biss, A Million Jews to Save, pp. 46, 71, and 122.

71. Kasztner claimed that in proceeding against the Abwehr agents, the SS had requested the cooperation of the Vaada and that with the exception of Brand the Vaada leaders rejected the request. Der Kastner-Bericht, p. 87.

72. Ibid., p. 93.

73. For further details on Amin el-Husseini, the Mufti of Palestine, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 798-799.

74. Moreshet, Archives Doc. D. l. 7 18.

75. Ibid.

76. For text, see Weissberg, Advocate for the Dead, pp. 106-107. Grosz claimed that the letter was written on Krumey’ s orders. S.l.M.E. Report no. I.PRO, Fo.371 /42810, pp. 79-81. 77. For details on the background and affiliation of the various representatives attached to the Istanbul Vaada, see Dalia Ofer, "The Activities of the Jewish Agency Delegation in Istanbul in 1943," in RAH, pp. 435-450. See also Chapter 3.

78. For details on this issue, see David Wyman, Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed. Commentary, New York, 65(May 1978)5: 37-46.

79. Weissberg, Advocate for the Dead, pp. I 19-120 and 122. 80. The State Department was kept abreast of the Brand case by the British Foreign Office as well. Secretary of State Hull, in tum, forwarded these communications, along with the American position, to Steinhardt.

81. "Strictly Confidential" report prepared for Ambassador Steinhardt on June 4, 1944. Moreshet Archives D. 1.721.

82. PRO, Fo. 371 /42813-819, p. 1399.

83. For text of the protocol, see Beth Lohamei Hagetaot, Archives, Hungaria-Slovakia, 2, Doc. U278. For a somewhat abbreviated English version of the text, see Weissberg, Advocate for the Dead, pp. 131-132.

Some historians claim that the SS attributed great importance to the protocol, inducing them to cease the deportations. They also see a correlation with Horthy's decision to halt the deportations on July 7, 1944. This claim, however, fails to explain the eagerness with which the Eichmann-Sonderkommando deported thousands of Jews from the Kistarcsa and Sarvar camps and the Nazi s' negative reaction to the offer by the Swiss and the Swedes to save a limited number of Hungarian Jews (see Chapter 25). See, for example, Paul L. Rose, "Joel Brand's ' Interim Agreement' and the Course of Nazi-Jewish negotiations 1944-1945." The Historical Journal, 34 (1991) 4: 209-229.

84. See letter of the Istanbul Vaada, dated July 5, 1944, addressed to the Budapest Vaada at Moreshet, Archives Doc. D. I. 748. It was received in Budapest on July 7, the day after Horthy had stopped the deportations. Der Kastner-Bericht, p. 148.

85. Beit Lohamei Hagetaot, Archives, Hungaria-Slovakia, 2, Doc. U275.

86. Shortly after he arrived in Istanbul, Grosz had begged the British authorities to admit him to the Middle East "since he feared the consequences of returning to enemy territory." Beca use of hi s shady past, the British, after arresting him in Aleppo, decided to hold him in custody until the end of the war. PRO, Fo. 371 /42807-812, pp. 79-81.

87. Preliminary report by Shertok dated Jun e 27, 1944. Weizmann Archives, Rehovot, Israel.

88. Ibid.

89. Moreshet, Archives, Doc. D.1.713. These desperate pleas from Budapest were relayed to Jerusalem and from there by Shertok to Weizmann via the Foreign Office. He considered Brand's return as "imperative" and demanded that the Germans be urged to discontinue the slaughter of the Jews pending a meeting. See Randall' s letter to Weizmann dated June 23. Weizmann Archives.

90. Moreshet, Archives, Doc. D.1.713. 91. For an evaluation of the attitude of the leaders and officials of the Grand Alliance toward Brand 's mission, see Chapter 31. For additional information on the Brand case, see Gustav Warburg, Rescuing Hungarian Jews. The Jewish Monthly, London, I (October 1947): 26-37; The Strange Case of Joel Brand. Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, London, 3(April 9, 1954):. 3-4; June 11, pp. 5-6; June 18, pp. 11-13; June 25, pp. 11-13; July 2, p. 7; Jul y 9, p. 5; August 20, p. 5; Leon Poliakov, Juifs contre camions: l ' histoire de Joel Brand (Jews for Trucks: The Story of Joel Brand). Le Monde Juif(The Jewish World), Paris, 11 (October 1957) 11: 3-7.

92. While in Tel Aviv he wrote a 46-page report about the situation of the Jews of Hungary (Memorandum uber die jetztige Lage der Juden Ungarns...) which apparently served as a basis for Weissberg's Advocate for the Dead. For the copy of the memorandum, dated January 25, 1945, see The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, S26/ l 190/ a/b.

93. Weissberg, Advocate for the Dead, pp. 176-185.

94. In May 1964, while he was in Frankfurt, West Germany, testifying in the trial of Hermann Krumey and Otto Hunsche, Eichmann’s former closest collaborators, Brand confessed that he made a "terrible mistake" in passing the Eichmann offer to the British. It became clear to him, he emphasized, that " Himmler sought to sow suspicion among the Allies as a preparation for his much-desired Nazi-Western coalition against Moscow. " The New York Tim es, May 21, 1964.

95. Weissberg, Advocate for the Dead, p. 15.

96. Ibid., pp. 178-179.

97. The New York Times, May 20, 1944.

98. Some of his telegrams to this effect may be found in the Weizmann Archives and in the PRO. See, for example, Fo. 371 /42807, p. 75.

99. Request transmitted to Rabbi Wise via Pinkerton on June 29, 1944.

100. See copies of his telegrams to these leaders, dated October 17, 1944, at the Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, S26/ l l 90a/b.

101. See, for example, Aryeh Morgenstern, "Va'ad hatzala ha 'meuchad shelid ha'Sochnut ha 'yehudit upheulotov beshanim 1943-1945" (The United Rescue Committee of the Jewish Agency and Its Activities During 1943-1945). Yalkut Moreshet, Israel, (197 1) 13: 60-103. On Hungary, see especially pp. 84-92. See also Shabetai B. Beit-Zvi, Ha tsiyonut hapost Ugandit ba 'mishvar ha 'shoa (Post-Ugandian Zionism in the Crucible of the Holocaust) (Tel Aviv: Bronfman, 1977), 495 pp. For a more sympathetic overview of the Yishuv leaders' position on the Brand mission, see Dina Porat, The Blue and the Yellow Stars of David, op. cit., pp. 188-211.

102. For further details on Brand's background, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, p. 901. On his mission, see those listed on pp. 476-479

103. Endre later disclaimed any knowledge of the Kasztner or Brand affairs. Baky stated that he had some knowledge about them and that he had ordered Hain to release Kasztner and his friends on the request of Hans-Ulrich Geschke, the head of the SD in Hungary. Sworn statements by Endre and Baky before Dr. Endre Pollak, the prosecutor in the Transylvanian war crimes trial cases, on December 17 and 18, 1945. Both original statements are on file in RG-52.

104. Der Kastner-Bericht, p. I 05.

105. In his confidential report from Geneva dated February I 0, 1946, Zoltan Glatz claims that the transport in Kolozsvar was put together with the cooperation of Jozsef Fischer (Kasztner’s father-in-law), Hillel Danzig, Lajos Marton, Jeni.\ Kertesz, and Sandor Weiss. Citing examples of nepotism, Glaz claims that the transport included 32 members of the Fischer family, approximately 20 members of Zsigmond Leb’s family, and approximately 14 members of EiR!re Balazs's family. Yad Vashem Archives M-20/95. For the names of those who eventually left for Budapest and from there to Bergen-Belsen, see the lists at Yad Vashem, Archives M-20/59 and M-20/68.

106. See Kaltenbrunner's letter of June 30, 1944, responding to the June 7 request by SS-Brigadeführer Hanns Blaschke, the Mayor of Vienna, concerning the "assignment of labor to essential war work in the city of Vienna." RLB, Doc. 184 (3803-PS). At Nuremberg, Kaltenbrunner tried to deny that he wrote this letter to Blaschke. /MT, 11: 344-346. During his trial in Nuremberg, Kaltenbrunner denied that he had written a response to Blaschke. See Judit Molnar, "Embermentes vagy arulas? A Kasztner-akci6 szegedi vonatkozasai" (Rescue or Betrayal. The Szeged Connection of the Kasztner Campaign). In: Csendorok, hivatalnokok, zsid6k. Valogatott tanulmanyok a magyar holokauszt tortenetebo/ (Gendarmes, Civil Servants, Jews. Selected Studies on the History of the Hungarian Holocaust). Judit Molnar, ed. (Szeged: Szegedi Zsido Hitkozseg, 2000), pp. 191-197.

107. Without identifying the source of his data, Levai lists the various items handed over to the SS whose value was variously established as ranging from 3.2 to 11.0 million Swiss francs. See his Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 356. See also Der Kastner-Bericht, pp. 150-151.

108. Der Kastner-Bericht, pp. 130-133.

109. Some passengers managed to send typewritten reports back to Budapest. See, for example, the letter by J. D. BI., dated July 1944, in the archives of Yad Vashem, M-20/47.

110. According to Lajos Marton and other eyewitnesses, a few of the Jews who were aware of the realities of Auschwitz, including Jozsef Fischer, were reluctant or refused to take a bath.

111. Der Kastner-Bericht, p. 252. See also report by Siegfried Elek, one of the members of the group, addressed to A. Silberschein on November 12, 1944. Yad Vashem Archives, M-20/95. According to the recollections of Georges Amsel, then an 11-year-old boy, the treatment of the people in Bergen-Belsen was not as generous as it was described by Kasztner after the war. Personal communication dated Paris, May 20, 1992.

112. According to Zoltan Glatz’s report, cited above, the Jewish Council of that group consisted of Zsigmond Leb, Jeno Laszlo, Jozsef Fischer, Jozsef Moskowicz, Endre Balazs, Sandor Weiss, Jeno Kertesz, and Endre Kremer. The report notes several economic abuses by some of these leaders.

113. See, for example, Weissmandel’s passionate letter of July 16, 1944, cited above.

114. Kasztner periodically informed Schwalb and Saly Mayer about developments in Hungary, including his negotiations with the SS. For copies of his letters to Saly Mayer, see Israel State Archives, Jerusalem, File no. 31: 124/ 53.

115. Der Kastner-Bericht, pp. 152-155.

116. See Komoly’ s letter to Schwalb dated July 24, 1944, in Moreshet Archives, Doc. D. 1.976.

117. Biss, A Million Jews to Save, pp. 112-117.

118. See Glossary. HIJEF was organized by Eli and Yitzhak Stembuch; its driving force was actually Recha Stembuch, Yitzhak's wife. For details on her background and activities, see David Kranzler, Thy Brother's Blood. The Orthodox Jewish Response during the Holocaust (New York: Mesorah Publications, 1987), pp. 189-190 and I 95-203.

119. The diplomatic correspondence on this plan does not make absolutely clear whether Freudiger's proposals as interpreted by the Stembuch brothers involved the safeguarding of the Kasztner transport or the organization of a new convoy of" 1,200 prominent Orthodox Jews. " See, for example, Harrison’s telegram 4802 to the Secretary of State dated July 26, 1944. For further details on the Stembuch brothers’ difficulties with both Mayer and the Vaada, see below. See also David Kranzler, Thy Brothers Blood, op. cit., pp. 107-108.

120. Freudiger was very bitter about the pressure from Komoly, Hansi Brand, and Offenbach. He claimed that this incident had induced him to escape to Romania together with his family on August 9, 1944. See Five Months, p. 277. Freudiger explained his position in a letter he wrote from Romania to Kasztner on August 20, 1944-shortly after his arrival in Romania. For the text of his Jetter, see The Tragedy of Hungarian Jewry, op. cit., pp. 289-294. Kasztner mentions only the matter of the 200 trucks without revealing the background of the Freudiger " offer. " Der Kastner-Bericht, pp. 155-156.

121. RAH, p. 15.

122. Pressure for the meeting was also exerted by the Istanbul Vaada, which in tum was constantly pressured by Budapest. See, for example, Istanbul’s cable to Shertok in London, dated August 14, 1944. Weizmann Archives.

123. RLB, Docs. 294 and 295.

124, Kasztner claimed that the Germans had been offered 15 million Swiss francs, payable in three monthly installments and that he had formulated the three conditions. Der Kastner-Bericht, p. 187. Yehuda Bauer of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, whose portrayal of Mayer’s wartime role is quite sympathetic, concluded that Mayer had offered no specific sum s and that it was Mayer who originated the three preconditions. See his "The Negotiations Between Saly Mayer and the Representatives of the SS in 1944-1945." ln: RAH, pp. 5-45. See especially, p. 23.

125. RAH, p. 31.

126. The marches were of course not halted on humanitarian grounds only. The Germans desperately needed able-bodied Jews to build trenches and other defense lin es for the protection of Vienna.

127. Der Kastner-Bericht, p. 242.

128. In one of his many statements after the war, Becher claim s that he persuaded Himmler sometime "between the middle of September and October 1944" to issue the following order for Kaltenbrunner and Pohl: "Effective immediately I forbid any liquidation of Jews and order that, on the contrary, hospital care is to be given to weak and sick persons. I hold you... personally responsible even if this order is not strictly adhered to by lower echelons. " 3762-PS. For Kaltenbrunner’s explanation of the background of this statement, see IMT, 11:334-36. For details on HIJEF and it officers, see David Kranzler, Thy Brother s Blood. The Orthodox Jewish Response During the Holocaust, op. cit.

129. Der Kastner-Bericht, p. 246.

130. Cf. Der Kastner-Bericht, pp. 245-50; RAH, pp. 32-34.

131. Schwartz was born in Russia in 1899 and brought to America as a child. After receiving a doctorate from Yale, he served as an instructor at the American University in Cairo and on the faculty of Long Island University. He became director of European operations of AJDC in 1938. He died in New York on January 1, 1975.

132. RAH, p. 36.

13 3. Biss, A Million Jews to Save, pp. 209-2 10.

134. Der Kastner-Bericht, pp. 3 13-330. See also Chapter 32.

135. For some details on Musy’s involvement in various rescue schemes, see Hecht Archive. University of Haifa. eds. Paul Lawrence Rose and Herbert Druks, (New York: Garla nd Publishing, 1990; Archives of the Holocaust, Vol. 12). See especially the introduction by P. L. Rose, pp. ix-xxv.

136. Acting in the names of Agudath Yisrael and the Committee of Orthodox Rabbis in the United States (represented by the Stembuch brothers), Musy persuaded Himmler to allow a transport of 1,200 Jews to leave Theresienstadt for Switzerland on February 3, 1945. Kersten had great influence on Himmler. He made it possible, for example, for Norbert Masur, a member of the Board of the Stockholm branch of the World Jewish Congress, to see Himmler on April 21, 1944. For Kersten's account see his The Kersten Memoirs, 1940-1945 (New York: Macmillan, 1957), 314 pp; Masur’ s account is in his En Jude ta/armed Himmler (A Jew Speaks with Himmler) (Stockholm: Albert Bonniersforlag, 1945), 36 pp; Bernadotte’s version is in his The Curtain Falls. Last Days of the Third Reich (New York: Knopf, 1945), 154 pp. For further details, see RAH, pp. 24-28 and 37-41.

137. RLB, Doc. 326. See also Jeno Levai, Eichmann in Hungary (Budapest: Pannonia, 1961), pp. 200-201, and Chapter 25.

138. See note by Vischer, the Secretary of the Swiss Legation in Berlin, in NA, Microcopy T-120, Roll 4203, Frames K7 8 9/ K209226-227, K7 89/K209228-247 and 253-57. 139. For a facsimile of Kasztner’s letter, see YVS, 8: 16.

140. Ully Kertesz and Julia Weisz were picked up the first day of the German occupation while they were trying to buy tickets, presumably to return to Kolozsvar. Lajos Marton, A Svajcba 1944 augusztu sbanes decemberb en erk ezett bergen-belseni cs oport esemenyein ek rovid kronografiaja (A Short Chronology of the Bergen-Belsen Group That Arrived in Switzerland in August and December 1944) (Geneva, 1945), p. 2 (manuscript).

141. Der Kastner-Bericht, pp. 253-254. The girls were among the approximately 3,200 Hungarian Jewish women transferred from Auschwitz-Birkenau in the fall of 1944, following the Nazis’ decision to destroy the camp before the arrival of the Soviet troops. Besides the Be vorzug tenlager for the Hungarians, there were similar camps in Bergen-Belsen for other "prominent" Jews with foreign pass ports, including 593 Polish and 660 Dutch Jews. Yad Vashem Archives, M-20/ 168. For some background information on the Bevorzugtenlager in Bergen-Belsen, see the diary of Rudolf Martin Cheim (a.k.a. Rudolph Marten), a German-Dutch Jew who survived the war with his wife and daughter, in YIVO archives Record Group 804.

142. Some of the Jewish leaders in Switzerland made a special effort to free Fischer and his family from the camp. See, for example, Josef Mandi’s letter to A. Silberschein, dated September 2, 1944. Yad Vashem Archives, M-20/ 46.

143. For the list of the Jews in these camps, see ibid., M-20/ 59.

144. See his and Pozner's telegram exchanges of January-February 1945. Ibid. See also Marton, A Svajcba 1944 augusztus ban.

145. See, for example, the memoranda of April 18, April 19, and May 27, 1945, addressed to Dr. Hans Klee of Relico-Komitee zur Hilfeleistungfar die kriegs betroffene judis che Bevolkerung (Committee for the Aid of the War-Stricken Jewish Population), Geneva. ibid.

146. On May 9, 1945, when the Third Reich offered its unconditional surrender, Kasztner sent a "mission accomplished" telegram to Neustadt in Tel Aviv, emphasizing his main achievements. Pazner Files, Yad Vashem. (After settling in Israel, Pozner changed his name to Pazner.)

147. RLB, Doc. 439 (2605-PS). It was used as USA exhibit 242 in the Nuremberg trials.

148. Der Bericht des jiidischen Rettungskomitees aus Budapest, 1942-1945 (The Report of the Jewish Rescue Committee of Budapest, 1942-1945) (Basel: Va 'ath Ezrave ' Hazalah be Budapest, 1946), xiii + 191 pp. Prepared for submission to the first post war congress of the World Zionist Organization, it was published under the title Der Kastner-Bericht, edited by Ernest Landau. A copy of Kasztner's report was given to Wisliceny while he was in a Bratislava jail awaiting execution. For his review of the report, see Doc. 901 of Bureau 06 of the Police of Israel used in preparation of Eichmann’s trial. See also Maria Schmidt, Mentes vagy arulas? Magyar zsido onmentesi akciok a masodik vi laghaboru alatt (Rescue or Betrayal ? Hungarian Jewish Self-Rescue Activities During the Second World War). Medvetanc (Bear Dance), Budapest, (1985)2-3: 111-125. For a sympathetic overview of Kasztner’s activities see Dov Dinur’s introduction (pp. 3-42) to the Hebrew edition of Kasztner’s report: Din ve-ches hbon she/ va'adat ha 'hatzala ha'yehudit be 'Budapest 1942-1945 (Israel: Haguda le'Hantzachat Zichroshel Dr. Yisrael Kasztner, n.d.), 228 pp. For the English version of Kasztner’s original report, see The Kasztner Report. The Report of the Budapest Jewish Rescue Committee, 1942-1945. Laszlo Karsai and Judit Molnar, eds. (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2013), 393 pp,

149. Sternbuch's views were outlined in a lengthy rebuttal (July 5, 1948) addressed to Dr. Kubowitzki of the World Jewish Congress. The accusations directed against Kasztner and Mayer were amplified in a 16-page memorandum Sternbuch had submitted on February 5, 1954, to Chaim Cohn, the legal counsel of the State of Israel, in connection with the impending Gruenwald-Kasztner libel suit. The memorandum includes a harsh indictment of Kasztner. For further details, see David Kranzler, Thy Brothers Blood, op. cit.

150. Ferenc Szálasi’s diary notes of February 11, 1946, include the following text: "The Jews will soon realize that those who returned alive from the past Jewish tragedy or remained alive owe their survival to me. " A Szálasi-per (The Szálasi Trial). Elek Karsai and Laszlo Karsai, eds. (Budapest: Reform, 1988), p. 255. Wilhelm Hottl, in turn, claimed that the Jews of Budapest had been saved by Himmler. See his interview in Peter Bokor's Vegjetak a Duna menten, op. cit., p. 192. Still others asserted that the Jews of Budapest had in fact been saved by Raoul Wallenberg-the Swedish diplomat who had been transformed into a mythological figure. It has virtually become "politically correct" to ignore the determining role the Red Army had played in the liberation of the Jews ear ly in I 945. See Randolph L. Braham, " Rescue Operations in Hungary. Myths and Realities. " ln: Yad Vashem Studies, Jerusalem, 32(2004): pp. 21-57. (Hungarian version:,, Mentoakciok Magyarorszagon: mitoszok es valosag." In: T-V, pp. 133-171. See also his " Rescue Operations in Northern Transylvania: Myths and Realities." In: The Holocaust: Essays and Documents. Randolph L. Braham, ed. (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 2009), pp. 85-98.

151. Mayer's "exploits" were outlined by Dr. Joseph C. Hyman and Moses A. Leavitt, the Executive Vice-Chairman and Secretary of the A.JDC.

These claims were vehemently denied by Kasztner, who rebutted them point by point in a lengthy letter addressed to Mayer on October 29, 1945. The press release and Kasztner's letter are on file in RG-52.

152. RAH, pp. 44-45. See also Bauer’ s "'Onkel Saly.' Die Verhandl un gen des Saly Mayer zur Rettung der Juden 1944/45 " ('Uncle Saly.' The Negotiations of Saly Mayer on the Rescue of Jews in 1944-45). Vierteljahrshefte for Zeitgeschichte (Quarterly for Contemporary History), Munich, 25(April I 977)2: 188-2 19, and his account of the Nazis' attempt to " sell" Hungarian Jewry and of Saly Mayer’ s positive role in Maari v, Tel Aviv, May 3, 1978. (Reproduced in Hungarian translation in Uj Kelet, Tel Av iv, May 5, 1978.) In their memoirs Kasztner, Brand, and Biss were highly critical of Mayer’s role, as were several leaders of the Bratislava Vaada, including Rabbi Weissmandel. The criticism of hi s "Germanic" attitude and secretive techniques was shared by many of the leaders of the major wartime Jewish organizations in Switzerland as well. The ultra-Orthodox Jewish groups were particularly vitriolic in their accusations. See, for example, The Holocaust Victims Accuse by Reb Moshe Schonfeld (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Neturei Karta of U.S.A., 1977), pp. 73-82. Kasztner’s opinion about Mayer is also reflected in his letter to Steger (March 9, 1947) in which he refers to Mayer as a " philanthropic gangster." RAH, p. 42.

153. Mayer died in 1950 at the age of 68. For biographical details, consult Bauer, "The Negotiations," pp. 42-45. 154. For unknown reasons, many of the statements collected by the police for the possible indictment of the Vaada and Central Jewish Council leaders were placed in the files relating to the trial in Budapest (1945-4 7) of Dr. Bela Berend. NB. 2600/ 1946. Duplicates of these documents are on file in RG-52.

155. Testimony of Bela (Adalbert) Lewinger during Kasztner’s trial in Israel in 1954. W. Z. Laqueur, The Kastner Case. Aftermath of the Catastrophe. Commentary, New York, 20(December 1955)6: 507.

156. Ibid., p. 503. 157. Ben Hecht, Perfidy (New York: Julian Messner, 1960), p. 78. Kasztner’s statement was found in the files of the War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg by Uri Siegel, a Tel Aviv attorney. The New York Times, February 6, 1956. See also Laqueur, The Kastner Case, p. 504.

158. The letter which included a detailed accounting of the rescue monies received during the war was used by the defense as Exhibit 22. Hecht, Perfidy, pp. 72-73 and 259.

159. Ibid., pp. 80-8 1 and 259.

160. Ibid., pp. 198-199 and 269.

161. Becher outlined his role in the rescue of Jews in a lengthy deposition signed on February 7, 1946, in which he devoted special attention to questions relating to the Holocaust in Hungary, giving details on the background and activities of the principal German and Hungarian officials involved in it. RLB, Doc. 438 (NG-2972). For details on Becher's background and wartime activities, see Criminals at Large, Istvan Pinter and Laszlo Szabo, eds. (Budapest: Pannonia, 196 I), pp. 150-164, and Jeno Levai, Afekete SS 'feher barimya" (The White Lamb of the Black SS) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1966), 191 pp. After the war, Andreas Biss emerged as a vocal champion of Becher's rescue activities.

162. Upon learning of the suit initiated by Kasztner, Sternbuch sent a 16-page memorandum to Chaim Cohn, the counsel for the State of Israel. Dated February 8, 1954, the memorandum, signed by a number of former associates of the HIJEF and of the European section of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States of America and Canada, catalogs the "reprehensible" activities of Kasztner. Citing Musy's statement of March 5, 1945, and Walter Schellenberg's sworn affidavit of June 18, 1948, the authors of the memorandum accused both Kasztner and Mayer of having in fact undermined, through their activities with Becher, Musy’s agreement with Himmler to have the approximately 750,000 Jews in the concentration camps freed. The memorandum also contained a critique of the report Kasztner had written after the war, especially with respect to its references to the HIJEF.

163. In a taped interview with this author (Tel Aviv, October 10, 1972), Hansi Brand was especially bitter about the performance of Kasztner's "friends" on the witness stand. She argued emphatically that it was "inconceivable that (these individuals) did not know what the German occupation meant in March-April 1944." She further insisted that the Jewish leaders of Kolozsvar had been informed exactly about what was happening to the Jews in Poland even before Kasztner's visit in early May 1944.

164. Psak din she/ beit-hamishpal ha 'mehozib 'Yerusha lay im betik pelili 124/ 53 ha 'yoets ha 'mishpati neged Malkiel Griinwald bifney nasi bel-hamishpal Dr. B enjamin Halevi (Decision of the District Court of Jerusalem in Criminal Case 124 /53, Attorney General v. Malkiel Grunwald Before the President of the Court, Dr. Benjamin Halevi) Tel Aviv: Kami Publishing company, 1957), p. 16. According to Ben Hecht, who had his own Revisionist-Zionist axe to grind, Danzig’s answer to Tamir’ s question " Did Kasztner tell you they were going to the gas chambers of Auschwitz"? was a laconic "No." See his Perfidy, p. I 08.

165. Taped interview with this author, Tel Aviv, October 8, 1972, on file in RG-52.

166. Hecht, Perfidy, pp. 105-10 8. Kenyermezo was a fictitious place (although that had been the name of a military training camp in World War I, near Esztergom). Rumors about labor there and in Transdanubia were also spread by gendarmes just before the deportation. In Nagyvarad one rumor had it that the Jews would be sent to Mezotur, south east of Budapest. See Andrei Paul, Azeszakerdelyi zsido lakossag deportalasa 1944-ben (The Deportation of the Jewish Population of Northem Transylvania in 1944), manuscript. See also the account by Istvan Marton in Bela Katona's Varad a viharban (Varad in the Storm) (Nagyvarad: Tealah Korhaztamogato Egyes let, 1946), pp. 3 14-325.

167. Rabbi and Mrs. Weinberger were smuggled across the Romanian border on May 2, 1944, on the eve of the ghettoization in Kolozsvar, with the aid-and at the expense-of an underground Zionist group headed by Hannah Ganz. In Turda (Torda), and from Turda to Bucharest, the Weinbergers were helped in the same manner as other escapees and refugees had been by a rescue team headed by Arnold Finkelstein, a leading official of the Jewish community, and Arieh Hirsch (later Eld ar), one of the heroic figures of the rescue effort. Disinterested documentary sources, including the memoirs of the drama/is personae, contain no reference to any mission associated with Rabbi Weinberger's arrival in Romania. See, for example, the recollections of Dr. Alexan der Safran, the former Chief Rabbi of Romania (Resisting the Storm [Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1987], p. 231), whom Rabbi Weinberger had identified as one of his contacts. See also the accounts of Mrs. Ganz (Grunfeld ), Mrs. Eszter Goro-Friinkel, and Arieh Hirsch-the three figures involved in the rescue of the Weinbergers-in the archives of the Strochlitz Institute for Holocaust Studies at Haifa University. These accounts are also on file in RG-52.

Rabbi Weinberger claimed that he had been sent on the " mission " by Jozsef Fischer, the head of the Jewish community of Kolozsvar and Kasztner’s father-in-law. He further claimed that he had worked with Erno Marton in Bucharest on the mission. Fischer left no account and there is no reference to Weinberger in either the Marton archives at the University of Haifa or in Kasztner’ s memoirs. Is it conceivable, as David Schon, the noted Israeli Hungarian-Jewish journalist observed, that Fischer would not have included Rabbi Weinberger's parents in the special "Kasztner group" had he actually sent him on that mission ? (Rabbi Weinberger’s parents were deported and killed in Auschwitz.) For Rabbi Weinberger’s version, see his " Versenyfutas a halallal " (A Race With Death) in the book he edited, A Kolozsvari zsid6sag emlekkonyve (The Memorial Book of Kolozsvar’s Jewry) (New York: Self-Published, 1970), pp. 213-235. Rabbi Weinberger’s self-serving memoirs and his wartime behavior remained a source of great controversy. In the late 1980’s, Rabbi Weinberger-Carmilly asserted that he had saved a large number of Jews during the Nazi era with the help of Raoul Orban-rescue activities he omitted to mention in his memoirs. For details, see documents filed in the Department for the Righteous at Yad Vashem and other major Holocaust-related archives.

Like Hillel Danzig and David (Dezso) Hermann, Rabbi Weinberger also disclaimed any awareness of the ultimate fate of the Jews before his safe arrival " on his mission" to Romania (p. 233). This appears to be in contrast with the information contained in a letter addressed to him by Raoul Orban with whom he bad established a mutually beneficial relationship in the mid 1980’s, corroborating each other’ s " rescue" activities in 1944. In his letter of April 24, 1986, orban wrote, among other things: "When the Gestapo and the SD set up office in Cluj, after March 20, 1944, more exactly early in April, Dr. Aurel Socol, a lawyer, and myself were given a sure piece of information by two German NCOs, namely, that the rumor about the concentration of Jews in ghettos in the cities of Hungary-occupied Transylvania bad no truth in it and that the Jews were to be deported to some unknown place they will never return from! I, for one, told you and through you, the Cluj " Judenrat, " to send the information to Oradea, Dej, Satu Mare, Sighetul Marmatiei, etc. which you did." The letter is in the Raoul Orban file at Yad Vashem, Department of the Righteous, Jerusalem.

For further details on this baseless rescue account, see Randolph L. Braham, Romanian Nationalists and the Holocaust: The Political Exploitation of Unfounded Rescue Accounts. (New York: The Rosenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies, 1998), 289 pp. and Zoltan Tibori Szabo, £let es halal m ez sgyejen. Zsidok menekillese es mentese a magyar-roman hataron 1940-1944 kozott (On the Boundary Between Life and Death. The Escape and Rescue of Jews Across the Hungarian-Romanian Border Between 1940 and 1944). (Kolozsvar: Minerva, 2001), 263 pp.

168. Upon his arrival in Romania, Marton became associated with the International Red Cross and active in the promotion of assistance for the Jews of Hungary and Romania. See Bela Vago, "Political and Diplomatic Activities for the Rescue of the Jews of Northern Transylvania." In: YVS, 6: 155-173.

169. Gideon Hausner, Justice in Jerusalem (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 340-34 1.

170. Laqueur, "The Kastner Case," p. 508.

171. The quotation is from Virgil, Aeneid, Book II, line 49.

172. Psak-din she/ beit-ha 'mishpal ha 'mehozi b 'Yerushaiay im betik pelili 1241 53, pp. 22-24 and 45. See also Hecht, Perfidy, pp. 178-183. For excerpts from the proceedings and copies of exhibits by both parties, consult Shalom Rosenfeld, Tik pelili 124. Mishpat Grunwald-Kasztner (Criminal Case 124. The Grunwald-Kasztner Case) (Tel Aviv: Kami Publishing Company, 1955), 470 pp. and Eman ue l Porat, Ha 'mishpat ha 'gadol. Parashat Kasztner (The Great Trial. The Kasztner Case) (Tel Aviv: Or Publisher, 1955), 264 pp.

173. The three gunmen-Joseph Menkes, Zeev Ekstein, and Dan Shemer-were condemned to li fe imprisonment on January 7, 1958. The New York Times, January 8, 1958. According to Hecht, Ekstein, the actual triggerman, was until a few months before the shooting a paid undercover agent of the Israeli government's Intelligence Service. This gave rise to many speculations as to a possible conspiracy to silence Kasztner, who had obviously become a liability to certain Israeli political circles. See Hecht, Perfidy, p. 208.

174. Ararpelili 232/55. Beirurshel ha 'mearer: Ha 'y oetz ha 'm ishpati le 'memshala neg ed hamegir: Malkiel Griin wald (Appeal Civil Case No. 232/55. Appeal of Appellant, The Government Prosecutor, Against Accused, Malkiel Grunwald) (Jerusalem: Mifal Haschichpul shel Histadrut ha ' Studentim shel ha' Universita Haivrit, 1957), 201 pp. It contains the opinions of Shimon Agranat (pp. 1-129), Moshe Silberg (pp. 130-163), Itzhak Olshan (pp. 164-174), S. Chesin (pp. 174-197), and D. Goitein (pp. 197-20 I).

175. ibid. See also Hecht, Perfidy, p. 272.

176. See, for example, Tamir’s Ha 'bakasha le 'kiy um diy un-chozer be 'mishpat Kasztner (Petition for the Reopening of the Kasztner Case), which he submitted on July 22, 1962. (Mimeographed, unpaged, available at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem).

177. University of Haifa, Center of Historical Studies, File H3h27-A. M.E.2 /l 5. A similar sentiment was expressed by Emo Marton in a note to a justice in which he further speculated on the psychological reasons why some of the witnesses testified against Kasztner. Ibid., File H3h26-A.M.E. 2/2.

178. See, for example, Dov Dinur's introduction to the Hebrew edition of the Kasztner report cited above.

179. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil" (New York: Viking, 1963), pp. 117-118. Communist historians, journalists, and propagandists have exploited the Kasztner affair ever since the launching of the drive against Zionism and cosmopolitanism late in 1948. Particularly vicious has been the campaign in the Soviet Union, where scores of books were published on the "evils of Zionism" See, for example, Yuri Ivanov's Caution: Zionism! (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 174 pp. For further details on the attitude of the Soviet Unio n toward the Jews during the war, see Chapters 10 and 31.

180. For further details, see Randolph L. Braham, " The Kasztner Case: The Historical Context." In: The Holocaust: Essays and Documents. Randolph L. Braham, ed. (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 2009), pp. 137-158, and the bibliographical references listed in 8-A, p. 905. On the Kasztner-Gruenwald libel case in Israel, see 8-A, pp. 717-728.

181. On the basis of the results of the 1939 elections for the Zionist Congress, four seats were allotted to the Mizrachi, three to the General Zionists, three to Hashomer Hatzair, and one to Ichud.

182. See Brand's letter to Barias, dated July 28, 1943, in Beit Lohamei Hagetaot, Hungaria, Vol. I, Doc. U 153.

183. For further details on the problems of the office and the difficulties with Krausz, see Komoly’ s letter to Barias dated August 25, 1943, in The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, S26/l 190 alb. See also the memorandum signed by Brand and the other representatives of the Ichud (November 10, 1943), protesting the arbitrary way in which Krausz was managing the affairs of the office, in Beit Lohamei Hagetaot, Hungaria, Vol. 2, Doc. U328. Criticisms of the way Krausz handled the affairs of the office were also expressed at the Transylvanian Zionist Conference (Erdelyi Cionista Konferencia), which was held on February 27, 1944. Marton, A Svajcba 1944 augusztusban

184. According to his critics, Krausz worked alone in one of the two rooms of the office, usually coming in around 10:00 A.M. The other room was normally filled by hundreds of clients. As a result he could neither keep pace with the demands of the office (letters would be stacked on his desk unanswered) nor satisfy the many anxious clients. See, for example, Rafi (Friedl) Ben-shalom,... weil wir Leben wollten (Because We Wanted to Live), Moreshet, Archives D.2.88, pp. 25-26. Shortly after the war, Krausz settled in Jerusalem where he died in November 1986.

185. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, pp. 157-158. See also Levai, Sziirke konyv, pp. 168-170. For a well documented account of the Kasztner-Krausz rivalry, see Ayala Nedi vi, Bin Krausz le 'Kasztner. Ha 'maabak el hatzala yehudi Hungariah (Between Krausz and Kasztner. The Struggle for the Saving of Hungarian Jewry) (Jerusalem: Carmel Publishing House, 2014), 484 pp.

186. The evidence is overwhelming that it was Krausz’s report of June 19, rather than the many similar reports sent by Kasztner and his colleagues, that became the focus of diplomatic activities in the summer of 1944. Copies or excerpts of the report were circulated between the U.S. State Department, the British Foreign Office, the Jewish Agency, and Weizmann’s office. See, for example, the communications by A. W. G. Randall to Weizmann, dated July I and July 5, 1944, in the Weizmann Files, Rehovot, Israel.

187. RLB, Docs. 324-326. See also Chapter 25.

188. The details of the emigration scheme were discussed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 14. For a summary of the decisions relating to the issuance of a collective passport and to the technicalities of transportation, see Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 244. See also Chapter 31.

189. For further details on this emigration scheme, see sections on "Switzerland" and "The Reaction of the Allies to the Horthy Offer" in Chapter 31.

190. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 245.

191. See, for example, Barlas's letter of August 12, 1944, addressed to the Budapest Vaada leaders, in Beit Lohamei Hagetaot, Hungaria-Slovakia, Vol. 2, Doc. U297. See also Komoly's letter to Nathan Schwalb, July 24, 1944, Moreshet Archives, Doc. D.1976.

192. For Bereczky' s account see his Hungarian Protestantism and the Persecution of Jews (Budapest: Sylvester, 1945), 47 pp. For further details on the role of the Christian churches, see Chapter 30. See also Judit Molnar, "Alelkek elposvanyosodasahoz nagymertekben hozzajarult a reformatus lelkeszi kar is."' Bereczky Albert targyalasai Komoly Ottoval 1944-ben ("The Corps of Protestant Ministers Also Largely Contributed to the Swamping of Souls." Albert Bereczky's Negotiations with Otto Komoly in 1944). Egyhcizf o rum, Budapest, XXIX(2014)2-3: 19-28.

193. Komoly kept a diary of his activities during this period. The part covering August 21-September 16, 1944, is reproduced in English translation in HJS, 3: 147-250. See also Bela Vago, "Budapest Jewry in the Summer of 1944." In: YVS, 8: 81-105, and Tamas Majsai and Maria Schmidt, "Komoly Otto naploja, 1944" (Otto Komoly’s Diary, I 944). In: A Rciday gyiljtemeny e vkonyve, III. 1983 (Yearbook of the Raday Collection. HI. 1983) (Budapest, 1984): 238-305. For further details, see Judit Molnar, "' Vajon megtelnek-e foljegyzeseimmel e konyv lapjai' ? Komoly Otto naploja (1944)." ("Will the Pages of This Book Be Filled With My Notes?" Otto Komoly’s Diary, 1944). Ln: KL-JM, pp. 473-490. See also her Komoly Otto, Kasztner Rezso es a magyar cionistak embermento tevekenysege 1944-ben (The Rescue Activities of Otto Komoly, Rezso Kasztner, and of the Hungarian Zionists in 1944). Szcizadok, Budapest, 147(2013)1: 107-129.

194. See Komoly’s entries for August 29 and September 7, 1944 in HJS, 3: I 86 and 214.

195. Friedrich Born, Bericht an das Internationale Komitee vom Roten Kreuz in Genf (Report to the international Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva) (Geneva, June 1945), pp. 34-36. See also Robert Rozett, Child Rescue in Budapest, 1944-5. Holocaust and Genocide Studies, London, 2(1987)1: 49-59.

196. For a listing of the children’s and foundlings' homes and the number of children placed in them, see Friedrich Born, op. cit., p. 60, and Der Kastner-Bericht, pp. 303-304.

197. For details, see Otto Roboz, "The Red Cross Home of the Jewish Orphanage for Boys in Budapest. " In: The Tragedy of Hungarian Jewry, op. cit., pp. 295-308. For the Hungarian version, see Evkony v 1983/84 Nearbook 1983-84). Sandor Scheiber, ed. (Budapest: Magyar Izraelitak Orszagos Kepviselete, 1984), pp. 275-292.

198. Among Komoly’s closest associates in Department A were the members of the Budapest Vaada (Hansi Brand, Sholem Offenbach, Kasztner, and Biss) as well as Sandor Groszmann, Dezso Billitzer, Andras Beregi, and Andras Fenyo. For a more nearly complete list of Department A's members, its organizational structure (together with the location of the various administrative units), and the hospitals it administered (as well as the physicians associated with them), see Born, Bericht, pp. 57-61.

199. For further details on Komoly's background and activities, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, p. 906.

200. For examples of such help, see Daniel Lowy, " Christian Help Provided to Jews of Northern Transylvania during World War II: As Revealed by the Jewish Weekly Egyseg (May 1946-August 1947). " In: RB-BC, pp. 113-136.

201. For examples of such expressions of sympathy or aid given to Jews as reported by Ferenczy, see Levai, Sziirke konyv, pp. 101-106 and 137-138. For Ferenczy’s reports, see Csendiirtiszt a Markoban, op. cit., pp. 280-317.

202. Levai, Sziirke konyv, pp. 114-117. See also Chapter 10.

203. Ibid., pp. 118-123. See also Chapter 26.

204. Ibid., pp. 124-130.

205. For details on the places of refuge, the people involved in the rescue effort, and the number of Jews rescued, see Denes Sandor, " Szervezett segitseg az Uldozottekert" (Organized Help for the Persecuted). In: A Ma gyar katolikus egyhaz az emberi jogok viide lme (The Hungarian Catholic Church and the Protection of Human Rights). Antal Meszlenyi, ed. (Budapest: A Szent Istvan Tarsulat, 1947), pp. 169-178.

206. Danuta Czech, Auschwitz Chronicle, 1939-1945 (New York: Henry Holt, 1990), pp. 666--667. See also Bereczky, Hungarian Protestantism and the Persecution of Jews, pp. 41-43. See also Nicholas Railton, Jane Haining and the Work of the Scottish Mission with Hungarian Jews, 1932-1945. (Budapest: The Author, 2007), 145 pp. In 1997, Yad Vashem identified Jane Haining as a Righteous Among the Nations.

207. For details, see Sandor Szenes’ s interview with Karoly Hetenyi Varga in his Befejeze t/en mull. Kereszt enyek es zsidok, sors ok (Unfinished Past. Christians and Jews. Fates (Budapest: The Author, 1986), pp. 219-259. Sara Salkahazi, Father Ferenc Kohler, and Father Jakab Raile were recognized as Righteous Among the Nations by Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, in 1969, 1989, and 1991, respectively. For additional details on Father Raile, who died in an automobile accident in New Jersey on September 6, 1949, see Bela Fabian, "An Undelivered Eulogy." America, (September 24, 1949) 81: 667--668. See also A Vilcig lgazai Magyarorszagon a masodik vilaghaboru alart (The Righteous of the World of Hungary during the Second World War). Kinga Frojimovics and Judit Molnar, eds. (Budapest-Jerusalem: Balassi Kiado-Yad Vas hem, 2009), pp. 233, 324-325, and 331-332.

208. For further details on rescue, see the bibliographical references listed in 8-A, pp. 462-469.

209. The investigative units of the gendarmerie prepared daily reports about these attacks. One of these reports, dated September 1944, for example, provided details about a partisan attack on August 25 in Belatanya, a small village in Gendarmerie District VIII, where there were 74 Jewish labor servicemen and 53 Hungarian guards. The partisans disarmed the guards, took their weapons and clothes, and left them unharmed but naked. NHA, Section K. (The gendannerie reports were originally filed in the Archives (BM. V II.res. 1944-9100) of the Ministry of the Interior.

210. Among the typical works exaggerating the role of Hungarian resistance and especially of the minuscule Communist Party are Gyula Kallai, A Magyar.fiigge tlensegimozgalom, 1936-1945 (The Hungarian Independence Movement, 1936-1945) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1965), 331 pp.; Fegyverrel a fasizmus ellen (With Guns Against Fascism). Jozsef Gazsi and Istvan Pinter, eds. (Budapest: Zrinyi Katonai Kiado, 1968), 313 pp.; Istvan Pinter, Magyar antifasizmus es ellenallas (Hungarian Anti-Fascism and Resistance) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1975), 488 pp.; Istvan Pinter, A Magyar Front es az ellenallas: 1944. marcius 19.-1945. aprilis 4. (The Hungarian Front and the Resistance: March 19, 1944-April 4, 1945) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1970), 263 pp.; and Jozsef Gazsi, Fenyek a Borzsonyben (Lights in the Borzsony) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1976), 236 pp.

211. Communication by Hillel Danzig, a leading figure of Hungarian Zionism. Danzig claimed that the Party was at first favorably inclined to cooperate and even entrusted the nationalities committee, headed by Mano Buchinger, with the matter. However, no action was ever taken-to a large extent because some of the Jewish leaders, who belonged to the more radical left wing on the Party, opposed it. They presumably insisted on following a strictly class approach to the Jewish question. ln a letter addressed to the Party leadership on June 30, 1946, Danzig expressed his bitterness over the wartime attitude of the Party, and above all over its postwar campaign against Zionism and the attempts to organize Jewish emigration to Palestine. See also Chapter 23 concerning Kasztner’s claim that he had kept the Social Democratic Party leadership informed about the realities of Auschwitz.

212. The important role of the Kallay government (rather than the leftist forces) in opposing the German pressure is emphasized by Ivan Boldizsar in his A masik Magyarorszag. A Magyar ellenallasi mozgalom torte nete (The Other Hungary. The History of the Hungarian Resistance Movement) (Budapest: Az "Uj Magyarorszag" Ropiratai, 1946), 94 pp. The booklet is also available in a French edition: L "'autre" Hongrie. Histoire du movement de resistance hongroise (Budapest: Nouvelle Hongrie, 1946), 76 pp. See also Chapter 7.

213. C. A. Macartney, I: 379-380.

214. See his A Ludovikato/ Sopronkohidaig (From the Ludovika to Sopronkohida) (Budapest: Magveto, 1978), p. 665.

215. The National Peasant Party (Ne mzeli Paraszt Part) was not formally organized until September 19, 1944, though Imre Kovacs and his associates in the "Village Explorers" (Falukutatok) group (see Chapter 2) had completed their plans to found it as early as July 1939. C. A. Macartney, 2: 322. See also Imre Kovacs, Ma gyarorszag megszallas a (The Occupation of Hungary) (Toronto: Vorosvary Kiado, 1979), 400 pp., and Peter Bokor's interview with Imre Kovacs in his Vegjatek a duna menten, op. cit., pp. 272-295.

216. At the outbreak of World War II, the illegal party was known as the Communists ' Party of Hungary (Kommunis tak Ma gyarorszagi Partja). Partly as a result of the 1936 Comintem decision on the dissolution of the party and partly because of embarrassment over the Hitler-Stalin Pact of August 1939, its (illegal) membership, according to an authority on communist affairs, dwindled from 400 in 1936 to around 20 in 1942. In 1943, aiming to overcome its isolation, mislead the Horthy regime, and improve its image among the workers, it changed its name to Peace Party (Bekepart). It was still operating illegally, however. On September 12, 1944, it assumed the name of Communist Party under the initiative of such underground domestic leaders as Laszlo Rajk and Antal Apro.

By 1944, several rival Communist party groups also existed in Hungary. The "Moscovites" (Matyas Rakosi, Erno Gero, Jozsef Revai, Mihaly Farkas, and Zoltan Vas), who had headed the Foreign Committee (Kulfoldi Bizott sag) in the Soviet capital before the liberation, established the Hungarian Communist Party (Magyar Kommunista Part). The local Communists in the parts of Hungary liberated by the Red Army revived the Communists’ Party of Hungary. Ln addition, there was the Communist group led by Pal Demeny and Aladar Weisshaus, which was composed of workers employed in Csepel and some of the suburbs of Budapest. For further details on the conflict within and among the various Hungarian Communist groups and parties, see the articles by Peter Gosztonyi in Menora-Egyenloseg, Toronto, June 8, 22, and July 20, 1974. See also Miklos Molnar, A Short History of the Hungarian Communist Party (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 168 pp., and C. A. Macartney, 2: 332-333.

217. Peter Gosztonyi, Menora, July 20, 1974.

218. C. A. Macartney, 2: 313.

219. For further details, see Sandor Szenes, Bef ej ezetlen mull, op. cit., pp. 92-94, and Peter Bokor’s interview with Istvan Szent-Miklosy in Vegjatek a duna menten, op. cit., pp. 312-333.

Upon the debriefing of Geza Soos and Major Domokos Hadnagy, who on December 9, 1944, flew from Papa to Caserta, Italy, then the European headquarters of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the American intelligence officers prepared two reports. For the text of these reports, including some references to the Jewish question in Hungary and with introductory summaries by Elek Karsai, see A Raday gyiljtemeny e vkony ve (The Yearbook of the Raday Co ll ection). Vols. IV-V, 1984-1985 (Budapest: A Magyar Tudomanyos Akademia, 1986), pp. 238-287.

220. Joint memoranda of the parties composing the Hungarian Front were submitted to Horthy on September 8 and 24. For summaries, see C. A. Macartney, 2: 333-334 and 364-365.

221. For some details, see ibid., 2: 365-366 and 383-385; Leva i, Feketekony v, p. 214. For further details on the possible use of labor servicemen in a general uprising, see below.

222. C. A. Macartney, 2: 444.

223. Ibid., p. 466.

224. Besides Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, Kiss, Tartsay, Nagy, and Revai, the Nyilas also indicted Miklos Makkay, Pal Almassy, Miklos Balassy, Robert Schreib er, Istvan Toth, and Jozsef Kovago. The court, headed by Vilmos Dominich, condemned Bajcsy Zsilinszky, Kiss, Nagy and Tartsay to death. The latter three were executed on December 8 in Budapest; Bajcsy-Zsilinszky was executed in Sopronkohida on December 24. For further details, see Jozsef Domokos, Ket pe r egy kotetben (Two Trials in One Volume) (Budapest: Magveto, 1978), pp. 218-438. See also C. A. Macartney, 2: 456-457 and 462-463. Jeno Levai, A hlJsok hose. Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre a demokracia vertanuja (The Hero of Heroes. Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, the Martyr of Democracy) (Budapest: MU il er Karoly, 1945), 105 pp., and Ervin Hollos, VK. F 2 (Police, Gendarmerie, VKF 2) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1971), pp. 407-415.

225. For details, see Szenes’s interview with Karoly Hetenyi Varga, op. cit. See also Karoly Hetenyi Varga, Katolikus fiatalok a naciellenes mozgalomban (Catholic Young People in the Anti-Nazi Movement). Uj Ember (New Man), Budapest, (December 2, 1984): 2.

226. Dr. Geza Soos, a former minor official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was flown in a stolen plane to San Severo, Italy, on December 9, 1944, to make an appeal to the Western Allies. According to OSS Field Memorandum 237, Dr. Soos brought a long a microfilm copy of the Auschwitz Protocols, but it was not forwarded from Bari to the OSS London Headquarters until April 1945. Dr. Soos's mission was fruitless. C. A. Macartney, 2: 457. A similar and equally fruitless mission had been undertaken earlier by Prince M. Odescalchi, a pilot in the Hungarian Air Force. In the summer of 1944, he landed in error in German-held Ancona instead of Foggia. He was executed by the Nyilas following his extradition from Italy late in the fall. Ibid., 2: 314 and 462.

227. For details on the resistance groups involved in the production and distribution of forged documents, including those led by Tibor Szalai and Matyas Szekely, see Levai, Szurkekony v, pp. 131-136. Small, basically ineffective, partisan groups were organized by the Soviets and dropped in the mountainous regions of northern Hungary beginning in August 1943. Among the Hungarians who participated in partisan activities as advisers or commanders were Ferenc Pataky, Sandor Nogradi, and Marton Szonyi. Minor partisan operations were also conducted a long the Yugoslav borders, especially in the Bacska, in conjunction with the Titoist forcers. Veesenmayer submitted reports on these nuisance operations to the German Foreign Office. See, for example, RLB, Docs. 247-289.

228. Gosztonyi, Menora, June 8, 1974. See also the issue of June 30, 1979. It is not clear whether the small Communist underground acted in concert with the Hungarian Communist exiles in the Soviet Un ion. For some details on the activities of these exiles, see Peter Gosztonyi, " A Magyar antifasiszta mozgalom a Szovjetunioban a II. vilaghabon'.t a latt" (The Hungarian Anti-Fascist Movement in the Soviet Union During the Second World War), Ibid., June 19 and June 26, 1992.

229. Lajos Feher, lgy tort enl (This ls How It Happened) (Budapest: Magveto, 1979), pp. 3 16-320. Unfortunately, the book does not include the text of the flyer.

230. For additional background on Hungarian resistance, see Peter Gosztonyi, A Magyar ellenall asi mozgalom tortenetebol (1944) (From the History of Hungarian Resistance (1944). Uj Latohatar (New Horizon), Munich, 8 (March-April 1965) 2: 99-118, and Ma gyarorszag tortenete (The History of Hungary), Gyorgy Ranki et al., eds. (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1976), pp. 1103-1106, 11 67-1170, 1178-1181, and I 202-1204. For additional details relating to Hungarian resistance, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 437-443.

231. Many of these Zionist couriers acted in cooperation with Dr. Lajos Gottesmann, a Zionist from Kassa, who was one of the leaders in charge of maintaining illegal contact with the provincial ghettos.

232. See, for example, Csendortiszt a Mark6ban, pp. 294 and 311.

233. Bernard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 290-295.

234. For additional biographical details consult Anthony Masters, Th e Summer That Bled. The Biography of Hannah Szenesh (London: Joseph, 1972), 349 pp.; Hannah Szenesh: Her Life and Diary. Introduction by Abba Eban (New York: Schocken Books, 1972), 257 pp.; Szenes Chanaelete, kuldetese es ha/ala (The Life, Mission and Death of Hannah Szenes) (Tel Aviv: A Hakibuc Hameuchad Kiadasa, 1954), 39 1 pp. See also Hecht, Perfidy, pp. 118-126, and the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 458-462.

235. After the war Nussbecher changed his name to Palgi. For his account, which contain s many inaccuracies, see Esjott afergeteg (A Whirlwind Developed) (Tel Aviv: Alexander, n.d.), 376 pp. Born in Kolozsvar in 1918, Nussbecher went to Palestine in 1939 where he joined the Ofakim Kibbutz. After the war, he served in the Israeli air force and later was one of the leading officials of El Al Airlines. From 1963 to 1966, he served as Israel’s Ambassador in Tanzania. He died in February 1978. 236.

Dafni was of Yugoslav background. He remained with the partisans and carried out his military mission, which was to assist in the escape of Allied prisoners and airmen shot down over enemy territory.

237. Katherine Szenes was picked up after the Nyilas coup and taken to the brickyard of Óbuda. From there she was marched in November to Hegyeshalom, but managed to escape and return to Budapest. She survived the war with the aid of Christian friends. For her story see "On the Threshold of Liberation. Reminiscences." ln: YVS, 8: 107-126.

238. Her remains were brought to Israel in 1950 and reinterred on Mount Herzl. For further details, see Katherine Szenes, The Death of Hannah Szenes. Midstream, New York, (Autumn 1958): 57-65. For further details on the life and activities of Hannah Szenes, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 459-462.

239. Asher Cohen, The Halutz Resistance in Hungary, 1941-1944 (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 19 86), p. 120.

240. See Veesenmayer’s telegram of July 8, 1944. RLB, Doc. 287.

241. A tentative agreement to free the parachutists was reportedly reached on October 14 at a conference held in the Ministry of Defense with the participation of Kasztner, Friedrich Born of the International Red Cross, Lieutenant Colonel Jozsef Garzoly of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Otto Hatz, and Istvan Olah, the Secretary of the Ministry. Under the terms of the agreement, the parachutists were to go free and refrain from engaging in any activities or leaving the city pending the final disposition of the case. Der Kastner-Bericht, p. 197.

242. For further details consult Dorothy and Pess ach Bar-Adon, Seven Who Fell (Tel Aviv: The Zionist Organization Youth Department, 1947), pp. 8 1-124 and 186-19 8; Marie Syrkin, Blessed is the Match (Philadelphi a: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1947), 361 pp.; Der Kastner-Bericht, pp. 142-146; and Dina Porat, The Blue and the Yellow Stars of David, pp. 220-228.

243. For further details on the background and activities of the parachutists, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 458-462.

244. Vadirat, 3: 27-37. See also Munkacsi, Hogyan tortent?, pp. 118-124.

245. Gyorgy Gergely, Beszamo a Magyarorszagi Zsidok Szovetsege !de iglenes lntezo Bizottsaga munkajarol ( Report on the Work of the Provisional Executive Committee of the Jewish Council of Hungary) (Budapest, 1945), pp. 36-37. (Manuscript).

246. Levai, Szurke konyv, pp. 200, 203-206. For further details on Section T, see Chapters 10 and 31; on Ujvary's activities, see section "The Vatican and the Budapest Nunciature " in Chapter 31.

247. Zvi Goldfarb, "On ' Hehalutz' Resistance in Hungary." In: Extermination and Resistance (Israel: Kibbutz Lohamei Hagetaot, 1958), I: 162-173. See also his statement of April 1, 1962, in Moreshet, Archives File A. 94. Goldfarb was a leader of the Dror movement. One of his closest associates in the movement was his wife, Neshka, a woman from Munkacs. He died in Kibbutz Parod in January 1978. Ben Shalom, Weil wir Leben wollten (Because We Wanted to Live), 152 pp. Moreshet, Archives File D.2.88. Hebrew edition: Neevaknu le'maan. he'haim (We Struggled for Our Lives) (Givet Haviva: Moreshet, 1977), 223 pp. A leader of the Hehalutz, Ben Shalom came to Budapest in January 1944. A representative of the Hashomer Hatzair movement, he went to Israel in 1947. He later served as Israel’s Ambassador in Mali, Cambodia, and Romania. Revesz, Hashoa be'Hungaria (The Holocaust in Hungary), statement available at the Center for Historical Studies at the University of Haifa, 14 pp.

248. An 18-year-old in 1944, Grosz was particularly active in the printing, storing, and distribution of false papers; he often went about disguised as a Nyilas, in uniform and armed. His account is reproduced in Ben-Shalom’ s Neevaknu le'maan he'haim, pp. 176-205. Mayer, whose underground name was Joska Megyeri, also dressed in Nyilas uniform; he maintained close contact with several non-Jewish resistance groups. For his account see ibid., pp. 149-160. For Pil’s account see YIVO, Archives file 187/3619; for Teichmann's account see Ben-Shalom, Nee vaknu le'maan he'haim, pp. 161-175. See also David Gur, Brothers for Resistance and Rescue. The Underground Zionist Youth Movement in Hungary during World War II. (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House, 2007), 270 pp.

249. Ben-Shalom, Weil wir leben wollen, pp. 32 and 46.

250. For details on the activities of the Halutz youth in 1942 and 1943, see Asher Cohen, The Halutz Resistance in Hungary, op. cit., pp. 16-52, and A halal arnyekaban. A nagy megprobaltatasok kora (In the Shadow of Death. The Age of Great Challenges). Hava Eichler and Yehuda Talmi, eds. (Tel Aviv: A Hanoar Hacioni Vilagmozgalom kozpontja, 1991), 66 pp., and Haim Genizi and Naomi Blank, "The Rescue Efforts of Bnei Akiva in Hungary During the Holocaust." In: YVS, 23 ( 1993): 73-212.

251. See his Weil wir Leben wollten, pp. 6 and 8. See also Chapter 23. 2

52. Ibid., pp. 24-28.

253. The originals of these documents were usually purchased from Polish refugees who had access to Hungarian officials.

254. According to Ben-Shalom this was also the reaction of some Zionists, including Zvi Szilagyi of the Vaada. See his Weil wir Leben wollten, p. 35.

255. Asher Cohen, The Halutz Resistance in Hungary, op. cit., pp. 76 and 91-93. Ganz’s closest collaborator in Kolozsvar was Yehuda (Pici) Levi. Ganz was apprehended in Kolozsvar and deported to Auschwitz, but survived to tell her tale. For further details on the Romanian rescue operations of the Halutz youth, see the testimonies of Hannah Ganz, Eszter Goro-Frankel, Asher Aranyi, and Arieh Hirsch (Eldar) at the Center for Historical Documentation at Haifa University.

256. Ben-Shalom, Weil wir leben wollten, p. 45.

257. Asher Cohen, op. cit., p. 129.

258. Ben-Shalom, Weil wir Leben wollten, pp. 69-70.

259. Formally, the building was administered by a Directorate that included Mihaly Salamon, Albert Geyer, Jeno Frenkel, and Simcha Hunwald. In addition a number of officials, some of them associated with the Central Jewish Council, were actively involved in the processing of the emigration lists. Among these were Erzsebet Eppler and Rabbi Fabian Herskovits. For the accounts of Eppler, Herskovits, and Salamon, see YIVO, Files 768/3647, 768 /3581, and 768/ 3648.

260. Otto Komoly’s diary, entry for September 6, 1944, in HJS, 3: 21 O; Ben Shalom, Weil wir lebe n wollten, pp. 102-105.

261. The conflict between Krausz and the Hehalutz led to Krausz's ouster from the Palestine Office leadership soon after the liberation of Budapest. He was officially informed of his replacement on May 25, 1945, by Barias. In the spring of 1946, he was also tried by a Zionist honor court. Among those who submitted detailed accusations against him were Sandor Groszmann and Rafi Ben-Shalom. See Groszmann’ s Adatok a Moshe Krausz, a Pa/amt volt titkara iigyeben tartando cionista becsiil etbirosagi targyalas ahoz (Data Relating to the Planned Zionist Honor Court in the Case of Moshe Krausz, the Former Secretary of the Palestine Office) (Budapest, April 20, 1946), 2 pp. (typescript), and Ben-Shalom's (signed Rafi Friedl) Klagesschrift g egen den fri.ih eren Leiter des Palestina-A mtes, Moshe Krausz (Indictment Against Moshe Krausz, the Former Leader of the Palestine Office) (Prague, April 14, 1946), 4 pp. (typescript).

Krausz defended himself and his record in a memorandum submitted on March 4, 1946, to the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem. See his Memorandum i.ib er die Tati gke it des Palestina-A mtes in Budapest in den kritischen Kriegs jahren 1941-45 (Memorandum on the Activities of the Palestine Office in Budapest During the Critical War Years of 1941-45) (Budapest, March 4, 1946), 12 pp. (typescript) Copies of all three documents are on file in RG-52.

262. On the resistance activities of the Polish refugees, see Bericht des Leiters des polni sch-jiidisch en Fliichtlingscomites (Report of the Leaders of the Polish-Jewish Refugee Committee), Yad Vashem Archives, M-20/99. See also Ben-Shalom, Weil wir leben wollten, pp. 37-38.

263. For details on Groszmann’s activities, see his personal account: Alexander Grosszman, Nur das Gewissen. Carl Lutz und sein e Budapester Alction. Gesc hicht e und Portrat (Wald: Ver lag im Wald gut, 1986), 284 pp. The book also contains many details on the Halutz organization and resistance. For additional details on the involvement of the Halutz youth in the rescue and feeding of children, see Asher Cohen, op. cit., pp. l80 ff

264. A videotaped interview with Vera Freeman (nee Gorog), taped by this author on November 22, 1997, is on file in RG-52 and in the archives of the VIVO.

265. For details on the background and activities of Pal Fabry, see Peter Bokor, Fehering, tiszta korrnok (White Shirt, Clean Nails). £/et es lrodalom, Budapest, (July 21, 1989): 7 and (July 28, 1989): 7. See also Maria Ember, A cinkos va llat von (The Accomplice ls Shrugging). Magyar Nemzet, Budapest, (August 29, 1989): 7, and Agnes Laszlo, Egysors, egy szazad. Fab, y Pal elete moz aikkepekben (One Fate, One Century. Pal Fabry's Life in a Mosaic of Pictures). (Budapest: Magveto, 1997), 368 pp.

266. Statement by David (Gur) Grosz, pp. 189-191. See also Pal Demeny, Emlekeim (My Memories). Tekintet (View), Budapest, (1988) I: 30-48. See also Asher Cohen, op. cit., pp. 141 ff and 21 Off

267. For references to Jewish and non-Jewish resistance in Hungary, see the bibliographical references listed in 8-A, pp. 443-457. See also Robert Rozett, " Jewish and Hungarian Armed Resistance in Hungary. " ln: YVS, 19: 269-288; and Josef Shefer, " Hanhagat ha' machteret h' eha lutzit be’ Hungaria " (The Leadership of the Halutz Underground in Hungary). In: Hanha gat yehudei Hungaria ba 'mivahan ha 'shoa (The Leadership of Hungarian Jewry in the Test of the Holocaust) (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1975), pp. 135-149; Tanuk vagyunk...! (We Are Witnesses...!). Ervin G. Gal iii, ed. (Tel Aviv: The Editor; 1970), 332 pp.; Levai, Sziirke kony v, pp. 210-214, and Istvan Gabor Benedek and Gyorgy Vamos, Tepd le a sarga cs illagot. lnterjuk az 1944-es budapesti zsido ellenallasrol Rip Off the Yellow Star. Interviews Relating to the Jewish Resistance in Budapest in 1944). (Budapest: Pallas Lap-es Konyvkiado, 1990), 240 pp.

CHAPTER THIRTY

THE ATTITUDE AND

REACTIONS OF THE

CHRISTIAN CHURCHES

The Christian Churches and the Jews

THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES must bear a great responsibility for the Hungarian Jewish catastrophe. Their attitude toward the Jews and their position on the Jewish question before and after World War I not only fostered the climate of anti-Semitism that determined the passivity if not open hostility of the masses, but also shaped their reaction to the Nazis’ Final Solution program. Major pillars of the reactionary regimes, the Christian churches were in the forefront of the national-Christian campaigns that attempted to retain the antiquated semi-feudalistic social order and to protect the " purity of the Christian spirit" in the country. In practice, they interpreted this as a mandate to counter " radical " socialist ideas and movements and to protect the nation from the alleged damaging influence of the Jews-twin objectives they had pursued with equal fervor.

While the potentially most damaging anti-Jewish policies of the Christian churches were adopted in the late 1930’s, the foundation for the anti-Semitic climate that made the Final Solution palatable had been laid in the so-called Golden Era of Hungarian Jewry (1867-1918). Although the anti-Semitic manifestations of this period were effectively controlled by the various Hungarian governments, the Christian churches provided added impetus to the anti-Jewish ideas and movements spearheaded by such political ideologues as Gyozo (Victor) Istoczy and Ivan Simonyi (see Chapter 1). The clergy, especially its lower echelon, also played an important role in the anti-Semitic party that was founded by Istoczy shortly after the end of the notorious Tiszaeszlar ritual murder case in 1882-1883. It also embraced with great fervor the Vatican-sponsored movement for the establishment of Christian Socialist workers' associations, which were clearly designed to isolate and eventually destroy the genuine trade unions, generally labeled as Marxist. The movement was forcefully supported by the Catholic People’s Party (Kato/ikus Neppart), which was for a long time headed by Count Nandor Zichy. Backed by the pro-Hapsburg aristocracy and the great landowners, this clerical, conservative party was particularly devoted to combating the "destructive and anti-Christian" ideas associated with " Jewish liberalism and socialism." One of the central forces behind Christian Socialism was Bishop Ottokar Prohaszka, whose spiritual leadership and sophisticated anti-Semitism exerted a profound influence on public opinion for several decades.

The Christian churches did not welcome the liberal policies of the government and especially resented those providing for the equality of all accepted religions and for the separation of church and state. The increasing militancy of the churches was expressed by their representatives in Parliament, from the pulpits, and through their major organs. For example, the Alkotmany (Constitution), the Catholic People's Party's daily founded in 1896, was the first respectable anti-Semitic national journal in the country. Edited by priests, it reflected a militant Catholicism which often found expression in rampant anti-Semitism. One of the leading experts on organizing and propagandizing for this form of Catholicism was Bela Bangha (1880-1940), the "Hungarian Savonarola." He crystallized the Catholic Church's ideological struggle against its two major opponents in his view-Judaism and socialism. 1

The Christian churches' attitude toward the Jews took a turn for the worse after the disaster of World War I. The military debacle, the "punitive" Trianon Peace Treaty, the failure of the democratic-socialist coalition government of Count Mihaly Karolyi to deal with the grave problems inherited from the past, and above all the radical revolutionary measures that were adopted during the short-lived proletarian dictatorship of Bela Kun had induced the churches to wholeheartedly embrace the counterrevolution that brought Miklos Horthy to power. As was the case in Germany, the Jews-along with communists and freemasons-were used as convenient scapegoats, making them responsible for all the ills that befell Hungary. They had to suffer the fury of the counterrevolutionary White Terror, whose ideological leitmotif was " the 1 Szeged Idea" (A szegedi gondolat). One of the most eloquent spokesmen of this ideology, whose central themes included anti-Bolshevism, anti-Semitism, revisionism, and chauvinistic nationalism, was Bishop Istvan Zadravetz, the country’s chief military chaplain and a leading figure of the Anti-Bolshevik Committee. 2 The idea was also propagated by newly founded ecclesiastical dailies, including the Nemzeti Ujsag (National Journal) and Uj Nemzedek (News Generation), which frequently raised the subject of the "international Jewish conspiracy" that was responsible for Hungary's debacle. The theme was also picked up by clergymen who were elected to Parliament. In his speech of December 3, 1919, for example, Father Gyula Zakany claimed that it was "the fault of the Jews that Hungary's territorial integrity was destroyed." He evoked the same theme before gatherings of the Awakening Magyars (Ebredo Magyarok), one of the many ultra-chauvinistic anti-Jewish organizations that flourished during the period. 3

Perhaps the most disastrous position taken by the leaders of the Christian churches came after the Nazis' acquisition of power in Germany and especially after the Anschluss. Though these leaders were fully aware of the dangers represented by Nazism to the Christian churches and organized religion, they fully supported, and occasionally even spearheaded, the policies aimed at the reacquisition of the lost territories with the aid of the Third Reich. They unwittingly provided a fertile ground for anti-Semitic propaganda by condoning the equation of Jews with Bolshevism and of National Socialism with Christianity. While many of these leaders lived to regret the position they had taken in the late 1930’s, especially during the German occupation, they legitimized many of the extremist policies that had been pursued by the representatives of the Right. Gyula Czapik, the Archbishop of Eger and the second-highest dignitary of the Catholic Church in Hungary, had deplored " the fatal error" of the German Catholic Church not to have identified itself with National Socialism. Bishop Laszlo Ravasz, the leading dignitary of the Reformed (Calvinist) Church, described the German quest for power as a drive motivated by ethical and religious principles.

This assessment was in accord with Bishop Ravasz's anti-Semitic views, which had guided his actions on the Jewish question ever since he first articulated them in 1917.4 Jozsef Grosz, the Archbishop of Kalocsa, argued that the Arrow Cross was compatible with Christ's cross. Bishop Zoltan Turoczy, one of the leading figures of the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church, argued that " true Christianity is not pacifist but militarist, in the spirit of world-conquering totalitarian powers." Istvan Hasz, the bishop of the armed forces, concurred with National Socialist ideas, arguing that "against the Jews, the destroyers of the country, any offense is permissible." 5 Emboldened by the public position taken by their leaders, many clergymen had no scruples about spreading the anti-Jewish poison among the Hungarian masses, which had generally been tolerant until World War I.

The successful molding of public opinion by years of vicious anti-Semitic propaganda, which was reinforced by the social reform promises of the ultra-rightists at home and the successes of the Third Reich abroad, made the Christian churches’ support of the major anti-Jewish laws both logical and destructive. The leaders of the Christian churches supported the adoption of the first two anti-Jewish laws, albeit with decreasing enthusiasm. They mostly thought that these laws had been in line with Hungary’ s national interests, arguing at first that they would in fact "prevent the further exacerbation of the Jewish question and assure the disarming of anti-Semitism." While they had no compunction about supporting the First Anti-Jewish Law of 1938, which allegedly even some Hungarian Jewish leaders had supported in the hope that it would " take the wind out of the Nyilas sails," some objected to a few provisions of the Second Anti-Jewish Law of 1939. Specifically, they objected to the openly racial aspects of the bill, which potentially affected even some Christians. These church leaders insisted on amendments to protect the rights and interests of Christian-Jewish converts and to advance the cause of assimilation and conversion among Jews. To counteract the reaction to these amendments, leaders of the churches represented in the upper house, including Sandor Raffay of the Evangelical Church, 6 Bishop Laszlo Ravasz of the Reformed (Calvinist) Church, and Jusztinian Cardinal Seredi, the Catholic Prince Primate of Hungary, justified the adoption of the laws by emphasizing the "threat" that the cultural, political, and economic influence of the Jews had represented for the national interests of Christian Hungary. 7

Notwithstanding the Jews’ loyalty to Hungary and their contributions to the advancement of Hungary's modernization and culture-they remained Hungarian-speaking even in the Successor States, to the great annoyance of the new authorities and majorities of these States-most of the Hungarian Christian church leaders bad fully aligned themselves with the anti-Semitic reactionary elements in proclaiming that there was a Jewish question requiring an urgent solution. Completely ignoring the socioeconomic realities of the country in general and of the poverty of the majority of the Jews in particular, they proclaimed that the Jews bad acquired so much " spiritual, moral, and material power" that they represented a threat to the Christian community.

The Christian church leaders showed the same insensitivity with respect to the adoption of Law No. II of 1939 and all its corollary decrees that led to the establishment and gradual expansion of the blatantly discriminatory labor service system. One of the few courageous voices of protest was that of Margit Slachta, the Mother Superior of the Social Mission Society, who tried to arouse public opinion and induce the military authorities to put an end to the cruelties and harsh measures that bad been adopted against Jews in the newly annexed part of Transylvania, especially Csikszereda, and against the labor servicemen. 8

The leaders of the Christian churches did, however, oppose the Third Anti-Jewish Law, which was enacted shortly after Hungary’s entry into the war against the Soviet Union in late June 1941. Again, an important reason for their opposition was that the law, which incorporated the racist provisions of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, directly affected many of their parishioners, both converts and Christian-born. As a result of their pressure and influence in the upper house, the law was amended to empower the Minister of Justice to waive the rules under exceptional conditions. Under the compromise solution, many potentially affected Hungarians, including several members of the aristocracy and of the governmental and political elite, were spared from being classified as Jews. 9

The preoccupation with the special interests of converts and Christians of Jewish origin was characteristic of most church leaders' attitude throughout the war, including the German occupation period. The record of their reaction to the Final Solution is at best mixed. Although they abhorred the methods the Nazis and their Hungarian accomplices had employed and though they visibly sympathized with the suffering Jew s, they undertook no effective measures to counteract the designs of those (1364) in charge of the Final Solution. Their measures may with generosity be classified as too little and too late. Whenever dignitaries of the various Christian denominations contacted the leaders of the government in attempts to alleviate at least the means that had been used in "solving" the Jewish question, they usually acted singly and on their own. Their primary concern even during the concentration and deportation of the Jews was the fate of the converts and Christians of Jewish origin.

When the Jews were ordered to wear the Yellow Star, the church leaders intervened primarily to have the converts exempted. They never contemplated emulating the example of many Danes or of Reverend Geza Takaro, the pastor of the First Hungarian Reformed Church of New York, who together with his parishioners expressed their sympathy with the Jews by defiantly wearing the Star of David themselves. 10 Nor did they ever think of adopting the position taken by Metropolitan Stefan, the head of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, and by other Bulgarian church dignitaries, including Metropolitan Kiril of Plovdiv and Metropolitan Neofit of Vidin, who publicly preached against the anti-Semitic policies of their government. 11 Yet Cardinal Seredi, and the other church leaders of Hungary, had presumably been aware of the more lenient treatment of Jews not only in Bulgaria, but also in Romania and Slovakia. They knew, for example, that the Romanians had halted the deportations in late summer 1942 and that most Romanian Jews did not have to wear badges. 12

Although the national leaders of the Christian churches occasionally considered the desirability of taking a public stand, at no time did they actually arouse public opinion against the injustices being committed against the Jews. Moreover, though fully acquainted with the mass murder of the Jews in the Axis-occupied parts of the Soviet Union since 1941 and in possession of the Auschwitz Reports since early May 1944 (see Chapter 23), the leaders of the Christian churches made no reference to them either in their sermons or in their appeals to the members of the government. They did not even share their awareness of the Final Solution with the lower clergy. According to Reverend Gyorgy Kis, "99.9 percent of the clergy were unaware of the death camps in the summer of 1944." 13

Some local church leaders, including Bishop Vilmos Apor of Gyor, had requested that Cardinal Seredi speak out in public against the (1365) violation of the most fundamental values of human rights. The Cardinal failed to act, although he once threatened to take such action. His failure to take a public stand had a negative influence on the other leaders of the Catholic and Protestant churches of Hungary. Many of them remained silent, emboldening the enemies and discouraging the potential rescuers of Jewry. 14 The few bishops who dared to broach the Jewish persecutions in their sermons unfortunately could not stem the tide, for their messages reached only limited local audiences.

Lacking encouragement from the upper levels of the church hierarchy, the junior members of the clergy failed, with a few exceptions, to become actively involved in protesting the concentration and deportation of the Jews. Some clergymen, like the representatives of various church-related organizations, managed to help some individual Jews and expressed shock over the way in which the ghettoization and deportation were carried out. Moved by the suffering of Jews in crammed freight cars, the National Association of Hungarian Catholic Women’ s Organizations (A Magyar Katolikus Noegyletek Ors zagos Szovets ege) and the National Hungarian Reformed Women's League (A Magyar Reformatus Orszagos Noszovetseg), for example, appealed to Sztojay on June 20 through the Hungarian Red Cross (headed by Elemer Simon) to permit the setting up of refreshment stands in the major rail hubs to help alleviate the plight of the Jews. The Prime Minister, after pondering the appeal for three weeks, forwarded the request on July 14, through Lajos Huszovszky, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which promptly approved it. By that time, July 18, the deportations had already been completed in the provinces and halted by Horthy. 15

During the Nyilas era, when the situation of the Budapest Jews became critical, a number of clergymen and nuns became actively involved in various rescue operations (see below). These humanitarian activities, though affecting only the surviving Jews of Budapest, contrast painfully with the insensitivity and lack of urgency that were shown by the top leaders of the churches. 16

The Attitude and Actions of the Catholic Church

After the passage of the new and harsher anti-Jewish measures after the German occupation, the leaders of Hungarian Jewry approached (1366) the dignitaries of the Christian churches for help. They took this step not only because of the vast power and influence the churches had enjoyed, but also because many of the traditional supporters of Jewry, including the anti-Nazi conservative-aristocratic representatives of the former ruling elite, were themselves under arrest. The church leaders reacted swiftly. This may have been because the Germans and the newly in stalled Sztojay government were us ing the Third Anti-Jewish Law as a basis for defining who was and who was not a Jew. Cardinal Seredi first approached Sztojay toward the end of March 1944, taking along a memorandum that was prepared by the Holy Cross Society (Szent ereszt Egyes ii/et),-the association of Jews who had converted to Catholicism. The Cardinal, echoing the views of the Society, expressed great consternation over the plans to make the wearing of the Yellow Star badge compulsory even for converts and Christians of Jewish origin, some of whom were priests and nuns or active members of the church. He reminded the Prime Minister that the Star of David was a symbol of religion and not of the Jewish race and, consequently, its wearing by Christians would be a contradiction.

Sztojay yielded on one point. On April 5, the day the Jews of Hungary began wearing the Yellow Star, the Prime Minister informed the Cardinal that priests, nuns, and lay church officials of Jewish background were to be exempted from the anti-Jewish measures. 17

The Cardinal met again with Sztojay on April 13 to review the position of the Catholic Church. The only result was a suggestion by the Prime Minister that the Church should better concentrate its energies on the struggle against communism. A week after the beginning of the ghettoization in Carpatho-Ruthenia and northeastern Hungary on April 16, Cardinal Seredi, having been informed of the cruelties perpetrated against the Jews, submitted a memorandum to Sztojay in the name of his fellow bishops in which he protested the violations of human rights. Once again he entered a special plea on behalf of converts, arguing that they should be separated from the Jews since they had themselves already done so by virtue of their conversion. He summarized the Catholic Church' s position by demanding:

The exemption of Christians from the measures enacted against Jews. (1367)

The removal of converts from the jurisdiction of the Jewish Council.

The exemption of converts from wearing the Star of David.

Permission for priests falling under the jurisdiction of anti-Jewish laws to have non-Jewish servants.

Recognition by the government that the confiscation of Jewish property often affected children who were no longer Jewish. 18

The Cardinal's failure to deplore the injustice and inhumanity of forcible removal of Jews from their homes, to condemn their concentration into ghettos and the expropriation of their property, or to issue any warning about the possible consequences of the anti-Jewish measures undoubtedly encouraged Sztojay and the other members of the government to proceed with their other and even more sinister designs involving the Jews. As if in gratitude for not having raised these grave issues, Sztojay had assured the Prince Primate in his reply of May 3 that the government had already exempted priests of Jewish origin and asserted that it would do everything possible to safeguard the economic interests of Christians whose parents were affected by the anti-Jewish laws. As to the Yellow Star badge, Sztojay emphasized that it was not construed as a symbol of the Jewish religion, but "as a convenient means for the necessary identification from the administrative point of view of those of the Jewish race." He added that he would not object to the converts wearing a cross as well. 19

In the wake of the deportation from Kistarcsa (April 30) and the ghettoization in Northern Transylvania and other regions, which also affected many converts, the Cardinal approached Sztojay once again, on May 10. This time, too, his primary concern was not the plight of the Jews. He urged that within the ghettos, just as in the labor service companies, the converts be separated from the Jews and allowed to carry out their religious practices. In connection with the deportations, he urged Sztojay to see to it that the deportees did not lose their lives without due process. With respect to the situation within the ghettos, he was particularly concerned that many Christians had been inconvenienced as a result of the forced relocations. (1368)

Cardinal Seredi was kept abreast of the anti-Jewish drive in the various parts of the country by many sources, including his own bishops. On May 11, 1944, for example, Endre Hamvas, the Bishop of Csanad, informed him about the horrors the Jews of Magyarkanizsa, Zenta, Zombor and the other communities had endured while being relocated to Szeged earlier that month. Bishop Hamvas emphasized that horrible as the condition of these Jews had been-many of them were placed in the pigpens of the local sausage factory-the situation of those in Kassa and Nyiregyhaza reportedly was even worse. Appalled as he was, however, Bishop Hamvas felt it important to stress that the efforts of the local clergy were being directed "to exempt the converts from ghettoization, that is to separate them from the Jews."20

Two days after the beginning of the mass deportations on May 15, Cardinal Seredi issued a circular to the bishops summarizing the Catholic Church’s activities and achievements on behalf of the converts. He rationalized his failure to publicize the measures that had been adopted by the government and the interventions of the Church by claiming that such a move might have induced the government to rescind its concessions or given it an excuse to impose additional restrictions on Catholics or Catholic institutions. 21

Papal Nuncio Angelo Rotta

The public silence and apparent indifference of the Cardinal to the Jewish plight bewildered even the Papal Nuncio [Angelo Rotta] and some among the bishops. On May 27, Bishop Apor deplored Cardinal Seredi’s resolution not to publicize the persecutions and violations of human rights. He pleaded with the Cardinal, as head of the Hungarian Catholic Church, to issue a pastoral letter covering the religious and moral implications of the situation in a language understandable to the people, or at least to permit wide distribution of his memorandum of April 23 or give the bishops a free hand to inform and guide their parishioners. Angelo Rotta, the Nuncio, approached Cardinal Seredi on June 8, the day after the completion of the deportations from Carpatho-Ruthenia, northeastern Hungary, and Northern Transylvania, to inquire why he and the bishops of the Catholic Church were not taking a more resolute stand against the government. The Cardinal defended his position with arguments about the possible negative impact of public disclosures and the problems of censorship. He also berated the Nuncio that, according to many sources, the utility of the Apostolic Nunciature in Budapest was questionable. (1369) Reportedly he told the Nuncio: "The Nunciature does nothing and nobody knows if it ever did anything; and it is deceitful for the Apostolic Holy See to maintain diplomatic relations with that German government which carries out the atrocities. " 22

Sztojay sent several of his associates to "enlighten" the Cardinal about the government's anti-Jewish policies. On June 2, Cardinal Seredi was visited by Istvan Antal, the Minister of Justice and of Religious Affairs and Education; on June 7, he received Lajos Huszovszky, a ministerial secretary in the Council of Ministers; on June 8, Bela Imrédy called on him; finally, on June 17 Istvan Barczy invited him and the Catholic bishops to a government luncheon, ostensibly to clarify all the issues raised by the Church. In all of these discussions, the Cardinal reportedly deplored the harsh measures adopted against the Jews and argued that the Jews ought to have been " militarized" and employed in the country or perhaps sent to neutral countries instead of being deported. He rejected the luncheon invitation because acceptance might have been construed as an outright approval of the government's policies. Sztojay tried to placate the Cardinal by informing him in a private letter on June 19 that the five demands expressed in his memorandum of April 23 were practically accepted and carried out by the government. 23

In the meantime, the Cardinal was being subjected to additional pressure to take a public stand and to try to arouse public opinion. On June 15, Laszlo Ravasz, the leader of the Reformed Church, approached him about the issuance of a joint public declaration. That same day, Bishop Apor again urged the Cardinal to take a public stand. 24 On June 27, the Nuncio [Rotta] conveyed the Pope’s desire that the "Hungarian bishops take a public stand in defense of Christian principles and in support of those compatriots that were unjustly affected by the racial laws, and especially on behalf of the Christians." By that time the Cardinal was in fact working on a pastoral letter to be read in all churches during Sunday services. His draft was reworked by Janos Drahos, his deputy, and a number of bishops. The final text, which was adopted after consultation with Bishop Apor and Gyula Czapik, the Bishop of Eger, was dated June 29 and read as follows: (1370)

‘Our dear believers in Christ!

‘The successors of the Apostles, the ever-present visible Head of the Church and the other bishops are, in accordance with the will of God, the preachers and guardians of the unwritten or natural and written or revealed moral laws of God, mainly those of the Ten Commandments. Accordingly, in the nearly two-thousand-year-old history of our Church, they have often raised their voices as chief pastors when these laws have been violated by anyone; and they have stood up for those-regardless of origin, nationality, religion or social position-who suffered ills without determination by valid judicial decree of individual acts of crime in violation of the divine laws; because no one may be lawfully punished for the crimes of other human beings who belong to the same race, nationality or religion, if he personally had no part in the commission of such crime. For that reason they stood up for actual slaves, poor pariahs, etc., and strove to make them equal to free men, they supported the poor, and they strove to raise the oppressed working class.

‘According to the testament of our thousand-year-old history, the members of the Hungarian Council of Bishops also stood up for the poor and for those who suffered innocently, or were persecuted; and they helped them not only by practicing innovative Christian love, but also by endeavoring to have the case of the poor and also the social problem systematically resolved through the legislature, and by trying to have justice prevail in every respect.

‘Above all, they supported the cause of the poor in every manner, because they knew that love is the highest commandment and that according to the words of Christ the poor will always be the ones toward whom love must be practiced. For that reason, even today, they maintain or support the age-old Catholic institutions of love even at great sacrifices, and establish new ones as well.

‘But our predecessor Hungarian bishops also saw to it that social and economic problems were solved systematically through the legislature, in a reasonable manner and free of politics. ln the middle of the last century, they endeavored to promote the liberation of serfs, sacrificing a substantial part of their own income. They also brought mighty sacrifices for the late r agrarian reforms. At the time the Parliament discussed these reforms, the Primate (1371) of the country, on behalf of the Council of Bishops, urged above all the allotting of land to poor families with many children, and proposed interest-free loans so they could secure the necessary working capital. According to the guidance of the socially minded Popes, Leo XIII and Pius XI, our predecessor Hungarian bishops urged the spiritual and material uplifting of the working class, the elevation of its inherent human rights, the just determination of working hours and wages; they supported the bill on old-age and disability insurance, and at the same time they also urged similar insurance for agricultural workers.

‘And whenever anyone’s inherent rights, such as the right to life, human dignity, individual freedom, religious practices, work, making a living, private property, etc., or rights obtained in a legal manner, are unjustly curbed or even taken away, whether by individuals or some communities or the representatives of the State itself, Hungarian bishops are obliged to raise their voices as chief pastors and point out that the aforementioned rights were given by God Himself and not by individuals, by communities or even by the representatives of the State; therefore-except for legal and valid judicial decree-no one and no power on Earth whatsoever can justifiably violate or deny it except for God Himself, or those upon whom God conferred legislative, governmental, judicial or executive power in this matter, because there is no power other than that coming from God. Nevertheless, the power received from God may only be practiced justly, i.e., in accordance with the moral laws of God, because God did not and could not empower anyone to practice injustice and violate His own laws.

‘Now therefore, our dear believers, we, the members of the Hungarian Council of Bishops, hereby fulfill our duty in these fateful times in defense of the innocent, by raising our protesting voices as chief pastors in God’s name against the type of warfare and bombardments condemned by Christian ethics. The destruction of the homes of peaceful citizens remote from any strategically significant site, the machine gunning of peaceful women and children from low-flying airplanes, the crippling of innocent children by the throwing of explosive toys: all these are acts which warfare claiming honesty cannot allow. (1372) But we must also point out that when in this horrible world war God’ s help is so badly needed, when we ourselves should carefully avoid any word or act that would draw God's wrath upon us and our nation, we see with unspeakable sadness that in Christian Hungary a series of measures have been taken that are against the laws of God. To you, our dear believers, we need not list in detail the measures which are well known to you along with the manner of their execution, and which violate or even deny the inherent rights of some of our fellow citizens, even some who are as one with us, members of our holy faith, only because of their origin. And all this is happening without the determination of individual guilt and judicial decree. You could truly only understand all this, if the same deprivation of rights happened to you.

‘As the Chief Pastor of our believers as ordered by God, all partisan politics has been far from us, is still far from us, and will continue to be so, as well as any group interest or any individual interest. We also have no doubt that a part of Jewry has had a guilty subversive influence on the Hungarian economic, social and moral life. It is also a fact that the others did not stand up against their coreligionists in this respect. We do not dispute the fact that the Jewish question must be resolved in a legal and just manner. Therefore we do not object, but actually hold it desirable, that in the economic system of the country the necessary measures be taken and the rightfully objectionable symptoms be remedied. However, we would neglect our moral and pastoral duty if we did not make very certain that the just shall not suffer, and that our Hungarian fellow citizens and Catholic believers not be offended merely because of their origins; therefore we have endeavored for several months through oral and written negotiations to protect the just generally, and especially our fellow citizens and believers who had been made victims of recently issued injurious measures: we have asked for the modification, and as it were, the repeal, of the injurious orders themselves.

‘Although we have occasionally been successful in reaching some mitigation which we accepted with gratitude, we are nevertheless deeply grieved that during our negotiations we simply could not obtain what we would have liked best, that the unjust violations and deprivation of rights, mainly the deportations, should finally be terminated. Since we were confident in Christianity, humanitarianism, and the humanity of the members of the government, we have (1373) not given up all hope despite the lack of success experienced until now; we have not issued statements to you but, other than taking the steps that were possible, we restrained ourselves and waited.

‘But now, when we see with great shock that our negotiations have been almost without success, especially in the most important respects, we solemnly disavow our responsibility. But in defense of the divine laws and by this means we also ask the competent authorities, recognizing their responsibility to God and history, to urgently remedy the injurious measures. These measures not only cause legal insecurity at this time of fighting for the existence of the nation, but they also disturb the unity of the nation, tum the common opinion of the Christian world against us, and more importantly they turn God against us.

‘Now as ever, we can have confidence in God above all, and therefore we ask you, dear believers, to pray together with us and work for the victory of justice and Christian love. Be careful that by approval or promotion of the objectionable acts you do not take the horrible responsibility upon yourselves before God and mankind. Do not forget that the true well-being of the homeland cannot be served through injustice. Pray and work for all our Hungarian co-citizens without exception, mainly for our Catholic brethren, for our Catholic Church and for our beloved Hungarian homeland.

‘Our chief-pastoral blessings on such intention, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, Amen. 25

The pastoral letter was brought to the attention of Antal, who promptly stopped its distribution, although some of the archdioceses, including those of Eger and Kalocsa, had received it before Antal’ s order was issued. It was reportedly read in some of the churches in these dioceses. Following a resolution of the Council of Ministers, Antal visited Seredi on July 6 in Gerecse, the Cardinal's summer residence. Although he once again condemned the actions of the government, the Cardinal, especially after he was warned about the consequences of a possible Nyilas takeover of the government, expressed a readiness to withdraw the pastoral letter if the Prime Minister informed him officially that he had accepted the demands outlined in his earlier memoranda, namely that the Christians were exempted from the anti-(1374) Jewish measures and the government did everything in its power to bring about the return of Christian deportees; the Church authorities could inform the parishioners that they were conducting negotiations with the government on the Jewish question and had already achieved certain concessions.

Upon Antal's immediate acceptance of the first two conditions, on July 7, Cardinal Seredi instructed all the parish heads by telegram to refrain from reading the pastoral letter. The following day (two days after Horthy had stopped the deportations) some of the leading members of the government-among them Sztojay, Antal, Imredy, and Kunder-appeared in Gerecse in an effort to solve the outstanding issues still plaguing church-state relations. Sztojay brought along a letter he had written the day before to summarize the government's position and the planned actions in response to the Church's demands. It read as follows:

‘In my reply dated June 19, 1944, to Your Eminence's letter dated May I 0, 1944, I was as yet unable to inform you in full detail of the planned, and since then partially executed, measures concerning Jews of Christian faith. However in my present letter I can give you more detailed and in the case of some concrete questions more factual information.

‘According to the wish expressed repeatedly by Your Eminence, the Royal Hungarian Government has taken the following measures regarding the modification of the rules relating to Jews, beyond the ones already known:

‘1. On July 6, 1944, it established the Organization of Christian Jews, which takes care of and bandies matters concerning Jews belonging to Christian denominations to protect their interests, independently from the Association of the Jews of Hungary.

‘2. It has ordered a strict investigation to ascertain whether cruelties and ruthless procedures indeed happened in connection with the transportation and relocation of Jews. As a result of the investigation it has been ascertained that the rumors about cruelties and ruthless handling are generally untrue or at least strongly exaggerated. However, there is no doubt that in isolated cases irregular behavior by some authorities has actually happened, contrary to the intention of the Minister of (1375) Internal Affairs. In such cases, the Minister of Internal Affairs has applied the strictest sanctions, and he will prevent the recurrence of simi lar cases with the same sanctions and other strict preventive measures in the future.

‘3. The deportation from the country of the Jews of Budapest has been suspended until further notice.

‘4. In the event that it is necessary in the future that the Jews of Budapest be deported from the country, the Christian Jews will remain in the country. It is true that the Jews mentioned will still live in segregated apartments; however, organized care will be taken to ensure the free practice of their religion, and visits to churches and undisturbed spiritual care in general shall be secured by every means.

‘5. The relatives (parents, brothers and sisters, wives and children) of pastors of the Protestant churches will be excused from wearing the distinctive badge and from all associated consequences. In notifying Your Eminence of the above, may I express the hope that these measures, which under present circumstances may be regarded as far-reaching, will provide assurance concerning the protection of the lofty principles expressed by Your Eminence. 26

Sztojay's assurances must have assuaged the Cardinal, for be agreed to a compromise formula under which on July 8 and 9 the state radio was to broadcast to all parishes the Cardinal's communication that the pastoral letter was designed only for the information of the priests and church officials, and was not to be read before the parishioners. Instead, the following note would be read:

‘Jusztinian Cardinal Seredi... informs the Catholic faithful in His name and in the name of the Council of Bishops that He has repeatedly approached the Royal Hungarian Government in connection with the decrees relating to the Jews and especially the converts and is continuing his negotiations in this respect. 27

Anticipating criticism for his apparent surrender to the government, the Cardinal addressed a confidential letter to the bishops on July (1376) 9 explaining the reasons for his actions. In it he reviewed his activities since May 17, the date of his first communication to them, emphasizing his efforts to bring about the suspension of the deportations, and be set forth his reasons for the preparation and eventual rescinding of the pastoral letter. He concluded with his belief that the faithful would realize, through the radio announcement and the brief text read from the pulpits, that the Church had done its duty and that the secret negotiations bad yielded results that would have been impossible to achieve through an open conflict with the government. 28

The short note was read in all the Catholic churches of Hungary on July 16, by which time the only Jews left in Hungary were in the labor service companies or in Budapest. Although Bishop Apor had approached the Cardinal once again, on July 15, to urge him to be on guard against violations by the government of its assurances and to propose additional measures, he no longer raised the question of arousing public opinion. 29

In retrospect, it may have been just as well that the Pastoral letter was not read. Even though by the time it was supposed to have been read, Hungary-with the notable exception of Budapest-was already virtually Judenrein, the pastoral letter which the Cardinal decided to issue after such an inexcusable delay contained an inflammatory and reprehensible anti-Jewish statement. Even in this document reportedly designed to help the Jews, the Cardinal had felt it necessary to state that there was no doubt that one part of Jewry "bad a guilty subversive influence on the Hungarian economic, social and moral life... [while] the others did not stand up against their coreligionists in this respect. " Reverend Gyorgy Kis made the following poignant observation in this connection:

‘Thus in June 1944, after the provincial Jews and many tens of thousands of Jewish-Christians had been taken out of the country-physically and spiritually tormented, humiliated, robbed, and crowded into cattle cars-with most of them were already killed by the time the pastoral letter appeared, Prince Primate Seredi divides Hungarian Jewry into two parts. One part is guilty because it exercised a destructive influence on Hungarian life in every respect, the other, on the other hand, sinned with its silence because " it did not stand up against their coreligionists." What is the logical (1377) consequence of this? That both parts, that is all of Jewry, are to be condemned. 30

Throughout, the Cardinal pursued a discreet and private approach in dealing with the government even though he was fully informed about the problems that continued to plague the remnant of the Jewish community, including the "illegal" deportations from the Kistarcsa and Sarvar internment camps. 31 His failure to take a public stand was a cause of distress not only for the persecuted Jews, but also for many noted Hungarians living in exile. Petofi Radio, for example, commenting on a speech the Cardinal had made in mid-August, stated that the world, including Hungary's Christian society, had been without a pronouncement by him for five full months. The Cardinal's silence, the broadcast continued, led American-Hungarian Catholics to believe that he had been either imprisoned or murdered. 32

The Attitude and Actions of the Protestant Churches

The reaction of the Protestant churches to the anti-Jewish measures was not fundamentally different from that of the Catholic Church. 33 In fact, in most cases the attitude and actions of the leaders of the two Protestant church associations-the Universal Convent of the Reformed Church of Hungary (A Magyarorszagi R eformatus Egyhaz Egyetemes Konventje) and the Directorate of the Universal Evangelical Church of Hungary (A Magyarorszagi Evangelikus Egyhazegye tem Elnoksege)-generally paralleled those of Cardinal Seredi. 34 Although they too agonized over the plight of the Jews, especially over the manner in which the Jewish question was being solved, their primary concern had also been the welfare of the converts. Like the Catholic hierarchy, they mostly expressed this concern discreetly, appealing individually or collectively to the local or central leaders of the government for the redress of injustices.

Bishop Ravasz had approached Minister of the Interior Jaross and Gyula Arnbrozy, the head of the Regent’s Cabinet Office, on April 3, protesting the anti-Jewish measures and asking for exemptions from wearing the Yellow Star. He was particularly interested in exemptions for all officials and employees of the Protestant churches, including (1378) teachers, cantors, deacons, and church wardens of Jewish origin. He also pleaded for the establishment of a separate "Christian Jewish Council." He addressed a similar appeal to Sztojay on April 6.35

On April 12, Bishop Ravasz visited both Andras Tasnadi Nagy, the president of the lower house of the Parliament, and the Regent. He contacted the former to repeat the requests he had previously addressed to Jaross and Sztojay and to ask for certain exemptions for Jews, especially scientists, artists, and soldiers. He used the meeting with Horthy to urge him not to adopt any position in connection with the Jewish question that might " shift responsibility for the coming cruelties onto his unsullied name." Bishop Ravasz visited Horthy again on April 28. The day before, Ravasz had met Zsigmond Perenyi, the president of the upper house, who informed him about the measures that had already been taken against the Jews in Carpatho-Ruthenia and northeastern Hungary. Briefed by Samu Kahan-Frankl and Imre Reiner, two leading officials of the Central Jewish Council, Perenyi emphasized that the ghettoization of the Jews was but the prelude to their deportation and that their fate would be similar to that suffered by the Polish and Slovak Jews. 36 It was during this fateful meeting with Bishop Ravasz that Horthy revealed that he had given his consent to the delivery of a few hundred thousand Jewish workers to Germany in order to save Christian Hungarian workers. 37

Sztojay's response to Bishop Ravasz’s appeal of April 6 came on May 10. It was basically identical with the one that he had given to Cardinal Seredi concerning the same requests. 38 The Prime Minister emphasized that the Jewish question was being solved not on religious but on racial grounds. On May 9, the Bishop visited Sztojay in the company of Miklos Mester, the former Imredyist State Secretary in the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Education who turned against the Germans and the Nyilas in the summer of 1944. Bishop Ravasz sent another appeal to the Prime Minister of May 19 in which he protested against the measures that had been taken against the Jews. He stated, inter alia: "We see signs which indicate that in addition to the separation, deportation across the country’s border might also be in preparation." 39 This was four days after the deportations were already in full swing!

That same day, Bishop Ravasz received Karoly Wilhelm, a leading member of the Central Jewish Council, who informed him in detail (1379) about the deportations from Carpatho-Ruthenia and northeastern Hungary. Explaining that this time it was no longer a question of the humiliation or expropriation of the Jews, but a matter of their very survival, he pleaded for the help from the Reformed Church. The Bishop assured him that the Church had fulfilled its duty through the new petition he had just forwarded to the Prime Minister. 40 A young minister was sent to Kassa to check the veracity of Wilhelm’s report. He returned almost immediately fully corroborating it. New memoranda were submitted to Sztojay warning the government against the possible consequences of their unjust measures, but the response was always vague and noncommittal. While these memoranda included a condemnation of the deportations, their focus was primarily on the fate of the converts. The church leaders demanded the right for the ministers of the various denominations to serve the spiritual needs of their congregants in the ghettos, and the identification as Christians of persons who had converted before their children had reached seven years of age. 41

With ample new evidence about the cruelties with which the Jewish question was being "solved," the leaders of the Protestant churches approached Cardinal Seredi sometime in May to undertake, along the example of the Dutch and Danish churches, a joint campaign to thwart the government’s anti-Jewish measures. A meeting toward this end, organized through the good offices of Jozsef Cavallier, the head of the Holy Cross Society, was actually held in the Cardinal' s office in the Royal Palace which was but it yielded no positive results. 42 In addition to Cavallier, the meeting was attended by Father Jozsef Janosi and by Sandor Torok, the representative of the converts in the Central Jewish Council. According to Torok, when the Cardinal heard the plan of action outlined by the delegation he threw his skullcap to the floor in anger and declared: " If His Holiness the Pope does nothing against Hitler, what can I do in my narrower jurisdiction? Damn it." 43

The need for possible joint action by the Christian churches was raised with Bishop Ravasz by Cavallier as early as May 3. Bishop Ravasz first approached Cardinal Seredi on June 15 via a letter that was taken to Esztergom, the Prince Primate’ s See, by Cavallier. Bishop Ravasz raised the right question, but also offered an unfortunate loophole for temporizing over it. He asked: "When will the Christian churches deem the time to be ripe to voice their solemn declaration in protest, before (1380) the country and the world, against the inhuman methods currently being used in the handling of the Jewish question?" Although the mass deportations were already in full swing, Bishop Ravasz suggested that before such a public stand were taken, a delegation of churches should hand the government leaders "a final earnest warning." 44 The Bishop was apparently still more concerned with the possible breach in church state relations than with the murderous campaign against the Jews.

It appears that Bishop Ravasz completely ignored the pleas and suggestions advanced by Reverend Jozsef Elias, the leader of the Good Shepherd Committee (Jo Pasztor Bizottsag), his church's agency in charge of converts. In a June 1944 letter addressed to all the bishops of the Protestant churches, Reverend Elias proposed that a delegation of the heads or representatives of the Christian churches should go to Sztojay and announce that unless the government halted the deportations, the anti-Jewish measures would be publicly condemned through pastoral letters read in all the churches. If this demand were left unheeded, he proposed that the Christian church leaders should close all the churches, refuse to administer the sacraments to those who were involved in the deportations and to their families, and keep the church bells silent while the deportations lasted. 45 Cavallier took a copy of Bishop Ravasz’s proposed protest memorandum to Seredi, but the Cardinal did not find it possible to cooperate. 46 The Protestant church leaders consequently decided to forward the memorandum without him. The text was not finalized until June 20, because it had to have the approval and signature of the nine Protestant bishops. The memorandum, addressed to Sztojay, conveyed the church leaders' dismay over the manner in which the Jewish question was being solved. While they implored the Prime Minister to put an end to the atrocities, they emphasized that for the time being at least, they would not bring this issue to public attention in order not to aggravate his political difficulties. The memorandum was handed to Sztojay on June 23 by a delegation composed of Bishops Ravasz and Kapi, who were accompanied by Jeno Balogh and Baron Albert Radvanszky, the lay leaders of the Reformed (Calvinist) and Evangelical churches. 47

Sztojay told the church representatives that the accounts which charged that the Jews had been tortured were exaggerated. He referred to Laszlo Endre’s assurances that the converts were being separated (1381) from the Jews, that they were adequately represented within the Central Jewish Council by the noted writer Sandor Torok, and that the administrative and security organs of the state had been instructed to deal humanely with the Jews. Sztojay also repeated the standard lie that the Jews were merely being taken to Germany to work and that the families were being sent along to spare them from unnecessary worry about their loved ones. A copy of Endre's note of June 16 was forwarded by Huszovszky to Bishop Raffay on July 4.48

Probably frustrated by the failure of the delegation to get substantive concessions from Sztojay, on June 27 Raffay contacted Cardinal Seredi on his own, suggesting that the three long-established churches of Hungary submit a joint protest to either Horthy or Sztojay. The subject was once again "the shameful failure of the churches to protect their faithful" and the fact that the converts were concentrated together with Jews in camps and ghettos operating under the jurisdiction of Jewish Councils. 49 Once again, the Cardinal rejected the appeal, arguing that be was largely achieving his goals without such an approach and moreover that the churches must not expose themselves to the possibility of failure. 50

Since the Protestant church leaders found the responses of the government unsatisfactory, they decided to issue a pastoral letter to inform their congregants about their efforts on behalf of the persecuted. The letter, which was to be read in all churches on July 2, was drawn up by Bishop Ravasz. It read in part:

Brethren in Jesus Christ! The undersigned bishops of the Reformed Church in Hungary and the Evangelical Church in Hungary turn to you to inform you, in the presence of God, of the steps they have taken in the name of the Evangelical churches with respect to the Royal government. We inform the holy congregations that, after several petitions made in writing and orally, on June 23 we presented a solemn memorandum of protest and plea to the Premier. In this memorandum we related the utterly regrettable events which accompanied the segregation and deportation of the Jews of Hungary, whether Jews or Christians by faith. Having stated that this mode of solving the Jewish question violated God's eternal laws, the memorandum went on as follows: God has ordained us to declare to this generation His eternal gospel, and to stand as (1382) witnesses by the unchangeable laws of His world order, whether or not it pleases men. Standing on the foundation of this divine commission, humble and sinful men as we are, yet testifying to God’ s word in the sacred communion of faith and obedience, we condemn all modes of action which violate human dignity, justice and mercy and bring upon the head of our people the frightful judgment of bloodshed. At the sa me time, we earnestly besought the Royal government to put an end to the cruelties that were condemned by members of the government themselves as well, and to enforce the formal pronouncements on the one hand protesting against the assumption that the extermination of the Jews was a reality, and on the other hand containing instructions for the humane administration of the rules and regulation s pertaining to the Jews. We have to note that these pleas of ours led to no results... 51

Like Cardinal Seredi’s proposed pastoral letter, by the time this letter was scheduled to be read the deportations from the provinces had virtually been completed. At the end, the letter was not read either. Several of the bishops and their local church councils insisted that the letter also include a reference to the "inhumane bombings" inflicted upon Hungary. A new letter incorporating this reference was scheduled to be read on July 9.

Antal got wind of the Protestant church leaders ' intentions and disarmed them by the same technique he had earlier used with the Cardinal. At a meeting held in Ravasz's home in Leanyfalu on July 11, which was also attended by Mester, Bishops Kapi and Revesz, Reverend Albert Bereczky, and Szabolcs Lorinczy, Antal gave the same assurances concerning the special treatment of the converts and about the more humane treatment of the Jews. The church leaders yielded, rationalizing that an open break with the government might bring the Nyilas into power, which would be disastrous not only for the churches and the country but also for the Jews of Budapest. The formula of agreement was identical with the one that had been reached with the Cardinal. On July 12, the ministers of the Protestant churches were instructed to read the following text to their congregants during the July 16 Sunday morning services: (1383)

The Bishops of the Reformed Church of Hungary and the Evangelical Church of Hungary wish to inform the congregations that in connection with the Jewish question, a nd particularly the baptized Jews, they have repeatedly taken steps with the appropriate government officials and will continue to do so. 52

The efforts of the church leaders yielded some positive results. They gained exemption for church officials of Jewish background, as well as for persons in mixed marriages. They also achieved a more lenient treatment of converts, for the defense of whose interest a special council-the Association of the Christian Jews of Hungary (A Magyarorszagi Kereszteny Zsidok Szovetsege )-was established on July 14 (see Chapter 14). Concurrently a campaign was launched to register those who had converted before August 1, 1941. 53 This move, coupled with the leaking of Sztojay’s July 7 assurances to the Cardinal that converts would be exempted in case the deportations were resumed, caused many Jews to convert-to the dismay of both Orthodox Jews and the Nyilas.

The church leaders also undoubtedly contributed to the Regent’s decision to halt the deportations. Nevertheless, their covert although well intentioned negotiations, and the failure to give clear-cut guidance to the clergymen and the Christian masses, contributed to the climate that made the unhindered implementation of the Final Solution possible. 54

The Attitude and Actions of Individual Bishops

Most of the bishops of the various dioceses did everything in their power to induce the local authorities to alleviate the plight of the Jews. They also often contacted the central leaders of the Hungarian government. Again, with one or two exceptions the approach was private.

Among those who were indefatigable in their interventions in behalf of the Jews and especially the converts were Baron Vilmos Apor, the Bishop of Gyor, and Gyula Czapik, the Bishop of Eger. The former was so relentless in his protests that Jaross had threatened to imprison him. Bishops Lajos Shvoy and Endre Hamvas, the Bishops of Szekesfebervar and Csanad, respectively, expressed shock and consternation over the cruelties they had witnessed in their dioceses. This was also true of Jozsef Grosz, the Bishop of Kalocsa, Ferenc Virag, the Bishop (1384) of Pecs, and Sandor Kovacs, the Bishop of Szombathely. 55 Most bishops also pressured the Cardinal to take more vigorous leadership in opposing the government's anti-Jewish policies. 56

Three of the bishops publicly raised the issue of ghettoization and deportation on their own. During his Whitsunday sermon, Bishop Apor declared:

And he who denies the fundamental laws of Christianity about love and asserts that there are people and groups and races one is permitted to hate, and advocates that there are men whom one may torture, be they either Negroes or Jews, no matter how much he may boast of being Christian is in fact a pagan and clearly guilty.... And all those who approve such tortures and participate in their commission commit a serious crime and will not receive absolution until they make amends for their sin. 57

Bishop Hamvas of Csanad, speaking at the ordination ceremony for new priests in the Szeged cathedral on June 25, when the Jews of the district were being deported, also expressed himself courageously and eloquently:

It is especially important now to proclaim the truth because men's reason has been beclouded and their judgment impaired under the impact of one-sided propaganda. They consider as permissible, even praiseworthy, things that are forbidden by God as very grave sins and consider as Christian acts and feelings which are the most characteristic fruits of neo-paganism and cannot under any conditions be identified with Christianity. For what is happening nowadays? In the name of Christianity, hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people are deprived of their property and homes and are deported because of their race, which they are unable to do anything about, so that a flood of suffering descends upon them exposing their health and lives to uncertainty and denying their human dignity. Among these hundreds of thousands are innocent children, defenseless women, helpless old people and pitifully sick persons.... Some try to defend and explain the situation by simply labeling the entire race as guilty. But Christian morality states: The accused must be brought before a court and given an opportunity to defend himself, and may be condemned only after having been proven guilty; and the sentence must be proportionate to the (1385) crime... God's laws protect the right of every man, even the Negro and the Jew, and defend their right to property, liberty, dignity, and health and life. We do not say this as friends of Jews but as friends of truth. God gave certain fundamental rights to all men, irrespective of their national, racial or class differences. 58

Earlier that month, Bishop Hamvas wrote an urgent appeal to Prefect Aladar Magyary-Kossa, requesting his intervention on behalf of the Jews of Szeged who were about to be transferred to the local brickyard for entrainment and deportation. 59 In a letter to the Prince Primate dated July 15, he also expressed his outrage over the indignities to which the Jews, especially the women, were subjected during the body searches for valuables. 60

Perhaps the most courageous public stand was taken by Bishop Aron Marton, whose diocese covered all of Transylvania and who occasionally preached in Hungarian-held Northern Transylvania although his bishopric had its seat in the Romanian-held part of Transylvania, at Alba-Julia (Gyulafehervar). Speaking in St. Michael's Church of Kolozsvar on May 18, when most of the Jews of the surrounding area were still in the local ghetto, he movingly condemned the measures that were adopted against the Jews-in contrast to his Protestant counterparts in the area, who kept silent. His sermon, which was mimeographed and reportedly even distributed in other parts of the country, deserves extensive quotation:

Faithful to the command of its Godly founder, the Church, accepting and propagating man's love for his fellow man, has advocated the principle that the human race belongs to a single great family. ln addition to the positive command to show love for one's fellow man, the basis of the Church's attitude and consistent position was the fundamental belief of Christianity that we are all God’s children and are all brothers in Christ. The world is denying both these propositions, in both theory and practice. It has rejected the idea of everyone' s being God's children and especially that of brotherhood in Christ, with the proclamation of high-sounding and misleading ideas in the name of science. It has worked against the success of love for one’ s fellow man by pursuing one-sided and unjust interests under various slogans and often in the name of saintly pronouncements. We do not have the time (or the proper (1386) forum) to challenge this: when we are confronted with passion and subjectivity, the rational mind cannot help much. Against spiritual blindness the only effective remedy is God's mercy, and theories, no matter how contemporary they are proclaimed to be, are buried by newer theories. For us, however, my dear brothers, the fundamental premise of our belief, the command to love one's fellow man, still holds, and its open acceptance and practice is even more of a duty today than in former times. The appellation Christian, which has been used so many times as a symbol with so many meanings, compels us to do so, my brothers! He who sins against his fellow man endangers one of the great achievements of the 2,000-year work of Christianity-the idea of the brotherhood of man. He proceeds not in a Christian but in a pagan spirit and willingly or unwillingly joins those drives that split the nations into races, separate social classes and selfish unions, and set the nations against each other in irreconcilable animosities. And finally, my brothers, our last, nonnegotiable treasure compels us to this stand: our people' s honor. The people everywhere long for an order built on justice, on laws that are applied equally to all, and on love toward all, because they know through their innate feeling for justice and timeless experience that only this can give their life that sure framework within which they can work peacefully for themselves and the welfare of their families and the community. I have been informed that my parishioners, starting at the easternmost borders of the Church district, have been greatly shocked by news of the restriction of freedom and uncertain fate of certain persons, and have followed with great concern the measures that have lately been carried out against the Jews. I was most pleased to hear of this moral conception, opinion and judgment of my worshipers; I mention this with chief-pastoral pride because this is the conception, opinion and judgment of the broad masses and at the same time the happy sign that the true Catholic spirit is deeply rooted and still alive in our people’s soul as a living force. In the defense of truth and the service of love, persecution and imprisonment are a mark not of shame but of honor. 61

Bishop Marton’s stand was not well received by the Hungarian authorities. Rebuked by Jaross, he returned to Alba-Julia at the end of May and, having become a persona non grata, did not reenter Northern Transylvania until after the end of the war. 62 (1387)

One of the bishops whose attitude became the source of considerable controversy after the war was Jozsef Mindszenty, the Bishop of Veszprem, who later succeeded Cardinal Seredi as the Prince Primate of Hungary. Following the deportation of the Jews of Veszprem, Dr. Ferenc Schibema, the head of the local Nyilas party who also doubled as an SS-Obersturmführer, reportedly approached the local Franciscan monks, asking them to offer a solemn service and Te Deum in gratitude for the solution of the Jewish question in the city. 63 The bishop protested against the plan, arguing that the deportees also included converts, but reportedly relented after the Nyilas had threatened to distribute a flyer about his opposition. He finally permitted a special service on the condition that it should not include a Te Deum and that the Nyilas refrain from appearing in uniform. The services were held on July 25 in a church filled with worshipers, with a monk in festive green vestments offering the mass. (The Nyilas did appear in uniform.)64

The incident at Veszprem was unique; there is no evidence that such special services were held in any other town. On the other hand, there is also no evidence that the brave stands taken by Bishops Apor, Hamvas, and Marton had any impact on the masses in their particular dioceses. The anti-Jewish measures were carried out in these areas with the same ease and with most of the Christian population as passive as everywhere else in the country.

Source materials relating to the attitude and reactions of lower ranking clergymen are scanty. The large number of personal narratives and memoirs, both published and unpublished, after the war yield an incomplete picture. A number of priests and ministers took an active part in the weak Hungarian resistance movement and did their best to help the persecuted. Foremost among these were Reverend Albert Bereczky of the Reformed Church and Monsignor Bela Varga of the Roman Catholic Church. 65 Special mention should also be made of Dezso Angyal, Andras Egyed, Geza Izay, Ferenc Kallo, Ferenc Kohler, Jakab Raile, and Laszlo Remete, who had played an active role in both resistance and Jewish rescue work. 66 Many of the clergymen and women became particularly involved in rescue and relief work during the Nyilas era. The overwhelming majority of the clergy, however-in the absence of guidance and encouragement from their superiors-reflected the passivity of the population at large. Some occasionally (1388) expressed dismay over the manner in which the Jews were being treated in their communities, usually showing special concern for the welfare of the converts. To alleviate the plight of the latter, they normally approached their immediate superiors or the central leaders of their faith. Their attitude is illustrated by that of Father Elek Oberndorf of the Evangelical Church in Mohacs. In an appeal to Radvanszky on behalf of three local converted women, he articulated the views and feelings of many clergymen:

I know that Jewry was a foreign element in the nation’s body, which had to be removed. It is not against this, but against the manner of its implementation that every Hungarian of good will has objections. I now restrict my complaints exclusively to my Protestant brethren of the Jewish race who were entrusted to me by God.

In concluding his plea, Father Oberndorf pointed out that he "never was a friend of the Jews, but was a friend and brother of those with whom he had become united in Christ." 67

In contrast to the minority that tried to help and the many who were passive, a few clergymen actually sided with the Nyilas, giving them spiritual and occasionally even physical support in the implementation of anti-Jewish measures. For example, Dean Ignac Laszlo of Gyergy Oszentmiklos, a member of the upper house, advocated the physical annihilation of the Jewish people. 68 Another example is that of Father Andras Kun, a Minorite monk who was reportedly at odds with the church hierarchy. Wearing a gun and a Nyilas armband, he was involved in the torture-filled investigation of 300 protected Jews in the Budapest Nyilas headquarters at 14 Varoshaz Street. Approximately 200 of these Jews were subsequently shot along the banks of the Danube. Father Kun was also involved in the January 11, 1945, massacre of the patients and staff of the Jewish Hospital on Maros Street, where he reportedly ordered the Nyilas to fire in the "holy name of Christ." 69

The Christian Churches During the Nyilas Era

During the Nyilas era, the leaders of the Christian churches resumed their pleas on behalf of the Jews. Earlier in July 1944, Antal had warned the church leaders that an open confrontation with the govern (1389) ment might bring about a Nyilas takeover of power. Yet, when this very thing occurred, the church leaders continued to rely on the same tactics, even though the social order they so faithfully supported had been destroyed.

The Papal Nuncio again took the initiative in warning the new rulers of Hungary against resuming draconic measures against the Jews. Cardinal Seredi also contacted Szálasi on October 24 and 27 and submitted a memorandum on November 2; however, while he raised the Jewish question, his primary concern was with the government’ s planned actions in view of the worsening military situation. In light of the rapid advance of the Red Army, the Cardinal discussed the advisability of evacuation and urged that Budapest and Esztergom be declared open cities.

On November 8, following the start of the death marches to Hegyeshalom (see Chapter 26), the Cardinal protested the treatment of the Jews, demanding the safeguarding of their right to life and reminding Szálasi about the Sztojay government' s assurances concerning the suspension of the deportations. Shortly afterwards Bishop Ravasz submitted a memorandum with five specific demands: declaration of Budapest as an open city; discarding the plans for the city’s evacuation; adoption of humane methods in the treatment of Jews; ending of the deportations; and safeguarding Jewish lives. Szálasi’s response was delivered by Jeno Szollosi, the Deputy Prime Minister, on November 24. The church leaders were told that Szálasi had obtained assurances from Hitler that the bridges and public works of Budapest would not be destroyed. They were also told that the Jews would be separated and the labor servicemen (including at this time all able-bodied Jewish men and women) would be transferred closer to the German border "in order to prevent their vengeance against Hungarians in case of a Russian occupation."

Dissatisfied with the government' s reply, on November 26, Bishop Ravasz approached Cardinal Seredi via Valdemar Langlet, the representative of the Swedish Red Cross, suggesting that a delegation composed of the leaders of the three churches visit Szálasi. The Cardinal, who was already quite ill at the time, rejected the idea as useless. Earlier, the Cardinal had given a similar reply to the leaders of the Central Jewish Council who, in a telegram dated November 14, had appealed for his (1390) intervention because Jews were being rounded up and deported without regard to sex or state of health and in violation of existing decrees. Seeing the reluctance of the Cardinal to cooperate, the bishops of the Reformed and Evangelical churches submitted a memorandum to Szálasi on their own. In this document, dated December 1, they proclaimed that the treatment accorded the Jews "mocks God's eternal laws which prescribe humane treatment even of one's enemies and brings God’ s anger on the bead of the nation."70

While the church leaders tried to alleviate the situation of the Jews through direct appeals to the Nyilas governmental figures, some clergymen took an active role in trying to save Jewish lives. By far the most active among these were those associated with the ecclesiastical institutions for converts.

The Holy Cross Society

The major institution devoted to the protection and advancement of the interests of Jews converted to Catholicism was the Holy Cross Society (Szent Kereszt Egyesiilet). The establishment of a special committee to protect the interests of Jews converted to Catholicism was proposed in the fall of 1939 by Baron Morie Kornfeld, one of the country's leading industrialists. A convert himself, Baron Kornfeld bad been concerned with the possible impact of the anti-Jewish laws, which incorporated racial ideas with potentially ominous implications for Jews and converts alike. A committee of this kind was established under the leadership of Count Gyula Zichy, the Bishop of Kalocsa, following a meeting of the Catholic bishops on October 3, 1939. 71 Under the guidance of its secretary general, Dr. Jozsef Cavallier, the committee at first devoted its attention to the support of the refugees that began to enter the country after the outbreak of World War II. It also came to the aid of those affected by the anti-Jewish laws, cooperating in this regard with the major Jewish welfare organizations, including MIPI and OMZSA. Early in December 1940, the committee was amalgamated with the Holy Cross Society which, under the leadership of Father Jozsef Janosi, pursued similar objectives. Following the death of Bishop Zichy, Bishops Hamvas and Apor became its main patrons.

After the German occupation, the Holy Cross Society became heavily involved in the protection of converts from the anti-Jewish (1391) measures. But it also was active in providing aid and comfort to the many refugees in the country, irrespective of their religious background. This part of its work was directed by Mrs. Bela Ronai, who was deported by the Germans. Its medical services were organized and directed by Dr. Margit Kormos. The Society worked closely with the Catholic hierarchy as well as with the Papal Nuncio, and was under the overall direction of Cavallier and Father Jozsef Janosi. It was a primary force in the establishment of the Association of the Christian Jews of Hungary and a champion of human rights. Its effectiveness was brought to an end late in November 1944, following a number of Nyilas raids on its offices. On November 17, Cavallier himself was shot and wounded and taken away by the Nyilas together with approximately 150 Jews who were applying for Papal protective passes. The Society's activities thereafter were to a large extent absorbed by the Good Shepherd Committee. 72

The Good Shepherd Committee

The most visible cooperation between the Catholic and Protestant churches of Hungary in connection with the protection of the persecuted Jews was that established between the Holy Cross Society and the Good Shepherd Committee (Jo Pasztor Bizottsag), the association of Jews converted to Protestantism. 73 This Committee was established on October 20, 1942, under the direction of Reverend Gyula Murakozy and the sponsorship of the Universal Convent of the Reformed Church of Hungary. The leadership of the Committee was entrusted to Reverend Jozsef Elias, himself of Jewish background. Among his closest associates were Dr. Imre Kadar, the secretary of the Committee; Emil Hajos, deacon; and Reverend Karoly Dobos, Dr. Ferenc Benko, and Andor Borbas as well as a host of volunteers who devoted their energies to social and charitable work as well as to serving the spiritual needs of the converts.

Reverend Gabor Sztehlo

The Evangelical Church affiliated itself with the Committee in May 1944, when Bishop Raffay appointed Reverend Gabor Sztehlo as its representative in charge of protecting the children of labor servicemen and converts. Before the German occupation, the Committee paid special attention to the physical and spiritual needs of the converts who were affected by the various anti-Jewish laws, including the converts serving in labor service companies. It also helped Jewish and (1392) non-Jewish refugees, both by providing assistance for those interned in the camps of Csorgo, Garany, Riese, and those on Magdolna, Pava, and Szabolcs Streets in Budapest and by serving as a link to KEOKH, the police agency in charge of aliens.

After the occupation, the Committee acted in cooperation with the representatives of the various Protestant denominations to ease the plight of the Jews in general and of the converts in particular. Toward this end it worked closely with the Holy Cross Society and the Central Jewish Council. 74 While it cooperated with the Council, the Committee leadership, presumably in an attempt to provide better protection to the converts and Christians of Jewish origin, it worked hard to bring about the removal of the converts from the jurisdiction of the Council as stipulated by the laws then in effect. The Good Shepherd Committee leadership discussed this matter on May 7, and forwarded a summary of its resolutions to the chairmanship of the Reformed Church shortly thereafter. 75 During the Sztojay era, the Committee provided opportunities for conversions-either real or merely formal-and distributed protective passes that were issued by the legations of the neutral states. Elias was also active in bringing about the establishment of the Association of the Christian Jews of Hungary. 76

The work of the Committee became especially important during the Nyilas era, when it arranged for the sheltering of approximately 1,500 children in 32 homes. 77 The groundwork for these activities had been laid two years earlier, when the Committee had set up a Protestant Orphans' Home in Noszvaj, near Eger, to shelter Jewish and non-Jewish refugee (mostly Slovak) children. Shortly before the Nyilas coup of October 15, Reverends Elias and Sztehlo persuaded Geza Kiss, a legal adviser for the Nyilas, and Mihaly Orosz, the propagandist appointed by Laszlo Baky to lead the "cultural struggle" against the churches, to help protect the children's homes against wanton attacks by Nyilas gangs. The feeding, housing, and protection of the children were assured through the cooperation of the International Red Cross, which had established a special department (Section B) for this purpose. 78 The Section, which was headed by Reverend Sztehlo and included Dr. Janos Petery and Professor Papp, had acted in close cooperation with Komoly's Department A and with the Swedish Red Cross, headed by Valdemar Langlet. The Section's program was largely financed by (1393) Heinrich and Otto Haggenmacher and their families, who also provided large quantities of food as well as a number of homes. 79

Swedish Red Cross representative Alexander Kasser

Since Reverend Elias had to go into hiding almost immediately after the Nyilas coup (he had been blacklisted by the Nyilas for his philanthropic and political activities), responsibility for the protection of the children fell almost exclusively on Reverend Sztehlo. He carried out his tasks with great courage and skill. Although some of the homes were subjected to Nyilas and police raids (one of these, around December 10 through 12, was reportedly led by Laszlo Endre himself) remarkably, no harm befell any of the children entrusted to his care. The children of the homes on Munkacsy Mihaly, Kiraly, and Perczel Mor Streets were taken into the ghetto only to be smuggled out with the connivance of Reverend Sztehlo and the IRC. 80

Following the establishment of the Budapest ghetto, the Committee served the spiritual needs of converts, providing solace and comfort for many Jews as well. The representatives of the Committee, including Reverends Gyula Nagy and Sandor Borsos, also managed on occasion to smuggle food and medicines into the ghetto. Reverend Nagy maintained close contact with Miksa Domonkos of the Central Jewish Council in his endeavors to help the persecuted. 81 The activities of these dedicated clergymen complemented the rescue and relief operations undertaken by the representatives of the International Red Cross and of the neutral states.

Notes

1. Robert Major, The Churches and the Jews in Hungary. Continuum, (Autumn 1966): 373. For further details, see Judit Kubinszky, Politikai antiszemitizmus Magyarorszagon, 1875-1890 (Political Anti-Semitism in Hungary, 1875-1890). (Budapest: Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1976), 275 pp., and Miklos Szabo, 1.Jjvonasok a szazadforduloi magyar konzervativ politikai gondolkodasban (New Lines in the Hungarian Conservative Political Thinking at the Turn of the Century). Szazadok, Budapest, (1974) I: 3-65.

2. For details on his political-ideological views, see Pater Zadravetz titkos nap/o-ja (The Secret Diary of Pater Zadravetz). Gyorgy Borsanyi, ed. (Budapest: Kossuth for Magyar Tortenelmi Tarsulat, 1967), 311 pp. See also Chapter 1.

3. Major, The Churches and the Jews in Hungary" pp. 374-375. See also his 25 evellenforrada/mi sajto, 1918-1944 (25 Years of Counterrevolutionary Press, 1919-1944 ) (Budapest: Cserepfalvi, 1945), pp. 22-3 1.

4. Major, The Churches and the Jews in Hungary, pp. 375-376.

5. Bishop Ravasz articulated his anti-Semitic views, referring to the Jews as a race, in his contribution to a symposium titled "The Jewish Question in Hungary" (Azsidokerdes Magyarorszagon). Huszadik szazad (Twentieth Century), Budapest, 1917, pp. 126-129. Bishop Ravasz reportedly was also a member of the special committee that engineered the 1919 election of Horthy as Regent and remained his loyal supporter to the end. Details about Bishop Ravasz's anti-Semitic views are provided by Reverend Jozsef Elias, the noted Reformed Church clergyman who played a leading role during the Holocaust in rescuing Jews. See his 70-page letter addressed to Dr. Laszlo Juhasz, a Hungarian clergyman living in Munich, dated December 1986. A copy of the letter is on file in RG-52. For further details on bishop Ravasz's activities, see the bibliographical references listed in 8-A, p. 909.

6. Bishop Ratfay' s intolerant views about the Jews were articulated in his contribution to the symposium cited above. See also Huszadik Szazad, op. cit., p. 125.

7. See, for example, the self-serving Pro Memoria written by Bishop Laszlo Ravasz in late December 1944 or early 1945. (A copy of the manuscript is on file in RG-52.) See also " Seredi Jusztinian feljegyzesei 1944 vegen" (Jusztinian Seredi’s Notes at the End of 1944), with an introduction by Sandor Szenes, in Kritika, (Criticism), Budapest, (1983)8: 28-33. For a sympathetic evaluation of the role of the Catholic Church with emphasis on its opposition to the Nazis and their supporters in Hungary, see Miklos Beresztoczy, " A magyar katolicizmus harca a nemzetiszocializmus ellen " (The Struggle of Hungarian Catholicism Against National Socialism). In: A magyar katolikus egyhaz es az emeri jogok vedelme (The Hungarian Catholic Church and the Protection of Human Rights), Antal Meszlenyi, ed. (Budapest: A Szent Istvan Tarsulat, 1947), pp. 9-20. For a positive view of Cardinal Seredi’s position, see Antal Meszlenyi, " A hercegprimas a zsidotorvenyek enyhiteseert" (The Prince Primate for Easing the Impact of the Jewish Laws), ibid., pp. 31-43. For a favorable view of the role of the Christian churches during the Holocaust in general, see Laszlo T. Laszlo, Az egyhazak szerepe a zs id omentesben Magyarorszagon. I. A zs id otorvenyek (The Churches' Role in the Saving of Jews in Hungary. I. The Anti-Jewish Laws). Katolikus Sze mle (Catholic Review), Rome, 31 (1979)2: 139-163. See also Laszlo’s apologetic The Role of the Christian Churches in the Rescue of the Budapest Jews. Hungarian Studies Review, Toronto, 11 (Spring 1984) I: 23-42. For further details on the background and activities of Cardinal Seredi, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, p. 910.

8. Dr. Slachta was also active in transmitting to the Vatican and to Francis Cardin al Spellman of New York documents relating to the destruction of the Jews of Poland and Slovakia which she had received from the MIPI representatives. Jeno Levai, Sziirke kony v magyar zsidok megmenteseriJl (Grey Book on the Rescuing of Hungarian Jews) (Budapest: Officina, n.d.), p. 168. Her heroism and humanitarianism were recognized by the Special Commission for the Designation of the Righteous of Yad Vashem, which honored her with its highest award: a medal, a certificate of honor, and the right to plant a tree on the Avenue of the Righteous at Yad Vashem. For further details, see Maria Schmidt, " Margit Slachta's Activities in Support of Slovakian Jewry, 1942-43." In: Remembering for the Future. Jews and Christians During and After the Holocaust (Oxford: International Scholars' Conference, 1988), pp. 207-211. See also Tamas, "The Deportation of Jews from Csikszereda and Margit Slachta’s Intervention on Their Behalf." In: Studies on the Holocaust in Hungary, Randolph L. Braham, ed. (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1990), pp. 113-163.

9. For references to the various anti-Jewish laws and the reaction to them, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 78-98. See also Chapters 4-6.

10. Popular resentment and the King’s opposition prevented the introduction of the badge in Denmark. In the Netherlands, where opposition to the anti-Jewish measures was also strong, many people expressed their sympathies with the Jews by wearing the badge themselves. See Philip Friedman’s The Jewish Badge and the Yellow Star in the Nazi Era. Historia Judaica, 17 (April 1955) I: 4~ 7 and 66-68. Vadirat, 3: 27, 86-87 and 133-135.

11. Frederick 8. Chary, The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, 1940-1944 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972), pp. 188-189.

12. A memorandum to this effect was sent to the Cardinal on August 14. Vadirat, 3: 385-387.

13. See Sandor Szenes’s interview with Reverend Gyorgy Kis in his Befej ezetlen mult. Kereszte nyek es zsidok, sorsok (The Unfinished Past. Christians and Jews, Fates) (Budapest: The Author, 1986), p. 269. The record also shows that although the leaders of the Christian churches received hand-delivered copies of the Auschwitz Reports early in May 1944 (see Chapter 23), none of them mentions the Reports in their writings.

14. For a highly sympathetic evaluation of Cardinal Seredi’s role during the Sztojay and Szálasi eras, emphasizing his stand in support of the persecuted, see the three articles by Antal Meszlenyi in A magyar katolikus egyhaz es az emberi jogok vedelm e, pp. 44-96. See also Laszlo T. Laszlo, Az egyhazak szerepe a zsidomentesben Magyarorszagon. II. A budapesti zsidosag megmeneklilese (The Churches' Role in the Saving of Jews in Hungary. II. The Rescue of Budapest's Jewry). Katolikus Szemle (Catholic Review), Rome, 31(1979)3: 217-235. 15. Vadirat, 3: 186-188. For further details on the anti-Jewish attitude of the Christian church leaders, see Moshe Y. Herczl, Christianity and the Holocaust of Hungarian Jewry. (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 299 pp., and Jeno Gergely, "A magyarorszagi egyhazak es a Holocaust " (The Churches of Hungary and the Holocaust). In: RB-PA, pp. 441-456. 16. See Randolph L. Braham, Magyarorszag kereszteny egyhazai es a holokauszt (The Christian Churches of Hungary and the Holocaust). Miiltes Java, Budapest, (2000)3-4: 43-60. Reproduced in T-1, pp. 9-36. For further details, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 522-527.

17. Jeno Levai, L'eglise n e s'est pas tue. Dossier hongrois 1940-1945 (The Church Did Not Keep Silent. Hungarian Documents, 1940-1945) (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), pp. 83-84. See also Chapter 15.

18. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, pp. 122-124.

19. Ibid., pp. 124-125. 20. Letter dated May 11, 1944. Archives of the Prince Primate (Primasi Leve /tar), Esztergom.

21. Levai, Zsidosors Ma gyarorszagon, pp. 125-27. See also Levai, L 'egli se ne s 'es t pas tu e, pp. 85-93. For the complete text of the circular, see Vadirat, 2: 53-61. 1396

22. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, pp. 183-184.

23. Ibid., pp. 184-187.

24. Bishop Apor’s letter of June 15, 1944, was delivered to Cardinal Seredi by Jozsef Cavallier and Jozsef Elias. For the text of the letter, see Szenes’s Befejezetlen miilt, op. cit., pp. 102-103.

25. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, pp. 188-191. The text of the Cardinal’s pastoral letter is also reproduced in Kritika (Criticism), Budapest, (1983)5: 21-22.

26. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarors zagon, p. 193. Cardinal Seredi included the text of the letter in his July 10 circular addressed to the bishops. See Vadirat, 3: 126-129.

27 The text was brought to the attention of the bishops and priests together with the instruction that the pastoral letter not be read on July 10. Ibid., pp. 128-129. The Council of Ministers was informed about the agreement by Antal on July 12. Ibid., pp. 148-149.

28. Ibid., 3: 115-121.

29. The views of the Council of Ministers were summarized for the Cardinal by Miklos Beresztoczy, a ministerial counselor, on July 12. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, p. 195. 30. See Szenes’ s interview with Reverend Gyorgy Kis in his Befejezetle n mitt, op. cit., p. 283.

31. Vadiral, 3: 312-3 17.

32. Petofi Radio was a British-sponsored organ of the Independence Group (Fiigg etlens egi Csoport) headed by Mihaly Karolyi, the former Prime Minister; its broadcasts emanated from Alexandria, Cairo, and London. Ibid., 3: 412-413. For further details on the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 527-533.

33. For a review of the Protestant churches' attitude during the Horthy era, see Istvan Konya, A magyar reformatu s egyhaz f e lso vezetesenek politikai ideologiaja a Horthy-korszakban (The Political Ideology of the Higher Leadership of the Protestant Churches During the Horthy Era) (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1967), 243 pp. See also Janos Pal, Zsidokerdes a Magyarorszagi Un itar ius Egyhaz nemzet-es egyhazepito strategiajanak ttikreben (1940-1944) (The Jewish Question as Reflected in the Strategy of the Unitarian Church of Hungary for Nation-and Church Building, 1940-1944). Kereszleny Magveto, Kolozsvar, 115 (2009)3: 381-420 and 115(2009)4: 531-560, and Tamas Majsai, Biborosok es piispokok a zsidomentes barikadharcaban (Cardinals and Bishops in the Barricade Struggle for the Rescuing of Jews). Budapes ti Negyed, 3(Summer 1995)2: 169-180.

34. The nine leading figures of the Protestant churches were Laszlo Ravasz, Bishop of the Reformed (Calvinist) Church District Along the Danube; Janos Vasarhelyi, Bishop of the Reformed Church District in Transylvania; Imre Revesz, Bishop of the Reformed Church District in Tiszantul; Andor Enyedy, Bishop of the Reformed Church District in the Tiszaninneni ("Cis Tisza") Area; Elemer Gyory, Bishop of the Reformed Church District in Transdanubia; Bela Kapi, Bishop of the Evangelical Church District in Transdanubia; Sandor Raffay, Bishop of the Evangelical Church in the Banyai (Mining) District; Zoltan Turoczy, Bishop of the Evangelical Church in the Tisza District; and Dezso Kuthy, Bishop of the Evangelical Church District in the Cisdanubian Area. For further details on the antecedents of the joint approach and for the text of the appeal, see Bishop Ravasz’s Pro Memoria, op. cit., pp. 1-15.

35. Ibid., pp. 3--4.

36. Reverend Jozsef Elias asserted that the primary reason why Bishop Ravasz was approached by Zsigmond Perenyi to intervene with Horthy was precisely because of the Bishop’s long and intimate political association with Horthy. See his letter to Dr. Laszlo Juhasz cited above.

37. Ibid., pp. 5 and 12. See also Albert Bereczky, Hungarian Protestantism and the Persecution of the Jews (Budapest: Sylvester, n.d.), pp. 14-18. Reverend Bereczky’ s booklet is based largely on Bishop Ravasz's Pro Memoria. See also Chapter 11.

38. On the basis of Sztojay's communication, some bishops in structed the ministers in their diocese to carry out their responsibilities to the converts. Specifically, they were asked to go into the ghettos to serve the spiritual needs of their congregants and advise them that they could wear a white cross next to the Star of David. Vadirat, 3: 130-133.

39. For the text of the letters exchanged by Bishop Ravasz and Prime Minister Sztójay, see Ravasz's Pro Memoria, op. c it., pp. 5-7. 40. Ibid., p. 13.

41. Vadirat, 3: 310-312.

42. Bereczky, Hungarian Protestantism, pp. 19-20.

43. See Sandor Szenes's interview with Sandor Torok in his Befeje etlen mull, op. cit., pp. 199-200.

44. Bereczky, Hungarian Protestantism, pp. 19-20. See also Bishop Ravasz's Pro Memoria, p. 13.

45. See Szenes’s interview with Reverend Jozsef Elias in his Bef ej ezet/en mull, op. c it., p. 68.

46. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszag on, pp. 197-198.

47. Ibid., pp. 198-200. See also Vadirat, 3: 6-8, and Bereczky, Hungarian Protestantism, pp. 22-24. See also Bishop Ravasz's Pro Memoria, pp. 13-15.

48. Vadirat, 3: 38-39. 49. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

50. Cardinal Seredi responded on July 8, and included a copy of his planned pastoral letter of June 29. Ibid., pp. 111-112.

51. Bereczky, Hungarian Protestantism, pp. 24-26.

52. Ibid., p. 28. See also Vadirat, 3: 153-155.

53. The registration of converts between July 12 and 17 was announced on posters issued by Akos Doroghi Farkas, the Mayor of Budapest. The church leaders were eager to advance the conversion date to March 22, 1944, which caused some difficulties between the churches and the authorities. Vadirat, 3: 49-52, 60-61, and 155-158.

54. For further details on the attitude of the Protestant churches during the Nazi era, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 535-541.

55. For a highly positive evaluation of the attitude of Catholic bishops during the occupation, see Antal Meszlenyi, " A piispoki kar az emberi jogok vedelmeben" (The College of Bishops in Support of Human Rights). ln: A magyar katolikus egyhaz es az emberi jogok wide/me, pp. 114-147. See also Levai’s Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, pp. 145-149, and 185, and his Szurke konyv, pp. 72-83.

56. Bishop Apor and Bishop Hamvas were most active in urging the Cardinal to intervene. See, for example, Hamvas’s note of July 15 in which he expressed shock over the way the searches for valuables were conducted in Mako and Szeged. Vadirat, 3: 206-207.

57. Levai, Szurke konyv, p. 79.

58. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

59. A copy of the letter was sent to Bela Toth, the Acting Mayor of Szeged. Archives of Csongrad County (Csongrad Megyei Leve/tar), Szeged.

60. Archives of the Prince Primate (Primasi Leve/tar), Esztergom.

61 Munkacsi, Hogyan tortent?, pp. 144-145.

62. Bela Yago, "The Destruction of the Jews of Transylvania." In: HJS, I: 192-193. See also Marton Himler, i gy neztek ki a magyar nemzet siraso i (This ls What the Gravediggers of the Hungarian Nation Looked Like) (New York: St. Marks Printing Corp., 1958), pp. 60-62. During the Stalinist era of Romania, Bishop Marton, like many other clergymen of all denominations, was persecuted. He was arrested on June 21, 1949. Though he was allowed to return to Albalulia in 1955, his freedom of movement was restricted. He died in that city on September 29, 1980. For further details, see Mate Hidvegi, Marton Aron emlekezete (Remembering Marton Aron). UJ Kelet (New East), Tel Aviv, May 5, 1989. See also Laszlo Virt, Nyitott szivvel. Marton Aron erdely i piispok ele te es eszmei (With Open Heart. The Life and Views of the Transylvanian Bishop Aron Marton). (Budapest: Telek.i Laszlo Alapitvany-XX. Szazad lntezet, 2002), 444 pp., Tra~ca Ottrriar and Attila Seres, Marton Aron 1944. majus 18-i kolozsvari be szede a zsidok deportalasa ell en (Aron Marton’s Speech of May 18, 1944 in Kolozsvar Against the Deportation of the Jews). Mulles Jovo, Budapest, (2011)3: 43-50, and Zoltan Tibori Szabo, " Marton Aron-A Nepek lgaza" (Aron Marton-A Righteous Among the Nations). In: Kozossegteremto (regiesuj) erdelyi media (Community-Establishing [Old and New] Transylvanian Media). Gabor Gyorffy and Arpad Peter, eds. (Kolozsvar: Mega Kiado, 2014), pp. 57-67.

63. For documents relating to Schibema’s involvement in the drive against the Jews of Veszprem, see HNA, Roll I 16.

64. RLB, Doc. 289. Because of his opposition to the Nyilas following the Szálasi coup of October 15, 1944, Cardinal Mindszenty was arrested on November 29 and held captive first in Sopronkohida and then in Sopron. He succeeded Cardinal Seredi on August 16, 1945. He died in Vienna on May 6, 1975. Ferenc Vadasz, Mindszenty hercegprimas rehabilitaciojarol (On the Rehabilitation of Prince Primate Mindszenty). Uj Kelet, Tel Aviv, July 6, 1990. For further details, see Cardinal Mindszenty’s own account, Memoirs (New York: Macmillan, 1974), 341 pp., and the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 534-535.

65. One of the leaders of the Smallholders' Party, Monsignor Varga served as the President of the Hungarian Parliament after the war. Following the virtual communist takeover in 1947, he settled in New York, where he played a leading role in Hungarian exile politics.

66. For details, see Sandor Szenes's interview with Karoly Heteny i Varga in his Befej ezetlen mull, op. cit., pp. 219-259.

67. Vadirat, 3: 19-22. Answering on be half of Radvanszky, Sand or Vargha, the Secretary General of the Directorate of the Evangelical Church, assured Father Oberndorf that the Directorate had done everything that was humanly possible to put an end to the inhumane treatment of the Jews. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

68. Laszlo was tried after the war by a Romanian People's Tribunal in Kolozsvar and condemned to ten years' imprisonment. Vago, " The Destruction of the Jews of Transylvania," pp. 193 and 2 19.

69. Levai, Fekete konyv, pp. 254 and 258. On Kun's conflict with his superiors, see A magyar ka toli ku s egyhaz es az emb eri jog ok vedelme, p. 18. Having been found guilty of war crimes, Father Kun was executed after the war.

70. Bereczky, Hungarian Protestantism, pp. 34--3 7; Leva i, Zsidosors Ma gyarorszagon, pp. 319-321. See also Gabriel Adrianyi, Fiinfzig Jahre ungarischer Kirchengeschichte, 1895-1945 (Fifty Years of Hungarian Church History, 1895-1945) (Ma in z: v. Hase & Kochler, 1974), pp. 106-116.

71. For details on the Society's historical background with emphasis on Bishop Zichy's role, see Antal Meszleny i, "Zichy Gyula ka lo csaierse klelek-es eletmento a kcioja" (The Campaign of Gyula Zichy, the Bishop of Kalocsa, for the Saving of Souls and Lives). In: A magyar ka to likus egyhazes az ember i jogok vedelm e, pp. 97-113.

72. For details on the structure, membership, and wartime activities of the Society, see Jozsef Cavallier, " A puspoki kares a magyar Szent Kereszt Egyes Ul et e mb ervedo munkaja" (The College of Bishops and the Life Saving Work of the Hungarian Holy Cross Society). In: A magyar katolikus egyhaz es az ember ijogo kvedelme, pp. 148-168. See also Levai, Szurke kony v, pp. 84--85, and Szenes’s interview with Jozsef Elias in his Befejezetlen miilt, op. cit., pp. 35-36. For further details on the Society's background and activities, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, p. 533.

73. The official name of the Committee was "The Good Shepherd Missionary Subcommittee of the Universal Convent of the Reformed Church of Hungary" (A Magyarorszag i Reformatus Egyhaz Egyetemes Konvenlje 16 Pasztor Misszioi A lbizott saga.). It was popularly referred to simply as either the "Good Shepherd Committee" or the "Good Shepherd Mission." The two names a reused interchangeably in this work.

74. For example, at the request of Samu Stern, Mrs. A. Steckl, one of the members of the Committee, investigated the activities of the controversial Rabbi Bela Berend. See statement by Elias in YIVO archives, File 7 68/3652/a. In a letter addressed to this author on May 30, 1985, Reverend Elias disclaimed the authenticity of this statement. However, he corroborated the reference relating to rs. Adolf Steck, and provided additional in sights into his own warnings about Rabbi Berend’s activities. He emphasized that Stern’s request was originally addressed to Reverend Jozsef Cavallier and that the-Reverend Elias-was in contact to this effect with Otto Komoly and Istvan Foldes of the Central Jewish Council and with Dr. Sandor Szilagyi, a counselor in the Ministry of the Interior. See also Chapter 14.

75. See Memorandum K. 70/ 1944 which was forwarded to the leadership of the Reformed Church on May 12 under the signature of Gyula Murakozy and Reverend Elias. HNA, Roll 180.

76. Toward this end he worked closely with Sandor Torok, who represented the converts in the Central Jewish Council. Munkacsi, Hogyan /ori ent?, pp. 151-155. For Torok’ s account, see YIVO archives, File 768/3643. For further details on Reverend Elias’s activities, see his interview with Sfindor Szenes cited above.

77. Most of these were children of converts and Christian orphans. Many of these children were hidden in his Buda villa by Tivadar Homonnay, the former Mayor of Budapest (1942-March 1944). The protection of Jewish children was also the responsibility of Section A of the International Red Cross. For further details on Homonnay, see Menora, Toronto, June 18, 1993.

78. For the organizational structure of Section B, including a listing of the homes and the number of children placed in them, see Friedrich Born, Berichl an das Internationale Komitee vom Role n Kreuz in Geef (Report to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva) (Geneva, June 1945), p. 56.

79. Ibid., pp. 37-39. Heinrich (Henrik) Haggenmacher was the president of the National Association of Manufacturers (A Gyariparosok Orszagos Szove/sege). For some additional details on him, see Gyula Kadar, A LudovikatoI Sopronkoh ida ig (From the Ludovika to Sopronkohida) (Budapest: Magveto, 1978), pp. 511-512.

80. For Reverend Sztehlo statement see YIVO archives, File 768/3644. Sometime after the war, Reverend Sztehlo settled in Switzerland. His heroism and humanitarianism were recognized by the Special Commission for the Designation of the Righteous of Yad Vashem, which awarded him its highest honor: a medal, a certificate of honor, and the right to plant a tree on the Avenue of the Righteous at Yad Vashem.

81. Reverend Nagy was introduced to Domonkos by Lajos Gabor, the father of the well-known Gabor sisters, the well-known actresses. Personal communication. For additional information on the Good Shepherd Committee, see Bereczky, Hungarian Protestantism, pp. 19 and 43-46; Levai, Sziirke kony v, pp. 86-87, and Munkacsi, Hogyan 1orten1 ?, pp. 151-154.

CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE

INTERNATIONAL REACTION

AND INTERVENTION

THE NAZIS' intensive and ruthless pursuit of the Final Solution program demonstrated the defenselessness of the Jewish communities under their control, the ineffectiveness and powerlessness of the Jewish leaders of the free world, and the basic indifference of the non-Nazi and anti-Nazi world to the plight of the Jews.

The leaders of the neutral and Allied countries and of the Vatican and the International Red Cross-although aware of the Nazis' genocidal plans since the summer of 1942-for the most part neither spoke up in defense of the Jews nor came to their rescue until late June 1944. They rationalized their silence and inaction in terms of their particular national and institutional interests. The Allies, while concerned, were reluctant to liberalize their immigration policies or to allow the Jewish tragedy to affect their war strategy. The neutral countries, some of which originally sympathized with the Axis, refused to engage in any operations that might jeopardize their neutrality or burden their societies with a larger number of Jews. The Vatican was careful to protect its special position and the worldwide interests of the Catholic Church. The International Red Cross feared that intervention in support of the Jews might jeopardize its traditional activities on behalf of prisoners of war. The international reaction to the catastrophe of European Jewry took a more positive turn toward the end of June 1944. By that time, however, the deportations from the Hungarian countryside were coming to an end. This was also approximately three weeks after D-Day, when the defeat of the Third Reich was almost universally accepted as inevitable. (1402)

The International Red Cross

Until the middle of July 1944 the International Red Cross (IRC)1 was not directly involved in the protection of the rights and interests of Jews per se. In Hungary, as elsewhere, the IRC scrupulously adhered to the letter and spirit of the 1929 Geneva Convention, which restricted its activities primarily to matters relating to prisoners of war. It preferred not to get involved with matters involving civil populations at large-the primary concern of the national Red Cross organizations-let alone with the defense and protection of minority groups against abuses by their own governments.

The IRC was not inclined to accept the suggestion of Jewish organizations, spearheaded by the World Jewish Congress, that it confer upon the Jews held in the ghettos and the labor and concentration camps the status of civilian interne es-a procedure that would have enabled the IRC to carry out local inspection visits, send food parcels, provide medical care, and in the process perhaps save hundreds of thousands of lives.

Aryeh L. Kubowitzki of the World Jewish Congress

Aryeh Tartakower and Aryeh L. Kubowitzki (later Kubovy) of the World Jewish Congress suggested this to Dr. Mark Peter, the IRC's representative in the United States, in a sharply worded letter of December 10, 1943. This was followed by a personal discussion on January 5, 1944. Unfortunately, the IRC failed to approach the German Foreign Office with the demand that it confer the status of civilian POWs on all foreigners detained in Germany and the occupied countries until October 2, 1944, when the collapse of the Third Reich was already evident to almost everybody. 2

There were several reasons for the IRC’s reluctance to get involved in the rescue of Jews. For one thing, the Germans had declared that the Jews were not internees but detainees-a penal rather than a civil category. Consequently the supervision the IRC was empowered to exercise over the treatment of prisoners and internees did not apply to them. The IRC also claimed that continued protests in support of the Jews would be resented by the authorities and prove detrimental to the Jews as well as to other fields of IRC activities. 3 The IRC summarized its position as follows:

If help for the Jews had been the only cause which the international Committee was called upon to serve during the war, such a course, (1403) which could have put honor before the saving of life, might have been contemplated. But such was not the case. Relief for Jews, like relief for deportees, rested on no juridical basis. No convention provided for it, nor gave the International Committee even the shadow of a pretext for intervention. On the contrary, conditions were all against such an undertaking. Chances of success depended entirely on the consent of the Powers concerned. And there were all the other tasks, which the Conventions or time-honored tradition permitted the International Committee to undertake, or which, with so great difficulty, it had succeeded in adding thereto. To engage in controversy about the Jewish question would have imperiled all this work, without saving a single Jew. 4

Following this line of reasoning, the attitude of the IRC delegation in Hungary was at first identical with that manifested elsewhere in the world. The delegation restricted its activities to its traditional functions: responding to inquiries by foreigners and monitoring the treatment of prisoners of war, to whom it also forwarded parcels. These included thousands of Polish and Yugoslav prisoners and a smaller number of other Allied prisoners of war. 5

The IRC had been aware of the mass expulsion and subsequent massacre of the "alien" Jews of Hungary in the summer of 1941, and even discussed the " incident" in December without taking any action. By the summer of 1942, it had fully known that the Nazis were systematically massacring the Jews of Europe. Nevertheless, it continued to remain silent for fear of confronting the Germans. 6 Until October 1943, it even refused to send a delegate to Hungary despite repeated requests by the international Jewish organizations. The many reports and suggestions of Jean de Bavier, IRC’s first delegate in Hungary, calling for the alleviation of the plight of the suffering Jews and for the forestalling of a looming greater disaster, were not given any serious consideration at headquarters.

On February 18, 1944, de Bavier, seeing the portents of the German occupation of Hungary, asked Geneva for instructions on how to save Hungarian Jewry from the fate that bad befallen the Jews of Poland and other Nazi-occupied countries. On March 27, i.e., a few days after the occupation, de Bavier suggested that Max Huber, the president of the IRC, go and see Hitler with a view to improving the (1404) plight of the Jews of Hungary. 7 The failure of the IRC to follow up on de Bavier' s suggestion was characterized by Aryeh Ben-Tov, an authority on the activities of the IRC during the Second World War, as one of its greatest failures. He concluded:

Since the institution did not act in Hungary during the crucial months of the deportations and did not make the facts known either to enough interested organizations or to a sufficiently wide audience in general, the SS and the Hungarian Fascists were able to go much further than would otherwise have been possible in their attempts to implement the Final Solution. 8

Friedrich (Fritz) Born

De Bavier was recalled to Geneva, reportedly because he did not speak German, and replaced by Friedrich (Fritz) Born, the director of the Swiss-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce of Budapest (A Budapesti Svaj ci-Magyar Keres kedelmi Kamara).9 Although Born assumed his duties on May 10, after the ghettoization in the provinces was coming to an end, the IRC continued to maintain the same posture of neutrality that had characterized its earlier position. A change in its attitude came about only after the Swiss press published some gruesome accounts on the Final Solution in Hungary based on materials forwarded to Switzerland on June 19 by Miklos (Moshe) Krausz, the head of the Budapest Palestine Office (Chapter 23). About two weeks after the late June interventions by President Roosevelt, the King of Sweden, and the Pope, the IRC also decided to play a more active role in Hungary. The organization’s visibility became higher in both Budapest and Geneva. Born began a more active campaign, visiting the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies on behalf of the deportees. He also contacted Theodor Horst Grell, the specialist in Jewish affairs in the German legation, who had assured him that the Hungarian Jews were being taken to Germany only to work and that since the Germans needed able-bodied and healthy Jews they, the Germans, bad themselves berated the Hungarians for occasional mistreatments. Moreover, Grell had also assured Born that once the Jews arrived in Germany they were well taken care of and physically strengthened before assignment for labor. He rejected the suggestion that the IRC visit some of the camps. These camps, he argued, were spread throughout Germany and Poland (1405) and since the Jews were engaged in the production of war materiel, their location had to be kept secret. 10

On July 7, the day after Horthy had halted the deportations, Max Huber approached the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He wanted all available information that would ease the worldwide restlessness over the alleged events in Hungary, as well as permission for an IRC delegate to visit some of the ghettos and entrainment centers in which Jews were interned and distribute food and clothing. 11 A more specific request was submitted by Imre Tahy, the Hungarian charge d’affaires in Bern, on July 19.

Dr. Robert Schirmer, International Red Cross, Budapest, Hungary, 1944-45

Reporting on a meeting he bad a day earlier with Carl J. Burckhardt of the IRC, Tahy urged that Hungary request the Germans to allow Dr. Robert Schirmer, the IRC delegate in Berlin, to visit Budapest. He emphasized that Schirmer bad been asked to deliver a message to Horthy in connection with the Jewish question. 12

Schirmer arrived in Budapest shortly thereafter, and on July 21 he met with Sztojay. Schirmer repeated the request that was earlier submitted by Huber. He suggested that he be allowed to visit some Yellow-Star houses; that the "shipment of Jews for labor abroad" cease and Jews be concentrated instead in ghettos similar to the one that was established in Theresienstadt, which an IRC delegation had visited and approved of on July 23; 13 and that the IRC be given an opportunity to investigate the fate of the British and American pilots who were shot down over Hungary. 14

The response of Sztojay and Andor Jaross was transmitted to Schirmer on July 23 by Denes Csopey, the head of the Political Department of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The two leaders concurred with Schirmer's requests and suggested that the IRC delegation visit the Kistarcsa and Sarvar internment camps, which also contained non-Jewish political prisoners, and that the planned visits to Yellow-Star houses were to be undertaken in consultation with Jozsef Szentrniklossy, the head of the social-political division in the mayor’s office. 15 On July 27 and 28, a Schirmer-led IRC delegation visited the Kistarcsa and Sarvar camps, which were under the respective command of two decent men, Istvan Vasdenyei and Gyorgy Gribowszki. The situation in the camps was found to be quite acceptable. It is safe to assume that by then the delegates had been aware that the Germans bad managed to deport approximately 1,300 Jews from Kistarcsa and (1406) around 1,500 Jews from Sarvar a short while before the visit in spite of Horthy's halting of the deportations and the assurances given to the IRC. 16 The delegation also visited a few carefully selected Yellow-Star houses and Jewish institutions, finding the conditions generally satisfactory, although overcrowded. 17 The visits, presumably, gave a false picture of the dire situation Hungarian Jewry had lived under. Just as the IRC’s visit to Theresienstadt on June 23 had not revealed the realities of Auschwitz and Treblinka, the visit to the Kistarcsa and the Sarvar internment camps could, clearly, not disclose the horrible conditions that prevailed in the many brickyards and entrainment centers, let alone in the ultimate destination following their deportation.

While in Budapest, Schirmer also approached Edmund Veesenmayer, the Reich’s Plenipotentiary in Hungary, requesting permission to send packages to the deportees, to visit the camps, and to accompany the inmates on a deportation train to Kassa. Veesenmayer, after consulting with Eichmann, sent a telegram to the German Foreign Office (August 2), in which he said be would be ready to approve the first two requests " if adequate preparations were made." However, be urged that the last one be rejected, asserting that "this would violate the secrecy related to the travel route and destination." Adolf Hezinger, the Foreign Office’s expert on the treatment of Jews of foreign citizenship, was given responsibility for the reply. In a note to Horst Wagner, the head of Inland 11, he suggested the same answer that Hitler had given on July 10 to the Hungarians in connection with their earlier request to permit the emigration of some Jews. (This was in response to the appeals of Sweden, Switzerland, and the American War Refugee Board-see Chapter 25.) Hezinger suggested that the distribution of packages was to be allowed " only after the resumption of the transfer of Jews into the Reich. " He rejected the idea of anyone accompanying a deportation train, but hedged on the possibility of a camp visit "after thorough preparatory work in cooperation with Eichmann." 18

The IRC confidentially informed the local and international Jewish organizations in Switzerland about its activities. On July 21, Burckhardt met with the leaders of a few Swiss Jewish organizations; this was followed by a larger meeting on August 10 that was attended by Huber and representatives of the 17 largest domestic and international organizations and agencies in Switzerland, including the World Jewish (1407) Congress, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the Palestine Office, and the AJDC. Burckhardt reviewed the situation of the Jews in Hungary, emphasizing the activities the IRC had undertaken on their behalf. One of the objectives of the meeting was to impress upon the leaders of the local and international Jewish organizations the need to coordinate their activities. 19 Although the conferences, like the notes and memoranda handed to Jewish organizations, were identified as confidential, the Germans became privy to their contents. (The Germans frequently intercepted the mail and the memoranda that the Jewish leaders in Switzerland forwarded to their counterparts in Istanbul or Palestine. 20)

Don Angel Sanz-Briz, Spanish Minister (Ambassador) in Budapest, Hungary, 1944

While the IRC never achieved the goals it had outlined for Veesenmayer in July, in August it did become more involved in two plans of great interest to the Jewish community: support of the Spanish, Swiss, and Swedish-initiated emigration schemes and the protection of children. On July 12, the Central Jewish Council had been informed that Spain was ready to accept 500 children. On the advice of Angel Sanz-Briz, the Spanish charge d'affaires in Budapest, the Council persuaded the IRC to take the foreign-protected children under its aegis. The IRC, which consented to the suggestion early in August, thus acquired a legal framework by which to expand its activities to include the protection of "foreign "civilians.

The Spanish offer induced Burckhardt on August 9 to approach Baron Karoly Bothmer, the head of the Hungarian Legation in Bern. He suggested that Hans Bachmann, the IRC secretary-general, meet Tahy, who had earlier assured the IRC that Hungarian Jews holding Palestine immigration certificates or visas from neutral states would have the right to leave the country. The Hungarian response, formulated by Csopey on August 26, asserted that the Hungarian government would recognize the competence of the IRC in all aid and immigration matters which it represented or initiated with the Hungarian government. The IRC took full advantage of this position statement and intervened a number of times, urging the Hungarian government to speed up the emigration of 2,000 Jews, which was being processed by the Swiss Legation in Budapest. 21 It also transmitted the notes of the Allied governments to the same effect. On August 16, for example, the British and American governments informed the Hungarians that they had accepted Hungary’s earlier offer (see Chapter 25) and would " make arrangements for the care of such (1408) Jews leaving Hungary who reach neutral or United Nations territory. " 22 Though such efforts continued until the Soviet forces liberated Budapest, no groups were ever permitted to leave Hungary as a consequence.

By far the most important contributions of the IRC to the Jewish community in Budapest were the sheltering of children and the safeguarding and supplying of Jewish institutions, including the ghetto, during the Nyilas era. Plans for the protection of children were laid in August in light of the lingering threat of deportation, the continual dwindling of communal supplies, and the dangers associated with the rapidly approaching front. 23

Under Born's leadership two sections dealing with children were established within the framework of the IRC: Section A, which was placed under the leadership of Otto Komoly, the Zionist leader, 24 and Section B, which was entrusted to Reverend Gabor Sztehlo of the Good Shepherd Committee. 25 In addition, Born had been responsible for the establishment of Section T (Transportgruppe; Transportation Unit), which was composed of 25 to 35 recruits of Labor Service Company No. 101/359, the so-called Clothes-Collecting Labor Company (Ruhagyujto Munkasszazad), which was under the command of Captain Laszlo Ocskay. Section T, which was headed by. Dr. Gyorgy Wilhelm, the son of Karoly Wilhelm of the Central Jewish Council, and Istvan Komlos, was engaged in relief, rescue, and resistance operations. It was particularly active in the rescuing thousands of Jews from the death-marches to Hegyeshalom and in supplying the children’s homes and the ghetto with food and fuel. 26

During the Nyilas era, the IRC took under its protection a large number of Jewish and non-Jewish institutions-hospitals, public kitchens, homes for the handicapped and the aged, research and scientific institutes, and various shops. 27 Each of these institutions was identified by a plate posted at the main entrance that read: "Under the Protection of the International Committee of the Red Cross" in Hungarian, German, French, and Russian. Born and his associates kept track of the anti-Jewish measures of the Nyilas, including those officially initiated by the government and those that were illegally perpetrated, and appeared frequently before the leaders, especially Baron Gabor Kemeny, the Foreign Minister, to help alleviate the plight of the Jews. It was thanks to these interventions that on October 30 the government (1409) announced the recognition of the protective passes issued by the Vatican and the foreign legations as well as the granting of ex territorial status to all institutions and buildings protected by the IRC. 28

Shortly after the Budapest ghetto was established, Hans Weyermann arrived from Geneva to assist Born. Though the relationship between the two IRC representatives was not the most harmonious one, they managed to divide their responsibilities during the critical weeks before the capital's liberation. Before the Soviet siege of Budapest began on Christmas Day, 1944. Born withdrew to his home in Buda from where he directed the activities of the IRC in that part of the capital. Weyermann’s responsibilities were concentrated in the Pest part, where the ghetto was located. The effectiveness of the IRC during this time was greatly enhanced by its cooperation with the Papal Nuncio and of the representatives of the neutral states. In fact, some of the measures that were adopted in support of the beleaguered Jewish community, including the protection of the children's homes and the rescuing of Jews from the death marches, were conceived and carried out jointly (see below). 29

The Vatican and the Budapest Nunciature

Pope Pius XII

Though motivated by different considerations, the reactions of the Vatican to the catastrophe of European Jewry generally paralleled those of the IRC. According to the currently available evidence, Pope Pius XII and the top officials of the Vatican were as aware of the Nazis’ Final Solution program as the Jewish and non-Jewish leaders of the free world. This knowledge was also shared by some of the leading representatives of the Vatican abroad. Yet the Vatican, like the IRC, did not get actively involved on behalf of Jews as Jews until late in June 1944. Even then, the intervention was discreetly diplomatic, rather than public.

Evidence concerning awareness by the Catholic Church's leadership of the Final Solution was published by the Vatican itself in the 1970’s. In its series of volumes on the Papacy’s role during World War II, the Vatican published a number of documents which though obviously selective revealed that Pope Pius XII had received repeated reports through diplomatic and private channels concerning the mass killing (1410) of Jews in Poland and about the deportations to death camps from various parts of Nazi-dominated Europe. The Pope had learned about the deportation of Jews early in 1941 from the beginning of 1942, he had received a stream of detailed information about the anti-Jewish drive, including the fact that many of the deportees were destined to be gassed.

Theodor Cardinal Innitzer.

One of the first church dignitaries to alert the Pope about "the terrible fate" of the Jews was the Archbishop of Vienna, Theodor Cardinal Innitzer.

Giuseppe Burzio

Giuseppe Burzio, the papal envoy in Bratislava, kept the Vatican informed about the mass deportations from Slovakia from their beginning in March 1942. The Papal Nuncio in Berlin, Archbishop Cesare Orsenigo, reported to Monsignor Giovanni Battista Montini, then acting Secretary of State to Pope Pius (the future Pope Paul VI), that "the most macabre suppositions about the fate of the non-Aryans are admissible. " 30

SS-Obersturmführer Kurt Gerstein

In August 1942, SS-Obersturmführer Kurt Gerstein informed Dr. Winter, the legal adviser of Cardinal Count Preysing, the Bishop of Berlin, about the gassings he had witnessed at Belzec, near Lublin, and urged that this information be relayed to the Vatican. 31 A few months earlier, the representatives of the domestic and international Jewish organizations in Switzerland had an interview with Monsignor Filippo Bernardini, the Nuncio in Bern, informing him both orally and in writing about the plight of the Jews in East Central Europe.

Myron C. Taylor, President Roosevelt's personal representative at the Vatican.

A Jewish Agency memorandum, outlining the mass deportations from Western Europe and the executions of Jews in Poland, was forwarded to Monsignor Luigi Maglione, the Papal Secretary of State, in September 1942 via Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., the assistant of Myron C. Taylor, President Roosevelt's personal representative at the Vatican. 32

Archbishop Angello Roncalli

One of the main sources of information about the Nazis’ designs against the Jews was Archbishop Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli, the Apostolic Delegate in Istanbul (later to become Pope John XXIII). In his report dated July 8, 1943, addressed to Monsignor Montini, Archbishop Roncalli stated that millions of Jews had been sent to Poland and annihilated there. He did not elaborate on the annihilation, presumably because the concentration camp system had by then been sufficiently well known. Archbishop Roncalli also revealed his awareness of the exterminations to Franz von Papen, the German ambassador in Ankara, (1411) who replied by citing the Soviet massacre of Poles in the Katyn forest, near Smolensk. 33

One of Archbishop Roncalli’s sources of information was the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, with which be had been in close contact since 1943. The leader of the Agency’s delegation in Istanbul, Chaim Barlas, had kept the Apostolic Delegate informed about the anti-Jewish measures in Europe. In fact, a few days after Hungary' s occupation by the Germans, Barlas sent him a note thanking him for his readiness to get in touch with the Holy See and the Apostolic Delegate in Budapest on behalf of Hungarian Jewry. 34

The Jewish leaders of the free world, including those associated with the World Jewish Congress, made numerous efforts to induce him to speak out against the exterminations and to threaten Hitler and those actively engaged in the drive with excommunication. 35 Similar appeals were also made by Western leaders. In July 1942, Tittmann reminded the Vatican that its silence was "endangering its moral prestige and is undermining faith both in the Church and in the Holy Father himself." 36

[…]

Papal nuncio in Hungary Angelo Rotta (center)

The Vatican’ s position on Hungary was effectively put forth by Angelo Rotta, the Apostolic Delegate, who was also the dean of the diplomatic corps in Budapest. 47 An extremely able and compassionate man, the Nuncio took the leadership after the German occupation in warning the members of the newly established Sztojay government, individually and collectively, against any anti-Jewish excesses. Between March 23, when the Sztojay government was inaugurated, and May 15, when the mass deportations began, the Nuncio frequently contacted the Prime Minister and Mihaly Amothy-Jungerth, the de facto Foreign Minister, pleading for moderation and the redressing of injustices.

Gennaro Verolino, the secretary of the Nunciature.

These contacts were made either in person or through Gennaro Verolino, the secretary (uditore) of the Nunciature. The Nuncio was also in the forefront of the protest measures undertaken by the Christian churches of Hungary, urging their leaders to intervene even more effectively on behalf of the persecuted. During the first phase of the Final Solution program, however, the Nuncio, like the Hungarian church leaders, was especially concerned with the fate of the converts and the Christians of Jewish origin.

By May 15, when the deportations began, the Nuncio realized the inadequacy of his approach and the failure of the government to heed his warnings. On that day, he submitted a note condemning the actions of the government, emphasizing that the whole world knew what the deportations meant. 48 He appealed once again to the government not to overstep its bounds in the drive against the Jews. Alluding to the deportations that were just beginning, the note stated:

‘The Office of the Apostolic Nuncio regards it as its duty to protest against such measures. Acting not out of a false sense of compassion but in the name of thousands of Christians, it requests the Hungarian government once again not to continue its war against the Jews beyond the limits prescribed by the laws of nature and God's commandments, and to avoid any action against which the Holy See and the conscience of the entire Christian world would feel obliged to protest.

The note contained three specific requests:

‘That the government should differentiate between Jews and converts, and that the Christians should be exempted from the anti-Semitic measures, as in Slovakia. (1415)

‘That fundamental human rights be observed in the implementation of measures deemed necessary by the government in defense of state interests.

‘That the government should take appropriate steps to prevent the repetition of abuses and assaults against church institutions and persons such as those the police had committed during the raid against the Holy Cross Society.

This note is of particular importance in the annals of the Vatican, because it reportedly was the first official protest against the deportation of Jews lodged by a representative of the Holy See. 49 Like all subsequent notes, however, it was diplomatic in tone and personal in character. The Nuncio had undoubtedly been aware of the realities of the Final Solution program. In his note addressed to Sztojay on May 15, he wrote, inter alia: "Everybody knows what the deportations mean in reality." 50 Nevertheless, the Nuncio continued to adhere to the policies of the Vatican. As a well-known scholar of the Holocaust had concluded, "no representative of the Vatican ever publicly told Catholics that they must not cooperate because Germany was killing Jews systematically and totally, and killing Jews was a sin." 51

Along with the official protest note, the Nuncio also sent Sztojay a personal note, pleading that he support the three demands and pointing out that he was keeping the Holy See fully informed about developments in Hungary. 52

‘The Council of Ministers took up the Nuncio's plea on May 17, after similar demands had been advanced by the Hungarian church leaders. In accord with Sztojay's suggestions, the Council decided to:

‘Request the Minister of the Interior to establish a special section within the Jewish Council to deal with the affairs of converts.

Separate the converts from the Jews in areas where the ghettoization has not yet been completed.

‘See to it that in the case of a transfer of labor abroad from which converts could not be exempted, it would not be in the (1416) nature of deportation, and would be effectuated humanely, keeping the workers’ families together.

‘Set up a mechanism under which certain people might be exempted from the anti-Jewish laws for reasons of special national interest. 53

Reportedly, the Council of Ministers also received a message from Arnothy-Jungerth, who was quite unsympathetic to the policies of the Jaross-Endre-Baky group in the Ministry of the Interior and particularly sensitive about the negative reactions abroad. He disclosed that the Nuncio had shown him Pope Pius XII's note warning that "Hungary is the land of the Blessed Virgin and of Saint Stephen, and that the way it is behaving toward the Jews will be a permanent stain on its honor." 54

The Nuncio was informed of the Council’s decisions by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 27. The note merely repeated the standard answer that the transfers were humane, and for labor abroad. As if to ease the anxiety of the Nuncio in connection with the converts, the note emphasized that the mass conversion of Jews in recent years had been motivated primarily by political and economic factors. 55

The Nuncio was not persuaded by the government's obfuscating arguments. In his note of June 5, he once again deplored the deportations and the inclusion of the elderly, the ill, and the children. He expressed, somewhat sarcastically, his surprise that the government had extended to the Jewish laborers the favor of sending along their families when it provided no such opportunities for the thousands of Hungarian Christian workers who had been allowed to work in Germany for years. 56

The campaign by the Nuncio, paralleling that undertaken by the Hungarian Christian churches, received a boost late in June 1944. It was to a large extent due to the revelations in the Swiss press of the horrors of the deportations from Hungary and of the realities of the concentration camp system. Among some of the world leaders who had approached Horthy to put an end to these horrors was also Pope Pius XII.

Archbishop Angelo Roncalli

In connection with the tragedy of Hungarian Jewry, Pope Pius XII had been under pressure to act ever since the German occupation of Hungary on March 19, 1944. The pleas of the Jewish Agency leaders, transmitted via Archbishop Roncalli, were joined by those emanating (1417) from other sources. On March 24, the U.S. War Refugee Board had urged the Pope via the Apostolic Delegate in Washington to use his influence to protect the Jews of Hungary. 57 Another urgent appeal was advanced by the Board through Harold Tittmann, the American representative to the Vatican on May 26, 11 days after the start of the mass deportations:

We believe... That it is both timely and fitting that the Hungarian authorities and people should be reminded of the moral values involved and of the spiritual consequences that must flow from indulgence in the persecution and mass murder of helpless men, women, and children. To that end we earnestly suggest that His Holiness may find it appropriate to express Himself on the subject to the authorities and people of Hungary, personally by radio and through the Nuncio and clergy in Hungary as well as through a representative of the Holy See specially dispatched to Hungary for that purpose. His Holiness, we deeply hope, may find it possible to remind the authorities and people of Hungary, among whom great numbers profess spiritual adherence to the Holy See, of the spiritual consequences of such acts and of the ecclesiastic sanctions which may be applied to the perpetrators thereof. 58

The Pope was also approached by the Jewish leaders of the free world.

Rabbi Isaac Herzog

On May 22, for example, Rabbis Isaac Herzog and Ben-Zion Meir Uziel, the Chief Rabbis of Palestine, had approached him via the Apostolic Delegate in Cairo, with the request that he use his great influence... to prevent the diabolical plan to exterminate the Jews of Hungary. " 59 Toward the end of June, he bad been asked by Bernard Griffin, the Archbishop of Westminster (acting on behalf of the World Jewish Congress), to intervene in Hungary. 60

When the Pope yielded, his approach, like that of the Nuncio and the Hungarian church leaders, was both discreetly diplomatic and personal.

On July 25, the Pope sent the following telegram to the Regent:

Supplications have been addressed to Us from different sources that We should exert all Our influence to shorten and mitigate the sufferings that have, for so long, been peacefully endured o n account of their national or racial origin by a great number of unfortunate people belonging to this noble and chivalrous nation. in (1418) accordance with our service of love, which embraces every human being, Our fatherly heart could not remain insensible to these urgent demands. For this reason we apply to Your Serene Highness, appealing to your noble feelings, in the full trust that Your Serene Highness will do everything in your power to save many unfortunate people from further pain and sorrow. 61

Although the word "Jew" was not mentioned in the message, Horthy and his associates realized full well the intentions of the Pope. While the Nazis and the Sztojay government were clearing the last provincial areas of Jews, Horthy was already agonizing over the worldwide impact of the anti-Jewish measures. Cognizant of the rapidly deteriorating military situation, he became increasingly inclined to protect at least the Jews of Budapest. These conflicting positions were clearly reflected in the responses Sztojay and Horthy bad forwarded to the Nuncio and the Pope, respectively.

In his response to the Nuncio's note of June 5, Sztojay, on June 30, identified his government's position on the converts and on the nature of the deportations:

Though lacking the authority to alter the basis of the Hungarian legislative process through the regulation of the Jewish question, the Royal Government wishes to emphasize that it does not refuse the issuance of special considerations on behalf of converted Jews. It was in this spirit that the Royal Government had examined the recent note of the Apostolic Nunciature, and can summarize its opinion in connection therewith as follows:

1. As we have already stated, the interests of the converted Jews will be represented by a special section to be elected from within the Association of Jews in Hungary. Until the bylaws of the Association are approved, Mr. Sandor Torok will represent the converted Jews in the Provisional Executive Committee. All necessary measures have been taken to promote the operations of this representative of the converted Jews.

b) We take this opportunity to mention that Hungarian Jews are not slated for deportation. A large number of Jewish manual laborers are being placed at the disposal of the German government, and the fact that their families were sent together with them to Germany is the result of the decision to keep (1419) families undivided, since greater performance can be expected from Jews when they are relaxed by the presence of their families. In this connection, we saw to it that in the retention within the country of the manpower absolutely needed to maintain industrial and economic life, priority be given to the converted Jews and their families.

c) The Royal Government has for the time being suspended approval of various emigration plans initiated by the Swedish Red Cross and the Swiss government, which envisioned the emigration of a certain number of persons to Sweden and the Near East. The Royal Government is examining these plans in good faith, and as soon as they are about to be realized, it will see to it that the converted Jews are given priority in the opportunities for emigration.

2. The Royal Government has put into effect the strictest measures so as to generally reassure the Jews with respect to the execution of the measures adopted against them; it has prescribed humane and equitable treatment and scrupulous care as guidelines for the executive organs, which are required to refrain from any violation of the principles of humanitarianism. 62

In contrast to the devious explanations Sztojay gave to the Nuncio shortly after the important Crown Council meeting of June 26 (see Chapter 25), Horthy, in his July 1 response to the Pope's plea, clearly intimated a resolve to act:

I have received the telegraphic message of Your Holiness with deepest understanding and gratitude. I beg Your Holiness to rest assured that I would do everything in my power to enforce the claims of Christian and humane principles. May I beg Your Holiness not to withdraw Your blessing from the Hungarian people in its hour of deepest affliction? 63

The Nuncio was incensed by the callousness with which the Prime Minister tried to cover up the realities of the anti-Jewish drive. He gave vent to his outrage during a discussion with Sztojay on July 6. Mincing no words, he identified the handling of the Jewish question as "abominable" and as "dishonorable" for Hungary. He complained especially about the cruelties that were perpetrated by the gendarmerie (1420) and about the fact that many Hungarians who were born as Christians or had lived as Christians for 30 to 40 years were being treated in the same outrageous manner as the Jews. In response, Sztojay repeated the arguments he had given in writing on June 30 and catalogued the government' s concessions, which he had submitted in writing to Cardinal Seredi on July 7 (see Chapter 30).64 In fact, the Prime Minister urged the Nuncio during this meeting to use pressure on the Cardinal to make him desist from the planned distribution of the pastoral letter of June 29, which in his opinion was directed against the government. Sztojay invoked the threat of Bolshevism, which he claimed bad threatened both Hungary and the Christian churches. The Nuncio rejected the request, arguing that the Hungarian Catholic hierarchy was not engaged in any anti-government activity, but was merely trying to focus attention on the manner in which the Jewish question was being solved; he also warned against any limitations on the freedom of the church. 65 As it turned out, the Prime Minister achieved his objective despite the Nuncio’s opposition.

In his attempt to at least partially recapture the goodwill of the Holy See, Sztojay supported a special request by the Nuncio to have 14 baptized Jews exempted from the anti-Jewish laws 66 and on July 22 assured him in writing of the governmental concessions he referred to on July 6. The Nuncio, while grateful for the concessions, identified them "as far from being satisfactory." 67

The Nuncio also intervened on behalf of internees in response to Allied requests. On July 13, for example, he approached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to support a request that was transmitted by the American government via the Holy See to have all those interned for political, religious, or racial reasons be treated in accord with the Geneva Convention, and be made eligible to receive food parcels from the IRC. Since there were only a few internment camps of this type in Hungary, including those of Kistarcsa and Sarvar, the Ministry, with the consent of the Prime Minister’ s office and of the Ministry of the Interior, responded affirmatively two days later. 68 On July 31, following the " illegal " deportations from Kistarcsa and Sarvar, (see Chapters 22 and 25), the Nuncio pleaded with Istvan Antal, the Minister of Justice, on behalf of 3,000 political prisoners who were supposedly to be concentrated for deportation in Komarom. 69 (1421)

Although the deportations were officially suspended as of July 6, the threat of deportation lingered on (they continued in fact in the suburbs of Budapest on July 8 and 9), especially for non-converted Jews. The several dates set for the deportation of the Budapest Jews, as well as the plans for their resettlement outside of the capital (generally viewed as a prelude to the deportations), had induced the Nuncio to continue his efforts. Alarmed by the Central Jewish Council's communications concerning the planned "resettlement" of the Budapest Jews on August 25, Monsignor Rotta, in cooperation with the representatives of Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, on August 21, launched a vigorous protest against the envisioned deportations. 70

Even during this period of relative tranquility, the Jewish leaders of the free world continued their efforts to see the Pope on behalf of the beleaguered Jews. Isaac Herzog, the Chief Rabbi of Palestine, had been desperately trying-by direct and indirect appeals-to obtain an audience with the Pope. But all his efforts were in vain. The best he could achieve was a meeting on September 5 with Monsignor Hughes, the Papal Delegate to Egypt and Palestine. Hughes claimed that the Pope had withheld an invitation for the Chief Rabbi to come to the Vatican out of fear that such a visit "in connection with measures to save the people of Israel might, perhaps, drive the Germans to wreak vengeance on the remnants of Jewry in Europe."

Similarly, when the Chief Rabbi suggested that "the Pope make a public appeal to the Hungarian people and call upon them to place obstacles in the way of the deportations and that he declare in public that any person obstructing the deportations will receive the blessing of the church, whereas any person aiding the Germans will be denounced," Monsignor Hughes rejected the suggestion. He claimed that "the Holy Father would fear that a public appeal to the Hungarian people may drive the Germans to liquidate the rest of the Hungarian Jews."

When Rabbi Herzog argued that it would be difficult for the Germans to continue the deportations "if Hungarian Bishops were to go into the camps and announced publicly that if the deportation of Jews went on they would go and die with them," 71 Hughes remained adamant. Obviously, the Chief Rabbi was as naïve about the position of the Vatican as he was about the historical role of the bishops in Hungary. (1422)

Monsignor Angelo Rotta, Italy, Vatican diplomat in Sofia, Bulgaria, and Papal Nuncio (Ambassador) in Budapest, 1944-45

Following the Nyilas coup of October 15, the Nunciature expanded its operations on behalf of the persecuted Jews. In addition to pursuing its diplomatic approach, it also became actively involved in rescue operations, often acting in concert with the IRC and the legations of the neutral states. The Nuncio contacted Baron Gabor Kemeny, the new Foreign Minister, on October 18, and Szálasi himself on October 21. He asked them to exercise great restraint and moderation in the handling of the Jewish question and to ensure that the concessions made during the Horthy era be honored. These interventions became ever more frequent as the Nyilas terror worsened. The mobilization of men and women for forced labor and the beginning of the death marches toward the Austrian border early in November had led the Nuncio to conclude that Szálasi’s earlier assurances that the Jews would be neither deported nor annihilated could not be trusted. On November 17, he and the Swedish Minister handed Szálasi a note-the second joint action of the Nunciature and the legations of the neutral states-requesting that the government:

Revoke its decision to deport the Jews and bait the measures already in progress so that those separated from their families could return in the shortest time possible.

Assure humane treatment (sufficient food, shelter, medical and religious care, and respect for life) for those forced to live in concentration camps for labor service.

Fully and loyally observe the assurances it had given earlier with regard to the Jews under the protection of the legations accredited to Budapest. 72

That very day Szálasi issued his " final plan for the solution of the Jewish question." He divided the Jews into six categories, one of which consisted of those to be a lent to Germany; another, composed of approximately 15,000 persons holding foreign protective passes, was to be placed into an international ghetto. 73 Among the latter were the approximately 2,500 Jews and converts who had received protective passes from the Nunciature. On October 30, following the interventions of Friedrich Born of the IRC, the Szálasi government decided to (1423) recognize these passes. Taking advantage of this decision, the Nuncio ordered that all Roman Catholics affected by the anti-Jewish laws be issued passes, stipulating that their holders were under the protection of the Vatican. Although the Nunciature was authorized to issue only 2,500 such certificates, it actually issued many more. In a short while, approximately 15,000 such safe-conduct certificates were in circulation. Many of these were issued by Rozsi (Rose Marie) Vajkai, the head of the safe-conduct office in the Nunciature, whose own special exemption had been arranged through the intervention of the Nuncio earlier in the year. Wanting to save as many of the persecuted as possible, she issued certificates of protection to all those who submitted baptismal papers without checking whether they were genuine or not. 74

Many of the Jews holding safe-conduct certificates were housed in a few buildings in the international ghetto. They were identified by special name plates, stating that they were under the protection of the Vatican. One of the persons primarily responsible for the safeguarding of these buildings was Tibor Baranszky, a secretary in the Nunciature. 75

The Nuncio also authorized the use of pre-signed blank safe-conduct certificates to be issued for rescuing Jews from the Óbuda brickyards, where the victims had been concentrated before deportation, and from the death-march columns that were being driven toward Hegyeshalom. 76

In pursuit of these objectives, he cooperated with the IRC, whose main representative was Sandor Gyorgy Ujvary. A writer-journalist and publisher of Jewish background, Ujvary established contact with the Nuncio via Janos Toth, the liaison between the Nunciature and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ujvary had become associated with the IRC in October and continued to head its Jewish rescue section until the capital’ s liberation in February 1945. In this capacity he was involved in the protection of the IRC-sponsored children’s homes and in the distribution of baptismal certificates, which he obtained from Mrs. Laszlo Katona, a devout Catholic woman who managed a printing shop in Kassa. When the death marches began early in November, he decided to expand his rescue operations by involving the Nunciature as well.

Vatican protective document signed by Angello Rotta

When he reviewed his scheme for the "illegal" distribution of the pre-signed safe-conduct certificates, the Nuncio reportedly reassured him by stating: " What you are doing, my son, is pleasing to God and to Jesus, because you are saving innocent (1424) people. I give you absolution in advance. Continue your work to the honor of God. "77

Ujvary's effectiveness was enhanced by his role as liaison between the IRC and the gendarmerie, a position he had obtained through the cooperation of Lieutenant Colonel Laszlo Ferenczy, the officer in charge of the deportations from the provinces. He exploited his triple role by establishing good relations with Andras Szentandrassy, a high-ranking police officer who was the commander of the Óbuda brickyards, through whom he had succeeded in saving many Jews just before their deportation. These Jews, supplied with baptismal certificates, were usually hidden in convents, monasteries, and other church institutions. These rescue related endeavors had enjoyed the support of many notable Hungarians, among them Baroness Gizella Apor and Countess Maria Pejakevich. Ujvary’s rescue activities within the framework of the Nunciature had been particularly helpful along the death route to Hegyeshalom. Equipped with a letter of authorization signed by the Nuncio and with pre-signed blank safe-conduct certificates in his possession, Ujvary and his associates succeeded in saving thousands of Jews before they were to be handed over to the Germans. 78 Among his closest collaborators were Tibor Baranski, a textile merchant associated with the IRC, and Dr. Istvan Biro, a Transylvanian member of the House of Representatives. Shortly after the establishment of the Budapest ghetto, Ujvary also organized (December 7) a Department of Cooperation, whose task was to unify the rescue operations of the Nunciature with those of the neutral states under the umbrella of the IRC.79

Acting in cooperation with Sections A and B of the IRC, the Department of Cooperation had devoted special attention to the protection of children and of children's institutions. Toward this end, Ujvary had been in touch with Baron Kemeny, the Nyilas Foreign Minister. His close associates, including Milan Kosztich and Jozsef Eszterhazy, had maintained contact with Zoltan Bagossy, Kemeny’ s deputy, who reportedly was also a leader of a Nyilas terror group. When the Nyilas authorities decided just before the beginning of the Soviet siege of Budapest to transfer the Jewish children into the ghetto, the Nuncio and the representatives of the neutral states forwarded their third and last collective protest memorandum to the Hungarian government. The memorandum, dated December 20, implored the government to (1425) " allow all children (together with their mothers when the children are not yet weaned) to remain outside the ghetto in the refuges organized by diplomatic missions or in the various Red Cross institutions." 80 The appeal was only partially heeded; thousands of children, especially those in the buildings administered by Section A of the IRC, were taken into the ghetto.

Yad Vashem Citation

Újváry, Alexander (Sándor)

“Alexander Sándor Újváry was a writer and journalist who joined the International Red Cross in the middle of October 1944. Újváry served as head of the section responsible for saving Jews. He also arranged for the coordination of rescue activities with parallel institutions of the legations of the neutral countries, and served as liaison with those in the Arrow Cross who were in charge of carrying out the government’s anti-Jewish policies. Thanks to Újváry’s strength of character, and because of his pivotal positions in the hierarchy of the Red Cross, Újváry was able to save the lives of thousands of Jewish men, women and children during the Arrow Cross period, from October 1944 until the liberation of Budapest, in February 1945. Újváry provided letters of protection to hundreds of Jews who had been sent to the Austrian border on death marches. These letters, issued by the Red Cross or the Vatican, allowed the Jews who held them to avoid being transferred to the German Reich. Újváry also managed to have many hundreds of Jews released from an Óbuda brickyard, where they were concentrated prior to deportation. Thanks to Újváry’s bold intervention, a group of Jews from Department T, a transport division of the International Red Cross, was saved from expulsion to the German Reich. Together with his staff, Újváry kept Arrow Cross gangs from entering Red Cross protected houses and Jewish children’s residences. By bravely standing up to the Arrow Cross, Újváry kept these Jews from being transferred to the closed ghetto. Angelo Rotta*, the Apostolic Nuncio, or Vatican representative in the city, was witness to Újváry’s bravery. Rotta gave Újváry his blessing, and pardoned him for all the forgeries and illegal activities he participated in for the sake of saving Jewish lives, saying that Újváry was acting according to the will of God. Hans Weyermann, a representative of the International Red Cross stationed in Budapest during the Arrow Cross period, was another witness to Újváry’s actions. Weyermann confirmed that Újváry acted heroically at risk to his own life, saving thousands of Jewish individuals, including many children. Thanks to the testimony of Weyermann and others, Újváry received the Medal of Honor from the International Red Cross. After the war, Újváry left Hungary and settled in Munich. Although his survivors didn’t know the name of their rescuer and never met him personally, many articles and books were written about him, perpetuating his name and commemorating his heroism in the face of mortal danger. On October 10, 1985, Yad Vashem recognized Alexander Sándor Újváry as Righteous Among the Nations

Tibor Baranski

Yad Vashem Citation

Tibor Baranski

Sterneder, Margit

“Margit Sterneder worked in the Chinoin pharmaceutical factory, in Újpest, a Budapest suburb. Sterneder was a devout Roman Catholic who, in the name of Christianity, rejected both the racist ideology and the anti-Jewish laws that were official policy during the war. Sterneder became friends with a Jewish woman by the name of Dr. Hedvig Szekeres (née Spitzer), who was employed in the factory as a chemist. Over the years, Sterneder had become very close both with Szekeres and her family, and the friendship became even stronger after the passage of anti-Jewish legislation beginning in 1938. After the German occupation, the Jews of Budapest were forced to enter yellow-star houses in June 1944. Szekeres feared for the life of her six-month-old son and turned to her friend Sterneder, asking her to save the baby from deportation. Despite the risk it entailed, Sterneder agreed, taking the baby into her home for three months while Szekeres, her husband László and other members of their family entered a yellow-star house. Szekeres believed that lives of the Jews were no longer in danger under the Lakatos government, formed in August 1944. In September 1944, she took her son back from her friend Sterneder. When the Arrow Cross party came to power, in the middle of October, the situation for the Jews became much worse. Sterneder feared for the fate of Szekeres and her family. At the beginning November, she asked a family relative, Tibor Baranski*, a theology student who had just returned to Budapest from Kassa / Košice (today Slovakia) to approach the Vatican representative in Budapest and to ask for a letter of protection for the Szekeres family. The Vatican representative agreed, and thanks to the papers Baranski obtained for them, the lives of all nine members of the Szekeres family were saved. On January 11, 1979, Yad Vashem recognized Margit Sterneder as Righteous Among the Nations.”

Baranski, Tibor

“Tibor Baranski, born in Budapest, was studying for the priesthood in the city of Kassa / Košice (today Slovakia) near the Russian front. At the beginning of November 1944, Baranski was forced to leave Kassa and return home. When he arrived in Budapest, a relative, Margit Sterneder*, asked Baranski to procure Vatican letters of protection for a Jewish family by the name of Szekeres. Dressed as a priest, Baranski went to the Papal Nuncio, Angelo Rotta*, who listened to Baranski’s request and gave him nine letters of protection, one for each member of the Szekeres family. Encouraged by his success, Baranski returned to Rotta the next day to ask for another set of letters, this time for another Jewish family. Rotta agreed to his request, and then asked Baranski if he was willing to go to the brickyard in Óbuda, which was serving as a camp for Jews prior to their deportation. Again, Baranski was to disguise himself as a priest, and to present Vatican letters of protection, which would hopefully allow him to take some 50 Jews out of the factory. To help Baranski make a powerful impression on the Arrow Cross party members who were guarding the Jews, Rotta gave Baranski his own beautiful diplomatic vehicle, which flew the flag of the Vatican. Baranski’s mission was successful, and all the Jews who Baranski presented as having Vatican protection were released. After this, Rotta appointed Baranski as secretary of the department responsible for bestowing Vatican protection on Hungarian citizens. He was also made manager of the Vatican’s “protected houses,” buildings in which those who received protection letters could expect to live relatively safely, beyond the reach of the anti-Jewish laws. At the time, these houses sheltered many thousands of Jews. As part of his job, Baranski traveled in the Vatican’s name to Hegyeshalom, a border town where Jews were transferred to the German Reich. Using both real and fictitious letters of Vatican protection, Baranski got many of these Jews released, then traveled with them by train back to Budapest. Toward the end of the war, Baranski braved the bombardments in order to rush out after Jews who had been sent out on death marches. Despite the danger, he approached Jews marching along the main roads, or at various stopping points along the way, and gave them letters of Vatican protection. In his official capacity, Baranski paid for the upkeep of thousands of Jews living in the Vatican’s protected houses. He also did what he could to guarantee their security, fighting off the gangs of Arrow Cross members who ignored the houses’ protected status, entered the compounds and attacked the Jewish residents. At one point, Baranski, dressed as a priest, went to the train station, where Jews who had been part of the forced labor-service were in the process of being deported by Hungarian gendarmes. After a short argument with the officer in charge, Baranski got many Jews with Vatican protection letters taken out of the train cars, saving their lives. After the war, Baranski finished his studies and was ordained a priest. In 1948 he was arrested and indicted on trumped up political charges. He was jailed until 1953. In 1956 Baranski left Hungary as well as the priesthood. He married and settled with his wife in the United States. On January 11, 1979, Yad Vashem recognized Tibor Baranski as Righteous Among the Nations.

Wikipedia edited

“Tibor Baranski was a Hungarian-American man credited with saving more than 3,000 Hungarian Jewish women, men and children from the Nazis during the Holocaust.

“When he was 22, he was forced by the advancing Soviets to leave his seminary studies and return to Budapest. He talked his way into the residence of Papal Nuncio Monsignor Angelo Rotta, the Vatican's representative in Budapest. He persuaded Rotta to give him papers that would allow a Jewish family, friends of his aunt, to escape Hungary. Rotta recruited Baranski to help save other Jews. Over nine weeks, before the Soviets surrounded Budapest, Baranski orchestrated the rescue of over 3,000 Jews.

“In 1944, Baranski was studying at a Catholic seminary near Kassa, Košice (present-day Slovakia) to become a priest. He learned of Nazi murder plans through church channels. He was forced to return to Budapest at age 22 on October 20, 1944, as the Russian army drew near. By then the city was under tight control of German forces. Baranski lived with his aunt, who requested his help contacting Catholic church officials to ask them to intervene on behalf of the Szekeres family.

“Baranski saw a long line of people waiting for passes the Vatican embassy residence, the Vatican's representative in Budapest. Dressed in his priest's cassock, he later said, "I was not discouraged. Nonchalantly I pushed my way through the line and said that I was on official business." Germans and Hungarians believed that a "family could not be divided. So, if there was one Catholic spouse, for example, only one baptismal certificate was necessary. However, to cover the entire family, individual protection passes were needed, stipulating that the family was under papal protection."

“Baranski wandered through the embassy until he found Rotta's office. No one questioned him wearing a priest's cassock. He persuaded Rotta to give him nine letters of protection, one for each member of the Szekeres family. Encouraged by his success, Baranski returned to Rotta a few days later to ask for another set of letters, this time for another Jewish family.

“Rotta was impressed that Baranski spoke excellent German. He recruited Baranski to help protect Jews. Rotta provided Baránszki with letters of protection, baptismal, and immigration certificates. During the next 70 days Baránszki used them to save thousands of Jews.

Two weeks later, Rotta appointed Baránszki as the executive secretary of the Vatican's Jewish Protection Movement in Hungary, serving as a direct emissary of the Papal Nuncio. As head of the Jewish Protection Movement, he soon met other neutral legations. The group included Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat Baranski collaborated with Wallenberg and arranged private, unofficial meetings between the Swedish diplomat and Papal Nuncio Angelo Rotta. Baránszki often led secretive meetings with diplomats including Wallenberg, Swiss Consul Carl Lutz, Spanish Consul Ángel Sanz Briz and Giorgio Perlasca to save Jews.

“Baranski personally escorted individuals and families to hiding places, sometimes in secret rooms hidden within factories, and in the homes of other Catholics.

“Rotta asked Baranski to go to a factory where nearly 50 Jews who had been baptized as Catholic were being held captive before deportation to Germany and almost certain death. Disguised as a priest, Baranski discovered 2,000 Jews were being held captive inside, and called out the names of the baptized individuals he had been given. Then, while he distracted the guards, his assistants gave the remaining Jews information on how to contact the underground.

“On other occasions he intercepted groups of Jews who were being deported using fake Vatican letters of protection, persuaded their guards to allow him to bring some them back to Budapest.

“Rotta sent Baranski to Hegyeshalom with blank letters of protection. He freed hundreds of Jews, bringing them back to Budapest. Acting as the Vatican representative, Baranski paid for the upkeep of thousands of Jews living in the Vatican's protected houses. With the help of his aunt, who worked for a pharmaceutical company, he distributed medicine, extra food, and supplies to the hidden Jews.

He received a call from Adolf Eichmann, who told him that only 3,000 of the 12,000 protection letters previously authorized by the Nazis would be honored.

“He successfully won the release of dozens and hundreds of captive Jews. He gave the Nazis and Arrow Cross officials official-looking documents. He harbored about 3,000 Jews in the Vatican's protected sector of apartment complexes.

“The Soviets began the Siege of Budapest during the last week of December. They arrested Baránszki on 30 December 1944. He was sent on a forced march to a prison in Russia. Baranski was hospitalized and after the war ended, eventually made his way back to Budapest.

“His only reward for the risks he took, he said, would come from God "if" he was deserving. "I only did what God demanded of me. I'm only a useless servant."

The Attitude and Reaction of the Neutral Countries

The participation of the representatives of the neutral countries in the collective efforts undertaken by the IRC and the Nunciature during the Nyilas era was but a culmination of their activities in this sphere, which had begun shortly after the German occupation. Although the representatives of the neutral states were careful not to antagonize either the Third Reich or the Hungarian government, they did their best to alleviate the plight of the surviving Jews of Budapest. 81 By far the most active were the representatives of Switzerland and Sweden.

Switzerland. The involvement of Switzerland in Hungarian-Jewish affairs started shortly after Britain had severed relations with Hungary on April 8, 1941, following Hungary's participation in the Axis campaign against Yugoslavia. The Swiss had agreed to represent in Budapest the interests of Britain-and, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the interests of the United States and a number of other allied states as well. In this capacity, the Swiss also assumed responsibility for the handling of Palestinian immigration matters affecting Jews in Hungary. By coincidence, the Budapest branch of the Palestine Office, which was headed by Miklos (Moshe) Krausz, had received 600 Palestine immigration certificates from Chaim Barias of the Jewish Agency’s office in Istanbul, just three days before the German occupation. Although the newly installed Sztojay government yielded to the pleas of Jean de Bavier, the IRC representative, and issued its exit authorization early in April, the immigration could not be effectuated without German approval. This came later in the month in the wake of the Kasztner-Eichmann negotiations and served as a basis of various controversial rescue schemes (see Chapter 29). (1426)

While Kasztner and the other members of the Budapest Vaada were dealing with the SS, Krausz, who originally concurred with this approach, eventually decided to concentrate his efforts on a different rescue scheme. At the Crown Council meeting of June 26, 1944, the Hungarian government decided to accept the offer of some neutral and Allied countries to sponsor the emigration of 7,800 Jews. Of these, from 300 to 400 were sponsored by the Swedes. The 7,000 Jews who had Palestine immigration certificates or British offers of admission were sponsored by the Swiss. The Swiss Legation in Budapest had applied for exit permits for these Jews on April 26. 82

The decisions of the Crown Council were partially based on the reaction in Switzerland to the report on the situation of the Jews in Hungary (including an abbreviated version of the Auschwitz Reports) Krausz had sent to Geneva on June 19. The Swiss press published a series of exposes on the realities of the German concentration camps, paying special attention to the destruction of Hungarian Jewry. 83 The credence of the material forwarded by Krausz was enhanced by its distribution by several well-known Swiss academicians and theologians on July 4. 84 After this date, the press campaign acquired such proportions that Imre Tahy, the Hungarian charge d’affaires in Bern, had felt compelled to alert his government about the possible negative implications of the anti-Jewish drive. In his note of July 14, he identified the major newspapers and journals that exposed the details of the Final Solution in Hungary, emphasizing their sympathy for the Jews and their anti-Sztojay tone. 85

The press campaign coincided with protest meetings organized by church groups and political organizations. On July 10, for example, the Swiss Social Democratic Party held a protest rally condemning the destruction of Hungarian Jewry. The speakers had urged the government to end its silence and, as the base of the International Red Cross, follow Sweden in condemning the "frightful events" in Hungary. 86 Similar demands were advanced by cantonal governmental organizations such as the Great Council of Basel, the Caritas Association, and a considerable number of ecclesiastical organs. Among those which publicly condemned the horrors of the anti-Jewish drive in Hungary were the Church Council of Zurich Canton (July 7) and several leading clergymen, who spoke up during services in the Basel Cathedral on July 13. 87 (1427) Later in that month, the Cathedral was the scene of a demonstration by Swiss workers protesting the persecution of Hungarian Jewry. 88

George Mandel-Mantello, Honorary First Secretary for El Salvador in Geneva, 1942-45

The press campaign, like the many anti-Nazi and anti-Nyilas demonstrations, had been initiated primarily by the representatives of the many domestic and international Jewish organizations in the country. Georges (Gyorgy Mandi) Mantello, who then served as an official of El Salvador in Switzerland, had played an especially important role (see below). Anti-Hungarian campaigns similar to the one in Switzerland were also launched in other neutral and Allied countries. Their cumulative effect was to make the Sztojay government more responsive to suggestions aimed at easing the lot of the surviving Jews.

Carl Lutz and Staff

Sensing the changed atmosphere after Horthy's halting of the deportations on July 6, Carl Lutz, the Consul General in the Swiss Legation, took the initiative in arranging the possible emigration of the holders of the 7,000 Palestine immigration certificates. Acting in close cooperation with Krausz, 89 Lutz had soon emerged as one of the heroes of the Holocaust period in Hungary.

Lutz had been in the Swiss diplomatic service since his graduation from George Washington University in 1924. He had served in Washington and Philadelphia until 1935, when he was assigned to Palestine; after the outbreak of World War II, he also represented German interests there. Lutz was transferred to Budapest at the end of 1941 and on January 2, 1942, was appointed to head the Foreign Interests Section of the Swiss Legation. In this capacity, he represented the interests of Britain, the United States, and 14 other members of the Grand Alliance. As the spokesman of British interests, after the German occupation he also emerged as the representative of "foreign" Jews, including British and American nationals as well as Hungarian and other Jews in possession of Palestine immigration documents 90

Maximilian Jager, the Swiss Minister, Budapest

Accompanied by Maximilian Jager, the Swiss Minister, 91 Lutz visited Sztojay on July 21, requesting the Hungarian government's cooperation and assurances with respect to five specific points prior to starting the emigration of the Jews:

Jews appearing on the emigration lists should neither be sent for labor abroad, nor mobilized for labor service at home. (1428)

The Hungarian government should verify whether the Germans were indeed resolved, as some rumors had it, to prevent the implementation of the Palestine immigration scheme.

The Hungarian government should try to get the Germans to issue the necessary exit permits (Durchlass-Scheine) in Budapest so that the Jews could be listed in collective passports.

The Ministry of the Interior should cancel its directive to the Jewish Council to establish a camp for the prospective 9,000 emigrants, since the Germans might take advantage of such concentration and deport the Jews as they did in Kistarcsa a few days earlier. The Minister of the Interior should receive him personally if the technical details of the emigration required such a meeting. 92

Sztojay's immediate response to Lutz's requests was reassuring. He promptly got in touch with Jaross and suggested that the Jews slated for emigration be left in their homes while awaiting the completion of the formalities. He also approached Veesenmayer and Otto Winkelmann, the Higher SS-and Police Leader, who reportedly reconfirmed the Germans' position on the emigration plans advanced by Sweden and Switzerland. This was partially corroborated on June 23, at a meeting held in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had been attended by Lutz; Denes Csopey, the head of the Political Department; Oszkar Moor, a Ministerial Counselor; and Teodor Horst Grell, the expert on Jewish affairs in the German Legation. Csopey had urged Lutz to continue the technical preparations for the emigration. Despite the positive tone of the meeting, two of the responses caused Lutz considerable anxiety. Csopey reported that Jaross had no objections to leaving the Jews in their homes, but suggested that they be concentrated in the Yellow-Star houses on certain specified streets. When be reviewed Veesenmayer's and Winkelmann's response to Lutz, Grell remarked that " the actual beginning of the departure, however, was dependent on the settlement of a political question between the German and Hungarian governments." 93 (1429)

The political question referred to by Grell involved the conditions under which Hitler had expressed his readiness to cooperate with the scheme for the emigration of the 7,800 Jews. Heeding the advice of Veesenmayer and Ribbentrop, on July 10 Hitler had consented to the emigration of these Jews, "provided the Hungarians allowed the speedy resumption of the deportations of the remaining Jews." 94

Though disturbed by Grell’s remarks, Lutz proceeded with his plans for the emigration of the Swiss-protected Jews in accordance with the assurances he had received from Sztojay. Working closely with Krausz toward this end, on July 24, he brought about the establishment of the Glass House at 29 Vadasz Street (Chapter 29).95

Consul Lutz issued thousands of Schutzpässe (protective letters). These Swiss documents were in fact honored by German SS authorities. Lutz appeals to the other neutral legations in Budapest, including Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and the Vatican, for a united front against the deportations of the Hungarian Jews.

Those registered for emigration were classified as "foreign nationals" to be exempted from all anti-Jewish measures and relocated into specially assigned "Swiss-protected" buildings on Pozsonyi Road and its environs. They were eventually supplied with protective passes (Schutzbriefe or Schutzpässe), which stated that their bearers were " included in a collective Palestine passport and until their departure were under the protection of the Swiss Legation. 96 Two collective passports covering 2,195 names were in fact completed within a short time. 97

After the Hungarian exit visa and the Romanian transit visa had been secured, the collective passports were submitted to the German legation on August 3 for exit permits to make possible the departure of these Jews for Palestine via Romania. 98 ln spite of their assurances to Sztojay and other members of the Hungarian government, the Germans had apparently never really intended to let any of these Jews out unless the Hungarians accepted Hitler’s conditions.

But even these conditions were merely a ploy to induce the Hungarians to resume the deportations. This was partially revealed by Veesenmayer's June 25 communication to Ribbentrop. While reporting that the Swiss were holding Palestine immigration certificates for 40,000 Hungarian Jews, he hastened to reveal Eichmann’s and Himmler's position on the subject. Eichmann had revealed that Himmler would under no circumstances permit the emigration of the Jews to Palestine, for they were "without exception biologically valuable material." Eichmann was resolved to complete the Final Solution come what may. He was ready, if necessary, "to seek a new decision from the Fuhrer." Eichmann was confident that he would not have to resort to this ultimate step, for, as (1430) Veesenmayer had reported, he intended "to carry out the expected expulsion of the Jews from Budapest, once it was started, with the utmost suddenness and with such speed that they will be driven out before anyone has had a chance to obtain a travel document or visa to a foreign country. " 99

These issues were discussed again by the Council of Ministers on August 10. The views of the Foreign Ministry were expressed that same day in a memorandum by Denes Csopey, head of its Political Department. Addressed to Istvan Barczy, the State Secretary of the Council, the memorandum provided the outlines for a possible settlement of the Jewish question. The "laying of the Jewish question to rest" was required, according to the memorandum, by (a) internal political needs; (b) the requirements of Hungarian-German relations; and (c) the country’ s obligations towards the neutral countries and the International Red Cross in connection with the German conditions for going along with the limited emigration. According to the memorandum, there were 164,000 Jews living in Yellow Star-marked buildings in Budapest at the time. Of these, around 20,000 were converts, and about 10,000 were envisioned to emigrate under the various emigration schemes. With respect to the remaining 134,000 Jews and the Jews then serving in labor service companies, the memorandum stated that:

1. The number of Galician and infiltrated Jews was 50,000 to 60,000. The removal of these Jews could be offered to the Germans.

2. The Jews currently mobilized for labor service and their families (their wives, children, and possibly parents) would be retained to satisfy the country’s labor needs. The family members would be placed in provincial ghettos just as the 45,000 Jews were concentrated in Theresienstadt, Germany.

3. Also retained would be the exempted Jews as well as those who were exempted by the Regent up to a particular absolute number.

The Foreign Ministry suggested that the issuance of a declaration by the Regent concerning the above should be followed by a German declaration stipulating that the Germans would: (1431)

(a) Recognize that the Jewish question was thereby solved in Hungary to their satisfaction and would recall at least the SD organs.

(b) Cease their contact with the Jewish Council of Hungary and abstain from the removal of Jews (as was the case in Kistarcsa, Sarvar) by their own organs.

(d) Approve unconditionally the exit and transit of those sponsored by the International Red Cross, the Swiss government, and the Swedish Red Cross.

(e) Assure that those delivered would remain alive.

(f) Acknowledge that the property of those banded over remained Hungarian state property. 100

In the meantime, the "negotiations" proceeded on a new basis. Instead of the emigration route suggested by the Swiss for which they already had the necessary Hungarian exit and Romanian transit visas, the Germans now insisted that the Jews be directed via Western Europe to Lisbon. The objective was to delay if not completely block the emigration: unlike the Romanian route, which required only permits that the Budapest German Legation could have issued, the Lisbon route required exit and transit permits from Berlin.

The Swiss request for exit permits via Romania was consequently rejected on August 14. The rejection was based on Hezinger's suggestion of August 4, which coincided with Himmler's views. Hezinger and his colleagues bad argued that the Hungarians bad failed to resume the deportation program under the conditions outlined in the Fuhrer directive and that the emigration of Jews to Palestine would conflict with Germany's position toward the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. 101

The Swiss repeated their request on August 25, August 31, and September 11. By that time Romania had switched sides and the Swiss suggested the possibility that 2,000 Germans interned in "enemy camps" might be released in exchange. 102 The Germans, still hoping to find an opportunity to complete the Final Solution program, dragged out the (1432) negotiations. Following the Szálasi coup, the Swiss formally consented to a proposal under which 8,000 Hungarian Jews would be admitted to Switzerland 103 "for a short stay, provided that their quick emigration would be guaranteed and carried out by the American and British governments." 104 Under the plan, the Hungarian Jews were to be kept in Swiss transient camps until their departure for Palestine or Allied-controlled North Africa was arranged. 105 The British became apprehensive, expressing concern over the fact that the 8,000 Hungarian Jews might not be in possession of genuine Palestine immigration certificates. They were also worried about the possibility that the immigration quota might be exceeded if these Jews were allowed to enter Palestine. 106

Among those the Swiss offered to accept on a provisional basis were 1,000 children whom they bad originally offered to admit for a "vacation" in Switzerland on July 25.107 Efforts to expedite the emigration were also made by the Jewish organizations in Switzerland, Istanbul, and Palestine. The Germans continued their delaying tactics, wanting clarification as to whether the 2,000 Jews in the collective passports were part of or in addition to the 7,000 Jews whose emigration bad been agreed to. 108 This was obviously a charade; the Germans by that time had neither the will nor the means to make possible organized emigration of Jews. Following Romania's extrication from the Axis Alliance on August 23, 1944, the Swiss and Krausz, presumably still unaware of the Germans' real intentions, had devised a new plan for transporting the Jews listed in the collective passports to a Black Sea port via the Danube River. The Swiss had asked the British government for safe conduct for the boats, but were rebuffed because the river was "thoroughly mined by Allied Air Forces." 109 The Germans subsequently invoked their friendship with the Arabs and intimated that "if these Jews were going to American or British territory their departure would be viewed more favorably." 110 Krausz apparently accepted these assurances at face value, for he immediately informed the Jewish Agency delegation in Istanbul that the required exit permits would be secured and that the new route was through Switzerland and Portugal. He requested the WRB’s aid in obtaining the necessary transit visas. 111 This engendered another round of correspondence between the Jewish organization leaders in Switzerland, Turkey, and Palestine, all eager to assure the emigration of the Jews, and equally unaware of the Germans’ (1433) lack of sincerity. The exchange of correspondence, involving also the WRB and the Swiss authorities in Budapest and Bern, continued until the Soviets liberated the Hungarian capital.

Dr. Peter Zurcher

In the meantime, Lutz and his associates, including Dr. Peter Zurcher and Ernst von Rufs, acting in close collaboration with Krausz and other Zionists, tried to save as many Jews as possible from the Nyilas. In its eagerness to be recognized by the neutral powers, the Szálasi regime permitted the issuance of a limited number of protective passes, including 7,000 for the Swiss-sponsored Jews. 112 At first, it was envisioned that they would leave Hungary by November 15; when the emigration could not be effectuated because of the opposition of the Germans, the Jews were ordered into the so-called international ghetto. Despite the limitations imposed by the Nyilas, the number of protective passes increased phenomenally, primarily because of the illegal activities of the Zionists. Acting under the protective umbrella of the Swiss Legation, the Hehalutz youth distributed thousands of forged protective passes to Jews in the death-march columns, saving many of them just prior to their transfer to the Germans. (Many Hungarian guards, either because they were bribed or out of pity, honored the passes without checking them closely. 113 Occasionally, to the great chagrin of the SS and the Nyilas, an entire column would be so rescued and brought back to Budapest. The RSHA got wind of these activities and Ribbentrop urged Veesenmayer to have Szálasi lodge a protest with the Swiss for "sabotaging the Hungarian-German war effort." Veesenmayer complied immediately, reminding the Swiss and the Hungarian authorities in Budapest that protective passes could be issued only to Jews not yet mobilized for labor. He reassured the Foreign Office on November 16 that Jews in possession of protective passes would be screened and those with invalid ones would be "recaptured for labor." 114 Shortly thereafter raids were staged in the Swiss-protected buildings to winnow out Jews in possession of forged passes. The raids were organized by the Nyilas in cooperation with Obersturmbannführer Theodor Dannecker, representing the Eichmann-Sonderkommando. Many of those caught were shot into the Danube or compelled to rejoin the death marches to Hegyeshalom.

The raids did not stop the rescue campaign. Those associated with the Swiss rescue group continued their efforts. At the same time, other (1434) groups pursued their aid and rescue activities under the protective umbrella of other neutral states, especially Sweden. 115

Sweden. Sweden, the prestige and influence of which in Hungary can be traced to the services it had rendered the nation during both world wars, had been in a unique position. During World War I, the Swedish Red Cross had provided care for the Hungarian wounded and protection for the Hungarian POWs; it had also played an important role after World War I in the exchange of prisoners of war. The Sztojay government, like its predecessors, thus expected it to perform similar services once more. Moreover, Sweden was the power that represented the interests of Hungary and of all the enemy countries. Some of these, including Britain and the United States, had a considerable number of citizens of Hungarian origin, many of them quite well off, who might require protection.

The Swedish leaders, like those of the other neutral states, had been acquainted with the Nazis’ Final Solution program. They were kept abreast not only by their representatives abroad, who, as neutrals were stationed in all the countries of Europe, but also by the spokesmen of the Swedish Jewish community. Among these were Norbert Masur, an industrialist and the representative of the World Jewish Congress; Gunnar Josephson, the head of the Stockholm Jewish community; and Marcus (Mordechai) Ehrenpreis, the Chief Rabbi. 116 The latter were kept informed about the details of the anti-Jewish drive in Nazi-dominated Europe and urged to exert pressure on the Swedish government primarily by the representatives of the international and domestic Jewish organizations in Switzerland-who in turn received field reports from Bratislava, Budapest, and Istanbul. One of the direct links to Rabbi Ehrenpreis was provided by Dr. Zwi Taubes, the Chief Rabbi of Zurich. Another major source of information was Vilmos Bohm, a former Hungarian political figure and a journalist who lived in exile in Stockholm, where he was employed by the Press Reading Room of the British Legation. His reports, based on Hungarian newspapers and periodicals as well as intelligence communications, were periodically submitted to both the British and the Swedish authorities. Sweden also had a more direct experience with the Holocaust: in October 1943, it had helped rescue and offered haven to close to 8,000 Danish Jews. 117 (1435)

Sweden did not officially react to the anti-Jewish drive in Hungary until June 11, 1944, when the deportations from Carpatho-Ruthenia, northeastern Hungary, and Northern Transylvania had already been completed. On that day, Carl I. Danielsson, the Swedish Minister in Budapest, requested the Hungarian government to allow the Swedish Red Cross to join the Hungarian Red Cross in feeding and housing orphaned and abandoned children and in caring for victims of air raids. He also asked the government to cooperate in allowing the emigration of 300 to 400 Jews. They were to receive Swedish citizenship from King Gustav V, because they had relatives in, or had maintained long-term business connection with, Sweden. 118

Dr. Valdemar Langlet Swedish Red Cross delegate.

The Crown Council meeting of June 26 acted favorably; Amothy-Jungerth then accepted Danielsson's appointment of Dr. Valdemar Langlet as the Swedish Red Cross delegate. 119 Dr. Langlet, a member of the Swedish Legation and a Swedish-language lecturer at the University of Budapest, launched his humanitarian campaign with out delay, working in close cooperation with Sarolta Lukacs, the Deputy Chairman of the Hungarian Red Cross. 120

King Gustav of Sweden

Sweden became more deeply involved in aid and rescue work after June 30, when the King had sent a telegram to Horthy urging him to save the remaining Jews. The King’s appeal was part of the worldwide reaction to the horrors of the Final Solution program which had been publicized in the Swiss and later also in the Swedish press. It was also partially a response to efforts by American as well as Jewish interests to influence Sweden. 121

Ivor C. Olsen, the War Refugee Board representative in Sweden

Herschel Johnson, the United States Minister to Stockholm, and Ivor C. Olsen, the WRB representative, were the most active among the Americans. They were advised on May 23 by Secretary of State Cordell Hull to urge the appropriate Swedish authorities to persuade the Hungarians "to desist from further barbarism." 122 The Swedish Jews exerted their influence through Rabbi Ehrenpreis, Masur, and Josephson.

Swedish Foreign Minister Christian Gunther

Occasionally they talked with Foreign Minister Christian Gunther directly; at other times they used the good offices of Professor Hugo Valentin. 123

King Gustav's telegram was triggered by Dr. Taubes’s appeal to Ehrenpreis, which had promptly been relayed to Gunther. On the latter's recommendation, Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson obtained the Council of Ministers' approval for the King' s intervention on June 28. 124 (1436)

The Swedish press intensified its campaign early in July, paying special attention to the background of the King’ s action and its perceived consequences, including Horthy's decision to halt the deportations. 125 The press accounts, including the exchange of telegrams between the two heads of state, were brought to the attention of the German Foreign Office by Hans Thomsen of the German Legation in Stockholm. 126 In the meantime, Veesenmayer was also disturbed by the activities of the Swedes in Budapest. On July 5, he complained that Swedish officials were enabling Jews who were not Swedish nationals to leave Hungary by issuing them regular passports. 127

The Role of Raoul Wallenberg. The humanitarian activities of Sweden were greatly enhanced after the arrival in Budapest of Raoul Wallenberg on June 9, 1944. Then 32 years old, he had considerable political and business experience. Born into a well-known banking family in Stockholm on August 4, 1912, Wallenberg was brought up under the guidance of his grandfather, Gustav Oscar Wallenberg, the former Minister of Sweden to Japan and Turkey. (His father, Raoul Oscar, died shortly before he was born.) He inherited his penchant for diplomacy from many close relatives who had served in the Swedish government. One of them, his great-uncle Knut Wallenberg, was Foreign Minister during World War I; another great uncle, Axel Wallenberg, served as Swedish Minister to Washington. 128 His background paralleled that of the Swiss humanitarian Carl Lutz in at least two respects. He too had been educated in America and had spent some time in Palestine. Wattenberg graduated in 1935 from the University of Michigan, where he received a B.S. in architecture. In 1936, he spent six months in Haifa, where he worked in a Dutch-owned bank. While there, he met a number of German-Jewish refugees who made him conscious of the realities of National Socialism in the Third Reich, and acquainted him with the plight and aspirations of the Jewish people. He first established contact with the Hungarian Jews in 1941, when he became associated with an export-import enterprise headed by Dr. Kalman Lauer, a Swede of Hungarian-Jewish background. As the foreign trade representative of the firm, Wallenberg visited Budapest in February 1942 and again in the fall of 1943. On both occasions be bad ample opportunities to observe at first hand the impact of the anti-Jewish laws as well as to learn about (1437) the excesses committed against Jews in Ujvidek and in the labor service companies.

Lauer and Henrik Wahl, a general director of the Weiss-Manfred Works (both of whom were anxious to save their relatives), first hit upon the idea of sending Wallenberg to Budapest for rescue work. The possibility of expanding his role was raised in a discussion between Rabbi Ehrenpreis and Lauer at the end of May. Weeks elapsed before Wallenberg's mission was finally approved-primarily because Ehrenpreis at first had some misgivings about his youth and his request for large sums of money to bribe officials with. Ehrenpreis, however, was won over because of the enthusiastic support for Wallenberg’s selection by Johnson and Olsen. 129 The latter were advised by Secretary of State Hull on May 23 to impress upon the Swedes " the restraint which may result from the presence in Hungary of the greatest possible number of foreign observers... and to urge them in the interest of humanity, to take immediate steps to increase the number of Swedish diplomatic and consular personnel in Hungary. " 130

Raoul Wallenberg’s diplomatic passport

Wallenberg was thereupon appointed third secretary to the Swedish Legation in Budapest and given the specific mission to organize mass-scale relief action and to follow and report "on the situation with respect to persecution of Jews and minorities." 131 He arrived in Budapest on July 9, 1944, one day after the mass deportation program had ended in Hungary.

Raoul Wallenberg and Jewish Staff

In Budapest, Wallenberg took over the leadership of Department C of the Legation, which was in charge of rescue. One of his first steps was to visit the headquarters of the Central Jewish Council and hand over to Samu Stern the letter of recommendation he had received from Rabbi Ehrenpreis. 132 He asked for, and soon received a complete report on the situation of Hungarian Jewry. It was delivered to him by Laszlo Peto, the son of Erno Peto, one of the Council leaders. An official of the Council, Laszlo Peto knew Wallenberg personally: as students they had spent a summer in the same student hotel at Thonon-les-Bains, France-a chance encounter the Central Jewish Council exploited to its advantage. 133 Wallenberg quickly familiarized himself with the rescue activities of the Swiss Legation as well as those undertaken by Danielsson and Langlet in his own Legation. (1438)

Wallenberg's first official report to Sweden was dated July 17. In it he provided an overview of the catastrophe that had befallen Hungarian Jewry under the German occupation. 134 This was soon followed by other reports as well as by private communications to his business partner, friends, and relatives-all including details about the persecution of the Jews.

To carry out the rescue campaign, Wallenberg set up an organization that, at the height of its operations, included 355 employees, 40 physicians, two hospitals and a soup kitchen. Most of the staff and of the auxiliary personnel were Jews or converts who as a result of this work had gained immunity for themselves and their families. Among those who played an important role in the rescue work, especially as intermediaries with the Hungarian authorities, were Hugo Wahl, Bela Forgacs, and Vilmos Forgacs, who had been given the status of Swedish subjects.

Swedish Minister Carl Danielsson

While at first Carl Danielsson spoke in terms of granting Swedish citizenship to only the aforementioned 300 to 400 Jews with relatives or business connections in Sweden, the figure soon rose close to 650, thanks to a list Wallenberg had carried with him to Budapest. These were given a provisional or emergency passport (Provisoriskt Pass). Within a few months after Wallenberg's arrival, this rescue effort was expanded; it eventually included 4,500 Jews, a figure that was approved by the Nyilas government on October 31 in the expectation of diplomatic recognition by Sweden.

Danielsson signed protective paper

Originally expected to leave by November 15, these Jews were supplied with protective passes and transferred to "Swedish Houses" on Pozsonyi Road. As the Nyilas terror continued unabated, and especially during the Soviet siege, the number of those holding genuine or forged Swedish passes increased to well over 10,000. These Jews were housed in 32 Swedish-protected buildings. 135

The Germans were furious over the large-scale rescue activities by the Swedes. Reportedly some of the Hungarian officials were also disturbed by them, as they were about the rescue measures that were undertaken by the Swiss. According to Grell, Csopey once expressed the indignation of Hungarian government circles over the "indiscriminate manner" in which the Swedes were issuing their protective passes. He allegedly declared that the Swedes and the Swiss were aiming at getting into the good graces of the Western Allies at the expense of Hungary. 136 (1439)

In August, Lieutenant Colonel Ferenczy ordered the relocation of the few hundred Swedish-protected Jews who lived in Yellow-Star houses in various parts of the city. He used the list handed to the Hungarian authorities by Wallenberg as an excuse to establish contact with the Central Jewish Council and the Regent (see Chapter 25). The Council, which was entrusted with this task around August 22, was instructed to complete it by August 26. Some members of the Council, especially Lajos Stockler, found the order very disquieting. In the first place, Stockler, reflecting the anxiety of the Jewish masses, saw the transfer of the privileged Jews as an additional indication that the deportation widely rumored for August 25-26 would actually be carried out. He was also concerned with the problem of the unprotected Jews who had to be evicted from the Pozsonyi Road buildings to make room for the Swedish-protected ones. Finally, he felt that the decision of some of the Jews to rescue themselves individually or collectively through Zionist emigration schemes or through the help of neutral powers, thus separating themselves from the Jewish masses, was reprehensible. In his anger over these rescue schemes, he suggested that the Council sever all relations with the protected Jews. 137

Regardless of the feelings of some of its members, the Council had no alternative but to proceed with the implementation of the Ferenczy order. On August 23, it set up the machinery for the exchange of tenants. 138

Per Anger, Secretary of the Swedish Legation in Budapest, Hungary, 1944-45

After the Nyilas coup, the rescue work of the Swedish Legation expanded. The officers of the Legation, including the Minister and his closest aides (Gotte Carlsson, Lars Berg, and Per Anger), remained in Budapest, continuing to provide whatever assistance they could.

Lars Berg, Swedish Consul in Budapest, Hungary, 1944-45

The functions of Dr. Langlet acquired added importance as well. When the Nyilas decided to verify the authenticity of the protective passes issued by the Swedish Red Cross, he and his wife Nina, and her secretary and interpreter Maria Kola, did everything in their power to protect the Jews from being robbed or deported.

Swedish Red Cross protective pass issued by the Langlets

Another unit of the Swedish Red Cross, headed by Asta Nilsson, was particularly active in protecting children. When the Nyilas raided some children' s institutions and took the youngsters into the ghetto, they also took along Nilsson and Mrs. Bauer, a secretary in the Swedish Legation. (They were later freed through Wallenberg’s intervention.) 139 (1440)

Wallenberg himself moved his offices from the Buda side of the capital to Pest, where most of the Jews were concentrated, to be in a better position to help them. The number of officially distributed Swedish emergency passports soon passed 7,000. Like the thousands of protective passes, both genuine and forged, these provided a modicum of security to their possessors.

Jewish women released from the death marches photo by Tom Veres

Under Wallenberg’s guidance (and often with his personal assistance), Swedish rescue workers, including Mrs. Istvan Csanyi and Gedeon Dienes, saved hundreds of people from the death marches and the Óbuda brickyards by supplying them with protective passes.

Wallenberg (front right) at the Jozsefvarosi Railway Station photo by Tom Veres

Wallenberg was also successful in saving the Swedish-protected labor servicemen just before they would have been put aboard trains at the Jozsefvarosi Railway Station; those protected by the other neutral powers were less lucky.

For a while, the Szálasi government reluctantly tolerated the activities of the neutral powers in the hope of diplomatic recognition-Szálasi had hoped that these neutral powers would extend it immediately after he issued his "final plan" for the solution of the Jewish question on November 17. Early in December, he became so exasperated that he informed Danielsson that he would apply the full force of the anti-Jewish laws to the Swedish-protected Jews as well. Shortly thereafter, when the Soviet siege was about to begin, Szálasi demanded that the Minister and his staff move to Western Hungary. When they refused, Nyilas units attacked the Legation (December 10, 1944).

Wallenberg's role took on heroic proportions during the siege. The government had relocated to the western part of the country and the capital was in a state of anarchy, with armed Nyilas gangs roaming the streets and venting their frustrations on the helpless Jews. Wallenberg’ s tasks were staggering: in addition to saving Jews from the hands of the Nyilas, he struggled to obtain food for the tens of thousands of Jews in the ghetto and the protected buildings-an extremely difficult task since the capital was cut off from the usual sources of supplies. When the Jews became panic-stricken over the rumor that the Nazis and Nyilas had planned to destroy the ghetto just before the arrival of the Soviet forces, Wallenberg warned both Erno Vajna, the Nyilas leader entrusted with full powers for the defense of Budapest, and the German military commander against any massacres. In the midst of all these activities, he (1441) found time to submit his reports, giving specifics about the nature and magnitude of the catastrophe. 140

The Disappearance of Wallenberg. Raoul Wallenberg provided a heartening and rare example of great personal courage and self-sacrificing humanitarianism. Sadly, like many another heroic figure in history, he ended up sharing the fate of the victims he had come to help. But in a cruel and ironic twist, his tragic end was brought about not by the Nazis, but by the Soviets, who had been eagerly awaited as the harbingers of a new era of freedom and equality. Indeed, the Soviet involvement in the disappearance of Wallenberg is doubly ironical, for it was Sweden which had represented the interests of the USSR in Hungary during the war. On the day of the liberation of Pest (January 17, 1945), Wallenberg, who had been in touch with the Soviet officer in command of the fighting forces in Budapest since January 13, left for the Debrecen headquarters of Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky, then commander of the Second Ukrainian Front. Driven by Lajos Langfelder, an engineer who had served as his Hungarian chauffeur, and accompanied by a Russian guard, Wallenberg had some foreboding about his coming encounter with the Soviet commander. As he was departing, he allegedly told his coworkers: " I do not know whether I am going as a prisoner of war or as a guest." Neither Wallenberg nor Langfelder returned from that trip.

Staffan Soderblom, Sweden’s Minister in Moscow, reported Wallenberg’s disappearance after receiving a telegram from the Swedish Legation in Bucharest. The Soviet response to frequent Swedish inquiries was dissembling. For example, in February 1945 Aleksandra M. Kollontay, the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm, had assured Wallenberg’s mother as well as Foreign Minister Gunther that Wallenberg was alive and well in the Soviet Union; on October 18, 1947, over a year after Soderblom took up the matter with Stalin (June 15, 1946), Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei J. Vishinsky declared: " As a result of a careful investigation, it has been established that Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union, that he is unknown to us." 141

The Soviet cover-up did not end with Stalin’s death in March 1953. It was not until February 6, 1957, that the Soviet government acknowledged Soviet culpability in Wallenberg’s disappearance. On that day, Andrei Gromyko, then Deputy Foreign Minister, informed Swedish (1442) Ambassador Sohlman that Wallenberg had died in Moscow’s Lubyanka prison on July 17, 1947. The Soviet leaders pinned the blame on Viktor S. Abakumov, former Minister of State Security, who had been executed in December 1954 as an accomplice of Lavrentiy P. Beria, the former head of the NKVD (Soviet State Security and Secret Police, later renamed KGB). 142

In the late 1980’ s, Soviet officials transferred to the blame to Beria himself. 143 Toward the end of 1989, Nina Lagergren and Guy von Dardel, Wallenberg's half-sister and half-brother, were invited to Moscow by the KGB, supposedly to be given new information about Wallenberg’s fate. They were accompanied by Per Anger, Wallenberg’s deputy in Budapest and Sonia Sonnefeld, the secretary of the Swedish Raoul Wallenberg Association. Unfortunately, this meeting also proved a disappointment to the Swedes. While they were given some of Wallenberg’ s personal belongings, including his Swedish diplomatic passport and several notebooks which were said to have been found "during a recent search of the archives of the KGB," they were not given any new official information about Wallenberg’ s fate. The Soviet authorities simply reiterated their 1957 assertion that Wallenberg had died of a heart attack in Moscow’ s Lubyanka prison in 1947. 144

The rumor that Wallenberg was still alive in some camp, prison, or mental institution began to gain credence after the 1970’s, when Soviet immigrants, including former Gulag inmates, began arriving in the West. 145 It was primarily on the basis of their accounts that many well-known figures and governmental agencies in the West had urged the Soviet authorities to free Wallenberg or release his remains for burial in his homeland. 146

A shift in the Soviet position came toward the end of August 1990, when the authorities announced that they would permit an international commission to investigate the disappearance of Wallenberg and grant it access to prisons and archives, including those of the KGB. The commission completed the first phase of its investigations in September and provided "incontrovertible evidence" that Wallenberg did not die in the Lubyanka prison in 1947, as had been claimed by Gromyko; they cited the testimonies of Gulag survivors, including some from Vladimir prison where Wallenberg was reportedly also held for some time. 147 The findings of this commission conflict with the assertion of Oleg Gordievsky, (1443) a former KGB official, who claimed to have seen records indicating that Wallenberg had been executed in 1947 for refusing to cooperate with Soviet officials who were intent on recruiting him. 148

Shortly after the failed August 1991 coup, Vadim V. Bakatin, the new KGB chief, proved more forthcoming. However, neither be nor his deputy, Major General Nikolai Stolyarov, could shed new light on Wallenberg's fate. According to one of the few documents reportedly in the file-a handwritten letter, dated June 12, 1957, from the chief of the KGB to a senior Foreign Ministry official-the documents relating to Wallenberg had been destroyed on orders from the MVD (Ministry of State Security), the predecessor of the KGB (1946-1954). 149

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the leaders of the new " democratic" Russia proved equally reluctant to shed real light of the fate that had befallen Wallenberg after he was captured by the Soviets in Debrecen in January 1945. 150

Spain. Although openly sympathetic to the Axis powers, which had aided it during the Civil War, the Franco regime offered asylum to a limited number of Jews who had escaped from Nazi-dominated Europe. It was especially sympathetic to Sephardic Jews of Spanish origin. In 1943, for example, when the SS were engaged in the liquidation of Greek Jewry, the Spaniards had showed a special interest in the approximately 600 Jews in Salonika, whom they identified as Spanish subjects. The Nazis offered to repatriate all of them, but the Spaniards were willing to admit only 50. The Spaniards managed to have the remainder transferred to the special camp for privileged people (Bevorzugtenlager) in Bergen-Belsen. Eventually, 365 of this group were allowed to enter Spain at the end of the war. 151

As was the case with Switzerland and Sweden, Spain became involved in rescue activities only after the deportations from the provinces bad ended. It had become active only after a meeting that was held in Lisbon on July 5, 1944, of the Spanish ambassador to Portugal, Eliahu Dobkin of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, and I. Weissmann of the World Jewish Congress. At the meeting, the Jewish leaders had asked Spain’s help for the protection of Sephardic Jews living in the Nazi-dominated countries. The Spanish diplomat informed the Jewish representative that the Spanish government had (1444) already decided to grant protection to all Sephardic Jews who had proven " their Spanish origin or nationality at Spanish consulates." 152

One week later, the Central Jewish Council of Budapest received a telegram from the Tangier Committee for Aid to Refugees (Camile d’Assistance aux Refugies Tanger). Tangier, the Council was informed, would admit 500 children-200 of them specified on the list prepared by the Committee, and 300 to be selected by the Council. (Since the Tangier International Zone was under Spanish occupation during the war, this obviously reflected the position of the Spanish government.)

Angel Sanz-Briz the Spanish charge d’affaires,

A delegate of the Council immediately got in touch with Angel Sanz-Briz, the Spanish charge d’affaires, 153 who suggested that the Council ask Madrid to instruct its Budapest Legation to issue the visas for the 500 children and also for 50 to 70 adults, who would accompany them. He also suggested that the Council try to arrange the emigration through the IRC.154 Negotiations were begun by Born and Gyorgy Gergely, representing the Council, on July 29. They agreed, among other things, to immediately begin the registration of the children and place them in camps that would be protected by the IRC until their departure. 155 The matter was also the subject of discussions between Krausz and Zoltan Farkas, the Spanish Legation’s legal counselor. While the talks were proceeding, the Spaniards followed the example of the Swiss and the Swedes, and issued a limited number of protective passes.

The children’s emigration never took place. Following the Nyilas coup, the only question was their immediate protection and survival. This task was no longer carried out by the Legation’s ranking personnel; Sanz-Briz and his colleagues returned to Spain shortly after the Szálasi government had been inaugurated.

Giorgio (Jorge) Perlasca.

Leadership of the Spanish Legation was taken over by Giorgio (Jorge) Perlasca. An anti-Nazi Italian who had fought on Franco’s side in the Spanish Civil War, Perlasca came to Budapest in 1941 as a purchasing agent for an Italian food enterprise. After the German occupation, Perlasca went into hiding, fearing the Nazis both as an Italian national opposed to the Mussolini regime and as a recognized anti-Nazi. He was interned for a while by the Sztojay authorities, but allowed to return to Budapest just prior to the Szálasi coup. Early in November 1944, he acquired a Spanish passport from Sanz-Briz, who had asked him to get involved in helping the Spanish protected Jews. Provided with Legation documents testifying to his (1445) affiliation with the Spanish diplomatic service, Perlasca began his rescue activities with great zeal. 156 Later in the month, when Sanz-Briz and his colleagues returned to Spain, reportedly fearing the approaching Russians who bad been ill-disposed towards the anti-Soviet Franco regime, Perlasca decided to fill the void. Since he was a frequent visitor to the Legation, his "assumption of power" apparently did not arouse suspicion. The lower-ranked personnel of the Legation as well as the Nyilas Ministry of Foreign Affairs looked upon him as the new charge d’affaires. Perlasca and his associates issued approximately 3,000 protective passes. 157

Sans-Briz Spanish protective pass

Many of the holders of these passes were housed in the Spanish-protected buildings in the fifth district of Budapest. The effectiveness of Perlasca’s rescue activities had been greatly enhanced by the cooperation of Zoltan Tarpataky, the police officer in charge of law and order in the district.

Like the other protected Jews, the Spanish-protected ones were relocated into the international ghetto after November 15. Early in January 1945, they were transferred into the large ghetto. 158

The Germans, apparently unaware of Perlasca's personal role, were quite disturbed of the Spanish Legation’s rescue activities. 159 The accuracy of the reports on the Spanish government’s involvement in the rescuing of Hungarian Jews had disturbed the Germans in Budapest, Berlin, and Madrid. On October 13, Thadden reported that on the initiative of the Americans, the Spanish government was ready to issue visas to 2,000 Jews. About 10 days later Heinz Ballensiefen, the SS propaganda expert in Budapest, informed Rolf Gunther, Eichmann’s deputy in Berlin, that the Spanish Legation in Budapest had made an offer to the Central Jewish Council to protect Jewish orphans aged 14 to 16 years.

The information had some foundation in fact, for the Spaniards were still operating on the basis of the Tangier offer. On December 1, 1944, Friedrich Born of the IRC had asked the Spanish Legation to allow two leading members of Section A-Otto Komoly and Laszlo Szamosi-to work within the framework of the Legation on behalf of the children. Szamosi, acting as an official of both the IRC and the Spanish legation, had saved many children during the height of the Nyilas fury. 160 (1446)

During the death marches, Veesenmayer reported (November 13) that the Spaniards had requested exit visas for "additional Hungarian Jews having family relationships in Spain." 161

Despite the frequent exchange of telegrams between the various representatives of the German Foreign Office and the many exchanges of notes between the Spaniards and the Hungarians, no Hungarian Jews were ever allowed to leave the country under the Spanish scheme; the Germans had at no time issued the necessary exit and transit permits. 162

Portuguese Minister Carlos de Sampaio Garrido

Portugal. The Germans made an exception to their policy of refusing exit permits by favorably responding to a request by Carlos de Sampaio Garrido, the Portuguese Minister in Budapest, for the issuance of exit permits for a few Jews. 163 Three Jews were involved: Sampaio Garrido's secretary, Mrs. Bischowszky, and her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Gabor. The Hungarians heartily endorsed the scheme because they were anxious to put an end to an embarrassing incident in which the Hungarian police arrested the Portuguese Minister and some of his Jewish friends in Galgagyork, his summer residence just north of Budapest, on orders of Peter Hain, the head of the Hungarian Political Police, in the early morning of April 30. The police had planned to free the Minister, who invoked his diplomatic immunity; however, he refused to leave unless the others were also let go. Following a high-level conference involving Sztojay, Istvan Antal, Laszlo Baky, Hain, and Arnothy-Jungerth, it was decided (on the latter's suggestion and to the great chagrin of Baky and Hain) to release all the captives. The order was communicated to the police chief as well as to Sampayo Garrido by Gyula Teleki, the chief of protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On May 3, Sampaio Garrido lodged a strongly worded protest and demanded a full investigation. He was recalled shortly thereafter, whereupon he asked that his secretary and her parents be allowed to leave with him. Arnothy-Jungerth contacted Veesenmayer on May 23 and suggested that since the Minister would not leave without his secretary, nor she without her parents, all three be allowed to leave "to get rid of the Minister." 164 The German Foreign Office, after checking with Lisbon to see if President Antonio Salazar bad any interest in his Minister's case, concurred with Arnothy-Jungerth's recommendations and so instructed Veesenmayer. 165 The Germans issued the necessary papers (1447) to Mrs. Bischowszky immediately, but refused to issue them to her parents. The Minister left with his secretary on June 5; the Gabors were not allowed to leave until October 29. 166

Portuguese charge d’affaires Branquinho

On July 15 Portuguese charge d’affaires Branquinho and the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs applied to the German Legation for exit and transit permits for nine Hungarian Jews who had family or business relations in Portugal. The nine, including the Gabors, were given Portuguese passports valid till the end of the year. Veesenmayer was reluctant to act, although the departure of at least the Gabors had already been authorized, because in the meantime, the Fuhrer had laid down his conditions for allowing the emigration of Jews sponsored by the various neutral states. Consequently, the Portuguese request had for months been treated in the same dilatory manner as were the others. 167

In the meantime, the charge d’affaires had authorized that passports be issued to all those Jews who could prove that they had any relations in Portugal or in Brazil. The petitions were handled by Gyula Gulden, who acted as Consul General, and by Dr. Ferenc Bartha, who headed a special section in the Legation.

After the Nyilas coup, the Portuguese increased the number of their protective passes. Although they promised Foreign Minister Kemeny that no more than 500 passes would be issued, in fact, more than 700 were given out. The Germans at first refused to recognize them. However, Pedro Tovar de Lemos, the Portuguese representative in Berlin, intervened; in addition, Szálasi was eager to obtain diplomatic recognition from the neutral states.

The Germans therefore modified their position. Andor Hencke, the chief of the Political Division of the German Foreign Office, offered a politically expedient concession on November 9, suggesting the recognition of protective passes " provided they were kept within reasonable limits." The Hungarians were advised (November 13) to recognize no additional protective passes. 168 On October 27, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry had asked the Portuguese Legation to forward a list in three copies of those Jews it was interested in. Its note emphasized that if those Jews did not depart by November 15, they would be treated like other Hungarian Jews.

On that date, the Portuguese-protected Jews were also ordered to move into special protected buildings. Most of them were relocated to (1448) 5 Ujpesti-rakpart, which was under the administration of Dr. Sandor Brody. The dwellers were helped by Dr. Bela Richter, a state attorney who as air raid warden had allowed them to use the shelters reserved for Christians. As the Nyilas rule became ever more barbaric, the status of the Portuguese-protected Jews became increasingly precarious. On November 26, the labor servicemen protected by the Portuguese were ordered to appear at the Albrecht barracks, and from there, despite repeated assurances by the authorities, they were entrained and taken to the Sopron area to build the East Wall for the defense of Vienna. On January 4, 1945, at the height of the Soviet siege, the remaining Portuguese-protected Jews were transferred into the ghetto. 169 Three days earlier, 25 SS-men bad entered the Legation building and murdered 10 Jews who had been hiding there. 170

Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt

Turkey. Although Turkey had a legation in Budapest, it participated only marginally in rescue activities. On May 24, 1944, Secretary of State Hull cabled Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt in Ankara to urge the Turks " in the interest of humanity, to take immediate steps to increase the numbers of Turkish diplomatic and consular personnel in Hungary" and to use all means available to persuade the Hungarians to desist from further barbarism. The Turks apparently were not persuaded.

U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull

Late in June, Ambassador Steinhardt was once again asked by the U.S. Secretary of State to bring additional pressure on the Turkish government in light of the resolution then introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives by Congressman Sol Bloom, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Relations.

Sol Bloom, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Relations.

The resolution requested the Secretary of State "to urge that the government of Turkey facilitate, in the interest of humanity, the entry of refugees who can escape from the Nazis into Turkey and establish a refugee camp in which such persons can be temporarily sheltered on its territory." Acting under pressure, the Turkish representative in Budapest issued a limited number of protective passes. 171

The Attitude and Reaction of the Western Allies

As noted above, with the exception of the few individuals who were permitted to go to Portugal to avoid a potentially embarrassing (1449) diplomatic issue, no Jews were ever allowed to leave Hungary under the various emigration schemes. The Germans firmly adhered to the Fuhrer's directive under which, in order to protect the interests of the Arabs, 172 no Jews were to be allowed to go to Palestine; the 7,800 Jews who were sponsored by the neutral states were to be permitted, theoretically at least, to leave via Western Europe-a route requiring special travel permits from Berlin-and only if the deportation of the Jews of Budapest were resumed. The emigration schemes of the neutral powers were encouraged and supported by the Western Allies. The issue whether a more vigorous approach on the part of the Allies would have saved more Jews is one of the most controversial ones in Holocaust studies and continues, in light of the newly available evidence, to agitate scholars and laymen alike.

The Politics of Indifference. Beyond doubt, the Western powers abhorred the cruel and immoral racial policies of the Third Reich. Their attitude and reaction to the Nazis' anti-Jewish measures, however, were determined almost exclusively by considerations of national interest. During the first years of the Nazi era, it was widely believed that the regime would be short-lived or that its racial policies would eventually be moderated. Although these expectations were overtaken by events, the Western powers continued their policy of appeasement. In their myopic view of world history, they thought that they could secure peace by yielding to the continual "last demands" of Hitler. This also reflected their greater fear of the long-range danger represented by Bolshevism than of the immediate threat posed by National Socialism.

The Anschluss and the Nazis' ever-increasing barbarities presented the West with a dilemma: the Judeo-Christian ideals underlying the democratic credo came into conflict with national interest. Britain was dedicated to maintaining stability in the Middle East, which required the cultivation of good relations with the Arabs and consequently the restriction of Jewish immigration to Palestine; the depression-ridden United States was reluctant to change its restrictive quota-based immigration laws and policies. The two countries tried to find a way out of the dilemma by internationalizing the problem of refugees.

Evian conference headquarters Evian-les-Bains, France

On President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s initiative, a conference was held in July 1938 at Evian-les-Bains, France. Representatives of 32 (1450) nations attended; Britain participated only on the condition that Palestine would not be discussed. The conference reviewed a number of plans for the absorption of refugees, none of which ever came to pass.

George Rublee Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees (IGC)

Its only visible accomplishment was the establishment of an Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees (IGC) under the leadership of George Rublee, a Roosevelt protege, which was envisioned to organize emigration and secure places of refuge on an orderly basis.

The IGC remained basically a paper organization, for no nation was truly willing to offer refuge to the Jews. Hitler goaded the conference participants for "oozing sympathy for the poor, tormented people, but remaining hard and obdurate when it comes to helping them. " And indeed, as Ira Hirschmann accurately characterized the situation, Evian "was a facade behind which the civilized governments could hide their inability to act. " 173 This assessment was corroborated 41 years later by U.S. Vice-President Walter F. Mondale:

At Evian, they began with high hopes. But they failed the test of civilization. The civilized world hid in a cloak of legalisms. Two nations said they had reached the saturation point for Jewish refugees. Four nations said they could accept experienced agricultural workers only. One would only accept immigrants who had been baptized. Three declared intellectuals and merchants to be undesirable new citizens. One nation feared that the influx of Jews would arouse anti-Semitic feelings. And one delegate said this: as we have no real racial problem, we are not desirous of importing one. 174

The indifference of the Western Allies to the plight of the Jews continued even after Kristallnacht and the subsequent dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, when the refugee problem became acute. Britain adopted a White Paper in May 1939, regulating its policy on immigration to Palestine for the 1939-1944 period. Under that policy 75,000 Jews were to be allowed to enter Palestine during the five years-50,000 "regular" immigrants and 25,000 refugees. The latter were to constitute Britain's "contribution toward the solution of the Jewish refugee problem." 175 The United States, for its part, steadfastly refused to liberalize its immigration policies, using the IGC as a cushion to absorb national and international pressure for changing them. The (1451) racial and political-ideological factors underlying the opposition to the liberalization of the immigration laws were reflected in the March 31, 1944, note from Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, had addressed to John W. Pehle, the head of the WRB. Stimson had argued that uncontrolled immigration from certain countries was bound to modify the proportion of the racial stocks already existing in the country in violation of the intent of the immigration laws. 176

Following the outbreak of World War II, Britain, and, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States, subordinated all considerations of refuge and rescue to the exigencies of war. They consistently rejected specific pleas for rescue that had been advanced by Jewish leaders in the free and Nazi-dominated world as well as by underground and resistance organizations, arguing that the concentration of resources for the quickest possible defeat of the Third Reich was the most effective way of helping the oppressed.

The leaders of the Western world were fully and accurately informed about the anti-Jewish policies of the Nazis all over German-occupied Europe, as well as about the mass executions perpetrated by the Einsatzgruppen in the Soviet Union starting in June 1941. In the summer of 1942, they had received authenticated reports about Hitler's resolve to bring about the destruction of European Jewry and about the techniques the Nazis had employed in various concentration and death camps. The sources of many of these reports were the neutral states, especially Switzerland, whose representatives had access to the national political leaders, as well as the Jewish and underground leaders in the Axis and occupied countries to which they were assigned.

Leland Harrison

The major conduits through which the reports were transmitted to Washington and London were Leland Harrison and John Clifford Norton, the American and British Ministers in Bem. 177 These reports were occasionally personally corroborated by emissaries of the underground forces who managed to reach London and Washington (see Chapter 23).

Despite their awareness that the Nazis were bent on the total physical destruction of the Jews of Europe, the Western Allies clung to their resolve and consistently rejected any and all suggestions for an active involvement in rescue operations as incompatible with their need to marshal all their resources in the war against the Axis. However, in response to continuing pressure from both Jewish and non-Jewish public (1452) and ecclesiastical figures (in Britain, the Archbishop of Canterbury, was particularly active), and in light of the incontestable evidence about the Final Solution, they had agreed to issue a joint declaration on December 17, 1942 condemning the Nazis' drive against the Jews. It took over six months of diplomatic wrangling to finally agree on the text of this document condemning the Nazi atrocities:

The German authorities... are now carrying into effect, Hitler's oft repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe.... The above-mentioned governments and the French National Committee condemn in the strongest possible terms, this bestial policy of cold-blooded extermination.... They reaffirm their solemn resolution to ensure that those re sponsible for these crimes shall not escape retribution, and to press on with the necessary practical measures to this end. 178

This declaration by the Allies was the first to define extermination of the Jews as a crime. Its effectiveness was somewhat undercut by its implication that nothing would be done before final victory and by its failure to provide for some immediate threat or possible retaliation against the Nazis and their allies. Nevertheless, it was helpful in that it finally broke the conspiracy of silence. The mass slaughter of the Jews that had been going on since June 1941 was finally officially recognized as real and as criminal.

It read in Part

“Received alarming report stating that, in the Fuehrer's Headquarters, a plan has been discussed, and is under consideration, according to which all Jews in countries occupied or controlled by Germany numbering 3½ to 4 millions should, after deportation and concentration in the East, be at one blow exterminated, in order to resolve, once and for all the Jewish question in Europe. Action is reported to be planned for the autumn. Ways of execution are still being discussed including the use of prussic acid. We transmit this information with all the necessary reservation, as exactitude cannot be confirmed by us. Our informant is reported to have close connexions with the highest German authorities, and his reports are generally reliable. Please inform and consult New York.”

However, as was pointed out after the war by Gerhart Riegner, the representative of the World Jewish Congress in Switzerland who had submitted the first reports on the Final Solution in 1942, "until December 1942, the Western Governments were afraid of being identified too much with the Jews and of being accused by their own populations of waging war for the Jews." When these facts of the extermination program became public knowledge, these governments, Riegner continued, "showed a lack of imagination in devising the extraordinary measures required outside the normal bureaucratic routine effectively to budge an enemy like Hitler, and lacked the determination and will to carry them out." 179

While the Allies consistently refused to engage in any overt rescue operation on behalf of Jews, their propaganda agencies became relatively more effective after December 1942. Their radio broadcasts to (1453) the world and especially to countries under Nazi domination contained more specific information about the Nazis’ murderous drive against the Jews. These broadcasts had not only an informative and psychological value for the Jews, but also and above all, an important propaganda value for the Allies.

The declaration of December 1942 by the Allies and the public disclosure of some of the details of the Nazis’ extermination program resulted in requests from lay and religious leaders of all faiths, in both Britain and America, for concrete governmental efforts to rescue the victims of Nazism. In response, in January 1943, the British Foreign Office suggested another conference to deal with the problem. After considerable wrangling over the location and possible agenda, the Western Allies met in April in Bermuda. The conference was doomed to failure from the beginning. As at Evian, Great Britain reiterated its opposition to any consideration of Palestine as a haven; the United States insisted on keeping its immigration laws intact. The British rejected the appeal of the Zionist leaders to make Palestine a place of refuge, using a series of spurious arguments. 180 They expressed a fear that Germany might "change from the policy of extermination to one of extrusion... (and) aim as they did before the war at embarrassing other countries by flooding them with immigrants;" they were concerned about finding a place to settle large numbers of Jews; they were worried about the possibility that spies might be infiltrated with the refugees; and finally they raised the problem of the shortage of shipping. The debates were occasionally acrimonious: the British requested that the United States ease its immigration restrictions, while the Americans asked the British to facilitate the inflow of refugees to Palestine. The conference ended with a call for the revitalization of the JGC through a broadening of its scope and membership.

Like the earlier Evian meeting, the Bermuda Conference had no visible results. The final report of the conference was not issued until November 19, 1943. Commenting on its farcical character many years after the war, Richard K. Law (later Lord Coleraine), at the time the Parliamentary Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs who led the British delegation, stated: " It was a conflict of self-justification, a facade for inaction." 181 (1454)

The Western Allies’ recalcitrant position on the plight of the Jews was also revealed by their mishandling of certain specific rescue opportunities. For example, the Antonescu government of Romania had been prepared to send 60,000 to 70,000 Jews to Palestine, on Romanian ships carrying Vatican insignia, in exchange for a ransom of £250 per capita. 182 The Allies also missed several chances to rescue Jews in Bulgaria and approximately 60,000 Jewish children threatened by deportation in France. In each case, these opportunities were missed because of dilatory and antagonistic handling by Whitehall and Foggy Bottom. The British were once again concerned with " the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews, should they be rescued from enemy territory." 183 The U.S. Department of State offered a variety of meretricious arguments-to the frustration of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and his top assistants, who were also involved in the rescue effort. By the end of 1943, the Treasury officials decided on a new approach: they suggested to the President that the jurisdiction over rescue matters be transferred from the State Department to an independent agency.

The rationale for this approach was presented in a memorandum ("Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of This Government in the Murder of the Jews") prepared by Randolph Paul, the General Counsel of the Treasury Department. Paul documented the intransigence and foot-dragging of certain officials in the State Department, who bad " willfully failed to act to rescue the Jews." Their procrastination, dating back to April 1942, Paul argued, had " facilitated mass murder in Nazi Europe." 184

Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau

During those "terrible 18 months," Morgenthau reminisced after the war, " we knew in Washington... that the Nazis were planning to exterminate all the Jews of Europe. Yet... officials dodged their grim responsibility, procrastinated when concrete rescue schemes were placed before them, and even suppressed information about atrocities. " 185 After the draft memorandum was revised to include the negative role of the British Foreign Office, Morgenthau first discussed it with Hull on January 11, 1944, and then submitted it personally to President Roosevelt on January 16. That same day, on Roosevelt's suggestion, he also met Under Secretary of State Edward Stettinius. All three were reportedly shocked by the revelations.

War Refugee Board directors l-r Cordel Hull, Henry Morganthau, Henry Stimpson

On January 22, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9417, establishing the War Refugee Board (WRB) operating under the (1455) jurisdiction of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and War. The Order stated that " it is the policy of this government to take all measures within its power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death or otherwise to afford such victims all possible relief and assistance consistent with the successful prosecution of the war."

War Refugee Board (WRB) Josiah DuBois (m) John Pehle (r)

The WRB was placed under the leadership of John W. Pehle, the head of Foreign Funds Control in the Treasury Department and empowered to collaborate with private organizations, American and international agencies, and foreign governments in pursuing its objective. The establishment of the WRB marked, officially at least, the end of the U.S. policy of indifference. 186

John W. Pehle, the head of the War Refugee Board

The Western Allies and the Destruction of Hungarian Jewry. The views and policies of the WRB reflected the President's new resolve on playing a more active American role in providing relief and rescue for Nazi victims. 187 Established after the bulk of European Jewry had already been destroyed, the WRB faced its first major test in the case of Hungary.

The WRB began its operations with great zeal, expressing its concern for the treatment of the Jews of Hungary even before the German occupation. When it learned late in February 1944 that the Kallay government seemed to be yielding to German pressure " to deport foreign Jews and close its borders to refugees from Poland and elsewhere," the WRB expressed the American government's disapproval and warned it on March 7 via the U.S. legations in Lisbon and Bern. 188 Its real test came after the German occupation of Hungary on March 19, 1944. Its good intentions notwithstanding, it proved no match for the Nazis and Hungarians bent on the quick implementation of the Final Solution program.

The first alarm about the possible fate of Hungarian Jewry, coupled with specific suggestions for action by the Allies, was sent to the Western powers by Gerhart Riegner on March 21. His telegram to the heads of the World Jewish Congress in Britain and the United States read:

Most anxious about destiny Hungarian Jewry, the only important section European Jewry still in existence, because of recent political (1456) developments. Am suggesting worldwide appeal of Anglo-Saxon personalities [both] non-Jews and Jews, including chiefs of Protestant [and] Catholic churches to the Hungarian people warning them not to allow application of policy of extermination of the Jews by the German butchers or Hungarian quislings and to help Jews by all possible means in order to prevent their falling into the hands of the Germans. Warning should insist upon the fact that the attitude of the Hungarian people toward the Jews will be one of the most important tests of behavior which Allied nations will remember in the peace settlement after the war. Similar broadcasts should be made every night in Hungarian language during the next weeks. 189

The Western powers complied. As part of the psychological warfare campaign devised by the WRB, President Roosevelt issued a statement on March 24, condemning the Nazis and their allies for the heinous crimes they had committed in the course of the war. In connection with Hungary, the President declared:

In one of the blackest crimes of all history... the wholesale systematic murder of the Jews of Europe goes on unabated every hour. As a result of the events of the last few days, hundreds of thousands of Jews, who while living under persecution, have at least found a haven from death in Hungary and the Balkans, are now threatened with annihilation as Hitler’s forces descend more heavily upon these lands. That these innocent people, who have already survived a decade of Hitler' s fury, should perish on the very eve of triumph over the barbarism which their persecution symbolizes, would be a major tragedy.

U.S. Secretary of State Cordel Hull

In an attempt to dissuade the Hungarians from collaborating, the President warned that " none who participate in these acts of savagery shall go unpunished. " 190 That same day, Secretary of State Hull urged the Hungarians to resist the Germans, implying that only thus could Hungary " hope to regain the respect and friendship of free nations and demonstrate its right to independence." 191 The British government clung to its White Paper policies regarding Palestine immigration. Sir Harold MacMichael, the British High Commissioner in Jerusalem, reiterated on March 1, 1944, that the existing quota of 75,000 immigrants could (1457) not be exceeded, and that no further immigration quotas were planned after the expiration of the current one on March 31. Although he suggested that the 18,300 immigration permits not yet taken up be issued to refugees, he was reluctant to go along with the specific suggestions for their allocation by the Zionist leaders. 192 Nevertheless, eager not to appear totally callous, the British followed the U.S. lead.

British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden

After Sidney Silverman, a member of the House of Commons and president of the British Section of the World Jewish Congress, raised the question of the anti-Jewish measures in Hungary, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden (later Lord Avon) associated himself with the American President. In his statement of March 30, Eden emphasized that the " persecution of the Jews has in particular been of unexampled horror and intensity" and repeated the determination of the Allies to bring to justice all those guilty of such crimes. Like Roosevelt, Eden also called "upon the countries allied with or subjected to Germany to join in preventing further persecution and cooperate in protecting and saving the innocent." 193

The Allies’ warnings and declarations bad no effect on the Nazis and their Hungarian hirelings who had dedicated themselves to the realization of the Final Solution program. While they were implementing their plans, the WRB was engaged in a series of rescue-related activities that turned out to be useless-at least as far as the provincial Jews of Hungary were concerned. The WRB continued to warn the Hungarians (April 12), explored the possibility of providing escape routes via partisan-held Yugoslav territories, contacted the Turks for the issuance of transit visas, and demanded that persons holding documents issued by any North or South American republic be accorded all rights and privileges of such nationals. On the theory that the presence of foreigners in official or unofficial capacities might have a deterrent effect, the WRB requested the IRC (March 25) to " send effective representation to Hungary in order to protect the well-being of groups facing persecution." On May 25-26, following receipt of reports on the beginning of the mass deportations, the WRB instructed the American missions in Cairo, Bern, Lisbon, Madrid, and Stockholm to prevail upon the governments of the neutral states "in the interest of most elementary humanity, to take immediate steps to increase to the largest possible extent the number of... diplomatic and consular personnel in Hungary and to distribute them as widely as possible throughout the country. " 194 (1458)

The WRB’s expectations about the presence of foreign observers unfortunately proved unfounded. The determination of the Nazis and their Hungarian accomplices, the reluctance of the IRC and the neutral powers to effectively act, and the time consumed by diplomatic exchanges all conspired against the Jews. By the time Wallenberg arrived in Budapest on July 9, all of Hungary (with the notable exception of Budapest) bad already been made judenfrei.

The effectiveness of the WRB in the pursuit of relief and rescue operations was limited by the restrictions resulting from its general policy framework: it could undertake no measures that might be construed as inconsistent "with the successful prosecution of the war" or as being in violation of British and American immigration policies relating to Palestine and the United States. The negative effect of these policies was clearly reflected in the attitude and reaction of the Allies to the Brand mission, the revelations of the Auschwitz Reports, the demands for the bombing of Auschwitz, and the so-called Horthy offer relating to the emigration of Jews.

The Allies' Reaction to the Brand Mission. Brand’s arrival in Istanbul on May 19, 1944, on his Eichmann-approved "blood for trucks" mission (see Chapter 29) caught the Western Allies by surprise. Sir Harold MacMichael was briefed by Moshe Shertok (later Sharett) and David Ben-Gurion, the leaders of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, about the details of the supposed offer on May 25. That same day, Sir Harold informed his government, characterizing the offer as a "Nazi intrigue based on far other motives than the apparent ones." 195 The British War Cabinet took up the issue on May 31, and the immediate reaction of all those present was negative. A.W.G. Randall of the Foreign Office thought that "there were substantial reasons for having nothing to do with the proposals as they stood," but had warned that the United States might have a different view. He asserted that "the scheme might secure sympathy beyond its merits in Washington, where the President's War Refugee Board, backed by Mr. Morgenthau, had, partly for electoral reasons (Roosevelt was campaigning for his fourth term), committed itself to the ’rescue' of Jews." Oliver Stanley, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, suggested that the scheme should not be considered because " the evacuation of one million refugees from occupied (1459) territories and their maintenance in neutral or Allied countries could not be undertaken without a major alteration of the course of military operations." Therefore, the War Cabinet decided to inform the United States government of its decision not to engage in any dealings with the Gestapo. As one concession, they agreed to relay the information received from the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem to Chaim Weizmann and Nahum Goldman. 196

Without revealing any details of the measures adopted by the War Cabinet meeting he had attended, G.H. Hall, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, informed Weizmann about the details of the Brand mission-orally on June 2 and in writing on June 5. 197 Weizmann and the other Jewish leaders in London were eager to pursue the course of action that had offered the best hope of saving Jewish lives, but were also extremely anxious that anything the Jewish Agency undertook toward this end " should be with the knowledge and approval of H.M. Government. " 198 They had a series of discussions with representatives of the British Foreign Office, including Anthony Eden, G.H. Hall, I.L. Henderson, A.W.G. Randall, and Alan Walker.

On June 7, Weizmann met Eden and urged him to keep the Soviet government informed about the affair. 199 On June 22, 1944, Hall informed Weizmann about the findings of Shertok, emphasizing that Shertok was fully "convinced of Brand’s reliability, and that Brand himself was convinced that the German proposition was a serious one." Hall added that in Ben-Gurion’s view, however, " the whole business may quite likely be a trick." 200 The Jewish leaders in America were also somewhat skeptical, but emphatic on the need to keep the discussion open to save at least some Jewish lives. Nahum Goldman tended toward the theory that the offer was not part of psychological warfare, but a genuine offer "put up by Gestapo leaders (certainly Eichmann and possibly Himmler) with a view to obtaining foreign exchange for their own use when they would have to flee from a defeated and occupied Germany. " Rabbi Stephen S. Wise was not so sure of the motive behind the Gestapo offer, but thought it might be a move to discredit both the Allies and the Jews. 201

Immediately after Shertok's arrival in London, a meeting of the Jewish leaders was held (June 28), to hear his report on the interview (1460) with Brand and on his and Joseph Linton’s discussions with Randall, Walker, and Henderson of the Foreign Office that morning. 202 The Jewish leaders tried to persuade the British to allow Brand’s speedy return to Hungary and to undertake some action toward the saving of Jewish lives. While the British were skeptical about the whole Brand mission "because the Germans were going on with the deportations and killing," they were al so concerned about the possibility that the Germans might be serious and actually offer to "dump a million Jews on them." Randall remarked that difficulties had arisen even in connection with putting up a few thousand refugees. The British found a way out of their predicament by emphasizing that " they could not contemplate meeting the Germans without the Russians knowing about it. " 203 Weizmann warned his colleagues that "they must not do anything which could be interpreted by the people with whom they were in contact or by public opinion as an attempt to force Britain to do something which might interfere with the war. " He reminded them that " the shooting of 50 officers has done more to impress the public than the murder of four million Jews." He finally suggested that they tell Mr. Eden that the fiendish and diabolical German offer had put them on the horns of a dilemma. " On the one band, they might be able to save some Jews, but on the other band, there was danger that they might compromise themselves. "204

Following their discussion with Shertok, the British officers in formed Washington that they bad been reinforced in their conviction that the German offer was designed to:

Extract material concessions of war materiel from Allied governments.

Embroil the United Kingdom and United States Governments with the Soviet Government by representing to the latter that the former were negotiating with the enemy.

Elicit a rejection, which would then be represented as justification for extreme measures against Jews.

They labeled the German offer as not serious, especially as it came through such "insignificant or suspect channels," and added that Shertok himself appeared to agree with their analysis. 205 If their perception (1461) Shertok's position was accurate, Shertok did not represent the view of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem. On July 11, Ben-Gurion asked Nahum Goldman, via Pinkerton, to urge President Roosevelt "not to allow this unique and possibly last chance of saving remnants of European Jewry to be lost." The President was asked, as were the British, to support the following Jewish Agency proposals:

First, [that] intimation to other side be made immediately through appropriate channels of readiness to nominate [a] representative to discuss rescue and transfer [the] largest possible number of Jews; second, intimation to other side that immediate discontinuance [ of] deportations is [a] preliminary condition to any discussion. 206

Since the British had decided to prevent or at least postpone Brand's return to Hungary, the idea was born to have Menachem Bader of the Istanbul Vaada fill in for him. The Germans were ready to cooperate and offered to grant Bader the necessary permits and guarantee of safe return. Weizmann and Shertok took up his proposal with Eden on July 6. Shertok was convinced that the Germans' offer to Bader clearly indicated that they were ready to discuss the release of Jews. 207 Eden expressed great reservations about a British national going into enemy territory. 208 Unaware of the British attitude, the Germans pressed on with the Bader idea. On July 8, Bader was personally contacted by Stiller, the German Consul General in Istanbul, informing him of a request he had received from the German Foreign Office to fly him to Berlin. 209 The matter was taken up by Shertok with the Foreign Office once again on July 12. Randall reiterated Eden's arguments. 210 Thereupon Shertok suggested that Gustav Kullmann of the IGC be sent instead. Kullmann, who was concerned with refugee matters, had already visited several parts of Nazi Europe during the war, and the objections that were raised in connection with Bader did not apply to him. The British rejected this idea as well, arguing that Kullmann was, after all, an official of the League of Nations. 2 1 Shertok then renewed the proposal advanced several times earlier that "all Jews in Nazi-occupied countries be declared to be British-protected or Anglo-American-protected persons." Randall rejected this proposal as well by arguing that:

Such a step would be treated with contempt by the other side. (1462)

To make the offer appear serious, it would have to be accompanied by an offer to exchange, for which no Germans were available.

Giving asylum to hundreds of thousands of people was a practical impossibility.

Such an offer might make the Germans feel that the Allies were so preoccupied with the Jewish problem as to make this a vulnerable point, with the result that they would tighten the screws even harder. 212

The British were fearful that Brand's return might be construed as the first step in some formal negotiation which might lead them "into very dangerous issues." 213 Despite the pleadings by the Jewish leaders, Brand bad been retained in British custody. 214 Escorted by a British officer, he was taken to Cairo, where he was treated as a " privileged prisoner." Bandi Grosz, who accompanied Brand on the mission, was mistrusted because of his dubious credentials (see Chapter 29). He was less fortunate: shortly after he was picked up by the British in Syria, he was brought to Cairo, where he was held in a military prison.

Both men were interrogated for days on end. At one point, Brand claims that he was questioned by Lord Moyne, the Minister of State for the Middle East, who like Randall had expressed concern over acquiring responsibility for one million Jews in case the Germans kept their side of the bargain. 215

Ira A. Hirschmann

Brand received a more sympathetic hearing from Ira A. Hirschmann, who arrived in Cairo late in June, specifically to interview him and Grosz at the behest of the WRB.216 Hirschmann bad served as a special attaché of the American Embassy in Ankara, charged with the duty of carrying out the WRB’s program and policies in Turkey. When he undertook this special mission, he was already aware of the memorandum that Viscount Halifax had forwarded to Hull concerning the British government's opposition to any discussion with the "SS agents." 217 Overcoming the objection of the British authorities in Cairo, Hirschmann interviewed both agents, concluding that the British had erred in identifying the two in the same category. He informed Ambassador Steinhardt and the WRB that he could find no evidence to support (1463) the reservations of the British about Brand, underscoring his belief in Brand’ s integrity. 218

The British were less inclined to differentiate between the two men and their missions, considering the German proposals "a sheer case of blackmail or political warfare... calculated to stave off Germany's defeat." They, like the Americans, were sensitive to the position of the Soviets, whose suspicion they did not want to arouse at that juncture. Averell Harriman, the American Ambassador to Moscow, informed the Kremlin about the affair on June 15, without mentioning the trucks. Archibald Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador, had given Andrei J. Vishinsky, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, a more complete report, the day before. 219 The Soviet reaction was communicated by Harriman in a June 19 cable to the State Department: Vishinsky had been instructed to state that the Soviet government did not consider it "expedient or permissible to carry on any conversations whatsoever with the German government on the question touched upon in the Embassy’s note. " 220

The Americans were somewhat more flexible. Their position was reflected in a June 9 memorandum by Pehle. He emphasized President Roosevelt’s view that the negotiation should be kept open and continued in consultation with the British and the Soviet government in order to save the lives of as many intended victims as possible. 221 Again, presidential politics conceivably influenced the American position. The British apparently thought so: in its note of July 12, prepared for the War Cabinet, the Foreign Office emphasized that " the only reason why, at the outset, H. M. Government did not dismiss the Gestapo proposal with contempt was that the U.S. government, particularly in an election year, is desperately anxious to show that nothing, however fantastic, has been neglected which might lead to the rescue of Jews." 222 In the end, both the British and the Americans deferred to the Soviet opposition to negotiations with the Germans. On July 7, Harriman was asked to bring all the facts, including the matter of the trucks, to the attention of the Soviet government and to emphasize that neither British nor the American government.

has been deceived as to the character of this alleged offer of the German government and that the two governments are convinced (1464) that the offer is part and parcel of the psychological warfare effort of the German government. The alleged German willingness to guarantee that the trucks would not be used on the Western Front bears this out. 223

Harriman was also asked to inform the Soviet government that while the British and the Americans were fully aware of the undesirability of direct contact with the Germans, they were reluctant to shut the door completely to any possible "serious" offer by the Germans and were searching for methods of rescue which might be worked out through the intermediation of the Swiss. 224

Though the Allies were possibly correct in assessing the Brand-Grosz mission as an attempt by the Germans to strike a wedge between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers and as an integral part of their psychological warfare strategy, they failed both to alleviate the anxiety of the Jewish leaders of the free world and to provide some more meaningful alternate means of rescue. Whatever the hopes the Jewish leaders still had in connection with the mission dissipated in the evening of July 19, when the BBC brought it to public attention. The following day, the British press picked up the story, emphasizing that the "monstrous offer" of the Germans to barter Jews for munitions was a loathsome attempt to blackmail and sow suspicion among the Allies. The BBC broadcast and the British press reports caught the attention of the Germans as well. Ribbentrop requested a full report from Veesenmayer about the background of the affair. When informed that the Brand mission was based on " a secret order of the Reichsführer-SS," Ribbentrop got in touch with Himmler, who presumably gave him a satisfactory response. 225 There is no evidence that the two rivals brought the issue before Hitler. The Hungarian Foreign Office denied the " allegations" of the British altogether and reiterated the resolve of the Hungarians to solve the Jewish question " in a humanitarian manner." 226

The Allies' Reaction to the Auschwitz Reports and to the Krausz Report. The uproar over the Brand-Grosz affair became intertwined with the repercussions of the Krausz report of June 19, 1944, which included sections from the Auschwitz Reports (see Chapters 23 and 29).

George Mantello passport photo

Distributed for publication in Switzerland by George Mantello and (1465) relayed to Istanbul by Chaim Pozner (later Pazner) on June 23, the report became the subject of numerous exchanges between the neutral capitals and London and Washington. These included frantic appeals for help by the Jewish leaders in Jerusalem (Gruenbaum), Geneva (Lichtheim), Lisbon (Dobkin), and Stockholm (Ehrenpreis). On June 24, Harrison informed Washington in a lengthy telegram about the realities of the deportations from Hungary and transmitted the request of Jewish leaders in Hungary and Slovakia that the Allies bomb the rail lines and bridges leading to Auschwitz. 227 Two days later, Norton forwarded Lichtheim's message to London. It included specific recommendations: a warning to the Hungarians, reprisals against Germans in Allied hands, and the bombing of Auschwitz and the rail lines leading to it as well as of all government buildings in Budapest. 228 The Western Allies were also subjected to considerable pressure by representatives of other governments, 229 rescue organizations, and numerous Jewish and non-Jewish lay and ecclesiastical leaders-all urging that the Allies act to save the remnant of Hungarian Jewry.

The United States reacted on June 26: through the Swiss Legation in Budapest, it sent a sharply worded warning to the Hungarian government, reiterating America's concern over the Jewish persecutions and calling attention to the President's statement of March 24 concerning the punishment of those found guilty of war crimes. 230 Two days later, the Office of War Information transmitted a message to the Hungarians from Archbishop Francis J. Spellman of New York. The Archbishop warned the Hungarians that the anti-Jewish measures, which "shocked all men and women who cherish a sense of justice and of human sympathy," were "in direct contradiction to the doctrines of the Catholic faith professed by the vast majority of the Hungarian people." 231 The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond to the note until July 18, and as always, they argued that the Jews had been placed at the disposal of the German government as workers. 232 In the meantime, the United States had reinforced its warning with a massive bombing raid on Budapest (July 2).

The dismay of the British upon the reconfirmation of the news they had already been acquainted with was expressed by Churchill in a succinct note to Eden (June 29) in reference to the Norton telegram: "What can be done? What can be said?" 233 Responding to questions (1466) raised by Silverman, Gallacher, and others in the House of Commons on July 5, Eden confirmed the "barbarous deportations." Noting that the repeated declarations and warnings by the Allies had failed to move the Germans and their Hungarian accomplices, Eden reiterated the oft-stated position that "the principal hope of terminating this tragic state of affairs must remain the speedy victory of the Allied nations." 234

This response was not found satisfactory by everyone: the public outcry by leading Jewish figures, as well as by dignitaries of the Churches of England and Scotland continued unabated. William Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury, who had approached Churchill on July 3, 235 appealed directly to the Hungarian people on July 8. He implored them to help the persecuted Jews "even if that involved great personal danger. " 236 Similar messages were broadcast by the BBC. Frequently these also included information for the Hungarians about the true nature of the anti-Jewish measures and warnings to the members of the government and their accomplices about the consequences of their deeds. 237

The restriction of British rescue policy to the issuance of warnings to the Hungarians was presumably sanctioned by Churchill. This was reflected by his June 11 note to Eden concerning the Norton telegram and the Brand mission. The Prime Minister dismissed the latter as not worthy of being taken seriously, especially since it was "put forward through a very doubtful channel." In connection with the Norton telegram, he noted:

There is no doubt that this [persecution of Jews in Hungary and their expulsion from enemy territory] is probably the greatest and most horrible crime ever committed in the whole history of the world, and it has been done by scientific machinery by nominally civilized men in the name of a great State and one of the leading races of Europe. It is quite clear that all concerned in this crime may fall into our hands, including the people who only obeyed orders by carrying out the butcheries, should be put to death after their association with the murders had been proved. 238

The public reaction in the United States was more intense. The press occasionally published some details about the catastrophe that had engulfed Hungarian Jewry, 239 eliciting expressions of indignation and (1467) horror from leading political figures, as well as hundreds of Jewish and non-Jewish private organizations. 240

On June 3, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee called upon the Hungarian people to resist the orders of their government, help Jews to escape across the borders, and "watch and remember those who are accessories to murder and those who extend mercy, until the time when guilt and innocence will weigh heavily in the balance." 241 On June 21, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in a highly unusual action, called directly on Hungary to halt the mistreatment of the Jews. In a statement issued by Committee Chairman Sol Bloom (Democrat of New York), Hungary was reminded that the tide of the war had changed in favor of the Allies and urged that country to "stem the tide of inhumanity toward the helpless people within her borders." The Committee also expressed its determination to bring to justice the criminals guilty of inhumane conduct. 242 A similar warning was issued by Secretary of State Hull in his statement of July 14, in which he had publicly confirmed the mass killing of Hungarian Jews. 243

The warnings and threats issued by the Allies bad little, if any, effect on the Germans and Hungarians involved in the Final Solution program. The one approach that might have helped delay if not totally prevent the destruction of the Hungarian Jews was that suggested by Rabbi Michael Dov Weissmandel and other leaders of the Bratislava Vaada early in May-the bombing of Auschwitz, the rail lines and bridges leading to it, and of the major rail hubs along the route. The refusal of the Allies to act on these requests is well documented. 244 Among the major arguments for the refusal was that air operations were "impracticable" and counterproductive because they involved the diversion of aircraft needed for the success of military operations, 245 technically unfeasible, and difficult in the absence of accurate information on the location of the camps. These were basically spurious arguments, which aimed to camouflage the Allies’ resolve not to be deterred by considerations of morality in the pursuit of their national interests and military objectives.

Since the Germans were also using the rail lines and bridges to transport troops and war materiel, the bombing could easily have been justified even under the terms of Allied policy, which prohibited the use of armed forces for the rescuing of victims of enemy oppression "unless such rescues were the result of military operations conducted with the (1468) objective of defeating the armed forces of the enemy." 246 By the time of the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944, the Allies bad achieved full control of the skies over Europe. In fact, starting in the summer of 1944, they carried out a number of massive airstrikes on factory target areas near Auschwitz. 247 The claim by the British Royal Air Command (August 3, 1944) that it had no accurate information as to Birkenau's location 248 appears somewhat unfounded in light of the details included in the Auschwitz Reports. Moreover, by late August, the Allies had acquired an amazingly detailed aerial photograph of the camp with the aid of sophisticated photo analysis techniques. 249

While the Jewish leaders of the free world pleaded with the leaders of the Western Powers to act, 250 and while the political and military figures of these powers exchanged innumerable notes in their attempt to avoid doing so, the Hungarian Jews were being deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau at the rate of 12,000 a day. The exchange of memoranda continued well after Horthy bad baited the deportations and the Auschwitz machinery of destruction bad been demolished.

The Allies' Reaction to the Horthy Offer. The decision of the Hungarian Crown Council meeting of June 26, 1944, to permit the emigration of approximately 7, 800 Jews (see above) came to be known to the Western Allies as the Horthy offer. This offer had been communicated to Veesenmayer by Sztojay on June 27 and again by Horthy on July 8. The Swiss and the other interested legation representatives were informed a few days later. Unaware of Hitler’ s conditions for the approval of the limited emigration and of Eichmann’s sinister plans in connection with the scheme, Miklos Krausz, with the support of the Swiss Legation (Lutz) and the IRC, proceeded with the organization of the emigration of "7,000 families " (approximately 40,000 Jews) to Palestine. 251 Taking considerable credit for the decision of the government, Krausz wrote two letters on July 13-one addressed to Barlas in Istanbul and the other to Pozner and Kahany in Geneva. 252 He reported without any basis in fact-unless he was misinformed by the low-ranking Hungarian officials he dealt with-that the German authorities in Berlin bad already approved the emigration in principle and that they would not obstruct the departure of Hungarian Jews in possession of Palestine immigration certificates. Emphasizing that one of (1469) the conditions imposed by the authorities was that the emigration had to be effectuated swiftly, he urged Barias to immediately provide Turkish ships to transport the Jews in weekly groups of 4,000 to 5,000 from either the port of Constanta, Romania, or from that of Burgas, Bulgaria.

The Hungarian authorities spoke only in terms of 7,800 Jews; the Germans made no commitments concerning the issuance of the exit and transit permits beyond those stipulated by Hitler. The Swiss legation, however, presumably acting on Krausz's assurances, nevertheless, informed Geneva about the Hungarian offer in highly optimistic terms. The British Legation in Bern relayed the information to the Foreign Office on July 18; the following day, Harrison cabled to Washington:

A note from the Foreign Office dated yesterday, states that according to a telegram from the Swiss Legation in Budapest, authorization has been given by the Government of Hungary for the departure of all Jews from Hungary who hold entry permits for another country, including Palestine. 253

Later in the month, the offer was also transmitted via the IRC. 254 Relying on Krausz's reports to Barias, Pozner, and Kahany as well as on the communication from the Swiss Legation at Budapest, the Jewish leaders of the free world began a concentrated drive to make possible the immigration of 40,000 Jews to Palestine. On July 20, Shertok and Linton urged Randall to take "immediate action to explore and take advantage of the offer." 255 The following day they met the leaders of the IGC, including Emerson, and urged them to act toward the same end. 256 On July 31, Eleanor F. Rathbone, a member of the House of Commons, addressed a note to Eden on behalf of the National Committee for Rescue from Nazi Terror, complaining that despite assurances she had received from Hall a few days earlier, the British Foreign Office had failed to inform the Hungarians about the British government's "determination to find transport and accommodation for all who could get out. "257

The British, of course, had not yet decided to act on the offer. They were in fact concerned and worried about the possibility of a large number of Jews suddenly arriving in Allied-held territories. Their anxiety was reflected in a memorandum addressed to Randall by Robert Maurice A. Hankey, an official of the Eastern Department of the Foreign (1470) Office, on July 20. Having learned of the Horthy offer from MacMichael, Hankey cautioned:

It is clear that the floodgates of Eastern Europe are now going to be opened and that we shall in a very short time have masses of Eastern European Jews on our hands... The Eastern Department must remind you of the decision taken on a previous paper that a serious political situation would arise throughout the Arab world as soon as the Palestine quotas were filled.... It is vital that camps should be established... somewhere in the Mediterranean area, but not Palestine, and preferably not too near Palestine. 258

The War Department took up the issue on August 3. Eden reviewed the offer and emphasized the objections of the Colonial Office over the ability of Palestine "to accept at the moment anything like so many immigrants." 259 As Eden saw it, the British could either refuse the "Horthy offer"-jointly with the United States government or separately-and thus possibly arouse hostile public opinion, or accept it and risk civil war in Palestine thanks to an influx of Jews from Hungary into the Levant. 260

The British were willing to admit into Palestine, within the framework of the White Paper, a limited number of Jews who held genuine immigration certificates. They urged the United States to accept more refugees and to induce the Latin American countries to do the same. They also proposed a joint approach to Lisbon to persuade the Portuguese to allow Jews to enter Angola. 261

The United States adopted a more positive tone. Responding to some of the objections raised by the British in connection with difficulties over transportation and accommodation-objections clearly designed to delay a decision-the Americans argued that the Horthy offer "must be accepted as quickly as possible in order to save the largest number of lives possible." They also maintained that the Western Allies "must act immediately without waiting to consult or enlist the aid of other governments." 262 Its air of urgency notwithstanding, the United States showed no willingness to liberalize its own immigration policies. The only "concession" it made was to inform Germany and Hungary (via the Swiss) that (1471)

American consular officers in neutral countries have been authorized to issue an immigration visa to any person to whom an American immigration visa was issued or for whom a visa was authorized on or after July 1, 1941, and who has been in areas con trolled by Germany or of any of Germany's allies since December 8, 1941, provided that such a person presents himself to an American consular officer in a neutral country and is found not to have become disqualified for the issuance of a visa. 263

Notification to this effect was sent on July 26 to the American representatives in Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. They were instructed to assure the affected governments of U.S. willingness to make arrangements for the maintenance and support of the refugees. While this position represented a slight departure in U.S. immigration policy, it had no impact on the plight of Hungarian Jewry. For even if the Germans and the Hungarians had agreed to let the affected Jews leave the country, their number, given the American quota for Hungary, would have been minimal.

The Western Allies wrangled for about three weeks over the response to be given to Hungary. 264 The compromise formula-a positive approach with no specific commitments-was incorporated in the statement issued on August 17:

The International Committee of the Red Cross has communicated to the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States an offer of the Hungarian government regarding the emigration and treatment of Jews. Because of the desperate plight of the Jews in Hungary and the overwhelmingly humanitarian considerations involved, the two governments are informing the Government of Hungary through Intercross that, despite the heavy difficulties and responsibilities involved, they have accepted the offer of the Hungarian Government for the release of Jews and will make arrangements for the care of such Jews leaving Hungary who reached neutral or United Nations territory, and also that they will find temporary havens of refuge where such people may live in safety. Notification of these assurances is being given to the governments of neutral countries who are being requested to permit the entry of Jews who reached their frontiers from Hungary. The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States emphasize that, in (1472) accepting the offer which has been made, they do not in any way condone the action of the Hungarian government in forcing the emigration of Jews as an alternative to persecution and death. 265

A few hours before the statement was issued, the Colonial Office sent a copy to High Commissioner MacMichael, noting that no departure from existing Palestine immigration policy was intended. 266 Subsequently, the JGC held a number of meetings which were attended by interested British agency representatives, as well as Burckhardt and other members of the IRC to discuss the arrangements referred to in the declaration. 267 Contact was also established with the Allied and neutral countries that were likely to accept the Jews. Neither the IGC nor the neutral and Allied countries showed any sense of urgency. The smaller Allies and the neutral countries were perplexed over the failure of the greater powers to absorb larger numbers of refugees, and fearful that once they admitted the immigrants they would be permanently stuck with them. The IGC itself became bogged down in questions of financing, accommodation, and transportation. Consequently, even the few countries that showed some interest in the Allies' appeal were reluctant to accept more than a token number of Jews. This was anticipated by Pehle, who reminded President Roosevelt in a memorandum dated May 8: " The necessity for unilateral action by this government lies in the fact that we cannot expect others to do what we ourselves will not do and if we are to act in time we must take the lead. " The President was urged to make at least a symbolic gesture by establishing "temporary havens" for refugees, who would be classified as internees rather than immigrants. On July 9, President Roosevelt announced that such a temporary haven would be established for a maximum of 1,000 refugees at a former army post at Oswego, New York. On August 4, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes welcomed 987 carefully screened refugees to Oswego. 268 This meager contribution to the solution of the refugee problem by the leading power in the anti-Axis alliance certainly did not have a salutary effect upon the other nations that were called upon to act on the Horthy offer.

On September 6, Brazil expressed its readiness to admit 500 children, as long as it would have no "financial responsibilities in regard to transport or upkeep." 269 Two days later, the Republic of Ireland (1473) indicated its willingness to include Hungarian-Jewish children among the 500 children it had earlier agreed to admit. It explained that it could only take children "for reasons of security," and that 500 was "the largest number which the Jewish population of Eire could reasonably be expected to support and that the Irish economy could be expected to absorb. "270 Australia, while sympathetic, was deterred by the " unpromising shipping position; " New Zealand... " decided that for the time being they were unable to help;" South Africa indicated that it already had its "hands full with war refugees and evacuees;" Southern Rhodesia reported that no additional refugees could be accommodated; Canada failed to reply. 271

The greatest obstacle was the opposition of Britain to the liberalization of its Palestine immigration policies. The British continued to invoke their commitments under the White Paper, the need for security and stability in the Middle East, the problems of transportation, accommodation, and administration, and the potential diplomatic difficulties with Turkey and other countries on the transit routes. 272 They remained adamant in their position despite the great pressures exerted upon them, especially by the United States. The failure of Britain to admit the Hungarian Jews to Palestine was vehemently denounced in both Houses of Congress. 273 Jewish rescue and representative organizations in the United States submitted well-documented memoranda and sent deputations to the British Embassy in Washington. 274 All these moves were of no avail.

The dilatory manner in which the Western Allies treated the issue of rescue made the Horthy offer a moot question. Their political and military concerns, which in retrospect proved unfounded in view of the Germans’ unwillingness to let a large number of Jews escape their net, were considerably relieved by the fast-moving military developments. The volte-face of Romania on August 23, 1944, and the consequent swift Red Army offensive made the Horthy-related emigration via Romania, Bulgaria, and the Black Sea all but impossible. After the Nyilas coup of October 15, the British and the Americans reverted to the issuance of warnings of retribution as a means of protecting the Jewish community. 275 The WRB became involved in the rescue negotiations on the Swiss-Austrian border and in Switzerland most of which had involved Saly Mayer of the AJDC and Rezso Kasztner and Kurt Becher. (1474) McClelland’s personal involvement in the negotiations on November 4 may have had a decisive effect on their outcome, because Becher-had identified him for Himmler as " President Roosevelt's personal representative." 276

The many pleas by the Jewish leaders for help were usually answered by the standard assurances that the Allies were doing everything possible to avert the danger of new persecutions in Hungary. 277 These assurances bad no more effect on the Jews than the threat of retributions had on the Nyilas. The Jews remained as helpless as ever and the Nyilas continued their rampage until the arrival of the Soviet forces which liberated Pest on January 17 and Buda on February 13, 1945. 278

The USSR

While the Red Army played a determining role in saving the Jews of Budapest and of thousands of Jews in the labor service companies, the USSR bad not been particularly involved in the political-diplomatic " negotiations" designed to rescue Hungarian Jewry. The liberation of the remnant of Hungarian Jewry was the consequence of the military operations of the then combined Soviet-Romanian forces against the Axis rather than the result of a conscious policy of rescue or considerations of humanitarianism. Like the other members of the Grand Alliance, the USSR, too, was motivated primarily by considerations of national interests and the requirements of the war effort. 279

Following the German occupation of Hungary, the Soviet Union condemned the anti-Jewish measures the occupying forces and their Hungarian accomplices bad adopted. Its messages were usually broadcast to Hungary by Radio Moscow and more frequently by Radio Kossuth, the station that was operated by Hungarian communist exiles in the USSR. These messages usually called on the Hungarians to resist and on the Jews to remain confident in their ultimate liberation. Some of the messages, while well-intentioned, proved counterproductive. For example, on April 1, 1944 Radio Kossuth bad advised the Jews not to fall into a ghetto mood and to be ready to wear the Yellow Star proudly ("with their heads up "). 280 Since the Soviet press devoted little attention to the Final Solution and completely ignored the realities of Nazism during the period of the Hitler-Stalin Pact (August 23, 1939-June 22, 1941), it is quite possible that these Hungarian exiles and their Soviet (1475) colleagues had been ignorant of the dangers that were associated with wearing the telltale badge.

The government of the Soviet Union, unlike those of Britain and the United States, did not officially comment on the likely consequences of the German occupation of Hungary for the Jews. The Soviet silence had perplexed the Western powers as well as the Jewish leaders of the free world. On May 16, the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe appealed to Stalin, urging him to intercede on behalf of the Hungarian Jews. 281 A day later, the American Embassy in Moscow was instructed to urge the Russians to broadcast warnings to those involved in the deportations that they would be held personally responsible for their actions. The Embassy was also instructed to induce the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to use its influence upon the Nazi satellite governments and populations, encouraging them to resist German demands for the deportations and persecution of minority groups. 282 On May 25, Harrison and McClelland suggested that the Soviet government "be prevailed upon in regard to the purpose of the occupation of Hungary by the Nazis, to associate itself with the declaration of March 24 by President Roosevelt. " Such a declaration would carry great weight, they argued, "since the Soviet armies are standing on the frontiers of Hungary and the fear of the Russians in the hearts of the large number of 'collaborators ' in Hungary is mortal. " The suggestion was not cabled to the American ambassador in Moscow until June 10. 283 The British made a similar plea on July 13. Reminding the Soviet government of its participation in the December 17, 1942, declaration and of the Nazis’ failure to desist " from their barbarous treatment of the Jews, " Eden asked Molotov to arrange for a separate Soviet declaration, given the victorious advance of the Red Army. Such a declaration, Eden argued, " couched in terms of unambiguous frankness and proclaiming that the Soviet armies and retribution for these crimes would enter Hungary together, might have the effect of at least reducing the scale of these horrible outrages against the Jewish population." 284 In a personal message to Eden (August 16), Molotov pointed out that the Soviet government had repeatedly made such declarations. He mentioned specifically the declaration that was issued on November 2, 1943, by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. (This declaration did not identify the Jews as a special target of the Nazis.) Molotov assured Eden that the (1476) Soviet government had issued directives " to the appropriate propaganda organizations to pay special attention to the unmasking of these crimes, and to issue warnings regarding the inevitable severe punishment to be meted out to all who are found guilty of such crimes. " 285

Long fearful of a possible rapprochement between the Western Allies and the Third Reich that might lead to an anti-communist capitalist coalition the Soviet leaders were highly suspicious of any attempt to deal with the Nazis on matters of rescue. Therefore, they ignored almost completely the plight of Nazi-oppressed groups and minorities. Jewish labor servicemen who had escaped to the Soviet lines or who were captured as ordinary POWs were poorly treated; the government vehemently opposed any dealings with the Brand mission; the Horthy offer was condemned; 286 and no official public declarations condemning the extermination of the Jews were ever issued. All this reflected the Soviet leaders' suspicions and political interests.

These wartime attitudes of the Soviet Union were further exacerbated after the war. In September 1948, a few months after the establishment of Israel, the Soviet Union launched its internationally orchestrated campaign against Zionism and cosmopolitanism, a euphemism often identified with the Jewish people. During the Cold War, Soviet and East European authors published a large number of fictional and pseudohistorical works which aimed to demonstrate the linkage that had existed between Zionists and Nazis during the Holocaust. 287

El Salvador

The rescue activities of El Salvador were primarily the consequence of the efforts of a single person, Georges M. Mantello (formerly known as Gyorgy Mandel or Mandi). A Hungarian Jew from the Transylvanian town of Beszterce, he arrived in Switzerland in December 1941, reportedly as a purchasing agent for the Romanians. He eventually managed to have himself appointed First Secretary of the Consulate General of El Salvador in Geneva. In this capacity, he undertook several actions designed to help the victims of Nazism, especially Hungarian Jews.

Colonel I. H. Castellanos, the Consul General of El Salvador

In connection with the latter, his achievements were twofold. First, with the cooperation of Colonel I. H. Castellanos, the Consul General, but originally without the knowledge of the government of El Salvador, Mantello sent a few hundred "nationality" certificates to Hungary.

The (1477) possessors of the certificates were considered foreign nationals and thus exempted from the general anti-Jewish decrees. 288 Some complications arose over the fact that El Salvador had no neutral nation to look after its interests in Hungary. 289 (The Swiss, and later the Swedish, representatives in Budapest had assumed that role somewhat informally.)

Florian Manoliu, a member of the Romanian Legation in Bern.

Mantello’s second major achievement, which was shared with Pozner, was to contact Krausz in Budapest via Florian Manoliu, a member of the Romanian Legation in Bern. It was through Manoliu that Krausz sent his June 19 report with the abbreviated version of the Auschwitz Reports that evoked the worldwide reaction against the anti-Jewish drive in Hungary (see Chapters 23 and 29). 290 Acting independently of many domestic and international Jewish organizations in Switzerland, Mantello distributed the Krausz material to leading Swiss clergymen, political and academic figures, and journalists. 291 He was effectively supported in this campaign by Walter Garrett, the Zurich representative of the London-based Exchange Telegraph Company. On relief matters, he was aided by his brother Joseph (Josif) Mandel. 292

The Jewish Relief and Rescue Organizations

In addition to Mantello's operations, which were largely based on his personal social, political, and business contacts, Switzerland was the seat of a considerable number of domestic and international Jewish organizations devoted to relief and rescue activities. Among the domestic ones by far the most important were the Rabbinerverband der Schweiz (Association of Rabbis of Switzerland) of St. Gallen; the Schweizerisch es Israelitisch es Gemeindebund (Association of Swiss Jewish Communities) of Zurich; the Verband Schweizerischer Judischer Fluchtlingshilfen (Association of Swiss Jewish Refugee Aid Societies) of Zurich; and the Schweizerische Zentralstelle for Fluchtlings hilfe (Central Swiss Refugee Aid Center) of Zurich. The community of international Jewish organizations included the Agudath Yisrael World Organization in Geneva; the Union International de Secours aux Enfants (International Union for the Rescue of Children) in Geneva; and the Union O.S.E. of Geneva.

The international Jewish organizations that played a considerable role in connection with the tragedy of Hungarian Jewry were the AJDC, (1478) which was headed in St. Gallen by Saly Mayer; 293 the Jewish Agency for Palestine, which was headed in Geneva by Richard Lichtheim; 294 the Palestine Office of Switzerland (Office Palestinien de Suisse) which was headed in Geneva by Chaim Pozner and Samuel Shep; the Hehalutz World Center (Weltzentrale des Hechaluz) which was headed in Geneva by Nathan Schwalb; the World Jewish Congress, which was headed in Geneva by Gerhart Riegner; 295 RELICO (Committee for the Aid of War-Stricken Jewish Populations), which was headed in Geneva by Abraham Silberschein; 296 and HIJEF (Hilfsverein far judische Fluchtlinge im Aus Lande; Society for the Aid of Refugees Abroad), which was headed by the Stembuch brothers in Montreux (see Chapter 29).

A committee devoted exclusively to the relief and rescue of Hungarian Jewry-The Swiss Committee of Assistance for the Jews in Hungary (Comite d'entr 'aide pour les Juifs en Hongrie; Schweizerisches Hilfskomitee far die Juden in Ungarn)-was formed in Zurich on March 23, 1944. 297 Composed of Swiss citizens of Hungarian origin, the Committee was under the leadership of Dr. Mihaly Banyai. 298 The Committee members had maintained contact with the Swiss authorities, Hungarian and Anglo-American diplomats, the Papal Nuncio, and the representatives of the IRC and of the domestic and international Jewish organizations in Switzerland. They had a particularly close relationship with the WRB, whose delegate, Laszlo Hamori, was of Hungarian-Jewish background. The Committee collected and disseminated information about the Nazi drive against the Jews, and offered specific suggestions to the various contacts on possible relief and rescue. 299

Despite the Nazis' claims about the power and influence of "international Jewry," the Jewish organizations were basically powerless. In addition to the transmission of information about the plight of the Jews, their activities consisted mostly of enlisting the support of governmental and international institutions, the disbursement of relatively small sums of money among some of the stricken communities, and the allocation of the limited number of Palestine immigration certificates that were made available by the British. Their staffs and operational budgets were pitifully small. (Their low budgets, which made large-scale relief and rescue operations all but impossible, resulted from the meager allocations by the increasingly impoverished free Jewish communities and the foreign-currency restrictions of the Allies.) As foreigners, the leaders of (1479) the international Jewish organizations abided strictly by the censorship and other regulations of the Swiss state which, while sympathetic to the plight of the Jews had been reluctant to admit any sizable groups of refugees and aimed above all to preserve its neutrality.

It was partially this fear of jeopardizing their status by upsetting their host country that had prevented the "foreign" Jewish leaders in Switzerland from publicizing the news about the Final Solution of which they had been aware at least since the summer of 1942. The same basic position characterized the attitude of the Swiss Jewish leaders, though they were not as vulnerable as the foreign Jews. When, for example, Chaim Pozner first learned in 1942 about Hitler's secret order to exterminate the Jewish people, he relayed this information to V. C. Farrell, the head of the British Intelligence unit in Geneva, for transmission to the Allies and to Benjamin Segalowitz, reportedly for possible dissemination. Segalowitz, a Swiss citizen, merely forwarded it to Gerhart Riegner, who, in turn, relayed it through the American Legation in Bern to Washington (see Chapter 23). Although it was made public in the fall of 1942, it received but scant notice in the press. There was no meaningful attempt to motivate or inform the Jewish masses about the scope of the order. One can only speculate about the possible reaction of the world and the impact on the Nazis' drive against the Jews had the order been publicized in 1942 as the Krausz report had been late in June 1944. The same holds true for the Auschwitz Reports, a copy of which had reportedly been sent to Schwalb soon after their completion late in April 1944. A press campaign based on those Reports, if launched early in May, might have had a sobering effect upon the political and governmental leaders of Hungary. Without these leaders’ cooperation the Germans could not have carried out their genocidal plans.

The limited effectiveness of the Jewish organizations was also to a large extent the consequence of the lack of cooperation among them and the absence of a central leadership. Leaders of world Jewry, including the heads of the World Jewish Congress, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, and the World Zionist Organization, had lived during the war either in New York (Rabbi Stephen S. Wise and Dr. Nahum Goldman), or London (Dr. Chaim Weizmann) or Jerusalem (David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Shertok), serving as conduits to their particular governments. In the absence of the top leaders, the heads of the various organizations in (1481)

Under a competent and respected central leadership, the effectiveness of the various organizations might have been enhanced; and the bureaucratic way in which they treated the news of the Holocaust and the basically ineffective measures they adopted toward the alleviation of suffering might then have been replaced by more efficient modes of operation. 308 However, the ultimate fate of the Jewish people in the Nazi sphere of influence would most probably not have been any different: the tragedy of the Jews lay not so much in the ineffectiveness of the domestic and international organizational Jewish leaders, but in their total helplessness during the war. Some of the Jewish leaders occasionally subordinated the urgent tasks of rescue to their preoccupation with the future of the Jewish people and the establishment of a Jewish state; 309 but this was not the source of their impotence. They were handicapped by lack of resources, by the absence of physical opportunities to reach the Diaspora Jews, by their lack of diplomatic status, by the limitations imposed by the British rule in Palestine, and above all by the lack of urgency with which the Allies viewed their plight. Although the Jews were singled out for total destruction by an enemy armed with all the resources of modern science, the leaders of the Grand Alliance rarely, if ever, heeded appeals by the Jewish leaders to intervene on behalf of Jews. They insisted with considerable persuasiveness that the best way to save Jews was to defeat Nazi Germany as quickly as possible. But by the time victory finally came, close to six million Jews had perished. The staggering toll reflects not only the genocidal single-mindedness of the Nazis and their collaborators, but also the indifference of the rest of the world.

Notes

1. The International Red Cross is frequently referred to as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

2. Aryeh L. Kubovy, "The Silence of Pope Pius XII and the Beginnings of the 'Jewish Document '." In: YVS, 6: 7-11. See also Unity in Dispersion (New York: World Jewish Congress, 1948), pp. 167-169.

3. Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on Its Activities during the Second World War (Geneva, 1948), I: 641. For a well-documented account of the efforts of Gerhart M. Riegner and other leaders of the World Jewish Congress, often acting in cooperation with Jaromir Kopecky, the delegate of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in Switzerland, to induce the IRC to act on behalf of the oppressed Jews, see Monty Noam Penkower, The World Jewish Congress Confronts the international Red Cross during the Holocaust. Jewish Social Studies, New York, 41 (Summer-Fall 1979)3-4: 229-256. 4. Inter Arma Caritas (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 194 7), p. 76.

5. Since the outbreak of World War 11, Hungary had interned approximately 3,000 Polish military prisoners and 5,000 Polish civilians. Among these were a number of Polish Jewish officers and soldiers who were interned separately in Vamosmikolaina camp commanded by First Lieutenant Bela Turcsanyi. They were treated quite well until November 19, 1944, when they were ordered to march toward the Austrian border along the Komarom-Hegyeshalom route. Questions relating to the treatment of Polish internees were handled by Section P of the IRC. For further details, see Chapter 3. See also Friedrich Born, Bericht an die Internationale Komitee vom Roten Kreuz in Gen/(Report to the International Committee of The Red Cross in Geneva) (Geneva, June 1945), pp. 2 and 39-41. The number of Yugoslav internees and prisoners of war ranged from 6,000 to 8,000. These were handled by Section Y of the IRC. There were also a relatively few British, Dutch, Belgian, French, and American officers and soldiers who had either escaped from German POW camps or been shot down (or were caught after parachuting) in Hungary. While Soviet POWs were normally handed over to the Germans, there was a camp in Veszkeny with eight officers and 246 soldiers. There were also 109 pro-Badoglio Italian prisoners who were interned shortly after the German-occupation. Ibid., pp. 3-4 and 41-45.

6. This conclusion was reached by Jean-Claude Favez, the former Dean of the Faculty of Letters and Rector of the University of Geneva, after a six-year review of some 350,000 Red Cross archival documents. See his Mission Impossible? le CIRC et Les camps de con centration Na z is (Lausanne: Payot, 1988). See also his Das Internationale Rote Kreuz und das Dritte Reich (Munich: C. Bettelsmann, 1988), 592 pp., and Aryeh Ben-Tov, Facing the Holocaust in Budapest. The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Jews in Hungary, 1933-45 (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 492 pp.

7. Ben-Tov, op. cit., p. 112. 8. Ibid., p. 387. ln an article published in I 988, Jacques Moreillon, the Director General of the IRC, admitted that the IRC "could probably have saved more Jewish people than it did... "and that had it "given greater encouragement to its delegates in the field, it might well have been more effective. This is true in particular for Romania and Hungary... " See his The Red Cross Reassesses Its War Record. Jerusalem Post, August 31, 1988. See also Werner Rings, Advokaten des Feindes (Advocates of the Enemy) (Vienna: Econ Verlag, 1966), 207 pp.

9. Born's closest associates in the Budapest office included Col Wehner, Arthur Karasz, Edit Tolgyessy, Daisy Daranyi, Elek and Klara Mathe, and Aliz Herceg. The IRC's economic bureau was headed by Jozsef Gal, the hospital bureau by Erno Teleki, and the doctors’ commission by Dr. Boldizsar Horvath. For details on the IRC structure, see Friedrich Born, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

10. Ibid., pp. 25-26.

11. Vadirat, 3: 100-102.

12. Ibid., pp. 226-227.

13. Prior to the Theresienstadt visit, the German authorities engaged in a nine-month beautification of the camp. For details on this deceitful project and on the composition and findings of the IRC delegation, see Meir Dworzecki, "The international Red Cross and its Policy vis-a-vis the Jews in Ghettos and Concentration Camps in Nazi-Occupied Europe." In: RAH, pp. 96-99.

14. Vadirat, 3: 246-247.

15. Ibid., pp. 249-250.

16. The leaders of the IRC complained about these deportations, arguing that they were a violation of Horthy's pledge. Baron Karoly Bothmer, the Hungarian Minister in Bern, relayed the protest to Budapest, only to be assured by

Lajos Remenyi Schneller

Lajos Remenyi Schneller, the then Acting Prime Minister, that the deportations were being carried out without the knowledge or consent of the Hungarian government. Jeno Levai, Szurke konyv magyar zsidok megmenteseriJL (Gray Book on the Rescuing of Hungarian Jews) (Budapest: Officina, n.d.), pp. 187-190. See also Vadirat, 3: 422-423.

17. Born, Bericht, pp. 27-28. See also No tiz uber die Situation d er Juden in Ungarn (Note on the Situation of the Jews in Hungary), November 14, 1944, Yad Vashem, Archives M-20/47.

18. RLB, Docs. 336-338.

19. The I RC was obviously aware of the often-conflicting operations and clearly discernible rivalries among some of the major Jewish organizations in Switzerland. For further details on the subject, see the last section in this chapter. For the minutes of the IRC conferences, see Yad Vashem, Archives M-20 /47.

20. For example, the Foreign Correspondent Censorship Office in Vienna (Aus landsbriefprufs telle Wien) intercepted an August 6 letter by Chaim Pozner addressed to S. Mandelblatt in Istanbul, which included copies of the reports by Born and Schirmer as well as details about the plans for the possible emigration of 7,8 00 families from Hungary. Copies of the intercepted materials were sent to the main censorship office in Berlin as well as to the Wehrmacht headquarters. RLB, Doc. 339.

21. These were the first of the 7,800 Jews whose emigration to Palestine the Swiss supported. The 2,000 Jews were provided with a collective passport through the efforts of the Palestine Office. For further details see the section on Switzerland below.

22. Vadirat, 3: 362-366, 467-472 and 481. This proposal was also supported by Alfred Zollinger, the IRC’s representative in Washington. See also Meir Dworzecki, op. cit., pp. 102-104.

23. According to one account, a plan for the protection of children was submitted to Born by Krausz shortly after his arrival in Budapest, but was not acted upon for a long time. Krausz reportedly complained about Born’ s alleged incompetence to Schirmer. For details on this and other accusations directed against Born, see Jeno Levai, Feher konyv. Kulfoldi akciok zsidok m egme ntesere (White Book. Foreign Activities for the Rescuing of Jews) (Budapest: Officina, n.d.), pp. 148-149, 15 2, and 155-157.

24. Born, Bericht, pp. 27 and 34-36. For details see "The Rescue Activities of Otto Komoly" in Chapter 29.

25. Born, Bericht, pp. 37-39. For details see "The Good Shepherd Committee" in Chapter 30.

26. Born, Bericht, pp. 33 and 36-37. See also Levai, Sziirke kony v, pp. 203-206, and the sections on the Nyilas era and Jewish resistance in Chapters 10 and 29, respectively.

27. For a list of the institutions that enjoyed the protection of the IRC, see Born, Bericht, pp. 54-68. One of the institutions that were taken under the protection of the IRC was the Columbus Street Camp, which had previously housed the Jews in the so called Kasztner group.

28. In recognition of his services on behalf of Hungarian Jewry, Friedrich Born was honored as a Righteous Among the Nations by Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, on June 5, 1987.

29. For further details on the activities of the IRC, consult David P. Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, I 977), 298 pp. and Aryeh Ben-Tov, op. cit. See also the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 517-520.

30. Paul Hoffman, Pius Knew in 1941 of Drive on Jews. The New York Times, April 27, 1974.

31. For Gerstein’ s statement of April 26, 1945, see PS-1553.

32. Nora Levin, The Holocaust (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968), pp. 686- 687. For some biographical details on Tittmann, who died on December 29, 1980, see The New York Times, December 30, 1980.

33. Paul Hoffman, The Vatican Knew of Nazi Pogroms, Its Records Show. The New York Times, April 5, 1973.

34. Saul Friedlander, Pius XII and the Third Reich. A Documentation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 222. For further details, see Chapter 23.

35. Kubovy, "The Silence of Pope Pius XII," p. 11. See also appeals by the British Section of the World Jewish Congress of June 26 and October 14, 1944, on behalf of the Hungarian Jewry in PRO, Fo. 371/42807, p. 32, and Fo. 371 /42820, p. 22.

36. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, /942. Volume 3. Europe (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 776-777. For additional documents on the subject, see section titled "Vatican. Efforts of the United States and Other Governments to Have the Pope Protest Publicly against Nazi Atrocities in German-Occupied Areas," ibid., pp. 772-780. See also Levin, The Holocaust, p. 686.

37. Report of Ernst von Weizsäcker, former Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office and the then German Ambassador to the Holy See, dated October 28, 1943. Alvin Shuster, Vatican Releases '43 Documents on Handling of Jewish Problems. The New York Times, January 24, 1976; Raoul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1961), pp. 429-430.

38. Kubovy, "The Silence of Pope Pius XII," p. 11.

39. Ibid.

40. The standard response was usually given by Monsignor Mantini on instructions from the Pope. It was revealed in a note attached by Monsignor Mantini to a telegram received from an Orthodox Jewish group in December 1942, in which the Pope was requested to intervene on behalf of the Jews of Eastern Europe. Hoffman, Pius Knew in 1941 of Drive on Jews, op. cit.

41. Friedlander, Pius XII and the Third Reich, p. 236; Levin, The Holocaust, pp. 692--693; Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1964), p. 305.

42. For example, in response to the October 14, 1944, appeal by Alex L. Easterman, the Political Secretary of the British Section of the World Jewish Congress, the Pope refused to make a public appeal, arguing that "if he made a public declaration about the treatment of Jews in Hungary he might have to yield to pressure to issue a similar statement in regard to Russian treatment of Poles and the Baltic populations." See telegram no. 701, dated November 20, 1944, from Sir D. Osborne, the British Minister to the Holy See, to the Foreign Office. PRO, Fo .3 7 l/42822, p. 86.

43. This theme was echoed in the 688-page volume of documents issued by the Vatican early in 1976. The volume also reflected the anti-Zionist bias of the Vatican, many of whose officers, including Cardinal Maglione, openly opposed the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Alvin Shuster, Vatican Releases' 43 Documents on Handling of Jewish Problems. The New York Times, January 24, 1976. For a sympathetic evaluation of the Pope’s role, see Carlo Falconi, Th e Silence of Piu s XII (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 430 pp.; Robert A. Graham, Pope Pius XII and the Jews of Hungary in 1944 (New York: The America Press for the United States Catholic Historical Society, 1964), 26 pp.; J. Derek Holmes, The Papacy in the Modern World, 1914-1970 (Crossroad, NY: The Author, 1981 ), 288 pp.; Jeno Levai, Hungarian Jewry and the Papacy (London: Sands and Company, 1968), 132 pp.; and Anthony R. E. Rhodes, The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators, 1922-1945 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), 383 pp..

44. Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, p. 303. See also Friedlander, Pius XII and the Third Reich, pp. I 03-14 7 and 236-238. See also Reverend John F. Morley, Vatican Diplomacy and the Jews During the Holocaust, 1939-1945 (New York: KTAV, 1980), 327 pp.

45. Gil Yakov, XU. Pius papa magatartasa a Soa idejen (The Attitude of Pope Pius XII during the Holocaust). VJ Kele (New East), Tel Aviv, October 9, 1987.

46. Another copy of the Reports-probably the one sent by Miklos (Moshe) Krausz on June 19-reached the Vatican via Monsignor Philippa Bernardini, the Apostolic Delegate in Bern, toward the end of June. 47. For the Nuncio's account see his "A budapesti nunciatura diplomáciai akciója a zsidok érdekében" (The Diplomatic Campaign of the Budapest Nunciature on Behalf of the Jews). In: A magyar katolikus egyhaz es az emb erijogok vedelme (The Hungarian Catholic Church and the Protection of Human Rights), Antal Meszlenyi, ed. (Budapest: A Szent Istvan Tarsulat, 1947), pp. 21-30.

48. The details of what the deportations meant were spelled out by Gennaro Verolino in his postwar interview with Peter Bokor. Verolino emphasized that by that time they had been aware that the Jews were being deported to Auschwitz and that those unfit for labor were being murdered. See Bokor’s Vegjatek a Duna menten (End Game along the Danube) (Budapest: RTV-Minerva-Kossuth, 1982), pp. 115-125. See especially, pp. 118-119.

49. Friedlander, Pius XII and the Third Reich, p. 21 8.

50. Vadirat, I: 319.

51. Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide (New York: The Free Press, 1979), p. 110.

52. Vadirat, I: 3 17-324. 53. Ibid., pp. 324-325.

54. Levai, Hungarian Jewry and the Papacy, p. 20.

55. Vadirat, I: 326-331.

56. Levai, Hungarian Jewry and the Papacy, pp. 2 1-22.

57. Summary Report of the Activities of the War Refugee Board with Respect to the Jews of Hungary (Washington, October 9, 1944), p. 4. (Typescript.) The report was prepared by Lawrence S. Lesser, the assistant of John W. Pehle, the head of the WRB. A similar report was advanced a few days later by Mr. Osborne, the British Minister to the Vatican.

58. Summary Report of the Activities of the War Refugee Board, pp. 11-12. See also Fein, Accounting for Genocide, p. 109. The Jewish leaders of America and Europe, including Kubowitzki, were in formed about the U.S. note to the Vatican by Lesser. Kubovy, "The Silence of Pope Pius XII," pp. 13-14.

59. Friedlander, Pius XII and the Third Reich, p. 223.

60. Graham, Pope Pius XII, p. 15.

61. Ibid., p. 12.

62. Levai, Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, pp. I 82-183.

63. Graham, Pope Pius XII, pp. 12-13.

64. For the minutes of the Nuncio-Sztójay meeting, see Vadirat, 3: 92-97. The pressure exerted by the Nuncio together with the Swiss and the Swedish representatives on Horthy and Sztójay was the subject of two telegrams sent by Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop earl y in July 1944. See RLB, Do cs. 186-187.

65. Vadirat, 3: 98-100.

66. See Sztojay’s note to Jaross dated July 13. Ibid., pp. 170-17 1.

67. Ibi d., pp. 25 1-255.

68. Ibid., pp. 167-170.

69. Ibid., pp. 302-303.

70. The note was handed over in person by the Nuncio and Carl I. Danielsson, the Swedish Minister, to Lajos Remenyi-Schneller, the Acting Prime Minister at the time. For text of the note, see "New Deportation Threats" in Chapter 25. This was the first collective action by the Apostolic Delegate and the representatives of the neutral states in Budapest.

71. Friedlander, Pius XII and the Third Reich, pp. 224-235.

72. Levai, Hungarian Jewry and the Papacy, pp. 37-38. Unlike the first note, this one was signed by Rotta, Danielsson, Harold Feller, Jorge Perlasca, and Count Pongracz. The latter three represented the Swiss, Spanish, and Portuguese legations, respectively.

73. See "The International Ghetto" section in Chapter 26.

74. Levai, Feher konyv, pp. 144-145.

75. In recognition of his wartime rescue activities, including the distribution of protective passes to Jews in the Óbuda brickyards and in t he death-march columns, Baranszky, who was only 21 years old at the time, was recognized as a Righteous Among the Nations by Yad Vashem on January 10, 1979. Baranszky settled in the United States in 1961. For further details on Baranszky’ s activities both during and after the war, see Anthony Cardinale, A Freedom Fighter for Many Seasons. The Magazine of the Buffalo News, Buffalo, October 11, 1981.

76. See section "The Death Marches to Hegyeshalom" in Chapter 26.

77. Levai, Hungarian Jewry and the Papacy, p. 44.

78. The letter of authorization empowered Ujvary to "search and bring home from camps and from en route those people of Jewish origin who were under the protection of the Apostolic Nunciature and who were taken or en route to the west in violation of the agreement between the Apostolic Nunciature and the Hungarian government." Sandor Ujvary, Szaba lytalan one letrajz (Unorthodox Autobiography). Menora, Toronto , (February 17, 1979): 8. See also Levai, Sziirke konyv, pp. 187-203.

79. In this endeavor, Ujvary had the cooperation of Biro, Geza Tolnay, Tibor Verehely, Milan Kosztich, Jozsef Eszterhazy, Laszlo Helle, Istvan Foldiak, Imre Farkas, Major Istvan Feher, and Captain Zoltan Horvath. Ibid.

80. Levai, Hungarian Jewry and the Papacy, pp. 50-51. See also his Szurke konyv, pp. 13-30 and 68-69, and Zsidosors Magyarorszcigon, pp. 179-183, 202-206, 319-320 and 349-351. For further details on the attitude and activities of the Vatican and of the Nunciature in Budapest, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 542-543.

81. The neutral states, like the IRC, did not really get involved in rescue and relief activities until after the completion of the deportations from the provinces. For a well-documented overview of the neutral countries' position in 1944, see Laszlo Varadi, KUlfoldi diplomaciai mentesi kiserletek a budapesti zs id osagert (Foreign Diplomatic Rescue Efforts on Behalf of the Jews of Budapest). Medvetcinc (Bear Dance), Budapest, (1985)2-3: 99-110.

82. See Sztojay’s June 27 note to Veesenmayer in "The Crown Council Meeting of June 26" section of Chapter 25.

83. The German Foreign Office was so concerned with the Swiss press reaction that it wanted to lodge a protest, but later rescinded this plan for fear that it would jeopardize the myth of Hungarian sovereignty. It therefore suggested that the Hungarians take such steps. NA, Micro copy T-120, Roll 4664, K-l 509/K.350356-.

84. See "The Auschwitz Protocols" section in Chapter 23.

85. Vcidirat, 3: 190-192.

86. The protest and appeal were monitored by the press department of the German Foreign Office. For text see NA, Microcopy T-120, Roll 4664, Kl 509/K. 350291-

87. Ibid., K-l 509/K.350354-. See also RLB, Doc. 369.

88. Vcidirat, 3: 296.

89. To increase the number of those to be rescued, Krausz and hi s Zionist colleagues interpreted the 7,000 to mean 7,000 family heads, which in effect meant from 30,000 to 40,000 Jews. For further details of this scheme, see "The Krausz Line" section in Chapter 29.

90. Lutz returned to Switzerland in April 1945. While en route in Istanbul he gave an interview in which he reviewed the tragedy and problems of Hungarian Jewry. For text see the Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, file S26/ l i 90. Lutz died in Switzerland in February 1975 at 73 years of age. For further details on his background, see Alexander Grossmann, Erinnerung an alten Generalkonsul Charles Lutz (Remembering the Late Consul General Emeritus Charles Lutz). Neue Zurcher Zeitung (New Zurich Newspaper), February 26, 1975. See also his Nur das Gewissen. Carl Lutz und seine Budapester Aktion. Geschichte und Portrat (Only the Conscience: Carl Lutz and His Activities in Budapest. History and Portrait) (Zurich: Verlag im Waldgut, 1986), 284 pp. For documentary resource materials relating to Lutz consult Bronia Klibanski’s "Archives of the Swiss Consul General Charles Lutz." In: YVS, 14: 597-566. See also Theo Tschuy, Carl Lutz und die Juden von Budapest. (Zurich: Verlag Neuer Zurcher Zeitung, 1995), 446 pp.

91. Jager left Budapest on November 10. His functions were assumed by Antoine J. Kilchmann and on December 9, following Kilchmann's departure, by Harald Feller, the Legation secretary. E. Szatmari, Bericht uber die Tätigkeit der neutralen Vertretungen in Budapest.... (Report on the Activities of the Neutral Representatives in Budapest.) Manuscript, pp. 16 and 23. Mr. Szatmari had served as an expert on the press in the Swiss Legation during the war.

92. Vadirat, 3: 242-245.

93. Ibid., pp. 247-249.

94. RLB, Docs. 324-326. See also Chapters 25 and 29.

95. When the "International Ghetto" was established on November 15, 72 buildings were assigned to house the Jews under Swiss protection. These proved inadequate because of the large number of holders of forged protective passes. Levai, Sziirke konyv, p. 182. See also Chapter 26.

96. Forged protective passes were produced in large numbers by the Zionist underground. These were used, among other things, to bring about the release of internees to provide a number of Jews, especially Zionists and their sympathizers, with a degree of immunity from further persecution. For details, see Chapter 29.

97. Many sources refer to either 2,000 or 2,200 Jews covered by the initial collective passports. Each collective passport was in fact a book containing more than 1,000 names with the vital statistics of and a photograph for each individual.

98. The Swiss request was also supported by the IRC. Both Huber and Burckhardt approached Baron Bothmer toward this end. Levai, Sziirke konyv, pp. 180-181.

99. RLB, Doc. 370. According to a communication from Reichel to Wagner dated August 15, Eichmann, presumably frustrated by his failure to proceed with his original plans, had a new idea. He was ready to grant a number of exit visas if the deportations resumed, but then-once resumed-he would stop the emigration of the visa holders. ibid., Doc. 330. 100. 516/Res. Pol.-I 944. Magyar Orszagos Leve/tar (Hungarian National Archives), Budapest: K.27. A copy of this document is on file in RG-52. See also Vadirat, 3: 374-375.

101. RLB, Docs. 329-330 and 371-373.

102. Ibid., Doc s. 374-377 and 383.

103. Marcel Pilet-Golaz, the Swiss Foreign Minister, informed Clifford J. Norton, the British Minister in Bern, on August I 0, 1944, about the authority he had received from the Swiss Federal Council "to offer a temporary refuge in Switzerland to 8,000 Hungarian Jews." See Norton’s telegram No. 3747, dated August 10, 1944, addressed to the Foreign Office. PRO, Fo. 371 /42814, p. 12.

104. According to M. Kahany, an official of the Jewish Agency in Geneva, he approached the Swiss Political Department on October 20 upon learning of the renewed drive against the Jews. He also contacted Leland Harrison, the American Minister, and Douglas MacKillop, the British charge d’Affaires, who reportedly persuaded Pilet-Golaz to proceed with the plan under the Anglo-American guarantees. Early in November, the Swedish representative in Switzerland persuaded the Anglo-Americans to extend their guarantee to the approximately 4,000 Hungarian Jews holding temporary Swedish passports, inasmuch as the route between Germany and Sweden was already severed. The Swiss reportedly agreed to admit the Swedish-protected Jews under the same conditions as the Swiss-protected Jews were. Kahany’s major source of information about developments in Budapest was Dr. Pozner (Pozner changed his name to Pazner after he settled in Israel.) See Kahany’s reports No. 103 and 104, dated October 30 and November 16, 1944, respectively, in the "Pazner files" at Yad Vashem.

105. The Swiss Legation in Budapest was informed about this decision of the Federal Council on October 31. Although the chances of the Jews leaving Hungary were minimal the Swiss were seriously concerned with the practical difficulties involved in caring for the refugees. They approached the Allies to have the Jews transferred, shortly after their arrival, to Marseille and to Philippeville, Algeria. See cable dated November 13, 1944, by acting Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, based on a communication received from McClelland. See also PRO, Fo. 371 / 42824, pp. 31-32.

106. See note dated November 3, 1944, addressed by Christopher Eastwood of the Colonial Office to Paul Mason of the Refugee Department in the Foreign Office. Ibid., Fo. 371/42821, p. 78.

107. On that date Jager told Anthy-Jungertb that he would accept children of 5 to 13 years irrespective of their national or racial background. Although at first (October 7) the Swiss rejected the German proposal that no Jewish or Volksdeutsche children be included, they later (October 24) relented after they were informally told that the Jewish children might be allowed to go to Palestine. RLB, Docs. 381 and 385-397. See also Levai, Feher kony v, pp. 11 2-113.

108. RLB, Docs. 400-404. See also NA, Microscopy T-120, Roll 4203, Frames K209276-285.

109. Cable No. 7394, September 8, 1944, addressed to the U.S. Secretary of State by John G. Winant, U.S. Ambassador in London.

110. Telegram No. 7998 of September 30, 1944, addressed by Secretary of State Hull to the American Embassy in London, based on messages received from McClelland. 111. Telegram No. 2077, October 30, 1944, from Ambassador Steinhardt to the U.S. Secretary of State.

112. This was agreed at the October 31 meeting held in Kemeny’s office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the participation of Lieutenant Colonel Ferenczy, Lutz, and Raoul Wallenberg, representing the Swedes. Szatmari, Bericht, p. 13.

113. RLB, Docs. 389-390 and 393.

114. Ibid., Do c. 399. Kaltenbrunner was promptly informed of the contents of Veesenmayer’s telegram. NA, Microscopy T-120, Roll 4355, Frame-K2 l 3435. See also Levai, Feher konyv, pp. 120-126, and his Zsidosors Magyarorszagon, pp. 311-316, 332-341, 359-360, and 367-368.

115. For further details on the rescue activities of Switzerland in general and of Carl Lutz in particular, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 510-511. 116. Before becoming Chief Rabbi of Sweden in 1914, Rabbi Ehrenpreis had served in Bulgaria (1900-1914) and in Croatia (1896-1900). Born in Lvov (Lemberg) in 1869, he died in Stockholm in I 951.

117. For details on the rescuing of Danish Jews, see Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, pp. 357-363, and Leni Yahil "The Uniqueness of the Rescue of Danish Jewry." In: RAH, pp. 617-625. See also Yahil's (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University and Yad Vashem, 1967), 316 pp.

118. See Sztojay’s note to Veesenmayer dated June 27 in Chapter 25 in section titled "The Crown Council Meeting of June 26." The note was based on Arnothy Jungerth's report to the Council of Ministers. For details, see Levai, Feher konyv, pp. 60-71.

119. The original plan called for the appointment of Count Oscar Bernadotte, the Deputy President of the Swedish Red Cross. Since Arnothy-Jungerth feared that the Germans would not grant him a transit visa, he suggested Dr. Langlet, who was already in Budapest. Dr. Langlet’s appointment was based on oral communication of July 4, which was followed by a written one ten days later. It was acknowledged with a pledge of cooperation by Gyula Ambrozy, the head of Horthy’s Cabinet Office, on July 25. Ibid., pp. 167-170.

120. Professor Langlet became active in setting up children's homes as well as in the distribution of protective passes. For details on his activities, see his Verk och dagar I Budapest (Work and Days in Budapest) (Stockholm: Wahlstrom & Widstrand, 1946), 221 pp.

121. For the text of the King's telegram as well as Horthy's reply on July 10, see Vadirat, 3: 58-60.

122. WRB cable No. 17 for Johnson and Olsen.

123. For Professor Valentin's account, see his Rescue and Relief Activities on Behalf of Jewish Victims of Nazism in Scandinavia. YI VO Annual of Jewish Social Science, New York, 8 (1953): 224-252.

124. See exchange of telegrams between Rabbi Ehrenpreis and Taubes in Yad Vashem Archives M-20/471.

125. Vadirat, 3: 56-58 and 241-242.

126. RLB, Docs. 362 and 364-365.

127. Ibid., Doc. 361. On July 7, he alerted the Foreign Office about a Swedish request for the emigration of 186 Hungarian Jews to Sweden. Ibid., Doc. 363.

128. For further biographical details, see Levai, Raoul Wallenberg regenyes elete, hiJsi kiizdelmei, rejtelyes eltiinesenek titka (Raoul Wallenberg's Adventurous Life, Heroic Struggles, and Secret of His Mysterious Disappearance) (Budapest: Magyar Teka, 194 8), 311 pp., and G. 8. Freed, "Humanitarianism vs. Totalitarianism: the Strange Case of Raoul Wallenberg." ln: Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters, 46 (1961): 503-528.

129. Levai, Raoul Wallenberg, pp. 30-39.

130. WRB cable no. 17 cited above. 131. See Johnson's telegram of June 21 to the State Department in Freed, "Humanitarianism vs. Totalitarianism," pp. 507-508.

King Gustav V Sweden

132. See text in Hungarian translation in Levai, Raoul Wallenberg, p. 42. Shortly after the meeting, the leaders of the Council sent a letter of appreciation to King Gustav, including some specific suggestions for aiding the remaining Jews of Hungary. Munkacsi, Hogyan tortent?, pp. 185-187.

133. Statement by Emo Peto in HJS, 3: 58-59.

134. The following day, Wallenberg wrote another report detailing some aspects of the tragedy, including information on some of the ghettos, the Kasztner transport, the SS-Weiss-Manfred deal, and the Yellow-Star houses in Budapest. He sent the two reports together with a copy of the Auschwitz Reports. Levai, Raoul Wallenberg, pp. 43-57.

135. Freed, "Humanitarianism vs. Totalitarianism," p. 509. According to Wallenberg, who presumably cited only official figures, the number of Jews protected by Sweden was only 7,000, and that they were housed in eight Swedish-protected buildings. See his report of December 8, 1944, in Levai, Feher konyv, pp. 134-136.

136. RLB, Doc. 367.

137. Vadirat, 3: 427-428. After the completion of the relocations, Stockier established a closer working relationship with Wallenberg. On October 5, for example, they discussed the possibility of sending clothing, food, and medicines for the deportees. Ibid., p. 592.

138. At the Council headquarters, the operation was directed by Jeno Bleier. His two immediate assistants, Emo Szalkai and Vilmos Vasadi, served as liaison to the Swedish Legation. At the site of the relocations on Pozsonyi Road, overall command was exercised by Gyorgy Bognar, who also had the power to settle disputes arising from the apartment exchanges. Those dissatisfied with his decision had the right to appeal to a Council arbitration committee headed by Imre Varadi. To be eligible for relocation into the Swedish houses, a person had to be in possession of a Swedish Schutzpass as well as a transfer permit from the Council. Ibid., pp. 428-431.

139. Levai, Feher konyv, pp. 172-174. In his Apesti getto (p. 97), Levai asserted that Nilsson (spelled Nielson) and Bauer had been freed through the intervention of Born of the IRC.

140. Wallenberg's reports were forwarded from Stockholm in English translation to London and Washington. Fo r a summary of Swedish help to Hungarian Jews, see PRO, Fo. 371 /42823, pp. I 08-113. For further details on Wallenberg’s activities during the Nyilas era, see Levai, Raoul Wallenberg, pp. 82-215. For additional details relating to Sweden's attitude towards the Jews and its rescue role in Hungary, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 494-496.

141. Freed, "Humanitarianism vs. Totalitarianism, " pp. 513-514. For Levai’ s version of Wallenberg's disappearance, see his Raoul Wallenberg, pp. 216-294.

142. For further details on Swedish-Soviet exchanges on the Wallenberg issue, consult Freed’s study cited above, pp. 514-528. See also The New York Times, February 8, 1957.

143. The reference to Beria’s involvement in the killing of Wallenberg was made in Paris by Ambassador Yuri Kashlev, chief of the Soviet delegation to the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in June 1989. Another member of the delegation, Vladimir Andreyev, the deputy procurator-general of the USSR, reiterated the Soviet position that Wallenberg had died in prison in the immediate postwar years. Edwin Eytan, Wallenberg Was Killed by Beria, Soviets Say. The Jewish Week, New York, June 9, 1989.

144. Esther B. Fein, Soviets Give Kin Wallenberg Papers. The New York Times, October I 7, 1989.

145. Among these were Alexander Solzhenitsyn, David Vendrovski, Menachem Meltzer, Abraham Kalinski, and Jan Kaplan, former inmates of Soviet prisons. See Maurice Samuelson, Soviet Said to Hide Fact Swedish Holocaust Hero Lives as Prisoner. The Jewish Week, New York, November 12, 1978; Elenore Lester, Rescued Jews Insist Wallenberg Lives in Soviet Mental Prison, ibid., June 24, 1979.

146. A number of Hungarian-Jewish Americans who were rescued in Budapest by Wallenberg, including Annette and Thomas P. Lantos of Alexandria, Virginia, and Robert Peter Held, formed a group called Concerned Citizens for Wallenberg toward this end. Nina Lagergren and Guy von Dardel, Wallenberg's half-sister and half-brother, managed to persuade Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel to take an interest in the case. (The Prime Minister suggested to President Carter that the latter take up the issue with the Soviet leaders.) They were also instrumental in bringing about the establishment in the United States of a Free Wallenberg Committee with Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Democrat of New York), Frank Church (Democrat of Idaho), Claiborne Pell, (Democrat of Rhode Island), and Rudy Boschwitz (Republican of Minnesota), as co-chairmen. In Great Britain a simi lar committee was formed under the co-chairmanship of Winston Churchill and Greville Janner, members of the House of Commons.

In July 1979, Annette Lantos and Lagergren were received by U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, who told them that the United States had recently raised the case with the Soviet government and were awaiting a reply. See "Raoul Wallenberg's Sister Sure Gulag Victim Is Alive, Gets Support of Senators," The Jewish Week, July 29, 1979. See also The New York Times, August 4, 1979, and Elenore Lester and Frederick E. Werfel, The Lost Hero of the Holocaust. The Search for Sweden's Raoul Wallenberg. The New York Times Magazine, (March 30, 1980): 20ff.

147. The commission included Guy von Dardel, Professor Marvin Makinen of the University of Chicago-a former prisoner at Vladimir-and Professor Irwin Cotler of McGill University, a lawyer and human rights advocate. Bram D. Eisenthal, Wallenberg May Be Alive, Probers Say. The Jewish Week, New York, October 12, 1990.

148. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), pp. 643--6 44.

149. KGB Chief to Let Agents Break Silence about Wallenberg's Fate. The New York Times, September 6, 1991. A report from Moscow dated December 27, 1991, indicated that the KGB took extensive pains to expunge from their records the name of Wallenberg. The documents on file support the official Soviet position that Wallenberg died of a heart attack in a KGB prison on July 17, 1947. Serge Schmemann, Soviet Files Show KGB Cover up in the Disappearance of Wallenberg. Ibid., December 28, 1991. For accounts about the possible reasons for Wallenberg’s murder, see Bernt Schiller, Raul Wallenberg. (Berlin: Neues Leben Verlag, 1993), Pavel Sudoplatov, et al., Special Tasks. (Boston: Little Brown, 1994), and Maria Ember, Wallenberg elrab lasa (The Kidnapping of Wallenberg). Budapesti Negyed, 3(Summer 1995)2: 181-208. According to a report by the Central Intelligence Agency during the late 1990’s, Wallenberg had been in the service of the Office of Strategic Services (later CIA) when he arrived in Hungary in 1944. See The Angel Was a Spy. U. S. News & World Report, May 13, 1996.

150. In 1960, Wallenberg was one of the first to be given the title of "Righteous Among the Nations" by Yad Vashem. On December 11, 1979, Yad Vashem bestowed upon him its highest honor, which was accepted by his half-brother, Guy von Dardel of Geneva. Raoul Wallenberg was also honored by the Hungarians early in April 1987. His statue by Imre Varga, commissioned by Nicholas M. Salgo, the former American Ambassador to Budapest, was erected on a small patch of grass on Szilagy i Erzse bet Fasor, in the Buda part of the capital. During the Cold War, many of Wallenberg's admirers had identified him as the savior of at least 100,000 Hungarian Jews. For a more realistic evaluation of Wallenberg's heroic activities, see Paul A. Levine, The Myth Has Obscured the Reality of His Heroism. The Washington Post, January 7, 2001. For further details on Wallenberg's life and rescue activities, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 496-510.

151. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, pp. 447-448.

152. See Weissmann’s cable to Alex L. Easterman of the London branch of the World Jewish Congress in the Weizmann Archives files in Rehovot, Israel.

153. Miguel Angel de Muguiro, the Spanish Minister in Budapest, had returned to Madrid soon after the German occupation. For further details on the Tangier connection with emphasis on the role played by Mrs. Renee Reichmann and her daughter Eva, see David Kranzler, Thy Brothers Blood. The Orthodox Jewish Response during the Holocaust. (New York: Mesorah Publications, 1987), pp. 247-254.

154. This offer by Tangier provided the IRC with the legal framework for its involvement in rescue work in Hungary. See the "International Red Cross" section above and Chapter 29.

155. The negotiations continued on August 2. See Gergely's notes on these meetings in Munkacsi's Hogyan tortent ?, pp. 208-2 12.

156. Laszlo Elek, Azolasz Wallenberg (The Italian Wallenberg) (Budapest: Szechenyi Kiado, 1989), 126 pp. For Mr. Perlasca' s diary notes, covering the March 19, 1944 to January 13, 1945 period, see pp. 57-110. See also Peter Magyar, Perlasca az "alspanyol" e ll enall o (Perlasca the "Pseudo-Spanish" Resister). Magyar Hirlap (Hungarian Journal), Budapest, April 8, 1989, and Michael Ryan, A Simple Deed with Awesome Power. Parade Magazine, (August 19, 1990): 4 and 6-7.

157. Levai, Feher kony v, pp. 143-144. Other sources, especially those written in the late 1980’s, put the number of those rescued by Perlasca at 5,200.

158. Perlasca, who lived in almost total oblivion near Padua until the late 1980’s, was finally honored by those he had rescued as well as by Yad Vashem, which bestowed up on him the title of Righteous Among the Nations (June 9, 1988). In April 1989, Perlasca was awarded the Order of the Star of the Hungarian People’s Republic (a Magyar Nepkoz tarsasag Cs ill agrendje ), and a month later he was feted in Budapest by the Jewish community as well as the Hungarian Parliament. Perlasca died in Padua on August 15, 1992, at 82 years of age. See also Ivan Harsanyi, A budapesti spanyol kovetseg alta l az 1944. ev i iildozesek idejen vedelemben reszesitett magyar zsid0k nevsora" (The List of the Hungarian Jews Who Were Rescued by the Spanish Legation of Budapest during the Persecutions in 1944). Holocaust Fiizetek (Holocaust Notebooks), Budapest, (1993)3: 46-104.

159. For further details on Perlasca's life and rescue activities, see his L’lmpostore (The lmpostor) (Bologna: II Molino, 1997), 193 pp. See also the bibliographical references listed in B-A, p. 908.

160. Laszlo Szamosi began his association with Section A of the IRC on October 10, 1944. After the war he settled in Israel, where he died in 1986. For further details on his activities, see Mihaly Salamon, Kereszteny voltam Europaban (I Was a Christian in Europe) (Tel Aviv: Nepiink, n.d.), pp. 170-176.

161. RLB, Docs. 356-360. For further details on the wartime attitude of Spain, see Haim Avni, Sefarad veha 'y ehudim ni 'yem e ha'shoah veha'emants ipatsiah (Spain and the Jews during the Holocaust and the Emancipation) (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1975), 292 pp.

162. For further details on the rescue activities of Spain, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 492-494.

163. From April 25, 1944 on, the Portuguese Legation was led by Sampaio Garrido, a diplomat reportedly of Jewish origin. In May, when he had to go to Switzerland for medical reason, Garrido was replaced by Alberto Carlos de Liz-Texeira Branquinho, who continued in his position until October 29. His successor was a Hungarian by the name of Gyula Gulden, who, after his flight to Switzerland on December 8, was replaced by Ferenc Pongracz.

164. RLB, Doc. 344.

165. See Gunther Altenburg’ s telegram of May 24, 1944, to the German Legation in Budapest. NA, Microscopy T-120, Roll 4355, Frame 213797 (NG-5583). See also Frames K213798-804.

166. Levai, Feher kony v, pp. 42-46.

167. NA, Microscopy T-120, Roll 4664, Serial K 1509/K3488 16-.

168. Ibid., Roll 4203, Frames K209296-3l l, and RLB, Docs. 345-353.

169. Levai, Szilrke konyv, pp. 215-218.

170. See Eva Ban, Lisszabon-Budapest-Berlin, 1944-1945 (Lisbon-Budapest-Berlin). Valosag (Reality), Budapest, (July 1992): 91-106. For further details on the rescue activities of Portuguese Legation in Budapest, see the bibliographical references listed in 8-A, p. 928.

171. WRB cables to Ambassador Steinhardt dated May 24 and June 28, 1944. See also Levai, Feher kony v, p. 174.

172. NA, Microscopy T-120, Roll 4203, Frames K209321-322.

173. Henry L. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue. The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945 (New Brunswick, J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970), p. 33.

174. Walter F. Mondale, Evian and Geneva. The New York Times, July 28, 1979. For details on the Evian Conference and its antecedents, see Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, pp. 22-44, and Arthur D. Morse, While Six Million Died. A Chronicle of American Apathy (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 199-220.

175. For details on Britain’s "Palestine Statement of Policy, May 1939," as the White Paper was officially called, see at Daniel Katzburg, "British Policy on Immigration to Palestine during World War II." ln: RAH, pp. 183-203. For a well-documented account of how Britain ignored the plight of the Jews during the war, see Bernard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 389 pp.

176. See Michael Mashberg, The West and the Holocaust. Patterns of Prejudice, London, l 2(May-June 1978) 3: 19-22 and 29. For a detailed and well-documented account of the position taken by Breckinridge Long and Robert Borden Reams, George Warren, Robert Alexander and others of the Visa Division of the Department of State, and of many in other U.S. agencies a nd departments in curtailing the inflow of refugees, see Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, pp. 45-166.

177. ln 1944, the representatives of the Jewish organizations in Switzerland often dealt with Roswell McClelland, the WRB representative, and Douglas MacKill op, the British charge d’Affaires.

178. German Policy of Extermination of the Jewish Race, The Department Of State Bulletin, (December 19, 1942) 182: 1009. Noting the accounts based on the Riegner report and the demands for rescue as reported in the British and the American press, Joseph Goebbels made the following entry in his diary for December 13, 1942: "The question of Jewish persecution in Europe is being given top priority by the English and the Americans.... At bottom, however, I believe both the English and the Americans are happy that we are exterminating the Jewish riffraff." The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943. Louis P. Lochner, ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), p. 241. On December 17, 1942, Eden warned the German people in the House of Commons of their responsibility relating to the persecution of the Jews. The New York Times, December 18, 1942.

179. British War Role on Jews Examined, The New York Times, November 19, 1967. Breckinridge Long's diary notes of April 20, 1943 emphasize Riegner's first point: "One danger in it all is that (the Jews’) activities may lend color to the charges of Hitler that we are fighting this war on account of and at the instigation and direction of our Jewish citizens." Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, p. 197.

180. For excerpts from Chaim Weizmann’s memorandum suggesting that the Conference consider Palestine as a place of refuge, see Herbert Druks, The Failure to Rescue (New York: Robert Speller, 1977), pp. 39-41.

181. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, pp. 167-207. See also Morse, While Six Million Died, pp. 37-64.

182. Details of the ransom plan were reviewed by Arthur Hays Sulzberger in the February 13, 1943 issue of The New York Times.

183. John Morton Blum, Roosevelt and Morgenthau (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), p. 527.

184. Ibid., p. 531.

185. Ibid., p. 518.

186. For further details on the attitude of the Western Allies, see Fein, Accounting for Genocide, pp. 166-185. According to recently declassified documents, the United States had been fully familiar with the fate that had befallen the Jews of Hungary during the war. See, for example, 30-page report the research and analysis group of the Office of Strategic Services had prepared on October 19, 1944. National Archives, Washington, Report 2027, Record Group 226, Doc. 191. I, Box 4.

187. British and American critics of the Administration eager to impugn the President's motives rushed to point out that 1944 was a crucial election year. 188. Summary Report of the Activities of the War Refugee Board, p. 2. 189. Telegram No. 1249, March 23, I 944, from Norton to the British Foreign Office. PRO, Fo. 371 /39258, p. 61.

190. The New York Times, March 25, 1944. The flyers with the text of the President's statement were dropped from the air over Hungary and other Axis-controlled countries. Summary Report on the Activities of the War Refugee Board, p. 3.

191. The Department of State Bulletin, 10 (March 25, 1944)248: 278.

192. J. S. Conway, Between Apprehension and Indifference: Allied Attitudes to the Destruction of Hungarian Jewry. The Wiener Library Bulletin, London, 27 (I 973- 74)30/ 31: 39. See also the memorandum titled "Immigration" by the Zionist leadership, dated May 22, 1944, in the Weizmann Archives, Rehovot, Israel.

193. Great Britain. House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth Series, 398, March 30, 1944, pp. 1561-1564. 194. Summary Report of the Activities of the War Refugee Board, pp. 3-10. The American Representatives in the neutral capitals, especially Bern and Stockholm, were the conduits of many of the reports that emanated from Budapest and elsewhere concerning the fate of Hungarian Jewry.

195. PRO, Fo. 371 /42813-819, p. 1399.

196. For the minutes of the War Cabinet meeting chaired by Eden, see Yad Vashem Archives, M-27/4.

197. PRO, Fo. 371/42813-819, p. 1390.

198. Letter from Weizmann to Eden dated July 6, 1944. Weizmann Archives.

199. Eden's memorandum to Churchill dated June 20, 1944. PRO, Fo. 371 /42813- 819, p. 1391.

200. Letter from Hall to Weizmann (Confidential, W9647 /109/Q), dated June 22, 1944. Weizmann Archives.

201. Letter from Randall to Weizmann dated June 24, I 944. Ibid.

202. The meeting of June 28 was attended by Chaim Weizmann, Shertok, Locker, Agronsky, Bakatansky, Linton, Dugdale, and Namier. See minutes of that meeting, ibid.

203. Ibid. The British officials were guided by the position paper prepared in anticipation of Shertok's arrival in London. PRO, Fo. 371 /42807, pp. 59--62.

204. Minutes of June 28 meeting, Weizmann Archives. Shertok had kept Ben-Gurion informed about the negotiations in London. See, for example, his telegram of June 30, concerning his and Weizmann’s meeting with Hall. Ibid.

205. PRO, Fo. 371 /42813-819, p. 1373.

206. Department of State, Confidential File 840.48 Refugees/7-1144.

207. See telegram o. 5891, dated July 19, 1944, addressed by Winant to the Secretary of State, transmitting a message from Shertok for Nahum Goldman.

208. For a copy of the minutes of the meeting, which also involved Walker and Dickson of the Foreign Office, see Weizmann Archives.

209. Ben-Gurion’ s telegram to the British Foreign Office, dated July 13, 1944. Ibid. See also PRO, Fo .371 /42809, pp. 69-70. The reference to Berlin is an error. The discussions actually were envisioned to be held in Budapest.

210. The Americans concurred with the British and opposed any meeting between Bader and the German agents or their contacts in Istanbul. They extended the same prohibition to Joseph J. Schwartz, the AJDC’ s representative in Europe. See Hull’s telegram No. 2 101, dated July 27, 1944, addressed to Norweb and McClelland, the WRB representatives in Lisbon and Bern, respectively. For further details see Chapter 29.

211. Shertok and Linton took up the question of Kullmann later in the month with Sir Herbert W. Emerson, the head of the JG C. He, like Randall, rejected the idea, arguing that "under our present mandate, negotiation with Governments at war with the Allies was not contemplated." A copy of Emerson's memorandum on the discussions was forwarded by John M. Allison, an officer of the American Embassy in London, to the Secretary of State on July 24, 1944.

212. Report by Shertok dated July 13, 1944. Weizmann Archives. The idea raised by Shertok was also advanced by Rabbi Baruch Korff in America and Joseph H. Hertz, the Chief Rabbi of England. In their response to the Korff and Hertz proposals, the British argued that special treatment of the Jews was not only contrary to H. M. Government, but would also create difficulties with many Allied governments "who might feel that their own nationals are without the benefits of such special protection." PRO, Fo. 37 1/ 42808, pp. 92-96.

A similar proposal was advanced by Yitzhak Ben Zvi of the Vaad Leumi to Rabbi Stephen Wise via Pinkerton and the War Refugee Board. See the Pinkerton telegram to the State Department dated July 5, 1944.

213. Note by the Foreign Office, dated July 12, 1944. PRO, Fo. 37 1/42810, p. 71.

214. He shared his captivity wit h, among others, Samuel Springmann, a former Budapest Vaada leader who had been picked up by the British shortly after he was expelled by Turkey in March 1944.

215. Alex Weissberg, Advocate for the Dead. The Story of Joel Brand (London: Andre Deutsch, 1958), p. 167. Lord Moyne was assassinated in Cairo on November 6, 1944, by two Palestinian Jews.

216. For further details on Hirschmann’s mission, see telegram no. 514, dated June 9, 1944, addressed by Stettinius to Steinhardt.

217. The British view, crystallized at the War Cabinet meeting of May 13, was forwarded to Washington on June 3, 1944. PRO, Fo. 371 /428 13-819, p. 1398.

218. Ira A. Hirschmann, Life Line to a Promised Land (New York: Vanguard, 1946), pp. I 07-132. Hirschmann identifies the date of his arrival as June 30 (p. 11 0); however, Shertok, in his report of June 27, claimed that Hirschmann had already met Brand on June 22 219. PRO, Fo. 371 /42807, pp. 4-8.

220. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers, 1944. Volume 1. General (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. I 074.

22 1. This position was also made clear by the State Department. See Hull’ s telegram no. 683 addressed to Steinhardt on June 9, 1944. See also Viscount Halifax's telegram of June 22, 1944, addressed to the British Foreign Office. PRO, Fo. 37 1/42807, p. 63.

222. /bid., pp. 7 1-72.

223. Foreign Relations of the United States, pp. 1089-1091.

224. ibid. See also Viscount Halifax’s telegram dated July 9, 1944. PRO, Fo. 371 /42808, p. 84.

225. RLB, Docs. 290-292. See also NA, Microscopy T-120, Roll 4664/2, Serial Kl 509 / K350354-, and German Foreign Office, Bonn, File No. 212. The latter contains reprints and German translations of the articles that had appeared in The Times, Daily Telegraph, Manchester Guardian, and Daily Herald of June 20, 1944, as well as copies of articles that appeared in the Swedish press.

226. RLB, Doc. 293. For further details on the British attitude towards the Brand-Grosz affair, see Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, pp. 249-262.

227. See Harrison’s telegram no. 404 I addressed to the Secretary of State. See also Summary Report of the Activities of the War Refugee Board, p. 15.

228. Telegram No. 2949 dated June 26, 1944, addressed to the Foreign Office. PRO, Fo. 371 /42807, p. I 07. The Germans intercepted Norton’s telegram; Horst Wagner of the inland II Section of the German Foreign Office brought it to the attention of Kaltenbrunner on July 5, 1944. RLB, Doc. 342.

229. On July 4, 1944, for example, Hubert Ripka, the Acting Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, asked that the Allies issue an emphatic protest and warning to the Germans in connection with their crimes in Auschwitz and elsewhere. On July 10 and 15, J. Weytko of the Polish Embassy approached Henderson and Randall of the British Foreign Office on behalf of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe in general and of Polish nationals in Hungary in particular. PRO, Fo. 371 /42809, pp. 34 and 157.

230. Levai, Feher kony v, pp. 56-57.

23 1. Graham, Pope Pius XII, pp. 5-6. 232. PRO, Fo. 371 /428 15, pp. 116-118. The text was forwarded to Washington by Harrison on August 5 (telegram no. 5040).

233. PRO, Fo. 371 /42807, p. 106.

234. Great Britain. House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). 1944, (July 5, 1944) 401: 1160-11 62. Eden’ s remarks were also reported by the German News Agency DNB that same day. RLB, Doc. 341.

235. In his letter of July 13, Churchill repeated for the Archbishop the arguments Foreign Minister Eden had used in the House of Commons on July 5. PRO, Fo .371 /42809, p. 108.

236. Vadirat, 3: I 09-11 0. The Press Department of the German Foreign Office took note of the Archbishop's appeal to the Hungarians. RLB, Doc. 343.

237. For samples of such messages, see Vadirat, 3: 238 and 255-256. Toward the end of July, Allied planes dropped leaflets over Hungary, one side of which read " ls Your Conscience Clear?" Ibid., p. 357.

238. PRO, Fo. 371 /42809, p. 115.

239. Anne O'Hare McCormick wrote a particularly persuasive column in the July 15, 1944 issue of The New York Times ("Victims of the Last Fury of the Nazis"), urging the forces of humanity and Christianity to assert themselves to prevent the Germans from winning their "war against the spirit of man."

240. Among these were many American-Hungarian organizations. At a June 17 rally sponsored by the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe, the representatives of these organizations denounced the extermination campaign directed against the Jews of Hungary. The New York Times, June 18, 1944.

241. Ibid., June 4, 1944.

242. Ibid., June 22, 1944. Although the move bypassed normal diplomatic channels, it was subsequently approved by Hull. Ibid., June 27, 1944.

243. The Department of State Bulletin, Washington, I) (July 16, 1944) 264: 59.

244. David S. Wyman, Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed, Commentary, New York, 65 (May I 978)5: 37-46; Erich Kulka, Auschwitz Condoned, The Wiener Library Bulletin, London, 23 (Winter 1968-69) I (New Series 14): 2-5; The Controversy about the Bombing of Auschwitz, ibid., 18 (April 1964)2: 20; Herbert Druks, Why the Death Camps Were Not Bombed, The American Zionist, (December 1976): 18-21; Roger M. Williams, Why Was Not Auschwitz Bombed?, Commonweal, (November 24, 1968): 746-751; Bela Vago, "The British Government and the Fate of Hungarian Jewry in 1944." In: RAH, pp. 215-219. See also PRO, Fo. 371/PREM 4/ 51/10, pp. 1362-1363, 1365-1367; 371 /42808, pp. 107-108; 371/42809, pp. 127-137, 142-49; and 371 /42814, pp. 188-200.

245. See John J. McCloy’s letter addressed to Pehle on July 4, 1944.

246. The policy statement was issued by the War Department to assure the British after the establishment of the WRB. Wyman, Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed, p. 39.

247. While the Allies found it impossible to justify the effort required for the bombing of Auschwitz and the rail lines leading to it, they managed to divert 1,400 planes for the destruction of Dresden (Germany’s "Florence on the Elbe") on February 13-14, 1945, though the city-a center of art and architecture-was free of all but a few light industries. For further details, see Dresden Rebuilt. Tim e, (February 23, 1970): 32.

248. Vago, "The British Government and the Fate of Hungarian Jewry," p. 217.

249. For a view of the photograph, see The New York Times, February 24, 1979.

250. One of the Jewish leaders (Leon A. Kubowitzki) had opposed the bombing of Auschwitz, fearing that the first victims would be the Jewish inmates. He suggested instead that "the Soviet government be approached with the request that it should dispatch groups of paratroopers to seize the buildings, to annihilate the squads of murderers, and to free the unfortunate inmates." See his letter addressed to Pehle on July 1, 1944, and Yad Vashem Archives M-2/H-I 8. See also Dina Porat, The Blue and the Yellow Stars of David. The Zionist leadership in Palestine and the Holocaust, 1939- 1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 212-220. There is no evidence that either the Hungarians or the Germans ever went along with Krausz's interpretation that the 7,000 certificates-were for entire families.

252. Both letters can be found in the Pazner files in the archives of Yad Vashem.

253. Summary Report of the Activities of the War Refugee Board, p. 17.

254. Alfred E. Zollinger, the IRC representative in Washington, transmitted the offer on July 25. For text of the IRC note and of the U.S. reply of August 11, see ibid., pp. 20-22. See also Conway, "Between Apprehension and Indifference," p. 44.

255. PRO, Fo. 371 /42810, pp. 174-175. Linton also had a discussion with Henderson on this issue on August I. Weizmann approached Eden on September 6. For the minutes of the Linton-Henderson meeting and for a copy of Weizmann’s letter, see Weizmann Archives.

256. PRO, Fo. 371 /42810, pp. 200-202. A copy of the minutes of the meeting with the JGC leaders was sent to Washington on July 24. See telegram no. 17024 from John W. Allison of the American Embassy in London to the State Department.

257. Ibid., Fo. 371 /42812, p. 34.

258. Ibid., 371 /42810, p. 57.

259. Ibid., 371 /428 14, pp. 27-28. See also the minutes of the August 4 meeting of the War Cabinet Committee on the Reception and Accommodation of Refugees, ibid., CAB.95 / 15.

260. Ibid., 371 /42814, pp. 69-70.

261. Ibid., pp. 29-30. For a summary of the British position on the Horthy offer, prepared on August 8 for the War Cabinet, see ibid., pp. 74-76.

Questions relating to the Horthy offer were raised a number of times in the House of Commons. On August 1, Edmund Harvey and others questioned Dingle Foot, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare; on August 2, Hewlett questioned Eden; and on November 8, Hammersley and Sir T. Moore questioned Eden. Great Britain. House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates (Han sard), 1944: 402, August 1, 1944: 1140-41; August 2, 1944: 1410; 404, November 8, 1944: 1380.

262. PRO, Fo. 371 / 42814, p. 31. For a summary of the American position, see Winant’ s August 15, 1944, note and memorandum addressed to Eden. Ibid., 371 /428 I 5, pp. 55-58. See also Summary Report of the Activities of the War Refugee Board, pp. 17-22.

263. Summary Report of the Activities of the War Refugee Board, p. 19.

264. For some details, see Conway, "Between Apprehension and Indifference," pp. 44-46, and Vago, "The British Government and the Fate of Hungarian Jewry," pp. 219-222.

265. The Department of State Bulletin, 11 (August 20, 1944) 269: 175. For further details on the so-called "Horthy offer," see Bela Vago, "The Horthy Offer. A Missed Opportunity for Rescuing Jews in 1944." In: Contemporary Views of the Holocaust, Randolph L. Braham, ed. (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1983), pp. 23-45. 266. PRO, Fo. 371/42815, pp. 78-79.

267. Ibid., pp. 167-168, and Fo. 371/42816, pp. 148-150.

268. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, pp. 259-265.

269. See note of Moniz de Aragao, Brazil’ s Ambassador in London, addressed to Sir Herbert Emerson, the head of the JGC, PRO, Fo. 37 I / 42817, pp. 95-96.

270. Ibid., pp. 159-160.

271. Minutes of the October 23, 1944 meeting of the War Cabinet Committee on the Reception and Accommodation of Refugees, ibid., Fo. 371 /42820, p. 94.

272. See, for example, the note of August 21 addressed by Christopher Eastwood of the Colonial Office to Henderson, and Lord Moyne’s telegram no. 1960 addressed to the Colonial Office, ibid., 42815, p. 140, and 428 16, p. 40.

273. See, for example, Congressional Record, 90, Part 10, August 18, 1944, p. A3639 ("Hungarian Jews Must Be Saved," Extension of Remarks of Hon. Arthur G. Klein); August 22, 1944, p. A3698 ("Great Britain Must Act to Save Hungarian Jews," Extension of Remarks of Hon. Emmanuel Celler); August 22, 1944, p. A3686 ("Britain's White Paper Bars Rescuing of Jews of Hungary," Extension of Remarks of Hon. William Langer); November 10, 1944, p. A4577 ("Rescuers or Accomplices?," Extension of Remarks of Hon. Thomas J. Lane).

274. On August 28, 1944 Rabbi Baruch Korff, representing the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of America, led a delegation composed of the representatives of the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe and a number of congressmen. In a memorandum submitted to the British ambassador, the delegation requested that Britain open the doors of Palestine. (Rabbi Korff's approach to the setting up of the meeting was severely criticized by the British.) PRO, Fo. 371 /42818, pp. 108-112.

On September 25, Louis Lipsky, the Chairman of the Administrative Committee of the American Jewish Conference, submitted a detailed memorandum toward the same end. Ibid., 371 /42819, pp. 46-5 1. For further details on Britain's attitude towards the "Horthy offer," see Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, pp. 262-270.

275. Copies of the American notes to the Szálasi government transmitted via the Swiss, as well as the responses, usually found their way to the German Foreign Office. See, for example, RLB, Docs. 405-407.

276. For further details on the activities of the WRB, see Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, pp. 248-294. See also his "The Roosevelt Administration and the Effort to Save the Jews of Hungary." In: HJS, 2: 211-252. See also section titled "Kasztner's Negotiations with Becher" in Chapter 29.

277. See, for example, the October 30 note from J.M. Martin, Churchill's secretary, to Weizmann. Weizmann Archives. For additional documentary references relating to the American reaction to the problem of refugees, see Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1944. Volume I. General, pp. 98 1-1191. For further details on the attitude of the Western Allies, see Henry L. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue. The Roosevelt Administration and te Holocaust, 1938-1945, op. cit.; Martin Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), 368 pp.; Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), 262 pp.; Arthur D. Morse, While Six Million Died. The Chronicle of American Apathy, op. cit.; Bernard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945, op. cit.; and David S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984 ), 444 pp.

278. For further details on the wartime attitude of the Allies, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 480-482. For some details on the attitude of the USSR toward the Soviet and Polish Jews during World War II, see Dov Levin, "The Attitude of the Soviet Union to the Rescue of Jews." In: RAH, pp. 225-236. See also Fein, Accounting for Genocide, pp. 185-189.

280. Vadirat, I: 90-91.

28 I. "Russia’s Aid Sought for Jews in Hungary." The New York Times, May 17, 1944.

282. Summary Report of the Activities of the War Refugee Board, p. 7.

283. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

284. PRO, Fo371 /42809, pp. 58 and 137-139.

285. Ibid., F.37 1/42 8 15, pp. 64 and 71.

286. The Soviets, ever suspicious of special plans to save Jews, considered Horthy’s offer an attempt by the Hungarian government leaders to ingratiate themselves with the Western powers in the drive to split the Grand Alliance. See Nikolai Fedorov's commentary on Mo scow Radio (August 18, 1944) in Vadirat, 3: 406-407.

287. See, for example, The Promised land, a novel by Yuri Kolesnikov, which identifies Eichmann as having been a Zionist agent who arranged to send young and healthy Jews to Palestine while committing others to the gas chambers. See also Yuri Ivanov’s Caution: Zionism (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), a pseudo-historical works, which identifies Zionism as a worldwide conspiracy allied with monopolistic circles. It viciously condemned the activities of the Budapest Vaada, paying special attention to Kasztner's dealings with Eichmann and the implications of the Brand mission (pp. 87-88). For additional references, consult Braham, Jews in the Communist World. English Sources (New York: Twayne, 1961), 64 pp., and Jews in the Communist World. Non-English Sources (with M. M. Hauer) (New York: Pro Arte, 1963), 125 pp. See also the bibliographical references listed in B-A, p. 512.

288. Steiner, an official of the Swiss Legation, complained (July 11) to Jeno Miske-Gerstenberger of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that false El Salvador "national certificates" were being brought in from Switzerland and allegedly sold at high prices to Jews. Vadirat, 3: 136.

289. See Harrison telegram no. 3867 (July 17) to the Department of State, transmitting McClelland's message for the WRB.

290. For a highly positive evaluation of Mantello’s role, see Levai, Zsidosors Europaban (Jewish Fate in Europe) (Budapest: Magyar Teka, 1948), 335 pp.

291. In March 1989, Mantello was honored in New York, where then Mayor Edward Koch presented him with the "Eleanor Roosevelt Human Rights Award." Rep. Charle s E. Schumer CD-Brooklyn) paid tribute to Mantello in the Congressional Record. Mantello died in Rome on April 25, 1992 at age 90. For further details on Mantello's activities, see David Kranzler, Thy Brothers Blood, pp. 203-215, and Warner Rings, Advokaten des Feindes, op. c it., pp. 129-150. See also David Kranzler, The Man Who Stopped the Trains to Auschwitz. George Mantello, El Salvador, and Switzerland’s Finest Hour. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 341 pp.

292. Joseph Mandel (also known as Josef Mandi), a textile specialist for the I.N.C.O. firm of Bucharest, was sent to Switzerland in 1941 by the Ministry of National Defense of the Antonescu government to acquire aircraft cloth. Presumably he failed to carry out his assignment, for on October 21, 1942, the Ministry of the Interior asked N. Lahovary, the Romanian Minister in Bern, to bring about his extradition. (The Romanian authorities planned to deport him to Transnistria.) ln Switzerland, Joseph Mandel maintained close contact with Abraham Silberschein, the head of RELICO, informing him periodically about developments in Hungary-news he usually obtained through his Romanian contacts. For pertinent documents, see Yad Vashem, Archives M-20 /46. For further details on the rescue activities of El Salvador, see the bibliographical references listed in B-A, p. 482.

293. For details on the activities of the AJDC with emphasis on Mayer’s role in the negotiations with the SS, see Chapter 29. On the agency’s role in Hungary after the liberation, see Chapter 32.

294. Lichtheim’ s office was officially known as "The Executive of the Zionist Organization/The Jewish Agency for Palestine." One of his closest associates was Mieczeslav Kahany.

295. For details on the activities of the World Jewish Congress, see Unity in Dispersion (New York: World Jewish Congress, 1948), 38 1 pp., and Elizabeth E. Eppler, "The Rescue Work of the World Jewish Congress during the Nazi Period." In: RAH, pp. 47-69.

296. Its French and German names were: Comite pour l'assistance a la population juive frappee par la guerre; Komitee zur Hilfe leistung for die kriegsbetroffene judische Bevolke rung. Associated with the World Jewish Congress, Silberschein also headed SILBADO (Comite internationale pour le placement de intetectuels refugies; International Committee for the Placement of Refugee Intellectuals). One of his closest associates at RELICO was Hans Klee. For further details on RELICO's activities, see "Rescue Effort s with the Assistance of International Organizations." In: YVS, 8: 64-80.

297. The Committee was founded through the cooperation of Rabbi Zwi Taubes of Zurich, Mrs. Lajos Buchwald, Rabbi Armin Kornfein, Mrs. Daniel Lowenstein, the Mandel brothers, and others. Levai, Zsido sors Europriban, pp. 37-38.

298. One of Banyai’s closest associates was Geza Pallai, a member of the board of the Transimpex Import, Export & Transit Company of Zurich. Since he was a Hungarian citizen, Pallai was not formally a member of the committee.

299. For sources relating to the Committee’ s activities, see Yad Vashem, Archives M-20/ 47.

300. The Stembuch brothers, for example, were particularly bitter about the claims of success advanced by the World Jewish Congress and Rezso (Rudolph) Kasztner, and shared the negative views of the Budapest and Bratislava Vaada leaders about the activities of Saly Mayer. See, for example, Yitzhak Sternbuch’s July 5, 1948 letter addressed to Kubowitzki and Kasztner’s letter of October 29, 1945 addressed to Mayer, in Yad Vashem, Archives M-20/46 and 015/ 19-5, respectively. The World Jewish Congress’ s claim of credit for the rescuing of 190,000 Hungarian Jews was also attacked by Andreas Biss of the Budapest Vaada. See his letter of July 10, 1948, addressed to Kubowitzki, in Yad Vashem, Archives M-20/46.

301. See S. Mandelblatt's letter of December 24, I 942, addressed to Chaim Pozner. Pazner Files, Yad Vashem.

302. The Histadrut Aid Commission (Hilfskommission der Histadruth) was composed of Marc Jarblum, Pozner, Schwalb, and Silberschein; the Hehalutz Aid Commission (Hilfskommission der Hechaluz) was composed of Berkowitz, Bornstein, Muscat, Schloss, and Schwalb. See Lichtheim’s letter of March 6, 1944, addressed to the heads of the major Jewish organizations in Switzerland, in Pazner Files, Yad Vashem.

303. Chaim Barias, Hatzala bimi shoa (Rescue in the Days of the Holocaust) (Israel: Seit Lohamei Hageatot, 1975), p. I 02.

304. See Gruenbaum’ s letter to Lichtheim, dated February 10, 1944, and Lichtheim's letter of March 6 addressed to the prospective members of the Relief and Rescue Committee, in Pazner Files, Yad Vashem. For Pozner's response of April 3 and Schwalb's response of April 6, see ibid. and Central Zionist Archives, File L.22 / 60.

305. Der Kasztner-Bericht, p. 295.

306. See his especially bitter letter of July 3, 1944, addressed to Eliyahu Dobkin in Lisbon. He noted that institutions like the Red Cross were making jokes about the "disorder and disorganization" that characterized the behavior of the various Jewish organizations. Pazner Files, Yad Vashem.

307. Ibid. For a sympathetic review of Lichtheim’s role during the war and of his fruitless efforts to arouse the Jewish leaders of the free world concerning the tragedy befalling European Jewry, see Walter Laqueur, Jewish Denial and the Holocaust, Commentary, New York, 68 (December 1979)4: 44-55.

308. For a basically negative view of these organizations, see Aryeh Morgenstern, "Va ' ad hatzala ha ' meuchad shelid ha'Sochnut he'yehudit upheulotov beshanim 1943- 1945 " (The United Rescue Committee of the Jewish Agency and Its Activities during 1943-1945). Yalkut Moreshet, Israel, (1971)13: 60-103. On Hungary, see-especially pp. 84-92. See also Shabetai B. Beit-Zvi, Ha hiyonut hapost Ugandit ba-mishvar hashoa (Post-Ugandan-Zionism in the Crucible of the Holocaust) (Tel Aviv: Bronfman, 1977), 495 pp.

309. For a succinct self-critical appraisal of the failure of organized Jewry during the war, see Unity in Dispersion, pp. 193-196.

AMERICAN

JEWRY

and the

HOLOCAUST

The American Jewish Joint Distribution

Committee, 1939-1945

Yehuda Bauer

The Institute of Contemporary Jewry

The Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Wayne State University Press

Detroit

The Jews of Budapest: The Last Stage

The situation for Jews in Budapest improved after the order by Nicholas Horthy, the Hungarian head of state, to stop the deportations on July 9, 1944. A sizable emigration, to Palestine or elsewhere, appeared possible when the Hungarian government on July 18 declared its willingness to allow certain groups of Jews to leave Hungary, including 7,800 people to whom Moshe Krausz of JA's Palestine Office in Budapest had distributed Palestine immigration permits. The 7,800 visas soon became 8,700, and children would be accepted to Tangier. The Spanish government then agreed to take 1,500 more if they could get out of Hungary. The Portuguese legation joined in, offering 3 visas in August, but 700 in November. 9 The Swiss were prepared to take children, and a figure of 10,000 was mentioned. The Germans were prepared to release all those who had been accepted to neutral or Allied countries-provided that they could deport all the others. That was what the Germans intimated to the Hungarians. The Hungarians, now under a new government clandestinely trying to arrange a separate peace with the Allies, were not eager to anger public opinion in the West by further deportations of Jews. In the autumn it gradually became clear to the neutral representatives in Budapest that in fact the Germans would not allow anyone out. 10 (441) After the scare of August 25-26, when the Budapest Jews thought another deportation was coming, the situation became calmer, despite the fact that the Jews were concentrated in Jewish houses, were marked with a yellow star, and were in fact living in ghetto conditions. There were 2,168 such houses to start with, but the effect of Allied bombardment of Budapest was to reduce the number to 1,840.11 Two were converted into hospitals, and children's homes were established in some.

On October 15, 1944, Horthy prematurely announced the Hungarian decision to seek a separate peace with the Allies. But the Germans were prepared: a fascist putsch with German backing swept away the old Hungarian ruler and the remnants of legitimate government on the very same day. The Hungarian Nazis under Ferenc Szálasi took power-a violent minority recruited from the dregs of society. The Jews, who only hours previously had joyfully greeted the Hungarian exit from the war, had torn off the yellow badges and left their ghetto houses, were the immediate objects of brutal revenge by the Nyilas, the Arrow Cross fascist militia. However, the new authorities were not eager to hand over the Jews to the Germans; they wanted to keep them for themselves. Mass arrests were made and large numbers of Jews brought into brick factories on the east side of the Danube to dig trenches against the approaching Russians.

By this time, of course, the Jews of Budapest had heard about the gassings, and they were afraid that they would be led to mass destruction of the kind that had befallen the Jews of the provinces in the spring. But in the meantime, unknown to them, Himmler had given his order to stop the gassings; on the other hand, Hitler had agreed to the reintroduction of Jews into the Reich as labor slaves in April, 1944. 12 When, therefore, labor was required to build defense lines on the Austrian border with Hungary, Jews were recruited. The first people taken were those whom the Hungarians had concentrated for building their own fortifications, but others were then forcibly taken from the city. Ostensibly only the able-bodied were to be recruited and marched on foot to the border, but in fact, from November 8-15, the first terrible week of the marches, very young boys and girls and people well above their fifties were also marched off. They received no food for a march of eight to nine days of over 200 kilometers, and they were forbidden by their Hungarian guards to seek food from the population. Thousands died, though it is impossible to say exactly how man y; the most probable figure seems to be 7,000-10,000 people. "Not even (442) the Germans deported so brutally, " was the comment of a young Jewish observer. 13

The IRC and the neutral missions in Budapest tried to defend the Jews as best they could. On October 21, the IRC intervened with the German embassy, because it was obvious that it was there that the real power lay. The Nazis said that Germany needed more workers, and the Hungarians had kindly agreed to supply them in order to defend both countries from bolshevism. In any case, the Germans said, 1,500 Jews had been caught with weapons in hand, and they deserved to be punished. They would all be evacuated in due course. Born of the IRC also met with the Hungarian foreign minister, protesting to him on October 19 against the brutalities committed by the Arrow Cross militia. In those first days of Arrow Cross rule, about 600 Jews were murdered and their bodies thrown into the Danube. On October 23, after the first Jews had been taken to the brick factories, Born addressed an official protest to the Hungarian government. The Hungarians did not hurry with their reply. When it came on November 11, it declared they had not deported any Jews, but merely sent them to work. 14

Reszoe Kasztner and the Va'adah also entered the lists in an attempt to influence the Szálasi regime to cease persecuting the Jews. Kasztner tried to avoid excesses by pressing Kurt Becher to intervene in the name of overriding Nazi interests. Becher apparently did so, and the result was a Hungarian order published on November 15 that henceforth only men between the ages of fifteen and sixty, and women between fifteen and forty, were to be taken. Two days later, women were no longer marched off, and on November 27 the marches stopped. Men in labor companies, who were under Hungarian military command, were at first deported on foot along with the other Jews, and on November 28-29, trains were made available to deport more of them. From a German point of view-expressed by Rudolf Hoess, commander of Auschwitz-the foot marches were of no use. Even the Germans on the Austrian border refused to take many of the Jews because they were in no condition to do any work, and this time the Himmler command was clear: they were actually to work. With the same coldness and efficiency with which mass murder was accomplished, sick and exhausted people were refused admittance to Austria. Some of them returned to Budapest; some died on the spot, at Hegyeshalom. Eichmann, who tried his worst to get more Jews, failed. In the end, according to Hehalutz (443) estimates, 25,000 civilians and 13,000 members of labor battalions were involved in these marches. 15

From November 27, after the end of the foot marches, Jews were forced to move into a small area in the city set aside as a ghetto. A makeshift wooden fence was erected around it. Thousands of persons were taken out of their houses or kidnapped in the streets by Arrow Cross militiamen and were indiscriminately murdered, their bodies usually being disposed of into the Danube. There was no way of earning a living, and the people had to be fed, because there was very little possibility of buying food as the Russians began to invade Budapest. By December 26, the ring around the city was closed. Until the liberation of Buda on January 18, 1945, and of Pest three weeks later, the situation of the Jews was much worse even than that of the rest of the starving population. Further casualties were caused by aerial and artillery bombardment by the Russians.

What was unique in the Budapest situation was the way in which gradually, from July, 1944, to the end of the year, representatives of neutral countries and of IRC, as well as Jewish groups, developed means of saving Jewish lives in the face of a deteriorating situation. The starting point was the Palestinian certificates provided through Moshe Krausz, who was living at the Swiss legation. The man in charge there was Consul Charles Lutz, who had represented Switzerland in a similar capacity in Palestine earlier in the war. Lutz was friendly towards Jewish aspirations, and he allowed Zionist youth movements to use Swiss consular emblems to protect the house from which the distribution of the Palestine certificates was organized and in which a number of the holders of these papers lived. The Swedish legation was also engaged in rescue work. After King Carl intervened against the deportations in late June, it was decided that Raoul Wallenberg, scion of a well-known family of bankers and soldiers who had important social connections with Jews, should join the Swedish minister, Carl I. Danielsson, as a third secretary. Their objective was to save as many Jews as possible. The WRB equipped Wallenberg with up-to-date information about Hungary, and JDC gave him $100;000, of which he took one-half (200,000 Swedish crowns) and went to Budapest in July, 1944. Four Hungarian Jews with business connections, who had been given protection by Danielsson and promised that Sweden would admit them if they managed to reach it, served as a precedent. Wallenberg began issuing similar protection certificates. 16 (444)

After the takeover by the Szálasi regime in October, Lutz and Wallenberg enlarged their activities considerably. A close relationship developed between them and leaders of the Zionist youth movements, especially the contact man with the foreign missions, Rafi Benshalom. The youth groups established an efficient workshop producing forged papers of all kinds, and Lutz and Wallenberg tacitly agreed to the large-scale forgery of Swiss and Swedish papers. Soon there were at least 14,000 instead of the 8,700 authorized holders of Swiss certificates, though Lutz' s own estimates of the numbers ranged between 15,000 and 30,000. Many of the holders of these papers were concentrated by the youth groups in some forty houses that were placed under Swiss consular protection. Lutz established a Jewish department at his consulate to deal with the problems arising from the need to protect the houses and their inhabitants, which was run by Otto Komoly, head of the Va'adah. The Swedes had a similar set-up, and while officially 4,500 protection papers were issued by Wallenberg, probably thousands more such papers were in circulation. Wallenberg's personal style differed from that of Lutz: he intervened personally wherever he could and saved people from columns marching to the Austrian border or from the hands of the militia whenever he could find a pretext to grant them Swedish protection. 17

The period after October, 1944, also saw a dramatic increase in IRC activities in behalf of Jews. The IRC specialized in the protection of children, primarily orphans or children of deported parents. The numbers varied from 2,000-5,000, and they were organized in up to twenty-four homes run by the youth movements. In addition, many hundreds of adults were given certificates as working with these children; again the youth movement members forged papers. Born also used JDC funds to open public kitchens that operated from late October until close to liberation. The numbers of these kitchens and the numbers of people served in them was never quite clear. Early in November, 18,000-20,000 people were reported to be receiving meals, while late in the month the number was claimed to be 40,000---surely an exaggeration. At any rate, it is fairly well established that basic feeding was provided on a considerable scale. Apart from the IRC kitchens, funds were supplied to the various groups, from the still functioning Judenrat to the Zionist Va'adah, to feed people. 18 The Spanish and Portuguese legations followed the example of the Swiss and the Swedes. The Portuguese acting consul, Jules (445) Gulden, not only offered several hundred visas to Portugal, but handed out an additional 1,200 papers of protection. The papal nuncio followed suit, and 5,000 protection papers supposedly from that source circulated, though how many of these were genuine is not clear. 19

What made the granting of protection papers a mass phenomenon was the activity of the Zionist youth movements. There were not more than 300-400 young men and women between the ages of seventeen to twenty-two or twenty-three, most of them refugees from Slovakia, who by a deliberate decision opted for an attempt at mass rescue by forgery rather than an armed rebellion on the model of the Warsaw ghetto. As a result of their forging of protection certificates, probably no fewer than 50,000 such papers were in circulation in Budapest in November-December, 1944. In addition, Benshalom and his friends engaged in daring exploits. Dressed in Arrow Cross uniforms and pretending to lead children-and occasionally adults-to places of execution, they saved them from prisons and makeshift camps or execution squads. Their close contacts with whatever Hungarian antifascist underground there was increased their possibilities of saving Jew s by hiding them in non-Jewish areas. 20 As a result of all these efforts, about 119,000 Jews survived in Budapest: 69,000 in the ghetto area, 25,000 in hiding places in the city, and 25,000 in the protected houses. Many thousands of those who survived outside these houses were saved by the protection certificates. 21 All of these activities required money. Some was sent from Istanbul, but the bulk came from Mayer in Switzerland or from apres arrangements. Direct transmissions by Mayer, usually in foreign currency notes, for the Judenrat and the Va'adah were effected through Schwalb's Hehalutz contacts or through IRC. Kasztner also received cash transmissions, which he brought from the Swiss border to Hungary; the IRC and Lutz received direct subsidies from Mayer. The youth movements received their funds either from the Va'adah or from IRC, whereas Wallenberg was largely financed from Sweden, where WRB sources paid him JDC fund s. Because of the nature of these arrangements, it is extremely difficult to estimate how much JDC help was given. 22 However, IRC appears to have received for Hungary at least 1.25 million sfr. ($280,000) between July, 1944, and February, 1945. Over 1 million sfr. ($227,000) were transferred in cash to the Judenrat and the Va'adah, and Lutz received direct subsidies of about 81,000 sfr. ($18,000). Some of these sums were lost, stolen in transit or (446) confiscated by the Germans, but, on the other hand, additional sums were made available locally through credit arrangements. Food was also sent, but some wagons from Switzerland never arrived, sugar and flour bought by Born in Budapest was damaged by bombs, and the rest presumably was stolen by Hungarians. The conclusion is that JDC financed most of the rescue activities in Budapest-the direct feeding, the upkeep of the children' s homes, the protection papers, and, unknowingly, even the youth movements' underground activities. Again, as in some of the other areas we have discussed, JDC acted solely as a financing operation; the results were achieved through the self-sacrifice of Swiss people like Born and Lutz, Swedes like Wallenberg and his staff, and Jews such as Komoly, Kasztner, and the youth leaders.

The End in Slovakia

Another area where Mayer tried to help was Slovakia. The outbreak of the Slovak national uprising on August 29, 1944, triggered a series of events that spelled the end of Slovak Jewry. Thousands of Jews participated in the uprising, including a special Jewish unit formed out of the inmates of the Jewish camp at Novaky. The German reaction was swift. SS units crossed the border, and after two months of fighting, the rebellion was defeated. The three Czech generals in charge were captured and murdered at Mauthausen; the remnants of the rebel forces were either caught by the Germans or dispersed. Some of these latter, including 2,000 Jews, retreated into the Tatra mountains and continued to live and occasionally fight there until liberation. The rest of the Jews, probably over 20,000 with their numbers swelled by those who had returned from Hungary, became the objects of Nazi revenge. Towards the end of September, Alois Brunner, one of Eichmann's chief henchmen, arrived in Bratislava in order to deport the Jews to Poland. On September 28, 1,800 Jews were arrested in one mass action in that city. On November 16, the remaining Jews in the city were asked to report to the Slovak Judenrat building, but only 500 did. Thousands were caught in police raids, in Bratislava and in the province; some were murdered on the spot, while others were brought to the camp of Sered, from where 13,500 were deported to Germany-the first five trains to Auschwitz and the rest to other camps. The leaders of the Oz, who remained at their post to the end, were included. A Gestapo agent caught Gizi Fleischmann while she was writing a (447) letter, probably to Schwalb or Mayer, and she too was brought to Sered, probably on October 20. The Nazis intended to let her stay there if she gave the names and addresses of Jews hidden in Bratislava, but when she refused, she was deported to Auschwitz with the remark that her return was undesirable. Michael Weissmandel was also deported, but he managed to jump from the train and returned to Bratislava, while his pregnant wife and five children went on to be murdered at Auschwitz. 23

In Slovakia, just as in Budapest, attempts were made to move the neutral countries and the Vatican to intervene. But there were no neutral legations in Slovakia; the Swiss had a consul there, but they did not have diplomatic relations with the Slovak state. Nevertheless, they protested against the deportations, and the Vatican also sent a protest note on September 20. They were of no avail. The IRC, which also intervened, was told that the Germans were responsible and that one could not talk to the Germans on Jewish matters-this line of argument had been suggested by German ambassador Hans Ludin himself in order to make things easier for the Slovak government. On November 26, the IRC's attempt to approach Ottamar Kubala, the chief of the Slovak special police force charged with rooting out opponents and Jews, also failed. A special German murder squad, commanded by a Dr. Josef Witiska, reported at the end of 1944 that it had killed 2,257 Jews and deported over 7,000 others.

Up to the last, Reszoe Kasztner and his friends in Bratislava and Budapest believed that the deportations from Slovakia could be stopped by bribes, whereas Mayer, in his negotiations with Kurt Becher, demanded an immediate end to the Slovak deportations as a condition for any steps undertaken to satisfy German demands. But it was Becher himself who said that, because the Jews had participated in the Slovak rebellion, he could do nothing about them. Bratislava certainly was the last place where Eichmann had a free hand.

Mayer tried to help on two different planes. Unknown to Kasztner and Fleischmann, he provided some funds for the ransom arrangements Orthodox leaders made with Becher, though he did not believe in them. He paid a total of 537,900 sfr. (about $128,000) for goods supposedly supplied locally to the Nazis in fulfillment of their demands between September, 1944, and the end of the German rule in Slovakia and Hungary. More effective was the 200,000 sfr. (about $47,000) he provided through the IRC delegate to Slovakia, Georges Dunant, who reached Bratislava at (448) letter, probably to Schwalb or Mayer, and she too was brought to Sered, probably on October 20. The Nazis intended to let her stay there if she gave the names and addresses of Jews hidden in Bratislava, but when she refused, she was deported to Auschwitz with the remark that her return was undesirable. Michael Weissmandel was also deported, but he managed to jump from the train and returned to Bratislava, while his pregnant wife and five children went on to be murdered at Auschwitz. 23

In Slovakia, just as in Budapest, attempts were made to move the neutral countries and the Vatican to intervene. But there were no neutral legations in Slovakia; the Swiss had a consul there, but they did not have diplomatic relations with th e Slovak state. Nevertheless, they protested against the deportations, and the Vatican also sent a protest note on September 20. They were of no avail. The IRC, which also intervened, was told that the Germans were responsible and that one could not talk to the Germans on Jewish matters-this line of argument had been suggested by German ambassador Hans Ludin himself in order to make things easier for the Slovak government. On November 26, the IRC's attempt to approach Ottamar Kubala, the chief of the Slovak special police force charged with rooting out opponents and Jews, also failed. A special German murder squad, commanded by a Dr. Josef Witiska, reported at the end of 1944 that it had killed 2,257 Jews and deported over 7, 000 others.

Up to the last, Reszoe Kasztner and his friends in Bratislava and Budapest believed that the deportations from Slovakia could be stopped by bribes, whereas Mayer, in his negotiations with Kurt Becher, demanded an immediate end to the Slovak deportations as a condition for any steps undertaken to satisfy German demands. But it was Becher himself who said that, because th e Jews had participated in the Slovak rebellion, he could do nothing about them. Bratislava certainly was the last place where Eichmann had a free hand.

Mayer tried to help on two different planes. Unknown to Kasztner and Fleischmann, he provided some funds for the ransom arrangements Orthodox leaders made with Becher, though he did not believe in them. He paid a total of 537,900 sfr. (about $128,000) for goods supposedly supplied locally to the Nazis in fulfillment of their demands between September, 1944, and the end of the German rule in Slovakia and Hungary. More effective was the 200,000 sfr. (about $47,000) he provided through the IRC delegate to Slovakia, Georges Dunant, who reached Bratislava at (448) the end of October. Five hundred Jews who were hiding in Bratislava were helped. Dunant's attempt to create a home for orphaned children in Liptovsky Svaty Mikulas, a town in central Slovakia, failed, however, and the children were deported. In January, Mayer sent him another 200,000 sfr. Through Becher's efforts-although Musy was to claim it as his achievement-a group of 69 people, most of them from Bratislava, left the city on March 31, reached Vienna on April 3, and then traveled to the Swiss border. Among them was Rabbi Weissmandel. 24

The Final Months in Austria

Another area of Mayer's concern was Vienna. A pitiful remnant of 229 "full" Jews were still there in early 1945, including Josef Löwenherz, head of the community since 1938, as well as a few thousand half-Jews and Jews in mixed marriages. Life centered largely around the hospital, where an energetic but controversial young doctor, Emil Tuchmann, tried to save lives with practically no medical supplies.

In June, 1944, about 17,000 Jewish deportees from Hungary, including women and children, arrived at nine camps in the Strasshof area near Vienna. Of these, 1,500 were sent to Auschwitz or died locally in the summer of 1944. By the end of the year, many of those remaining in the camps were drifting into Vienna, where they were employed by Nazi industries; their women and children were still with them, and though there were losses from disease and aerial bombardment, there were still 6,000 of them in Vienna, and another 6,000 nearby, in early 1945. Approximately 2,500 people (it is unclear whether these were included in the 12,000 just mentioned) were sent to Bergen-Belsen early in 1945; many of them were to die of starvation in the camp in March-April, 1945. However, it is clear that a majority of the original transport survived.

That so many of the Jews in the Vienna area did survive was at least partly due to the work undertaken by Dr. Lutz Thudichum of IRC, who went there at the end of 1944. Mayer sent no less than 400,000 sfr. ($91,000) to Thudichum, who bought food and clothing, mainly in Bratislava, where some goods could still be obtained. When contact between Slovakia and Vienna became more difficult-though Bratislava is just across the Danube from the Austrian capital-Austrian food was also bought, and some was imported from Switzerland. 25 Thudichum, however, like his (449) colleague Dunant in Bratislava, was liable to be fooled by the Nazis. For example, he thought that Hermann Krumey, Eichmann's henchman in Vienna and now responsible for a "just but strict" supervision of the Jews' well-being, was a gentleman. Dunant, visiting Theresienstadt on April 6, 1945, gained a favorable impression of it-the Nazis managed to hide the atrocities. The last 10,000 people who had been sent to Auschwitz in the preceding autumn, he reported, were sent "in order to be utilized as laborers or in order to supervise the administration of the camps." 26 In fact, of course, they were gassed.

Rescue at the Last Moment

Mayer's main concern, besides the ransom talks and the Hungarian situation, was his fear that the Germans would murder the last of their Jewish captives before they were finally defeated. This was the fear he called "11:59." He tried to persuade Becher to agree to the provision by IRC of food to the camps; he joined general and specifically Jewish efforts to persuade IRC to take a strong stand in the matter of keeping the camp inmates alive; and he of course provided funds and pressed IRC to do whatever it could. Up to the very end, he supplied money for parcels to Jewish inmates of the camps. Most of the $265,000 he spent through IRC in 1944, and the $587,000 he spent in 1945, went into parcels and truckloads of food. He knew quite well that it was never certain that Jews would get this food, but, as IRC wrote to him in early December, 1944, parcels were of very little importance from the "alimentation point of view, but very important psychologically. "27

In July, 1944, the IRC had ceased sending parcels to Birkenau (Auschwitz), having realized that they were not received by Jews. Instead, it supplied Theresienstadt and Bergen-Belsen; probably a proportion at least of these packages were delivered to their intended destinations at Theresienstadt, and certainly at Bergen-Belsen to those privileged groups intended by the Nazis for exchange. Early in 1945, Mayer increased his efforts in this regard. He gave large sums to the IRC in order to get parcels to these two camps; on January 1, he sent 10,000 packages. The IRC was helped in this

by a general agreement of November 20, 1944, by the German Red Cross to have packages sent to Jews.

As time went on, Mayer persuaded IRC to send convoys of trucks into Germany, despite the dangers from air attacks by the (450) Allies and the shortage of trucks in Switzerland. He gave money for ten trucks and a first convoy went off late in March, 1945, bound for Germany. In April, another convoy went to Landsberg and Kauffering concentration camps, where 12,000 Jews were reputed to be interned. The 14,000 parcels sent there were largely used after liberation, because no distribution of any size could take place in the chaos that reigned at the time. These large transports of parcels were apparently the basis of the rumors spread in America that Mayer had visited Germany before liberation and distributed help to the camps. Mayer was unhappy about these rumors, because he had avoided personal publicity; of course, the fact that he had never actually crossed the Swiss border was well known to his Jewish opponents, who then made great play with denying the hero-making image that JDC-New York was clearly trying to create. 28

Joseph Schwartz involved Mayer with another venture after the Swedish government agreed, late in 1944, to the sending of parcels from Sweden to Jews in concentration camps in Germany. At first there were to be 20,000, amounting to 100 tons of foodstuffs. The WJC allocated $25,000 for this program, which was channeled through its representative in Stockholm, Hillel Storch. But Storch had no experience in this kind of work, and there were technical difficulties. When JDC was asked to help, Schwartz at first insisted on its taking over the whole program, though in the end he relented. An additional $75,000 were required, and Laura Margolis, the JDC representative in Sweden, was told to go ahead. The money was transferred largely from Switzerland. But most of the parcels came too late. Of a total of close to 40,000 that were prepared, 7,500 were sent to Bergen-Belsen, 7,500 to Ravensbrück, and 2,259 to other places. The rest remained in Sweden and were ultimately distributed among the survivors of German camps whom the Swedes took in during April-June, 1945. 29

As the war drew to a close, Schwartz worried more and more about what he would find when the Germans were defeated. Some of the ideas occasionally heard from New York showed how little people had really learned in America. There they talked of a "reconstruction of Jewish life, restoring Jews to their economic position," and of retraining "those who cannot return to their former homes. "30 Schwartz knew it would be more complicated than that. The main problem was that the enormity of the Holocaust had not had time to sink in. Jewry acted in a state of shock. (451)

JDC was no more prepared for the problems of liberation than it had been for the problems of mass murder. Nor were the other Jewish organizations. The Jewish public did not really believe that there would be many survivors, and yet on the other hand it had not internalized the loss of millions. In April, 1945, the big German camps began to be uncovered. Normal human beings had never before visited hell, nor had they seen the devil incarnate. What the Allies found was disbelieved, misunderstood, or trivialized in cheap statements. Probably some 200,000 Jews were liberated from the camps on the collapse of Hitler' s Reich. Probably that number again had lost their lives in the last months of the Nazi regime, when untold thousands of prisoners were marched backward and forward through the ruined landscape of the crumbling Nazi empire. These victims were not gassed or shot en masse, but marches without food and with stragglers shot by SS guards did the job just as well. Nobody helped the Jews or any of the other persecuted groups in this last frightfulness of the Nazi regime. One by one, what was left of the marching columns was liberated by the Allied armies. The war ended on May 8. On May 9, Theresienstadt was liberated. The war against the Jews had started before the war on anyone else-it ended after everything else was finished. JDC had struggled against the horror as best it could. Now, after five-and-a-half terrible years, the vast graveyard could be surveyed. (452)

Some Afterthoughts

The Nazis did not treat the Jews in the same way as all the other peoples they oppressed. This qualitative difference was misunderstood at the time, and it is very difficult to grasp now. "What happened to the Jews, happened to others, Catholics, communists, liberals, socialists-all were persecuted. Their sole desire was liberty to express a point of view." This evidence of absolute miscomprehension was published in the London Daily Mirror on August 3, 1945, and it is representative of views widely held then and later. The fact of the matter is that in National Socialist ideology, the Jews were centrally important as a negative force. 1 They were an antirace, or a hybrid race with satanic qualities, and intent on ruling the world-in fact, ruling it already. Nazi imagery in, for instance, books for Nazi kindergartens and primary schools, contained the identification of the Jew with Satan, for which there were long-standing precedents in Christian antisemitic teaching, and the modern, quasi-scientific identification of the Jew with microbes, viruses, dangerous bacilli, or with repulsive insects. 2 What the Nazis were after was what they imputed to the Jews: the control of the world. This could only be achieved if Jewish world-domination was broken, and the demonic Jewish element removed. Hitler's planned invasion of Russia was motivated not only by strategic and political considerations, but also quite explicitly by his desire to destroy the Jewish enemy lurking behind (453) the Soviet regime. 3 The Nazi regime thus rested on two foundations: the desire for German world domination and the need to destroy the imaginary Jewish power.

Nazi attitudes to the other European nations were never very clearly defined; the Nazi leaders held various views. One may, however, generalize by saying that apart from the Jews and, possibly, the Gypsies, all the other European nations were considered Aryan. By and large, West Europeans were considered either as possible allies (this was true of the Germanic nations), or as subject peoples to be treated, on the whole, firmly but kindly. The Slav nations were to be the slaves of the Nazi empire, and were often termed subhuman. There was never a clear plan for total physical annihilation of any of these nationalities-the Nazis would need their muscles-but there were both plans and actions designed to destroy them as autonomous ethnic groups, constituting what was afterwards called "genocide." 4 It involved selective but massive murder (for instance of the Polish intelligentsia), the destruction of independent, nationally linked religious life (for instance the mass murder of the Polish Catholic priesthood in western Poland), the destruction of national culture and its symbols, the elimination of universities, and the plan to abolish all secondary and most primary school education.

But only in the case of the Jews did the Nazis intend the total physical annihilation of a people whom in their imagination they had identified with a demonic force. Their anti-Jewish attitude resulted from the combination of an age-old hatred fostered by the other monotheistic religions against the father religion and those who adhered to it and the secularist rebellion of a technologically oriented nationalistic civilization against the Judeo-Christian ethical tradition. It was that deadly pseudoreligious combination that produced Nazism and the Holocaust. The Nazis, in light of their quasi religion, could not and did not see the Jews as human at all. This well-documented fact is hard to grasp, but it must underlie any evaluation of Nazi policies towards Jews and the Jewish reaction to them.

Once the Nazi political mythology had denied the human qualities of Jews, the way was open to mass murder. Nevertheless, it was not the only option open to the Nazi regime. The Jews were not solely an anti-Germanic power, they were also parasites feeding on the body politic of the nations they controlled. While ultimately Jewish power had to be destroyed globally-presumably by mass murder-this was not necessarily the best short-(454) term policy. The export of Jews in return for real political and material advantages might rid the Nazi empire of the Jews, and at the same time introduce their destructive influence into the societies of Germany's adversaries. Antisemitism would spread because everyone would hate the Jews fleeing from German rule which would create a pro-German atmosphere among those nations. Furthermore, the enemy societies would be weakened by disruption caused by Jewish influence. 5 The sale of Jews was made possible by the same irrationality that had made mass murder possible: the identification of Jews as nonhuman beings made it feasible to barter them for other objects of trade.

These were at least some of the considerations that led the Nazis to their offers to release Jews against ransom, the payment to be made in money, goods, political advantages, or a combination of these elements. It appears that at times the Nazis were really expecting to sell at least some Jews for their own advantage. But the negotiations had no chance of success because the Allies were not willing to buy. The West, conducting a bitter war against the enslavement of nations and threats to its civilization, did not understand the Nazis' attitude to the Jews at all. Psychologically hemmed in by ancient anti-Jewish prejudices and laboring under the immense stress of a world war, the western powers failed to grasp that the Nazis' war against the Jews was different from their war against other peoples and yet was an essential part of their struggle for world domination. In the interests of the aims for which they fought the war, the western Allies might have decided that the total annihilation-from sacral, quasi-religious motives-of a people was too dangerous a precedent. That was the real or the only chance that the ransom negotiations had, but the western powers rejected it. The Soviet Union, fighting a nationalistic war, was in any case no partner for political actions ultimately based on ethical foundations. But, for the span of time between May, 1944, and the autumn of that year, ransoming Jews became a topic for top-level Allied consultations. The rejection of the proposals was anything but haphazard. It was the result of careful consideration. Brand, and later Saly Mayer and JDC's role in the negotiations, became a matter of world politics, and the fate of many Jews hung in the balance. The upshot of the ransom negotiations was, however, that the Nazis were willing to sell lives and nobody bought them.

Against this general background, Jewish options were very limited. During World War I the Jews could choose to support the (455) liberal western powers or the conservative German-led coalition; the Germans fought a war against the archenemy of the Jews, tsarist Russia, while the Allied powers fought for a democratic world in which the Jews might hope to find their place. There was no such choice for the Jews in World War II. Jewish influence in the United States counted for little, contrary to the popular imagination, and for nothing in the United Kingdom. 6 Palestine Jewry was threatened with the extinction of its hope for national existence and could exercise no influence over what was happening in wartime Europe. The Jewish people had no armed might and little economic leverage; they were almost completely powerless. In that situation, aid, rescue, hiding, bribery, ransom, or, in special circumstances, desperate armed rebellion, were the kind s of reactions that could be expected.

JDC's involvement throughout the war was that of the body set up by American Jewry to extend help to Jews abroad. Despite attempts by some other groups to enter the field of aid and rescue, JDC remained American Jewry's representative in that area. Aid and rescue could be achieved by a combination of money and political pressure on those who could facilitate its work. The funds available, however, depended on American Jews' awareness of the Holocaust, and the concrete problem of money was therefore very much tied in with the seemingly abstract epistemological problem of the relationship between information and knowledge. We have noted in the preceding pages that at all stages of the war there was no lack of information regarding the fate of European Jewry, though it is true that explicit news items regarding the total mass murder reached Britain and America only in the late spring of 1942, or about a year after the beginning of the Nazi murder actions on German-occupied Soviet soil. But even without that specific information, enough was known of ghettos and camps to justify a rethinking of Allied and Jewish policy regarding the Jews in Europe. On the other hand, in the late spring and summer of 1942, when the facts of the Holocaust became known, millions of Jews were still alive who could be helped. The seeping in of knowledge was, however, a slow process, and was not completed even by the end of the war. JDC's leadership, not only in New York but even in Lisbon, did not grasp the full impact of what was occurring to Europe's Jews. In a sense, JDC' s response was the reaction of sanity: had the organization grasped what was happening, it might well have lost its capacity to do anything at all. But it is clear that with the exception (456) of a few individuals, JDC leaders in the free world were acting out what may be called "normal" reactions to "normal" disasters, whereas what was happening was an "alpine event" (to use Franklin H. Littell' s terminology) calling for "not normal" reactions. "Not normal" would, in this context, refer to actions leading to the breaking of norms of ordinary warfare in the interest of Europe's Jews.

JDC acted in the way it understood best: energetically, spending its funds to help a maximum number of people. History was, in a way, kind to JDC. A conservative, antinationalistic agency of American Jewish philanthropists was suddenly faced with forces that were beyond its comprehension, and contrary to its creed, its very basis, it became, in country after country, in situation after situation, the embodiment of an embattled Jewish people. To the adversary, JDC became the representative of an imaginary Jewish world government; to many victims, it became a hope, a symbol of Jewish unity and Jewish compassion.

In beleaguered Europe, JDC was in most cases represented by a group of individuals who became leaders of the suffering Jewish communities and often rose to heights of heroism. This was true of the JDC group in Warsaw, who tried to save masses of starving people as long as there was any hope. JDC-Warsaw financed many of the preparations for the Warsaw ghetto rebellion and then, most probably, the rebellion itself. There were leaders such as Gizi Fleischmann in Slovakia or Wilhelm Filderman in Rumania, who were representative of large groups of Jews, and not only of JDC. To them JDC, personalized by Saly Mayer in Switzerland, tried to provide the wherewithal for their desperate fight against destruction. In other places, such as France, there was no unified Jewish representation, but JDC supported those groups and individuals who were involved in rescue; occasionally, usually indirectly, JDC supported armed activities.

Generally, one can divide JDC activities into three main types: direct involvement of American emissaries in local activities; direct involvement of local JDC groups in aid, rescue, and sometimes political activities; and funding of local initiatives. We have seen examples of the first of these with Moses Beckelman's work in Lithuania and Laura Margolis's work in Shanghai. The second type is exemplified in Warsaw and in Jules Jefroykin's group in France. The third we have seen in Slovakia, Rumania, Zagreb, Italy, Belgium, and Holland. The involvement of Americans was necessarily transitory; with America's entry into the (457) war, this kind of activity had to cease. It is hard to assess the relative effectiveness of the other two kinds of JDC involvement. No planning of these activities was possible; the y arose out of desperate necessities and were adjusted to the concrete situation.

The link between JDC-Lisbon and the Jewish communities in most of Europe and Shanghai after 1942 was Sal y Mayer in Switzerland. Our inquiry has shown the unique importance of this man in the JDC story. A more flexible, le ss complicated individual might have been a better choice, but Mayer did surprisingly well, his opponents' claims notwithstanding. Above all, he gras pe d the situation better than many others, managing to supply, with the little money he had to give, not merely help but hope.

The terrible question is often asked whether more could have been done to save lives. Michael Weissmandel wrote that the Jews of the West were asked to shed not blood-dam in Hebrew-but money-damim. If all the money in the world had bought the life of just one child, it would have been cheaply bought. American Jewry gave JDC very little money until 1944 ($37,909,323 in 1939-43) and somewhat more in 1944 and 1945 ($35, 551,365). The $194, 332,033 it raised in 1945-48 showed how late the reaction to the disaster of the Holocaust was. Some of the expenditures of scarce JDC dollars were, to judge with the benefit of hindsight, less than judicious. Hundreds of thousands were poured into the fiasco that was the Sosua venture in the Dominican Republic. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were given to the Russians, in addition to the millions that the American people as a whole gave. Had they been allocated to Gizi Fleischmann or Reszoe Kasztner, they might have made a real difference. Yet the bulk of JDC's limited funds went where it was needed most. The results achieved were in many areas and cases just what had been hoped for. Without JDC funds, the hiding of the children in France, the rescue from starvation in the Transnistrian ghettos, the feeding of the Jews beleaguered in the Swiss and Swedish houses in Budapest-these and many more ventures would have been impossible.

JDC's limitations lay in its very legalistic approach to rescue, its limited funds, and an Allied policy that aimed exclusively at military victory rather than at both victory and the saving of lives. Within those limitations, JDC did a great deal of good. It was basically an organization of volunteers. Its workers, from the lay leadership in New York who gave of their time without hesitation and often without limit, to the heroes of the Holocaust---:Gizi (458) Fleischmann, Emmanuel Ringelblum, Isaac Giterman, and all the others-were united in a typically Jewish endeavor. It was perhaps best expressed by Saly Mayer in one of his notebooks: "Stop this Rezeach!" "Rezach," in Hebrew, means "murder." Jewish tradition says that he who saves one soul is likened to one who has saved the whole world. (459)

Chapter Sixteen

1. For some of the general background and the Brand episode I have use d the following sources: Randolph L. Braham, ed., Hungarian Jewish Studies, vol. 1, esp. Nathaniel Katzburg, " Hungarian Jewry in Modern Times," pp. 137-66, and vol. 2, esp. Erno Laszlo, "Hungary's Jewry: A Demographic Overview," pp. 137-82, and Bela Vago, "Germany and the Jewish Policy of the Kallay Government," pp. 183-210; Ernest Landau, ed., Der Kastnerbericht, (practically identical with Reszoe Kasztner, Der Bericht des judischen Rettungskomittees au s Budapest, 1942-1946, n.d. [19461); Andreas Biss, Der Stopp der Endlösung; Joel Brand, Beschlichut Nid onim Lamavet, ed. Alex Weissberg; Brand’ s interrogation in Cairo in June, 1944 (PRO-FO 371-42811/WR324/3148); Yehuda Bauer, The Holocaust in Historical Perspective.

2. I am grateful to Dr. Frederic Goeroeg for some background information (interview of Mar. 14, 1968).

3. SM-43, Aug. 15, 1944, IRC report, "Die Situation des ungarlandischen Judentums"; cf. Vago, "Germany and the Jewish Policy. " pp. 190-91.

4. R-9, Aid to Overseas Jews, 1939-June, 1940.

5. Randolph L. Braham, "The Kamenets Podolsk and Delvidek Massacres: Prelude to the Holocaust in Hungary," Yad Vashem Studies 9 (1973):133-56.

6. SM-38, Nov. 22, 1943, Kasztner and Springmann-Mayer, quoted in Kastnerbericht, p. 45. Livia Rothkirchen, " Hungary-An Asylum for the Refugees of Europe," Yad Vashem Studies 7 (1968):127-42, says that there were 5,000-15, 000 Jews among the approximately 140,000 Polish refugees in Hungary. Mos t of them managed to escape to the West. She also maintains that there were 15,000 Slovak Jewish refugees in Hungary, but this figure is based on later testimonies.

7. Mayer's relationship with these students shows him from a unique angle. See, for instance, SM-38, Nov. 25, 1941, Georg Lorenz-Ma ye r, addressed to "Yater Saly "; ibid., Aug. 11, 1946, Laszlo Baum-Mayer, which says in part: "You, dear Mr. Mayer, were in the most difficult period a good father not only to me, but to all Hungarian students, something we all know how to value."

8. Biss, Stopp der Endlösung, pp. 40-49; Brand, Beshlic/rut Nidonim Lama vet, pp. 7-9. Brand's arrest and release pose something of a mystery. Eichmann must have known some of his German background when he entrusted Brand with the mission to Istanbul. On the other hand, Brand’ s cousin, Biss, hints in Stopp der Endlösung at previous contact between Brand and the Gestapo, but Biss took Kasztner's side in later disagreements between the two and may have had an axe to grind. Biss admitted Brand's courage and resourcefulness, but regarded him essentially as an adventurer, a heavy drinker, and an unstable character. The documentation quoted later in this chapter tends on the whole to support Biss's evaluation.

9. Kastnerbericht, p. 42; MA contain much correspondence regarding the fight between Krausz and Kasztner.

10. Bela Vago, " The Intelligence Aspects of the Joel Brand Mission," Yad Vashem Studies 10 (1974):111-28.

11. Brand, Beshlichut Nidonim Lamavet, p. 54. 494

12. SM-7, Aug. 10, 1942, telephone Mayer-Schwartz.

13. SM-38, Mar. 2, 1944, Mayer-Kasztner.

14. Kasztner wrote to Istanbul on January 30, 1944, that he was helping 2,000 refugees from Poland, and that the majority of Hungarian Jews were cold and uninterested. In fact, the Va'adah was sending parcels and other aid to Theresienstadt and even to Jews hiding in Vienna (so-called U-Boote, " submarines" ). It had spent the equivalent of $72, 400, apparently since February, 1942. Mayer also received detailed reports regarding the work done. See MA, 0.1.7.6 and 976; SM-38, Dec. 12, 1943, Stern-Mayer; Jan. 25, 1944, Springmann-Mayer.

15. Kastnerbericht, pp. 53-57, where Kasztner states, it seems wrongly, that Brand went into hiding at Winninger's apartment. He actually went to Rudi Scholz (Brand, Beshlichut Nidonim lAmavet, pp. 56-58). After the war he claimed $8,000 and a gold cigarette case from Winninger; the claim strengthens his contention that he did not hand the Va'adah' s archive to the Abwehr for safekeeping, as Kasztner alleged, but rather sacrificed his own property in order to give the Abwehr "something" (see Germany-Claims, Devecseri-Brand, 1955). The Abwehr seems to have been misled into thinking that anti-Hitler putsch would eliminate the 55. In a discussion with the Va'adah on March 1, 1944, they hinted that the German army would soon take over all Jewish matters.

16. See the detailed documentation in Randolph L. Braham, The Destruction of Hungarian Jewry.

17. As, for instance, Randolph L. Braham, "The Jewish Council in Hungary," Yad Vashem Studies 10 (1974):69-109. Braham accuses Kasztner of not having warned Hungarian Jews of what they were to expect (he quotes Eichmann's statement that "Kasztner rendered us a rea t service by helping keep the deportation camps peaceful"). He establishes quite clearly that the leader hip of Hungarian Jewry knew what was happening to Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe (pp. 75-77). The masses, however, "had no inkling of the mass murders com mitted in the German concentration camps and of the gas chambers." (The gas chambers became known in Hungary only in late April or early May, 1944, when the accounts of the Auschwitz escapees, taken down in Slovakia, were transferred to Budapest.) In the next sentence, he admits that they had heard rumors; he then says, "They, like their leaders, deluded themselves into thinking that w h at h a d happened in Poland could not possibly happen in Hungary" (p. 77). If they had no inkling, they could not delude themselves. Braham's confusion stems from a basic error in epistemology: people had information, not knowledge.

18. The issue of armed action is discussed in Kastnerbericht, pp. 54-56, 67-69, and in great detail in Brand's interrogation in Cairo (PRO-FO 371-42811 / WR324/314, p. 8). The Jews had aB of 2 machine guns, 3 rifles, 40 hand grenades, and 150 revolvers.

19. Rafi Benshalom, Ne 'evaknu Lema'an Ha'hayim [We struggled for life], pp. 49-79.

20. Kastnerbericht, pp. 71-78; Brand, Besh lichut Nidonim lAmavet, pp. 61-66; excerpts from Wiliceny's testimony in Braham, Destruction of Hungarian Jewry, 2:922-28.

21. Kastn erbericht, p. 89; Brand, Beshlichut Nidon im lAmavet, pp. 73-78; Kasztner's version is borne out by Biss, Stopp der End liisung, p. 52. It seems that Biss was present at the meeting.

22. See Brand's Cairo interrogation, PRO-FO 371-42811/WR324/3148, p. 20. In this interrogation Brand said that the first meeting took place o n April 16 (p. 18) and the second on April 25. In Beshlichut Nidon im lAmavet (p. 73) he says the first meeting occurred on April 25, hi s birthday. I assume he would not make a mistake regarding an event that took place o n his birthday.

23. Brand, Beshlichut Nidonim lA mavet, pp. 84-87. In Kasztner's confused account, Brand's two meetings with Eichmann were merged into one, and two days later, according to Kasztner, on May 10, he was arrested. One ma y assume that Kasztner remembered the date on which he was arrested, and by that time he knew of the German offer of trucks for humans. That would mean that the third Brand-Eichmann meeting took place on Ma y 8.

24. PRO-FO 371-42810, June 4, 1944, Reuben Resnik's report.

25. Vago, " Intelligence Aspects of the Joel Brand Mission," pp. 120-21; Brand, Beshlichut Nidonim l..ama ve t, pp. 81-84, an account of Brand' s meeting with Fritz Laufer and Erich Klausnitzer, two SD men. Apparently Grosz brought Brand to Laufer and also persuaded him to abandon the Abwehr people to their fate.

26. Yago, "Intelligence Aspects of the Joel Brand Mission," pp. 123-24; interrogations of Grosz in Cairo, June, 1944, in PRO-FO 371-42811 /WR422/9/G.

27. WA, 0.1.719, May 27, 1944, Bader-Wenia; May 27, 1944, Bader-Brand; 0.1.720, June 10, 1944, Bader-Wenia.

28. Shertok's account to the Zionist leadership in London, published in Ma'ariv, June 6, 1954; FO 371-42807, Hirschmann's interrogation of Brand.

29. PRO-CAB 95/15, HC cable, 683, May 26, 1944; FR US, 1944, 1:1050, Steinhardt cable, May 25, 1944.

30. FRUS 1944, 1:1050-52; WRB materials contain all of the tele grams exchanged with Ankara, London, and Mo scow. The Russian attitude was made clear in a note from Vyshinski on June 18 (ibid., p. 1074); PRO-CAB 95/15 contains the British documentation on the subject.

31. CZA, 526/1232, Gruenbaum's re port on a conversation with U.S. Consul General Pinkerton in Jerusalem on June 7, 1944. Gruenbaum thought Brand’s story was just a German trick. The only thing one could do to help was use force, which in the circumstances meant using the bombing plan (526/1284, June 21, 1944, Gruenbaum-Barlas). His colleagues in JA did not favor the bombing at that stage. Gruenbaum wrote: "They prefer not to interfere with mass murder out of a fear that Jews might be hurt by bombing. I was angry and I then understood why only in April 1943 armed resistance took place" in Warsaw. The American refusal to bomb Auschwitz is in WRB, July 4, 1944, John J. McCloy-Pehle; the British refusal is in CZA, 526. Auschwitz was bombed on September 13, 1944, according to the publications of the Auschwitz museum.

32. Veesenmayer reported on June 30 that 381,661 Jews had been deported up to then (NG-2263); on July 11, he said that 457,402 had been deported (NG-5615).

33. Braham, Dest ruction of Hungarian Jewry, 2:695, Veesenmayer message, June 29, 1944; p. 764, cable by Thomsen, Aug. 11, 1944; p. 419, Veesenmayer, Jul y 7; p. 425, Veesenmayer on Sztojay, July 6; p. 430, Winkelmann, Jul y 7; and documents quoted on pp. 436, 437, 441; Weissmandel, Min Hametzar, pp. 103-11.

34. The fact that Resnik' s report (seen. 24 to this chap.) is in the Public Records Office shows that the British were given a copy immediately; it is also in the WRB files and the JDC archives.

35. WA, 0.1.720, Protocol of May 29, 1944, signed by Brand and "Moledet" (Hebrew for " homeland") and transferred to Budapest, which states that the Allie s had accepted the principle contained in Brand' s proposal.

36. Life, Dec. 5, 1960, p. 146.

37. Kastnerbericht, pp. 126-34; cf. Weissmandel, Min Hametzar, pp. 123-40.

38. PS 3803, June 30, 1944, Kaltenbrunner-Blaschke. The number of people in Vienna is unclear; different sources give different figure s within the margin mentioned in the text.

Chapter Seventeen

1. Blum, ed., Morgenthau Diaries, 2:209-11; Feingold, Politics of Rescue, pp. 239-44; Morse, While Six Million Died, pp. 71-97. 496 Notes to pages 402-17

2. See WRB, 120 to Ankara, Feb. 12, 1944.

3. WRB, Presidential Press Release, Jan. 22, 1944.

4. WRB, 1023; 1805; 1806.

5. Hirschmann's memoirs, Caution to the Winds,

6. Morse, While Six Million Died, p. 382.

Chapter Eighteen

1. PRO-JR 44(18), May 8, 1944.

2. FO 371-47807/W949/3/48, June 28, 1944.

3. PRO-JR 44(18), May 31, 1944.

4. PRO-JR (44)19, July 13, 1944. Brand refused to return. He had no positive answer for the Germans, and by the time the British decided to let him go in October, 1944, he had decided that there was no point in returning to Hungary. See Bauer, Holocaust in Historical Perspective, pp. 94-155.

5. FRUS, 1944, l:1062n; ibid., p. 1047, June 19, 1944, Memorandum to the British Embassy.

6. MA, D.1.713, Bader-Wenia, June 24, 1944.

7. Feingold, Politics of Rescue, p. 267.

8. PRO-JR (44)21, Aug. 3 and 4, 1944; PRO-JR (44)22, Sept. 4, including McClelland's letter to WRB of Aug. 11, 1944.

9. Braham, Destruction of Hungarian Jewry, 1:334, NG-2234, Veesenmayer-Ribbentrop; ibid., p. 340, Apr. 14, 1944, Jagerstab protocol; ibid., 2:697, NG 2236, July 6, 1944, Berlin m emo; ibid., p. 700, July 10, 1944.

10. MA, 0.1.713, June 24, 1944, Bader-Wenia; 0.1.746; 0.1.721; WRB, July 27, 1944, Pehle-Stettinius; July 28, 1944, Stettinius-No r web.

11. WRB, McClelland-WRB, Aug. 11, 1944 (No. 4197).

12. SM-9, telephone conversation with Lisbon, Aug. 6, 1944; SM-17, June 15, 1945, "Arba" report by Marcus Wyler-Schmidt.

13. Material in SM-4.

14. SM-9, telephone conversation with Lisbon, Aug. 1, 1944.

15. SM-17, June 15, 1945, "Arba " report by Marcus Wyler-Schmidt.

16. Ibid.

17. WRB, McClelland-WRB, Aug. 11, 1944 (No. 4197).

18. SM-13, original version of WRB No. 2867, Aug. 21,1944.

19. SM-13. Mayer tried to convince JDC to send funds to meet at least some of Becher' s demands; he asked for $2 milli on, but in vain (ibid., Aug. 24, 1944).

20. Braham, Destruction of Hungarian Jewry, 2:635-36, Becher' s cab le of Aug. 23, which reached Himmler on Aug. 25; Himmler approved on Aug. 26 (ibid., p. 637); Kastnerbericht, p. 175; Braham, Destruction of Hungarian Jewry, 2:481.

21. WRB, No. 2990, Aug. 30, 1944, to Bern; Sept. 1, 1944. McClelland-Mayer.

22. SM-9, Sept. 10, 1944, telephone conversation with Lisbon.

23. SM-13, SM-17, Wyler-Schmidt's report. See also three small notebooks kept by Mayer and now in the JDC SM archive.

24. WRB, No. 6110 from Bern, Sept. 16, 1944, McClelland-Washington (signed Harrison). McClelland added that his personal opinion, and that of Mayer also, " is that all time possible has now been gained... so that these negotiations can be considered as having lapsed." His assessment differs from that of Kasztner, who expressed his disappointment at Mayer's "impossible diplomacy" ("die unmogliche Diplomatie"; Kastnerbericht, p. 182), which, according to him, pre-497 Notes to pages 417-32 vented the saving of many lives. Kasztner al so expressed his disappointment that Joseph Schwartz did not negotiate instead of Mayer, ignoring the fact, well known to him, that Mayer acted with Schwartz's full backing. Yet Kasztner admitted that Becher's reaction was exactly w h at Mayer and McClelland had hoped for. "He will wait in Budapest for a telegraphic... answer from Saly Mayer. Until then no decision will be reached" (ibid., p. 179).

25. Biss, Stopp der Endlösung, p. 175.

26. Kastnerbericht, p. 187.

27. WRB, No. 6619 from Bern, Oct. 5, 1944, McClelland-Washington; SM-13, notebook.

28. See Trumpy's series of articles in Sie und Er (Switzerland), Se pt. 14-Nov. 9, 1961.

29. Aug. 10, 1944; photocopy printed in Sie und E, Oct. 5, 1961.

30. On November 27, 1944, Mayer paid 69,200 s fr. for four tractor s to be shipped to Germany; private communication to me from Roswell McClelland regarding his lack of knowledge of tractor shipments. Freudiger did not approach Mayer directly, though he was in touch with him. He fled Hungary on August 10, and on October 13 he and Link forwarded a memorandum to Mayer in which they reported that the actual ransom was less important than the need " to urge the Jews who, it is notorious, control all operations in Britain and the USA, to compel the Allies to stop the war against Germany. Germany would be ready to undertake common action with the Wes tern Powers against Russia" (SM-39).

31. SM-21, Musy report, n.d.; see also WRB, July 31, 1945, final report of McClelland, pp. 51-52.

32. WRB, No. 274, June 28, 1944, from Stockholm; No. 279, Oct. 18, 1944; No. 281, Mar. 28, 1945. The ghettos of Kovno and Siauliai were transferred to camps in Germany in July, 1944.

33. SM-14; SM-17; Kastnerbericht, p. 208.

34. OHO, Interview with Roswell McClelland, July 13, 1967; Kastnerbericht, pp. 211-17; SM-17.

35. WRB, No. 3932, Nov. 18, 1944; Mayer received the cable on Nov. 21.

36. WRB, No. 4014, Nov. 28, 1944, to Bern; WRB, No. 8045, De c. 9, 1944, from Bern; also OHO, Interview with Roswell McClelland, July 13, 1967.

37. Kastnerbericht, p. 235.

38. SM-14; see also Trumpy, as in chap. 18, n. 27.

39. SM-14; Kastnerbericht, pp. 241-46.

40. Kastnerbericht, p. 248; this version is confirmed by Mayer's notebooks.

41. SM-21(2). On November 30, he paid 64,750 sfr. to the Willi Company for four tractors; on December 19, he paid 145,195. 60, and in January,1945, he paid 103,994.60, for a total of 313,940. 20 sfr. (close to $75,000).

42. WRB, No. 8118, Dec. 13, 1944, McClelland-Pehle.

43. WRB, No. 4273, Dec. 19, 1944, to Bern; No. 8390, Dec. 28, 1944, from Bern.

44. WRB, No. 102, Jan. 6, 1945; FRUS, 1945, 2:1121, Jan. 6, 1945, to London.

45. SM-42; Kastnerbericht, pp. 260-66; NG 5230, Becher's testimony, Mar. 24, 1948.

46. WRB, Nos. 424, 605, Jan. 25 and 28, 1945, from Bern.

47. WRB, No. 881, Feb. 8, 1945, from Bern.

48. SM-21, Musy report; SM-16(2), Schellenberg trial document 50, deposition by Jean-Marie Musy, May 8, 1948.

49. YV, 0-51/DN-39/2119.

50. SM-17; Kastnerbericht, p. 291.

51. SM-16(2), Schellenberg trial document 51, deposition by Benoit Mu sy, Ma y 8, 1948; Kastnerbericht, pp. 315-27.

52. WRB, No. 881, Feb. 8, 1945, from Bern; YV, 0-51 /DN-39/2119; als o SM-498 l 6(2), Schellenberg trial document 40, deposition by Franz Goering; declaration of K. Beche r at Nuremberg, June 24, 1948; Tribune de Geneve, July 19, 1948, with 3chellenberg's testimony of June 18, 1948; SM-21, Nov. 17, 1948, Isaac Sternbuch military tribunal at Nuremburg; relevant correspondence in lsraelitisches Wochen-1/att, Nov.-Dec., 1948.

53. SM-42, Mar. 9, 1947, Kastzner-Steger. 54. OHO, Interview with Roswell McClelland, July 13, 1967.

Chapter Nineteen

1.Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, pp. 25, 628-29.

2. SM-21, Musy report, n.d.

3. See FO 371-WR855/49148, Mar. 22, 1943 and JR (44)16, June 29, 1944.

4. FO-JR (44)12, Memo of Sir H. Emerson, Max 17, 1944.

5. 9-27, July 20, 1944, Emerson cable to JDC; Conf.-1, Feb. 27, 1945, outgoing via WRB, Emerson cable of Feb. 27, 1945; SM-6, Dec. 4, 1945, Schwartz-Mayer; SM-10, telephone conversation, Mayer-Lisbon, Mar. 11, 1945. 6. SM-23, Nov. 24, 1943.

7. Ibid., note of conversation on Aug. 10, 1944.

8. WJC, material of Kopecky meetings, Feb. 22, Mar. 5, Mar. 26, 1945.

9. Braham, Destruction of Hungarian Jewry, 2:740-49, esp. Veesenmayer's message of Nov. 15, 1944; for Spain, ibid., 755, Vessenmayer, Oct. 13, 1944.

10. Ibid., pp. 697 (NG 2236), 700 (July 10, 1944), 705 (July 24, 1944).

11. SM-43, Nov. 1944, "Note sur la situation des juifs en Hongrie, CICR."

12. Livia Rothkirchen, "The 'Final Solution' in Its Last Stages," Yad Vashem Studies 8 (1970): 7.

13. SM-39, Nov. 27, 1944, Peretz (Revesz)-Schwalb. 14. SM-43, Nov. 1944, " Note sur la situation des juifs en Hongrie, CICR"; Braham, Destruction of Hungarian Jewry, 2:528-31. On October 29, the Szálasi government announced that henceforth

valid protection papers would be respected, but on November 17, it declared that protected Jews would have to leave the capital by November 20. After that date they would be treated just like all other Hungarian Jews.

15. Kastnerbericht, pp. 221-23, 233-38; SM-39, Kasztner's letter of Nov. 26, 1944; for the trains on Nov. 28-29, see NG-4987; SM-45, Hehalutz report, n.d.; SM-39, Schwalb-Mayer, reporting on a talk with Kasztner on Dec. 4, 1944.

16. Morse, While Six Million Died, pp. 363-64.

17. Ibid.; Benshalom, Ne'evaknu Lema'an Ha'hayim, esp. pp. 112-17; SM-39, Lutz interview in Istanbul, n.d. (Apr. 1945, with Fishohn); ibid., Lutz reports, June 11, 1945, July 1, 1945, and letter to Mayer, Dec. 22, 1944; see also SM-43, Nov. 1944, "Note sur la situation des juifs en Hongrie, CICR."

18. SM-39, Nov. 27 and Dec. 5, 1944, Kasztner-Mayer; WJC, Nov. 9, 1944, Riegner-Schirmer conversation; SM-39, Peretz (Revesz)-Schwalb, Nov. 27, 1944.

19. SM-45, IRC, Jan. 12, 1945, on Jules Gulden; WJC, " Die Vernichtung d. Bundapester Judenheit," report; WJC, IRC letter of Nov. 27, 1944.

20. Benshalom, Ne'evaknu Lema 'am Ha 'hayim, esp. pp. 140-44, 161-75.

21. Ilona Beneschofsky, "The Position of Hungarian Jewry after the Liberation," in Braham, ed., Hungarian Jewish Studies, 1:237-46; cf. Erno Laszlo, " Hungary' s Jewry, a Demographic Overview," ibid., 2:137-82; SM-39, "Zusammenfassender Auweis" (Aug. 31, 1945), according to which the total number of returnees from Germany was 72,104, of whom 14,025 were formerly members of labor battalions.

22. The figures in this paragraph were computed on the basis of Mayer's financial reports in SM-4. Rothkirchen, Hurban Yahadut Slovakia, pp. 37-43; additional material may be found in Braham, Destruction of Hungarian Jewry and Weissmandel, Min Hametzar. On Gizi Fleischmann, see Chaim Kafri, "Gizi Fleischmann Kelochemet" [Gizi Fleischmann as a fighter], YM, no. 13 (June, 1971), pp. 46-59; WJC, IRC report of Jan. 11, 1945.

24. Mayer was accused of not providing ransom money for Slovak Jews, as in SM-38, Sept. 19, 1944, Kasztner; in fact, Mayer pressed Lisbon to per it him to pay (Sept. 26, 1944, telephone conversation with Lisbon) and then sent money anyway without asking (or telling Kasztner). On Kubala, see WJC, IRC report of Feb. 9, 1945; IRC report of Apr. 19, 1945; SM-43, Apr. 19, 1945, IRC report. For Dunant's rescue attempt, see SM-39, Apr. 13, 1945, Kasztner-Mayer; Mayer's correspondence with IRC about Slovakia, Oct. 27, Nov. 21, Dec. 4, 1944, and Jan. 26, 1945.

25. SM-39, Feb. 2, 1945, Kasztner-Mayer.

26. SM-28, Schirmer report on Vienna for Thudichum's assessment of Krumey; for Dunant's impressions, see WJC, IRC report of Apr. 27, 1945.

27. SM-23, Dec. 18, 1944, IRC-Mayer.

28. Ibid.; SM-10, Apr. 5, 194 5, telephone conversation Mayer-Lisbon; Jan. 30, 1945, on the sending of parcels to Landsberg.

29. SI-Sweden, 1940-44, Margolis report for the end of 1944; ibid., Nov. 21, 1944; SM-23, June 27, 1945 report on the Goteborg parcel scheme; Jan. 1, 1945, IRC-Mayer.

30. R-32, Weekly Digest, Oct. 1944.