Jewish Rescue and Self-Help
Braham 1981 pp. 1238-1244:
“The Jews' attempts to help themselves in the struggle for survival took various forms-both individual and collective. The former was more common in the countryside, the latter in the capital. In Budapest, the rescue efforts were, for a variety of reasons, relatively better organized and more effectively directed. In the first place, the opportunities for successfully surviving with Aryan identification papers were much greater in the capital than in the countryside, where everyone knew the local Jews. Moreover, by the time the organized rescue campaign was launched in the capital, Horthy had already halted the deportations and the country returned, albeit only for a short time, to a semblance of normality. Following the Szálasi coup of October 15, 1944, the rescue (1239) campaign entered an acute phase. The rescuing of Jews from the clutches of the Nyilas murder squads that terrorized the city became mostly the task of young Halutzim. Their acts of heroism provided by far the finest hours of the resistance.’’
“In the provincial communities, the opportunities for rescue were far fewer. For one thing, many of the large Jewish communities were in the Great Hungarian Plain, where the terrain was not conducive to hiding. Moreover, the ghettoization and concentration of the Jews in the provinces started less than a month after the German occupation, with the leaders of most communities unaware of the meaning and ultimate scope of the anti-Jewish measures. Even among those who had been alerted about the possible danger awaiting them by courageous young Zionist couriers from Budapest, most chose to heed the reassuring messages conveyed by the traditional central leadership of Hungarian Jewry. They were understandably less inclined to believe the apocalyptic warnings of the young Halutzim they did not know than the comforting messages of their trusted leaders with whom they had closely cooperated for many years. They were, of course, unaware of the fact that the organ through which they had received the official communications-A Magyar Zsidok Lapja (The Journal of Hungarian Jews)-was in fact a thoroughly censored paper primarily serving the interests of the Nazis.’’
“A few provincial Jews took the warning of the Halutzim seriously and escaped from the ghettos or entrainment centers. Most but by no means all were relatively young men from the villages who had trusted friends among the peasants or were familiar with the surrounding mountainous terrain; the largest number of escapees were from ghettos close to the borders with Romania and Slovakia. A number of provincial Jews tried to escape the deportations by building hiding places within the ghettos, 26 and an indeterminate number managed to escape to Budapest and melt into the crowds, usually by means of forged Christian identification papers. A handful of daring Jews succeeded in escaping to Switzerland by hiding in produce-laden freight cars.’’ 27
“The total number of escapees was relatively small. Most of the men between 20 and 48 years of age had been in labor service companies stationed within the country, along the fronts in the Ukraine, or in the copper mines of Bor, Yugoslavia. Within the ghettos, families were usually resolved to stay together come what may. A number of (1240) families in fact managed to escape across the border intact; 28 their number would undoubtedly have been larger had the leaders of the ghettos along the borders, including those of Kolozsvar, Marosvasarhely, and Nagyvarad, clearly informed the masses about the fate the Nazis really were planning for them. While many of the lay and spiritual leaders of these ghettos managed to save themselves by various schemes, the ghetto dwellers were reassured, partly through a rumor intentionally spread by the gendarmerie that they were being relocated to either Mezotur or a place called Kenyermezo, where they would be employed as agricultural workers for the duration of the war.’’
“Under the extraordinary conditions of the time, most Jews were psychologically ready to accept without question the Nazis' reassuring lies. Some among the persecution-wise Polish and Slovak refugees proved more adept at saving themselves. Some built bunkers in and around Budapest and stocked them with food and weapons; others returned to their former homelands, where the anti-Jewish drive was by then at a standstill. Their attempt to warn the Hungarian Jews about the looming disaster proved unsuccessful.’’
The Jewish Council
Braham 1981 p. 1241-1243
“Although created by and generally construed as an instrumentality of the SS and of their Hungarian hirelings, the Central Jewish Council (Kozponti Zsido Tantics) also emerged as a major source of relief and rescue-especially for the Budapest Jews after the completion of the deportations from the provinces. 30 During the first crucial period (1241) of the German occupation, the members of the Council were preoccupied with fulfilling the incessant and increasingly exorbitant demands of the Germans. The Hungarian authorities flatly refused to deal with them, claiming that the handling of the Jewish question had become the exclusive responsibility of the SS. Deprived of their rights as citizens and subordinated to the Eichmann-Sonderkommando, the Council members nevertheless tried to do what they could for the Jews. They became involved in a desperate, and generally futile, attempt to prevent or at least delay or minimize the ultimate catastrophe they had feared. Like many people in Hungary at the time, the Council members also believed at first that with the inexorable advance of the Red Army the country might be liberated before the Germans had a chance to carry out their sinister designs. But when they realized the zeal with which the German and Hungarian squads in charge of the Final Solution were going about their work they tried to save those who could still be saved. It was a Sisyphean task, for, with Horthy in self-isolation, the conservative-aristocratic wing of the Right eliminated, and the new Hungarian authorities fully collaborationist, the Council leaders had to rely on their own constantly dwindling resources. They tried to get into the good graces of the Nazis by fulfilling with servility all their exorbitant demands for goods and money. As was the case in some ghettos in Poland, they also tried to persuade the Germans that the Jews would be economically valuable if retained within the country. The Germans were reminded of the crucial role the Jews had been playing in the economy of a country whose industrial and agricultural production was to a large extent subordinated to the German war effort.’’
“The Germans were of course eager both to further expand their economic and military exploitation of Hungary and to achieve their murderous racist objectives. The Council members found themselves in an increasingly unenviable position: many of the instructions they had to carry out were clearly related to the Nazis’ sinister designs. While they were spared the agonizing tasks imposed upon their counterparts in Poland, Lithuania, and elsewhere with regard to the selection of Jews for deportation and certain death, they were often used indirectly for this purpose. They were used to lull the Jewish masses into a false sense of security and as a conduit for the distribution of hundreds of summonses to Jews selected by the squads in charge of the Final Solution for (1242) “special treatment." Though many of these Jews-lawyers, journalists, and businessmen-ended up in Auschwitz, the Council members rationalized their involuntary involvement as relatively beneficial. They argued that since the summonses were distributed promptly by Jewish couriers, the victims had some time to settle their affairs, prepare some food and clothing, and make arrangements for escape. The Nazi-Hungarian units, in their view, would have picked them up faster and without any prior notice.’’
“One of the Council members, Fulop Freudiger, the representative of the Orthodox Jews in the Council, was particularly active in rescue work during the deportations from the provinces. In addition to his involvement in the Zionist-oriented rescue effort, Freudiger managed through his contacts with Dieter Wisliceny to save close to 80 prominent, mostly Orthodox, Jews-rabbis and communal leaders-from the ghettos of Debrecen, Kassa, Nagyvarad, Nyiregyhaza, Papa, Sopron, and Szekesfehervar just before their scheduled deportation.’’ 31
“During the Nyilas era, the most indefatigable members of the Council working on behalf of the persecuted Jews were Domonkos, Stockier, and Berend. The latter, pursuing a rather unorthodox course, was particularly active through his dealings with Jozsef Sarosi, the local Nyilas leader in the Budapest ghetto area. Peto, Stern, and Wilhelm, who had dominated the Council before the coup, were in hiding at the time.’’
“The Council's relief and rescue operations were carried out mostly through its specialized committees. While primarily responsible for the implementation of the various Nazi-imposed demands, they tried to do everything in their power to minimize the suffering of the Jews. With the passage of time, their functions acquired ever greater importance. They faced a gargantuan task during the relocation of the Jews into Yellow-Star houses and especially during the Szálasi era, when the ghetto of Budapest was established. The officials associated with MIPI were particularly active in helping the internees in various camps and, like the Halutzim, managed to free a number of Jews by providing them with forged identification papers. 32 The physicians in Council-supported makeshift hospitals worked tirelessly to save the lives of disease-ridden and starving ghetto dwellers and the countless Jews brutalized by the Nyilas.’’ 33 (1243)
“While the Central Jewish Council's role had a questionable, if not generally harmful, effect upon the provincial Jewish communities, 34 its efforts on behalf of the Jewish community of Budapest were much more successful. However, the claim of several of its members that by its actions, including the reestablishment of contact with the Regent, the Council played a crucial role in halting the deportations cannot be substantiated. While the Auschwitz Reports, which the Council members had submitted to Horthy after an unforgivable delay must have influenced the Regent’s decision to halt the deportations on July 6, the main impact toward this end was provided by the documentation that Miklos Krausz had sent to Switzerland on June 19, 1944. It was this documentation that eventually elicited the responses from the Pope, President Roosevelt, and the King of Sweden, all protesting the persecution of the Jews in Hungary, and partially motivating Horthy to act.’’ 35
Notes
29. For further details on the activities of the IRC, consult David P. Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, I 977), 298 pp. and Aryeh Ben-Tov, op. cit. See also the bibliographical references listed in B-A, pp. 517-520.
30. Paul Hoffman, Pius Knew in 1941 of Drive on Jews. The New York Times, April 27, 1974.
31. For Gerstein’ s statement of April 26, 1945, see PS-1553.
32. Nora Levin, The Holocaust (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968), pp. 686- 687. For some biographical details on Tittmann, who died on December 29, 1980, see The New York Times, December 30, 1980.
33. Paul Hoffman, The Vatican Knew of Nazi Pogroms, Its Records Show. The New York Times, April 5, 1973.
34. Saul Friedlander, Pius XII and the Third Reich. A Documentation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 222. For further details, see Chapter 23.
35. Kubovy, " The Silence of Pope Pius XII," p. 11. See also appeals by the British Section of the World Jewish Congress of June 26 and October 14, 1944, on behalf of the Hungarian Jewry in PRO, Fo. 371/42807, p. 32, and Fo. 371 /42820, p. 22.
Levai 1948 p. 166-167:
“Authorised to do so by the Minister of the Interior, Endre by his decree No. 176.744/ 1944. VIL b. B. M., dated May 6th, appointed the members of the Provisional Executive Committee of the Union of Jews in Hungary. From among the members of the previous Jewish Council the following were appointed to the new Executive Committee: Samu Stern, Dr. Erno Peto, Dr. Karoly Wilhelm, Samu Kahan-Frankl and Fulop Freudiger. The appointment of the following four members came as a great surprise; Dr. Bela Berend, Chief Rabbi of Szigetvar, Sandor Torok, a newspaper editor, Dr. Jozsef Nagy, Chief Medical Officer of the Jewish hospital and Dr. Janos Gabor, the legal representative of the Jewish Community in Budapest. Wild guesses as to why these individuals had been appointed were immediately circulating. It later became known officially that the appointment of Dr. Jozsef Nagy was due to the (167) influence of one of his patients, Dr. Istvan Vassanyi, a secretary in the department which appointed the members of the new Council. Editor Sandor Torok's name was on the black list of the Press chamber and he was at that time interned in Csepel. His frantic wife finally succeeded in establishing the right connections. His protector, among others, went to Zoltan Bosnyak, who was widely known as a close friend of Laszlo Endre's, At this time Bosnyak was constantly at the Ministry of the Interior and played a great and important part in the planning and execution of the anti-Jewish decrees. Torok's protector by good luck chose just the right moment in which to approach Bosnyak, who had him appointed to the Council as representative of the baptised Jews. For Torok this also meant that he was discharged from Csepel. It was also Bosnyak, who appointed Dr. Bela Berend to the Council. At that time Berend's district was represented in Parliament by Count Domonkos Festetich, who was a notorious anti-Jewish politician, but who nevertheless maintained close business connections with the wealthy Jews of his district and even leased his lands to them. Festetich introduced the "level-headed Nationalist Jewish priest" to Bosnyak. This ambitious rabbi from Szigetvar - who incidentally had been decorated as an Army Chaplain - tried to convince Bosnyak of his errors and particularly attempted to contradict Baron Alfons Luyseszky's false interpretations of the Talmud. When the crisis in the Jewish problem came, it was Berend's point of view - and in this Bosnyak agreed with him - that baptism cannot change the status of a Jew, that baptised Jews should not enjoy privileges over Jews who had remained true to their faith and that the Jewish problem could be solved only by emigration sponsored by the Government. He wrote articles on these questions and gave them to Bosnyak, who had them published. This is the background of their acquaintance and why Bosnyak recommended Berend's appointment to Endre. Dr. Janos Gabor finally was appointed by request of the Germans. The legal representative of the Jewish Community in Budapest spoke German fluently and from the beginning maintained close relations with the Gestapo, who found him a useful medium through which to keep in touch with the new Council.’’
“On its first session - on May 15th - Samu Stern was elected chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee. Members of the previous council who, from the very beginning, were also present at the sessions of the Executive Committee were: Dr. Laszlo Bakonyi, Chief Secretary of the Jewish National Office; Dr. Hugo Csergo, Notary in Chief of the Jewish Community in Budapest; Dr. Janos Gabor (who now became a regular member); Dr. Zoltan Kohn, School Inspector of the Jewish Community in Budapest; Dr. Erno Munkacsi, Chief Secretary of the Jewish Community in Budapest; and Dr. Imre Reiner, Legal Adviser to the Orthodox Central Office. (Four of them: Bakonyi, Csergo, Gabor and Kohn were to become victims of their self-sacrificing labours; Erno (168) Munkacsi voluntarily resigned in June. Dr. Reiner, the representative of the Orthodox Jews, stayed at his dangerous post to the very last and ceaselessly fought in the interest of his co-religionists.)’’
Levai 1948 p. 81:
“At five o'clock in the afternoon of March 21st, [1944] the heads of the Jewish Community in Budapest, the representatives of various religious institutions and those of certain provincial Jewish organisations who happened to be in Budapest at the time met at the wish of the Germans in the assembly hall of the Jewish Community. The walls of this room were lined with oil-paintings of famous Hungarian politicians and scientists of Jewish origin. About 200 delegates were present when Krumey occupied the chair of the President, while on his right sat Wyslizeni and on his left Samuel Stern, the President of the Jewish Community of Pest. (81) An individual in mufti, who spoke German with an accent peculiar to the Swabs of Hungary, read out the names contained in the list handed to the Germans the day before. Those present, whose name was called out, answered with a loud: "Present!" Where the president or the head of some institution was absent, but was represented by another individual, the name of the representative was taken, A note was made in every instance of the reason for the absence of persons not answering their names.’’
“After the roll-call had been completed, Wyslizeni made a short speech that was again full of promises. While there would be certain restrictions, he declared, the Jews would still be allowed to continue their religious and cultural life as before. "Alles geht weiter wie bisher!" (Everything continues as before) he said. The Germans, he continued, attached importance to this, as they did not want a panic to break out, a run to be made on the banks or deposits to be withdrawn. Nothing, he declared, must be allowed to interfere with the religious services. He asked the Rabbis to re-assure the members of their congregations.’’
“The meeting then took note of the names of the eight representatives of the Jewish Council, formed for the purpose of passing on orders given by the Germans.’’
“A committee consisting of Dr. Samu Stern as president, Dr. Erno Boda, Dr. Erno Peto and Dr. Karoly Wilhelm represented the Neologists of Pest; the Neogolist community of Buda was represented by Dr. Samuel Csobadi; the Orthodox Jews were represented by Samuel Kahan-Frankl and Fulop Freudiger and the Zionists by Dr. Nisen Kahan. After the constitution of the Jewish Council, the only Jewish organ permitted-the "Newspaper of the Hungarian Jews"
Levai 1948 p. 326:
“The Jews tried to perform a sad duty, when a committee (the members of which were Andras Balog, Istvan Foldes, Albert Geyer, Sandor Groszmann, Dezso Sandor, Jozsef Sebestyen, Miklos Szego and Miklos Vida) led by Lajos Stockler visited Col.-General Gusztav Hennyey, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs. Their object was to secure aid for the deportees. This delegation, after applying to various international Red Cross organisations for aid, begged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to obtain the Nazi Government's permission to send parcels to the deportees. Hennyey took steps to this effect, the Swedish Red Cross even sent parcels, but, naturally, everything was stolen by the Nazis. This committee also forwarded lists to the neutral countries showing location of camps etc. Expressing the thanks of the Jews, the president of the committee told the Minister for Foreign Affairs:
"This has been the Hungarian Government's first kind gesture towards the Jews for a long time. We know how to appreciate this!"
*) Statement of the former Captain of Gendarmerie Marton Zoldi to the Political Police on October 25th, 1945, 22 (327)
Levai 1948 p. 384-385:
“In the ghetto, which on December 10th had been boarded off and isolated, the situation deteriorated from day to day. At first the number to be fed was only 8,000, but this number was increasing rapidly. Prices naturally rose to phantastic heights.
“Lajos Stockler, Chairman of the Jewish Council since October 28th, governed the ghetto, assisted by Dr. Istvan Foldes, Dr. Miklos Szego and Dr. Bela Berend. Captain of Reserve Miksa Domonkos proved to be an energetic assistant, as well as acting as executive official in charge of the few remaining clerks.’’
“The Jewish Council,-whose authority at that time was naturally confined exclusively to the ghetto - did its best to put its house in order. Administrative statutes of the ghetto were drafted. The detailed arrangements provided for the following administrative organs: head occupant of dwellings-house wardens -District Magistrates-The Jewish Council.’’
“The division. of the ghetto houses differed from the previously mentioned statement. In actual fact 291 houses with 4,513 flats comprised the ghetto. 243 houses were used as dwellings, 29 were communal buildings and 19 could not be used (war damaged, etc.)’’
“The Jewish Council in its ghetto function continually had to tackle three very serious questions. The first was the problem of accomodation. On this point the Council was free to make its own arrangements without the interference of police or Nyilas: the task of the Council's Housing Committee was to provide, as far as possible, the necessary living space. When providing accomodation, many aspects had to be considered, as a large proportion of the ghetto inhabitants were either old people or invalids.’’
“Throughout the existence of the ghetto, the food supply was supervised by Aldermann Janos Rosta, Head of the Budapest Food Department. Liaison with him was maintained by Lajos Stockler and Dr. Istvan Foldes. On December 7th they drew food ration cards for four weeks as well as the entitlement certificate for coal and wood. They also asked to be supplied with a small quantity of jam and soya sausage for the children, which was promised. So ration cards and promises were at hand, but difficulties arose with regard to transport. The Treasury agreed to meet the costs.’’
“The metropolitan authorities should have started to supply the ghetto on December 8th. According to their report, only a minimal food reserve for the 60 to 70,000 persons was available, with the exception of dried soups of a low calorific value. From that day on the dreadful struggle to maintain the food supply for the ghetto continued. On December 8th, 5,782 kilos of bread were (385) distributed in the ghetto and everybody received their daily ration of 150 grammes. (The number of persons entitled to rations on that day was 38,000), One day there was "pea soup," the next "bean soup," then mashed carrots and from time to time noodles or barley-corn. There was no warm meal in the evening, but some cereals were distributed instead as long as it was possible to do so. Gradually the quantity and quality of the food deteriorated, particularly in January, when it was no longer possible to supply the town.
“Other permanent problems that were gradually solved were laundries, chemists' shops, Turkish baths and a disinfestation centre.’’
“A considerable part of the Council's time was taken up by the problem of housing the 6,000 Jewish children, who-protected by the International Red Cross-were living outside the ghetto and whom the police-as the result of the constant clamourings of the Nyilas-wanted to have moved to the ghetto by December 7th. The proper housing of such a large number of children in a ghetto overcrowded already was no mean task. The larger part of the nursing staff of the different homes proved to be unreliable and-at that time-the majority fled from Budapest, leaving the children unattended. In the name of the International Red Cross Fritz Born and, later, Hans Weyermann, who had arrived in Budapest in the meanwhile, kept in touch with the Council. By agreement the Council were willing to undertake the housing of these children, but for that purpose they had to request the town to hand over to them buildings within the boundaries of the ghetto belonging to the Municipality after these had been cleaned, disinfected and properly equipped. Long discussions on this subject took place between Lajos Stockier and Chief Constable and Deputy Commander Janos Solymossy, at that time also Commissioner of Jewish Affairs. Born and Weyermann, too, took part in some of these discussions. The Council continually postponed the transfer of the children into the ghetto, being of the opinion that it was easier for the international organisations to ensure their welfare outside the ghetto, and because they wanted to gain time. Under Nyilas pressure the police became impatient and on December 12th-in spite of the agreement, according to which no children were to be brought into the ghetto until the Municipal schools were properly equipped-Superintendents of Police Dr. Koppany and Dr. Szinyei-Merse brought some 500 children into the ghetto.’’
Members
Dr. Samu Stern, president
Rabbi Berend
Dr. Erno (Ernest) Boda, representing the Neologists of Pest
Dr. Erno Peto, representing the Neologists of Pest
Dr. Georgy Wilhelm – refugee office
Dr. Karoly Wilhelm representing the Neologists of Pest
Dr. Samuel Csobadi, the Neogolist community of Buda
Dr. Miklos Kadar – refugee office
Samuel (Nisson) Kahan-Frankl, Orthodox Jews
Otto Komoly, Department A International Red Cross
Fulop Freudiger, Orthodox Jews
Miksa Domonkos, Technical – Industrial section – Captain of Reserve
Dr. Nisen Kahan, Zionists
Adorjan Stella – refugee office
Lajos (Louis) Stockler
Istvan (Steven) Foldes
Nagy
George Polgar
Vas
Executive Committee were:
Dr. Laszlo Bakonyi, Chief Secretary of the Jewish National Office
Beer
Andreas Borlog
Dr. Hugo Csergo, Notary in Chief of the Jewish Community in Budapest
Dr. Janos Gabor
Gergely
Albert Geyer
Sandor Grosman
Dr. Zoltan Kohn, School Inspector of the Jewish Community in Budapest
Dr. Erno Munkacsi, Chief Secretary of the Jewish Community in Budapest
Dr. Imre Reiner, Legal Adviser to the Orthodox Central Office
Aldermann Janos Rosta, Head of the Budapest Food Department
Rezso Muller
Dezso Sandor
Jozsef Sebestyen
Miklos Szego
Miklos Vida
The Relief and Rescue Committee: The Kasztner Line
Braham, 1981 pp 1243-1245:
“The Budapest branch of the Relief and Rescue Committee (Vaadat Ezra ve 'Hatzalah)-the Vaada-was established in January 1943. Until the German occupation on March 19, 1944, the Vaada's work revolved mainly around rescuing and helping the persecuted Jews of the neighboring countries (see Chapter 3). It maintained close contact with the "Working Group" (Pracovna Skupina), the illegal body which operated within the framework of the Bratislava Jewish Council, and with several Jewish underground leaders in Poland, as well as with the representatives of various major Jewish organizations in Palestine, Turkey, and Switzerland. It exchanged and disseminated documents, eyewitness accounts, reports, and memoranda relating to the destruction of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe. It also helped smuggle Polish, Slovak, and other Jewish refugees into Hungary, and provided the refugees with food, shelter, and identification papers. It used its influence with the "progressive" forces within Hungary to ease the lot of Hungarian Jews, including those serving in the labor service system. In addition, it maintained a well-developed communication and courier network that included members of the German and Hungarian intelligence services in Budapest.’’ (1244)
“The Vaada had contacts with foreign Jewish organizations and with agents of the German and Hungarian intelligence services, and its leaders were consequently among the best-informed persons in Budapest. They were acquainted not only with the details of the Final Solution program, but also with the complexities of the national and international political and military situation. They kept the representatives of the major Jewish organizations in Istanbul and in Switzerland fully informed about developments throughout Nazi-dominated Europe. Among the recipients of their periodic reports were the Jewish Agency leaders in Istanbul, and Saly Mayer of the AJDC, and Nathan Schwalb of the Hehalutz in Switzerland. 36’’
“Since the Vaada leaders were fully aware of the international political and military situation in early 1944, the German occupation did not catch them by surprise. They were also alerted about it five days earlier by Josef Winninger, a converted Jew in the service of the German Military Intelligence Service in Budapest. 37’’
“At the beginning of 1944, the Vaada leadership was composed of Otto Komoly (President), Rezso (Rudolph) Kasztner (Executive Officer), Dov Weiss (Secretary), Jeno Frankel, Moshe Rosenberg, Siegfried Roth, Uziel Lichtenberg, Josko Baumer, Joel Brand, Moshe Schweiger, and Samuel Springmann. 38 They represented the major Zionist parties in operation in Hungary, each of which, though limited in membership, had its own distinct views and tactics. As a result cooperation within the Vaada and between the Budapest and the Istanbul branches of the Vaada 39 was not always harmonious. The conflict inherent in interparty political differences was usually exacerbated by sharp personality conflicts among the leaders. Because of these difficulties, the effectiveness of the Budapest Vaada often suffered, eliciting critical and reproachful notes from Istanbul. 40’’
“The German occupation compelled the Vaada leaders to subordinate their internecine fights to the immediate tasks of rescuing Hungary's Jews. One of the first steps they took was to institute a system whereby each leader was assigned specific functions and responsibilities, which were determined according to his particular expertise and domestic and international contacts. Komoly, for example, was entrusted with the pursuit of the " Magyar line"-establishing contact with, and soliciting support from, Hungarian governmental, political, and church leaders. (1245) Although he was not formally in the leadership of the Vaada, Miklos (Moshe) Krausz, the Executive Secretary of the Palestine Office-the Budapest branch of the Jewish Agency's Aliyah (Emigration) unit-was asked, according to Kasztner, to get in touch with the representatives of the neutral countries. 41 Kasztner and Brand were assigned-or perhaps arrogated to themselves-the most controversial task: the establishment of contact with the occupiers. In the course of time, this SS or Kasztner line was also adopted by Hansi Brand and Andor (Andreas, Andre or Bandi) Biss.’’
Notes
36. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, /942. Volume 3. Europe (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 776-777. For additional documents on the subject, see section titled " Vatican. Efforts of the United States and Other Governments to Have the Pope Protest Publicly against Nazi Atrocities in German-Occupied Areas," ibid., pp. 772-780. See also Levin, The Holocaust, p. 686.
37. Report of Ernst von Weizsäcker, former Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office and the then German Ambassador to the Holy See, dated October 28, 1943. Alvin Shuster, Vatican Releases '43 Documents on Handling of Jewish Problems. The New York Times, January 24, 1976; Raoul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1961), pp. 429-430.
38. Kubovy, "The Silence of Pope Pius XII," p. 11.
39. Ibid.
40. The standard response was usually given by Monsignor Mantini on instructions from the Pope. It was revealed in a note attached by Monsignor Mantini to a telegram received from an Orthodox Jewish group in December 1942, in which the Pope was requested to intervene on behalf of the Jews of Eastern Europe. Hoffman, Pius Knew in 1941 of Drive on Jews, op. cit.
41. Friedlander, Pius XII and the Third Reich, p. 236; Levin, The Holocaust, pp. 692--693; Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1964), p. 305.
Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Resistance Movement
Levai 1948 p. 401:
The Jewish members of the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Resistance Movement were arrested and executed at 36, Visegradi Street on December 29th. 20 men and women were dragged from 39, Legrady Karoly Street (a house under Swedish protection) to the Party Headquarters at 35, Pozsonyi Street. They were stripped naked, lined up against a wall and shot. Jews in hiding at 49, Damjanich Street were discovered and executed. 273 Jews from 21, Katona Jozsef Street (another Swedish-protected house) were taken to Szabadsag Square, where they were deprived of their clothes. 80 of the younger men were picked out and shot; the remainder, including the completely naked women, were taken into the ghetto.’’